


COVERT ACTION

INFORMATION BULLETIN

NUMBER TWO

OCTOBER 1978

BY SUBSCRIPTION*



EXCLUSIVE: RECRUITING FOREIGN DIPLOMATS

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*The *CovertAction Information Bulletin* is available at selected bookstores around the world at \$2.00 per copy, in the U.S.; \$2.25 overseas. These bookstores are listed on page 2.

Bookstores



At presstime, the following bookstores had already agreed to carry the *CovertAction Information Bulletin*. We will try to list in each issue the stores around the world which carry it.

International Learnings Systems
1715 Connecticut Ave., NW
Washington, DC

Universal News
14th and Columbia Rd., NW
Washington, DC

Kramers Books
1517 Connecticut Ave., NW
1347 Connecticut Ave., NW
450 Pennsylvania Ave.
Washington, DC

Tobacco Etc.
Nash Blvd.
Rosslyn, VA

Guild News Agency
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People Books and Crafts
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Milwaukee, WI 53202

Modern Times Bookstore
3800 17th St.
San Francisco, CA

Fifth Ave. News
820 S.W. Fifth Ave.
Portland, OR


Red and Black Books
4736 University Way
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Rising Free
182 Upper St.
London, W1

København's Bogcafe
International Socialist Books
Kultorvet 11
Copenhagen

DIRTY WORK

The CIA In Western Europe



Edited by Philip Agee and
Louis Wolf

SPECIAL OFFER

This startling and invaluable new expose of the CIA, just published, lists for \$24.95. If you order your copy through the *CovertAction Information Bulletin* and at the same time subscribe to the *Bulletin*, we will give you a \$10.00 discount. Please use the Subscription/Order Form on page 27.

EDITORIAL

The six of us who work on the *Bulletin* had the privilege of attending the XI World Festival of Youth and Students in Havana, Cuba this August, where we met with delegates from the 145 countries represented there, and distributed the first issue of the *Bulletin* in public forums about our work. As our goal is to expose U.S. intelligence manipulations and personnel throughout the world, we were gratified to learn the degree of interest and knowledge already held by young people from so many countries about the role of the CIA and other tentacles of the U.S. intelligence octopus. It is our hope to encourage a similar level of concerned research among our U.S. readers as well, thus connecting domestic and international operations so that together we can identify, demystify and defuse them. The victims are here at home as well as overseas.

Upon our return to the U.S., however, we learned yet more about the insidious nature of the establishment media. Coverage of the Festival was minimal, abysmal in fact. Although there were constant revelations about the CIA during the Festival, especially at the International Tribunal Against Imperialism, there was almost no mention of these developments in the U.S. press. We have decided to reprint in this issue an important interview with Nicolas Sirgado Ros, a Cuban official who infiltrated the CIA for ten years, passed three lie detector tests during this period, and received a commendation and a gold Rolex watch from Henry Kissinger for his services to "democracy."



But there was another aspect of the coverage which greeted us back in the States—the articles which appeared about the *Bulletin*. For one thing, none of the articles mentioned the re-

search and news in the *Bulletin*, but spoke only of our "naming names." We stand behind our policy of naming names, but we believe that the research into and exposure of operations is just as important.

A CIA spokesperson, Herbert Hetu, was quoted as saying: "These people are operating under the overall pretext that everything we do is wrong." This was the most accurate statement to appear; we liked it so much we used it in our advertising as an unsolicited testimonial.

Once again, as we had expected, much of the coverage suggested that our policy endangers the lives of CIA officers around the world. We have dealt with this time-worn accusation so long that it is becoming tedious to respond. Of the hundreds of CIA people who have been exposed over the past five years, by many journals, magazines and newspapers, *not one* has been so much as injured because of the exposure. (Richard Welch, as is carefully documented in *Dirty Work*, was killed in Athens by a group which was stalking his predecessor, and because the house he lived in was well-known as the Chief of Station's residence, not because he had been named two years before in another post by *CounterSpy*, and several other publications.) Many of the people exposed have been transferred, retired, returned to Langley, and similarly rendered less effective, and this is what we ardently seek. We do not advocate assassination as a viable form of political struggle; we do advocate the abolition of the CIA and a total end to U.S. interference in the affairs of other countries.

In this issue we present a first: an on-the-spot account of how the CIA attempts to recruit foreign diplomats by one of our members, Jim Wilcott. This form of operation has never been fully explained before, by one who did it. We also are publishing the speech which Louis Wolf presented to more than 500 delegates to the Youth Festival on researching CIA personnel under diplomatic and military cover.

The subscription list for the *Bulletin* is beginning to grow, numerous bookstores around the world have agreed to carry it, and *Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe* has been published. We greatly appreciate the many friends and contacts around the world with whom we are now corresponding; we continue to urge our readers to keep in touch with us, to let us know when and how we may help you, and to be able to ask you for help.

Philip Agee
Ellen Ray
William Schaap
Elsie Wilcott
Jim Wilcott
Louis Wolf

HOW THE CIA RECRUITS FOREIGN DIPLOMATS

by James Wilcott

Tokyo Station, a Class A station of the CIA, was my first field assignment in the Agency. Prior to that I had worked for three years in finance at CIA Headquarters in Langley, Va. and my wife, Elsie, had worked in the Central America division there. The station was located in Tokyo at Washington Heights, an army base.

It became apparent that my stay in Japan would be much more enjoyable and meaningful if I could speak Japanese, so a few months after my arrival I started studying Japanese at the Tokyo School of the Japanese Language, which we all called Naganuma after the school's founder.

It was at Naganuma that I met Peter, an employee of the Yugoslavian Embassy in Tokyo. He spoke excellent English and was happy to have a chance to use his English in conversations with me. I liked him from our first meeting as he had a fine sense of humor and we had many interests in common. We began to have coffee after class and a close friendship developed between us. He had a practical orientation toward life and told many fine stories about various places all over the world that he had experienced in his assignments. He had served with the partisans during World War II at the age of 14 and was the nephew of Vladimir Dadier, a famous political figure of Yugoslavia. I preferred his company to that of the

had been to. I never grew tired of listening to his stories about women and the methods of seduction he had developed. Peter was the first person from a socialist country I had met and I was curious about how people from socialist countries differed from people from capitalist countries. He told me much about Yugoslavians, Russians, Poles, etc.

Reporting the Meeting

One day at work I mentioned Peter. I was immediately reminded of security regulations that required us to report to the security office any meetings with persons from foreign embassies, so I reported to the Chief of Security my association with Peter. He arranged a meeting for me with the Chief of Eastern European countries branch, Reid Denis. Reid handled all operational projects directed against Eastern European socialist countries other than the Soviet Union.

Tokyo Station was divided according to functional activities into operations and support, as was CIA generally. Operations branches handled the clandestine projects of the stations that included all the dirty tricks for which CIA has become so infamous. Important among these is recruitment of agents.

Support branches handled the housekeeping, record keeping, finance, personnel, logistics, mail, etc. Those of us in support ordinarily would not be directly involved in operational projects, although support people were used whenever an opportunity presented itself. This was my situation with Peter.

The meeting with Reid lasted several hours. He showed great interest in my friendship with Peter. He questioned me about every conversation I could recall with Peter and, in fact, requested me several times on various points in order, I assumed, to see if I told the same story. The manner in which Reid questioned me made me nervous. Had I done something wrong? Had I committed a security violation by associating with Peter? Finally he revealed his suspicion. Perhaps Peter was an agent of the Soviets attempting to recruit me as a double agent for the Soviets to spy on the CIA. Reid explained the CIA position on the Soviets and the Yugoslavians. The Yugoslavs were not considered "hostile" as the Soviets were and he did not think the Yugoslavs would be trying to recruit me. While the Yugoslavs and Soviets were not exactly bosom buddies, they were in contact at social, cultural and sports occasions frequently enough to provide plenty of opportunity for the Soviets to recruit Yugoslavs as agents. So went Reid's reasoning.



"I preferred his company. . ."

CIA people whom I found to be quite dull, conformist and not very friendly. Peter told me quite openly about his romantic interest in women not only in Japan but in other countries he

"First We Are Spies"

He questioned me on my knowledge of agent recruitment that I had studied in operational support school at Headquarters in preparation for the Tokyo assignment. These classes were conducted for the purpose of teaching the basics of spy techniques to support people in case a situation like mine arose and advantage could be taken of it. He reminded me of a basic principle of CIA: "first and foremost we are spies and secondly we are whatever our profession happens to be"—in my case an accountant. Peter was a classical recruitment target, assuming he was not working for the Russians, which Reid had by no means discounted at this point. He said we must make some tests of Peter to reveal whether or not he was a Soviet agent. If it could be discovered for certain that he was not, then we could go ahead with plans to recruit him for the CIA to spy on the Russians. The test would be made as follows. I would carry on the natural friendship with Peter which I had already established. At certain opportune times I would mention a name, an event, or an occurrence. If Peter were an agent this information would go through certain channels in the Russian Embassy. Japanese agents working for CIA on the Russian Embassy telephone taps would pick it up and Peter would be revealed. He did not tell me all the specifics as to how Peter would be revealed. He reminded me of the iron law of CIA operational technique called "tradecraft," drilled in to us since our first few days in the Agency—compartmentation and need-to-know.

Compartmentation means that every operation should be strictly isolated from every other operation—restricted, compartmented. Need-to-know means that only those persons with a clear operational necessity to know should know about any aspect of any operation. That way, if one operation or person is exposed, or in CIA terms "blown," only that person or operation is compromised and all else is secure. In my case, I was not fully trained, therefore it was much preferred that I did not know more than was absolutely necessary. I could make a slip and compromise a valuable asset of the CIA—that is, some CIA telephone tap. Furthermore, Reid wanted me to be as natural as possible with Peter. Too much concern with tradecraft could detract from the fine natural friendship already developed between us.

The Project Is Approved

Reid reviewed the basic method of operational techniques used by CIA. He had outlined the project, the recruitment of Peter, in a project proposal and cabled Headquarters for approval. The project had been approved, funds allocated and a final project outline would be sent from Headquarters. Headquarters would also be involved at the Yugoslav Desk, running name checks, checking its files for all the assignments Peter had had and any other information on Peter and, most important, checking to see if any other CIA contact or report had been made somewhere else. Perhaps he was a suspected Soviet agent at another assignment in the past.

Reid was the case officer running me and I was the development agent. Eventually a recruitment specialist would be cut in to make the actual recruitment pitch. None were immediately available. Every meeting I had with Peter required a contact report that I was to submit the next morning, or the Monday morning following a weekend. Reid would read the report and then call me for a debriefing and evaluation of the report and further elaboration on various points along with instructions for the next meeting.

My workload in Finance was reduced to allow time for me to prepare the contact reports and be debriefed, etc. I was not allowed to discuss the project with anyone else. Suitable excuses were made for my absences from the Finance Office during my work on this project. My colleagues in the Finance Office were still curious. What was Jim involved in? My wife was Reid's secretary and, of course, knew about the operation. Had she not been Reid's secretary, he would have preferred that even she not know about the project.

Initially I was quite overwhelmed by being involved operationally. It really wasn't my line of work and I wasn't sure if I could carry out my end of the operation. As for Peter, the thought of his being a Soviet agent disturbed me. If he turned out to be an agent, then our friendship was phony and he had betrayed me. I really hoped he wasn't working for the Russians. (It didn't occur to me in the beginning that I was betraying him.)

The next few weeks of meetings with Peter were quite different from the pure friendship association we had previously had. I began to adopt the operational mentality. Several operational people at the Station knew of Reid's project. To be sure I could carry out my role with Peter, I started talking with the operations people who had experience in recruiting projects. I heard a lot of stories about various recruitments and received advice and pointers on operational techniques of recruiting. In short, how to make our meetings look like something they weren't. After all, suppose I did slip and my role was exposed. How would Peter or the Russians (if he was working for them) react? Might some physical harm come to me? Military cover was considered light cover by the CIA. A good intelligence agent could find out that Building 724 at Washington Heights was CIA. (In fact, not long afterwards, the Station was exposed in the Japanese newspapers.) I must be on guard for the signs that would indicate Peter was on to me.

Debriefings

At the debriefing sessions, Reid meticulously questioned me on Peter's reactions to the verbal tests that I interjected into my conversations with him, even though I had written about them in great detail in the contact reports. I was instructed not to attempt to interject the test phrases except when the appropriate subjects were discussed. He taught me how to bait Peter into bringing up a general area in which the test phrases or names could appropriately be interjected. If he didn't take the bait and the conversation never got to that area, I was to forget it and try again at another meeting. Reid was also very interested in how the bills were paid at the bars

and coffee houses. Would Peter be willing to spend money on me? On a couple of occasions I was instructed to leave my money at home and complain about a shortage of funds to see how he would react and if he would pay my share of the bill or offer me money. If Peter was working for the Russians, they would certainly be testing me to see if a financial incentive was the proper approach to recruit me. At other meetings, he instructed me on how to pay the bills or offer to loan Peter money to see if a financial incentive was appropriate to recruit Peter. I was advanced funds and encouraged to spend money on him if he seemed willing to let me. This was a very sensitive part of the operation. Reid instructed me carefully on how to go about it. Peter's relations with his wife were also of great interest to Reid. He instructed me on how to get Peter to open up about his marital relations. How did I think Peter would take to a woman who showed an interest in him, he would ask. Would he have sex with her? Would he spend money on her?



"Reid meticulously questioned me..."

A couple of months passed. I was meeting with Peter regularly. Reid announced the results of the tests to determine if Peter was a Russian agent. They were all negative. Peter wasn't working for the Russians, he was certain of that. Headquarters found nothing. The Station found nothing. I learned that Japanese CIA agents had us under surveillance while in a coffee house or bar to check on the nature of our relationship and to verify what I had written in contact reports about it. Peter had been contacted at embassy parties and functions by various agents and points mentioned in my contact reports were discretely explored. In at least one instance, a Station case officer had talked to him. Phase I was completed. Reid was ready to start Phase II.

Phase II Begins

I was happy about the outcome of the tests. I wasn't a dupe after all. Peter apparently had a genuine liking for me. My cover was still intact. This operation would certainly help my career in CIA and I could expect a raise, if not a promotion also at my next performance review. I looked forward to the next meeting with Peter.

Reid outlined Phase II: I was to maintain the relationship under his direction and at the appropriate time a recruiting specialist would be cut into the picture. I would fade out and the recruitment agent would take over and eventually make the pitch to recruit Peter. This was not to happen immediately. There were still several objectives Reid wanted to accomplish through me to lay the groundwork for Phase III, Peter's recruitment. He wanted to determine the strongest motivation or incentive: was it money, women, ego gratification, or perhaps a repressed resentment about not having a higher position in the embassy? He even suggested repressed homosexuality as an underlying basis of our relationship.

My wife was called into his office and he asked her how she would react to receiving a photo of me in a compromising posture with another woman. He said that operational circumstances might occur in which it would be advantageous for me to engage in sex with a woman in order to get Peter into a similar sexual situation with a woman. He didn't want an incident like that to damage our marital harmony should it occur. She assured him that it would not. He said that in situations like this, you could never tell what would happen. Perhaps another intelligence service, say the British, the Japanese, the Yugoslavian or the Russian, might also have an eye on him and such a photo might come out of this kind of situation. At this debriefing and others to follow, Reid stressed the importance of getting Peter to spend more of CIA's money. The object was, as Reid put it, "to get him on the hook." That was, to get him in the habit of going to better bars and night clubs and plush hotels. We would concentrate on this over the next several weeks. I could draw all the money I needed and more as he wanted me to flash some big bills in front of Peter. He concocted some stories for me to explain to Peter the reason for having so much money and why I was willing to spend it on him. This was a very delicate part of the operation. He said he would also get me some help by getting some Japanese agents to manipulate Peter into some fancy clubs from time to time when they could.

Bar Hopping and Carousing

I enjoyed the next several weeks of bar hopping and carousing with Peter. We were meeting as often as four times a week,



"Peter and I were meeting as often as four times a week..."

as the language school was closed for the November, December and January holidays. I had an unlimited supply of money and no worries about the situation. The anxieties I had in Phase I faded away. I enjoyed Peter's company and our relationship. The uneasy feeling about the operation that swept over me from time to time was washed away with a few extra cocktails.

The contact report debriefings were much shorter now. Reid was still not satisfied with the amount of CIA money Peter was spending. He was interested in Peter's activities with women and indicated that some of the women we met were not entirely there by chance. He thought it just as well for me not to know which were for real and which were phony. I should just go ahead and do what came naturally and enjoy myself.

Less frequently now, he would have something for me to interject into a conversation or seize upon a point in the contact reports and question me about it. Once Peter made a rather kinky comment about women that interested Reid. He later told me that a team of five depth research psychologists from Headquarters were coming out to review the contact reports and other information on Peter and in particular this comment that was somehow very meaningful.

Reid decided it was time now for us to get a look at Peter's wife. He had followed closely the comments and discussions about marriage in general and Peter's marital situation which were written up in the contact reports. The possibility of recruiting his wife was also on his mind. It would certainly be of advantage in running Peter to also have his wife witting. Keeping the secret of his CIA status from his wife and explaining absences (if he were recruited) wouldn't be all that easy. Besides, his wife could also pick up valuable information from the Russian women. He was also concerned about Peter's wife being lonely with Peter being out so much. She might become angry and complain to someone at the embassy. This might give Yugoslav security a reason to watch Peter. Reid suggested that my wife and I invite both Peter and his wife to dinner. He even suggested the menu and alcoholic beverages. Operational funds were drawn to pay for it. My wife was instructed as to various areas of conversation to explore with Peter's wife. The following day I submitted my contact report as usual and Reid verbally debriefed my wife. Due to the unusually light debriefing and other indications, I suspected that a bug may have been placed in our house without our consent or knowledge. This was not an unusual practice as I had heard in stories about recruitments from the operational people. Our Japanese maid who took care of our son while we were at work was a live-in maid. Like all the maids for CIA employees, she had to have security approval. Most of them had worked for CIA families previously. It would have been quite easy to get the maid out of the house to install a bug and then retrieve it the next day. Verbal surveillance was one of the principal reasons in recruitment operations to have the target go to an agent's home or a safehouse for a contact.


Peter's wife and my wife got along very well and made plans to go shopping and to a movie together. Peter and his wife promised to come back and visit us again. Reid was pleased. He was certain some of the pressure had been taken off Peter. He also planned to have her entertained by the wives

of Japanese agents if there were signs that she was getting lonely or felt neglected by Peter.

The operation was dragging on. Aspects of it began to disturb me and I was anxious to have the recruiting agent take it over. There was a problem, Reid explained, inasmuch as a suitable recruitment agent was not readily available. He was pressuring Headquarters, but he did not want to take a chance with an agent who didn't have the proper experience. He was trying to get Headquarters to send Henry (a code name) who would be available in a couple of weeks. It looked pretty good so if I would just continue for a while more, Henry would soon be available and we could start Phase III. This operation would be of great benefit to my career, he reminded me.

The Recruiting Agent Arrives

My meetings with Peter continued for 3 or 4 more weeks. My wife went out with Peter's wife, who had also acquired some new found friends. Although Reid didn't tell me, I was certain they were arranged for her by Reid. I walked upstairs one morning with my contact report, as usual, after the previous night's meeting with Peter and was told by Reid to tell my boss, the Chief of Finance, to have someone watch my disbursement window as I would be out of the building for a while. Henry had finally arrived and we would be having the



"Henry had finally arrived . . ."

debriefing with him at a safehouse. The safehouse turned out to be an apartment a short distance from Building 724 on the base. On the way to the safehouse Reid told me that I would not be told Henry's true name. An alias would be established to accomplish the turnover of Peter to Henry.

Phase III Gets Underway

After introducing me to Henry and an exchange of pleasantries, Reid turned the meeting over to Henry. He started right in asking me many, many questions about Peter and our association. He explained how he had been briefed at Headquarters and had done some work of his own at Headquarters in preparation for Phase III. He had been in Japan for a few days and had studied all my contact reports, the biographic files, the

name checks and the testing reports that Reid had done, etc. He explained that he had had contact with Yugoslavians before and that everything looked good for recruitment of Peter, but that he worked methodically and slowly so I would still be on the project for awhile. I told him that I was due to return to the States for home leave in 3 or 4 months. He assured me that we could accomplish the turnover by then and that the return to the States was the perfect excuse for the break-off of my relationship with Peter. Peter need never know I was coming back to Japan for a second tour. He made a general outline of his plan for meeting Peter. He would pick a spot for the initial meeting. I would be given a fabricated story as to how I came to know Henry. My spotting of Henry would be made to appear as a pure chance meeting of two old friends. We would then join Peter and I would introduce Henry to Peter. I would gradually decrease my meetings with Peter while Henry would increase his and establish a firm relationship with him. By this time I would be ready to go back to the States. I would say good-bye to Peter and be out of the operation. Henry would eventually make the pitch to him.

While this was the general plan there were still many details to be worked out. He emphasized that while there were certain basics to recruiting such as those we learned in operation support school and the more expanded instructions that were taught at agent training at Camp Peary, Virginia, each recruiting specialist had his own variations and special techniques that worked for him. Some they learned through experience and some through the study of police and other intelligence service methods.

Particularly important was the spot that we picked for the introduction of Henry to Peter. This spot must be one that Peter himself suggests on the evening of the meeting. Henry's study of my contact reports indicated that Peter suggested where we would go about two-thirds of the time while I suggested where we would go about one-third of the time. Two places seemed more appropriate than the others, the Swan Coffee Shop near downtown Tokyo and Champs Elysee in Akasaka district near the New Japan Hotel. He would make the final decision later, however. He had some additional tests that he wanted me to make. One such test involved a commercial purchase that the Yugoslavs were trying to make; in his cover position as a European businessman for an export-import company he could obtain certain verification of Peter. He also mentioned the use of psychological profiles.

I had not heard of either of these methods of manipulation. In conversation with operations case officers it was explained that CIA would often help to get a person elevated to a higher position or more useful position in the following manner.

Say the Yugoslavs or the Russians were interested in purchasing a locomotive from the U.S. or some other western country. Someone working in the government department involved in the purchase was considered a possible recruitment target or perhaps already recruited. In some cases they might take a very long range view of a target. While they might not think it possible to recruit a certain person at this time, in two or three years that person might be recruitable if he were in a particular position. The company selling the locomotive would

be contacted. CIA would then work with a salesperson to get him to insist that the target be a party to the transaction. If the deal was large enough or important enough the desired results might be accomplished. The target might be promoted or moved to another position as a reward for his good work. Thus he might become more vulnerable to recruitment or if already recruited be in a more useful position. This technique was considered particularly effective where great emphasis was put on accomplishing production plans and goals with a smaller regard for political or other factors.

Questionnaires and Psychological Profiles

The psychological profiles, it was explained, were questionnaires filled out by case officers or principal agents. They would then be run through one of the new main frame computers at Headquarters. The computer would output several different psychological parameters, that is, scientifically-designated indicators to be of great use in evaluating and assessing a recruitment target. In 1962 this was a recent development but it had already proved its worth even though much additional work was still to be done in making up the questionnaires and deriving the parameters, etc. The shorter questionnaires could be used for less important recruitments while longer ones could be used for more important targets comprising as many as 200 or 300 questions obtained over many months or even years. Several grants to universities had been made to develop this asset. The questionnaires could be designed to be used by unwitting agents, that is, persons who might not know that they were working for CIA — a college professor, say, in Brazil who is sent a questionnaire to give to his students by a CIA agent with university cover posing as a professor of sociology doing research at a U.S. university. (With the fantastic development of computers since 1962, I would suspect that this may be a highly developed asset of the CIA at present.)

The meetings, contact reports and debriefings continued as usual except that instructions came from Henry through Reid to me. After about every third debriefing with Reid I also had a debriefing with Henry. These meetings took place in safehouses in and around Tokyo. Henry was very reluctant to meet on base. Several times I was accompanied by case officers who applied all sorts of evasive techniques to make certain that we were not under foot or vehicular surveillance to or from safehouse meetings.

At one evening meeting with Peter, Peter took me to an apartment house to have a few drinks with some of the people at the Yugoslav Embassy. It was a pleasant evening of social small talk and mild drinks lasting about one-and-a-half hours and seemed quite harmless to me. Henry was very excited and worried. He questioned me thoroughly on everything that was said, the appearance of the apartment, its exact location, and the names and descriptions of the people we met. He made some additional tests through me and through the Station to ascertain whether or not the people we met were who Peter claimed they were. This delayed the meeting to introduce Henry to Peter.

On another occasion, Henry neglected his usual reluctance to come on base and met my wife at the Meiji Club, a civilian employees club at Washington Heights, to dictate a rush correspondence to Headquarters.

Henry Is Ready

Finally Henry was ready. The briefing for the meeting took all day at a very secure safehouse on the outskirts of Tokyo surrounded by a high wooden fence. Every precaution was taken to avoid foot, vehicular, visual or verbal surveillance. The enormous amount of detail of Henry's plan astonished me. Every second of the evening of the meeting was accounted for with alternate plans in case of an unexpected occurrence. After meeting Peter, Henry will join our class at Naganuma. He knew some Japanese from previous assignments to Japan but was not yet up to our level. He would manipulate Peter into suggesting that he join our class. In order to do so Henry was tutored in Japanese on a crash basis to bring him up to our level, a beginning intermediate level. He had obtained all the class books, workbooks, tapes, etc., through a CIA contact at Naganuma, and had, I assumed, been tutored by a Naganuma teacher.

He had worked out a cover story for how it was that I knew him. I was supposed to have worked for him for a couple of months in New York City, two years before going to work for the CIA. I had gotten the job through relatives, as Henry was supposed to be an old friend of the family. Henry's cover was that he then owned a small company now no longer in existence. A company by this name was actually listed in the New York City phone book during the year that I was supposed to be there. It had been established by CIA for this purpose and actually had a business license and telephone number, etc. The type of job and duties I had been assigned were carefully worked out to fit in with my previous job experience. I had to memorize the cover story and then Henry drilled me on telling the story as I would to Peter. Then he would ask me questions to see if he could trip me up.

Next, we discussed the meeting. He had chosen the Champs Elysee restaurant in Alasaka, as this fit in more with his cover as a European businessman and with several other considerations. It was very important that Peter suggest that we go to the Champs Elysee. If he did not on the evening we planned for, then we would wait until the next time or the time after that. I would attempt to steer Peter to the counter where I was not in full view of the door but could nevertheless see it. After observing us discreetly from outside the plate glass window, Henry would open the door and step in. Then and only then should I recognize him, but only if he was carrying a newspaper in his left hand. This was his signal to me that everything was clear for the meeting to proceed as planned. If for some reason I thought it better for the meeting not to proceed as planned I would not recognize him. If all seemed clear, when Henry entered, I was to say, "My God, there's Henry. I used to work for him," and immediately leave my seat at the counter and walk up to greet him without any further explanation to Peter. Henry had been to the restaurant and drawn a

sketch. He showed me the exact spot to meet him. My back would be to Peter. Henry would be facing Peter sitting at the counter, from Peter's right side and in a position to observe his every reaction. We would then talk according to a script Henry had worked out. While talking we would move towards a table near Peter, and at the appropriate moment Henry would signal me to invite Peter to come and sit with us. Henry would then take over the conversation talking about our New York association and old times, and gradually work Peter into it.



"Henry would then take over the conversation..."

I had grave doubts. It did not seem possible that Henry could predict Peter's reactions that accurately or that I could carry off the meeting in a convincing manner. Henry assured me that it would all go well and there was nothing for me to worry about. He had done this many times before. Besides that, there would be two Japanese agents observing us and a police car in the immediate vicinity of the restaurant just in case. Henry called in the driver of the car who drove me to the safehouse. He played the part of Peter and we rehearsed the meeting several times. It was well after 5:00 pm by this time. Before leaving to go back to my home in Shibuya, Henry said that Reid knew the plan and would rehearse me on it just before the meeting. He probably wouldn't see me again before the meeting.

On the day set, Reid rehearsed me on my cover story and all aspects of the meeting. I told him I was nervous about it and was not sure I could perform my role. He assured me that it would go just fine and gave me a tranquilizer to take, but only after Peter suggested we go to Champs Elysee.

The "Chance" Meeting

It was not until the third class following the meeting with Henry that Peter suggested we go to the Champs Elysee. Henry came in, I greeted him, and the meeting went according to plan. I was surprised at how accurately Henry had predicted Peter's reactions and how skillfully he worked Peter into the conversation. We spent about an hour at the restaurant and then went to a bar. Henry had done his homework. He knew what to say to attract Peter's interest in him. As planned, on Henry's signal, I told Peter I had to leave early. The three of us made plans to meet the evening after next and we walked

to my car. Henry hailed a cab and offered to drop Peter off at his house. They left and I drove my car home.

The next morning I made out my contact report. It was only necessary for me to write up the time that Henry was not with us. Reid and I met Henry at a safehouse near the base. Henry was pleased with the meeting. He seemed quite certain that Peter could be recruited. He thought Peter could best serve to spot Soviet recruitment targets. We discussed the meeting and made plans for the meeting the following evening.

Henry Takes Over

Over the next two or three meetings I talked less and less and Henry talked more and more. Henry finally got Peter to suggest that he join our Japanese class after a bit of baiting. In line with Henry's instructions I invited Peter, his wife and Henry to our house for dinner. Henry was interested in meeting Peter's wife for evaluation and assessment. The dinner went well with Henry doing most of the talking. Henry started attending class regularly. After class the three of us would go for coffee. I started making excuses to go home early. At first I told Peter that Elsie wanted me to stay home more with our son Steven. Later I told him that I had to start preparing for my return to the United States.

I did not feel very comfortable about having deceived Peter. I was worried that any number of dirty tricks might be played on him to recruit him. Plans to warn him somehow crossed my mind from time to time. But I had learned that I would be given a polygraph test when I returned to Headquarters since this was the general practice when a support person was involved in an operation of this kind. It did not seem possible to give him such a warning and still be able to pass the polygraph.

The Last Meeting

Our last meeting, just prior to returning to the States for vacation and home leave, took place in a small bar. We talked for less than an hour. I made some vague references to the fact that while we talk about the freedom of the individual in the U.S. the individual was not really that free. Even in our associ-



"I never saw or heard from Henry or Peter..."

ations with people we were not free especially in this day and age of black boxes. He looked quite perplexed. I didn't think it was wise to say more and hoped he might be on his guard. I vowed never to get involved in this sort of thing again.

Although I inquired, I was never able to find out if Peter was recruited by CIA or not. Reid told me that it was strictly a need-to-know matter and he couldn't tell me one way or the other. Although I returned to Tokyo Station for another two years' tour, I never saw or heard from Henry or Peter. Reid returned to Headquarters soon after my second tour began in about September of 1962.

I had no problem passing the polygraph test.

(continued from page 28)

involved U.S. controlled and related banks cross-referenced. An excellent research item.)

Some Worthwhile Periodicals

The Public Eye, the newsletter of the Repression Information Project, approx. quarterly, \$8/year, from RIP, P.O. Box 3278, Washington, DC 20010. (Research on repression in the U.S., with particular focus on the extreme right. Copies of the first two issues are available, at \$1.50 each as is RIP's excellent pamphlet on the so-called U.S. Labor Party, *NCLC: Brown-shirts of the Seventies*, at \$1.00.)

Southern Africa News, the newsletter of the Southern Africa News Collective, six issues (1 year)/\$3, from P.O. Box 29126, Washington, DC. (Excellent news and analyses on Southern Africa struggles.)

Spotlight on Spying, the newsletter of the AFSC Program on Government Surveillance and Citizens' Rights, free (a contribution is welcome) from AFSC, Surveillance/Rights Program, 1501 Cherry St., Philadelphia, PA 19102. (News notes on developments in the government surveillance field around the country.)

Police Spying in Michigan, the newsletter of the Michigan Coalition to End Government Spying, free (contribution of \$3 suggested) from MCEGS, 234 State, # 808, Detroit, MI 48226. (News notes and other general articles in the field by one of the more active local organizations; definitely of interest to people outside Michigan, too.)

Lateinamerika Nachrichten, approx. monthly, in German, DM 30/year, from FDCL, Savignyplatz 5, 1000 Berlin 12. (Progressive analyses of human rights issues in Latin America.)

NOTE: Each issue the CovertAction Information Bulletin will list publications and periodicals of interest to its readers. We cannot repeat all listings every issue, but hope at least once a year to reprint all listings. Publishers of potential items for this column are encouraged to send us a copy; please include all details for ordering/subscribing.

RESEARCHING UNDERCOVER CIA OFFICERS

*The following is an edited version of a speech given by
Bulletin member Louis Wolf to several hundred delegates to
the XI World Festival of Youth and Students, Havana, Cuba,
August 1978.*

We of the *CovertAction Information Bulletin* welcome the opportunity to spread the message to all the youth of the world that the CIA is not indomitable, that it can be defeated, and that its personnel are immediately politically vulnerable and their work is greatly weakened or made ineffective the more their identities are exposed, both in the country where they are stationed at the time of exposure, and around the world. Our guiding principle in this effort is simply that the activities of the CIA cannot be separated from the people who carry them out. It is people who murder, who bribe, who subvert.

You Cannot "Reform" the CIA

The question always comes up: Is it possible to reform the CIA? The answer of course is no. In spite of a Presidential order on "United States intelligence activities" issued on 24 January 1978, and the many bills now before Congress including S. 2525 (from which I quote), and the restrictions that these "reforms" place on the pursuit of covert activities (the proposed law calls them "special activities"), the gaps are immense. Even the supposed "prohibitions" reveal to the uninitiated the kinds of dirty work the CIA does:

- "Sec. 135. (a) No special activity may be initiated or continued which has as its objective or is likely to result in—
- (1) the support of international terrorist activities;
 - (2) the mass destruction of property;
 - (3) the creation of food or water shortages or floods;
 - (4) the creation of epidemics of diseases;
 - (5) the use of chemical, biological, or other weapons in violation of treaties or other international agreements to which the United States is a party;
 - (6) the violent overthrow of the democratic government of any country;
 - (7) the torture of individuals; or
 - (8) the support of any action which violates human rights, conducted by the police, foreign intelligence or internal security forces of any foreign country."



Reading on, we find a section titled "Participation in Illegal Activity," where grown men and women who are elected officials propose an odd "reform" measure:

"Sec. 243. No person acting on behalf of an entity of the intelligence community may instigate or commit any violation of the criminal statutes of the United States unless such activity is undertaken pursuant to procedures approved by the Attorney General and—

- (1) does not involve acts of violence;
- (2) does not involve a violation of any other provision of the Act; and
- (3) is necessary to protect against acts of espionage, sabotage, international terrorist activity, or assassination."

The Fine Print and the Loopholes

Reading the fine print in Carter's Executive Order, it becomes obvious that the Order permits Presidential burglary—break-ins (known in the intelligence trade as "surreptitious entries" but Carter renames them "unconsented physical searches"), "black bag jobs," wiretapping, bugging, and physical or electronic surveillance. While many of these activities are carried out in the U.S. by the FBI, it works closely with the CIA, particularly when the elastic catch-all known as "national security" is invoked. A deputy assistant attorney general, Robert Keuch, justified this exception, saying: "The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. But we argue that searches are reasonable when conducted for foreign intelligence purposes and authorized by the President."

Yet even as these glorious "reforms" are put forward by the President and on the floor of Congress, the spies-turned-lobbyists and CIA defenders of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO), headed by David Phillips, chief of the Chile Task Force during the time of the overthrow of the Allende government, are feverishly campaigning against even these meagre measures, and they have the ear of many members of Congress and the Executive.

Aside from the everyday secrecy in which the activities of the CIA, FBI, and other agencies of the intelligence complex are shrouded, they take certain extra steps to cover themselves. The report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence spoke of how the FBI filed some of its most sensitive records under a "Do Not File" designation, to keep them out of the file folders with the subject titles of likely interest to Congress or when sought through the Freedom of Information Act by any given individual or organization. Likewise, the CIA claimed to have destroyed most of the records of its MK-ULTRA mind-control program, though reliable information suggests that all of these records are now on microfilm and hidden away deep in the caverns of Langley headquarters.

You might have heard of the American spy plane, the SR-71. This sophisticated aircraft flies normally at an altitude of 70-80,000 feet and at over 2,300 miles per hour. Crammed full of computers and photographic apparatus, and at this altitude and speed, this spy plane can read the label of a pack of cigarettes on the ground. However, even with such equipment at its disposal, the CIA still requires humans—many of them—

both to gather intelligence and to implement its multi-faceted covert operations.

It took people, not machines, to run the MK-ULTRA program. It was CIA people, not machines, who in 1953 considered buying 10 kilograms or \$240,000 worth of LSD (the price has multiplied many times since then). It is still not known whether the purchase was actually made, but it would have been sufficient for about 100 million doses.

It also took people (with some help from machines) to open and photograph almost a quarter million first-class letters between 1953-73. And despite their (and the FBI's) loud denials, the mail-opening continues.



One of the most sensitive areas of knowledge as far as the CIA is concerned is its budget. Flying in the face of demands by many individuals and organizations in the U.S., to say nothing of a growing number of members of Congress, the CIA has always managed to keep the amount of money which the American people must pay to keep it in business a tightly-held secret. There are reliable estimates for the yearly budget of the entire U.S. intelligence complex—approximately \$8-12 billion, or about 10% of all accountable U.S. government spending. As for the people in this complex of some one dozen different agencies, there are about 175,000 of them on the payroll, plus all the contractors, informers, mercenaries, agents provocateur, etc. In the CIA, it is thought that there are approximately 30,000 employees, of which over 5,000 are the elite covert operations people.

As a result of the recent revelations about the activities and identities of CIA personnel, the CIA is grasping at straws to keep their people from being discovered. That they are worried is evidenced in many ways, including a recent comment leaked by the CIA to *Newsweek* about its cover arrangements: "We are dealing with our cover impediments by creating a truly clandestine corps of operations officers." It is clear that the wall of secrecy behind which the CIA has traditionally worked is crumbling. As Philip Agee points out:

"We know enough of what the CIA does to resolve to oppose it. What we should do now is to identify and expose each of the people who instrument and execute the CIA's programs. People failed to campaign effectively against the CIA in the past because the CIA programs and people were unknown. Now that impediment is being removed."

Inspired by the victories of revolutionary movements in Indochina, Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau (and the list continues to grow). I have tried to develop some insights into a methodology of researching and exposing CIA personnel. Let me try to share with you some of the methodology that I have learned, not at any school or in any training course, but simply

by doing it. And believe me, it is not difficult.

Department of State Cover

In 1948, the National Security Council gave the green light to the CIA to use the Department of State as the vehicle to provide it with the means of cover for its operations personnel overseas. Since then, several thousand CIA personnel have used this cover arrangement, posing as legitimate diplomats in U.S. embassies, consulates and missions around the globe.

The fact is, of course, that the CIA not only wants, but must have cover in this manner. First of all, diplomatic cover means for most of the high and middle-ranking CIA officers that they will be given diplomatic immunity by the host government. This is not only nice to have because it means they don't have to pay for parking tickets and the like. More important is that it gives them access to a wide range of diplomatic, social and political strata, which is key to their work of intelligence gathering, development of relations and possible recruitment of the people they encounter, and ability to move around somewhat more freely than if they were just "private" American citizens. In cases where a CIA officer is caught in a "flap" (an operation that is discovered or "blown" and maybe even gets into the local or international press), diplomatic immunity means just that: he or she is essentially immune from prosecution. In these cases, the individual more than likely will be on the first available flight out of the place.

The Major Research Sources

There are in fact five major sources which have to be used, both individually and collectively, in researching and discovering CIA personnel who are operating or have in the past operated overseas under diplomatic cover. If one is interested in pursuing this research work, it is necessary to use some or all of these sources of information.


(1) *The Diplomatic and Consular Lists*—These are published regularly (1, 2, or 3 times a year) by the foreign affairs department or ministry of the host country. In most countries, it is also possible to get updated information of arrivals and departures or additions and subtractions from the list before the new list is actually printed, simply by phoning and asking for it (easier if the person phoning is a journalist accredited locally). Some of these lists include more of the American diplomats than others, and therefore more possible CIA personnel than others. On nearly all of these lists, at least the Chief of Station and one or two subordinates will be listed. Some lists even give addresses and phone numbers, which gives interested persons a way to phone them and ask for comments as to their status as CIA employees.

(2) *U.S. embassy/consulate/mission/military installation personnel lists*—These are regularly-printed lists that are produced for internal use by the American and locally-hired personnel. You or a friend may know someone who happens to have a lower-level position at the particular U.S. establishment concerned. A discreet approach to such person (if you feel you can trust him sufficiently) for a copy of the list might prove successful; naturally, such person need not know the exact nature of your interest in the list, perhaps that you are interested in it for a better understanding of the "good work" they do in your country. There are always ways to obtain such lists, and you should also know that these lists are not classified or secret information. A close examination of this list or directory will give you a good idea of what is what. Look first in the

offices or sections dealing with political, economic and consular affairs. Anyone with the rank of Counselor or Deputy Chief of Mission is almost definitely not CIA; such a title means that the person wouldn't have either the time or the freedom to do CIA work on top of their other duties. As for Ambassadors, while there are always some who work closely and enthusiastically with the CIA Station, and in most cases at least, know much of what the Station is up to in the broad sense, most Ambassadors (particularly career appointees) resent the CIA's power and influence over the relationship between the country to which he is supposed to be the President's personal representative and the Department of State. Such internal competition between the State Department cover is very real.

Another giveaway in these lists is an office or division with a title that often jumps out of the page at you as being an unlikely function or activity, or which is sort of nebulous. Examples of this are Regional Reports Unit, Political Liaison Section, Office of the Special Assistant, American Information Analysis and Evaluation Group, etc., etc. It will almost always turn out that these offices are the actual CIA Station's operations center at the particular diplomatic establishment in question.

In addition, and very important, there is the Station's communications office. Due to the fact that there are always CIA documents and meetings of its personnel, all CIA facilities are located separately (even if in the same building) from the facilities of the State Department. This is true of the special offices and divisions like those named above, and also of the communications facilities. The CIA never trusts its communications functions to the State Department communications people, but rather keeps its own channels and facilities, and these fall under the section or office known as "telecommunications." The telecommunications office will not only handle all CIA communications and records, but in some circumstances, may also process the State Department's "Top Secret"



cables and communications from or to the White House. The result is that while the CIA can read all the State Department's incoming and outgoing cable traffic, the CIA does not reciprocate. State Department people nearly always resent the unequal nature of this situation, but there is little they can do to change it, and so the resultant inner rivalry is almost always a factor at American embassies.

(3) *The Biographic Register*—Many CIA people were integrated into their cover as cryptodiplomats in the 1950s and 1960s, and so when you pick up the State Department's publication, the *Biographic Register*, many of them are listed. The *BR* gives quite a lot of biographical data on the person including date and place of birth, education and degree, branch, rank and dates of military service, private employment, and government employment ("Government Experience").

The first tell-tale sign will usually appear in the Government

Experience category. When the person is said to have worked with the Department of the Army/Navy/Air Force/Defense, and with such job titles as "political officer," "analyst," "research analyst," "political affairs officer," "plans officer," "programs officer," "staff planning officer," and a few more to boot, you know immediately that this is no ordinary member of the diplomatic corps, but is a live one. Why? Civilians in the above named military departments have almost never had such positions; so not only can you be sure that the person is CIA, but you also know when they joined the Agency and the length of their initial training.

There are three main foreign service rating and grade groups. "O" = Foreign Service Officer; "R" = Foreign Service Reserve Officer; "S" = Foreign Service Staff Officer. In 1974, when former State Department intelligence officer John Marks first wrote his now-famous article "How To Spot A Spook", which broke the first ground in the development of this research methodology, he told how the State Department had always refused to give "O" status to CIA personnel under diplomatic cover. The reason has been that this is a category for career foreign service personnel, and State never wants to give such status to CIA personnel who may or may not be around in a few months or years, depending upon the whims of the Agency and whether the person is caught in a "flap" of some kind. With "R" or "S" personnel, the State Department can separate them without too much bureaucratic problem. This leaves the "R" and "S" categories for CIA people. While there are indeed a number of legitimate State Department people, such as secretarial, communications/records and consular representatives who will have "R" or "S" ratings, CIA personnel abroad under diplomatic cover at least through 1974, will *only* have these ratings (one or the other). Moreover, as Marks pointed out, CIA people, much more than genuine State Department personnel, tend to switch from "R" to "S" or vice versa and back again. However, it must be stressed that since the publication of Marks' article, it is possible that the State Department has relented in its control over the "O" rating.

(4) *The Foreign Service List*—Like the *Biographic Register*, the *FSL* was printed by the Department of State, at least until the CIA forced the State Department to cease publication because of its utility in uncovering CIA personnel. (Stocks of these publications that were in the warehouse of the State Department and the Government Printing Office were even ordered to be destroyed—somewhat similar to the book-burnings in wartime Germany and in Chile at the time of the overthrow of Allende.) The last issue appeared in August 1975, while the last publicly available *BR* was published in July 1974. The *FSL* gave a pretty fair listing of the straight and not-so-straight diplomats and administrative personnel at embassies and consulates and missions in every country in the world with which the U.S. had diplomatic relations, with their job title, grade, and date of arrival. (Back issues of the *BR* and *FSL* are found at depository libraries, and many city or university libraries.)

(5) The last main source of information about the CIA presence in a country is *the press*. While there will be relatively few stories that reveal in so many words a CIA operation or officer (we hope this will become more of a trend in the future), there are other indicators that are easily recognizable. For example, when a country is suffering from severe inflation, unemployment, underdevelopment and an unequal class structure, there is a very strong likelihood that the CIA will be on the scene to exploit the situation, to create pro- or

anti-government propaganda (as the case may be), to back its friends, and to discredit or destroy its enemies with various dirty tricks. Signs of these activities often are apparent to the knowledgeable citizen, and particularly if one has a friend in the media or is a media person, it is possible to have some additional access to information that when put together with knowledge about who is who in the local CIA station, gives a pretty good picture of Station operations.

Non-official Cover

One way the CIA is trying to keep its overseas operations personnel from being discovered is by putting them under what is known as "non-official cover". This can be as pseudo business men or women in an American corporation with operations in the country, as missionaries, as professors or academic researchers, as tourists, etc. This can also include employment with a wholly-owned CIA company—known as a proprietary. These people are much more difficult to trace, but every now and then they cross paths with one of the operations personnel under "official cover". There are also intense pressures being brought on Congress by the intelligence establishment to open other government departments to them to use regularly for cover, such as the International Communications Agency (formerly the U.S. Information Agency), Agency for International Development, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Internal Revenue Service, and even, once again, the Peace Corps. Whether these forces will get their way with Congress, which must give at least broad approval to such changes, remains to be seen.

What To Do

Once you have researched the embassy personnel (and where appropriate the personnel at a local U.S. military installation, where some CIA personnel are likely to have cover), as well as the other assorted Americans whose presence and activities are out of the ordinary feel free to check them with us, or with others in other countries who have been working in the same field of research. If you can do so without revealing yourself to the CIA people, keep them under surveillance, take note of their movements, whom they meet with among the local population, etc. Try to get a photograph of the person.

If you feel certain that the person is CIA, based on your research (don't make the mistake of thinking all Americans at an embassy or other installation are CIA), then it is time to publish and expose their identities and, where known, their activities.

Remember, CIA personnel (whether under cover in a foreign country or at home behind a desk at the headquarters in Langley) depend very heavily on the maintenance of secrecy as to who they are and what they actually do for a living. Once they are exposed, life in general and work specifically become very difficult. If their access to people and to officials of the country is cut off, their work soon dries up. If they then leave, they will probably be transferred elsewhere and replaced, and so the research process must begin again.

Good luck!



During the few weeks preceding the publication of *Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe*, a number of news items appeared, indicating that the CIA had just learned of the existence of the book, of Philip Agee's involvement in it, and was pressuring the Justice Department to stop it. The articles which appeared hinted at injunctions and at espionage charges against Agee, co-editor Louis Wolf, and even publisher Lyle Stuart.

As we knew all along, these "rumors" were nothing more than elaborate posturing by the CIA. The Agency was aware of the existence of this book nearly four months earlier, when they sent the above letter to Lyle Stuart. After repeated attempts to reach Stuart, he finally spoke with them, inquiring if his caller was from the same agency which had assassinated Che Guevara, overthrown Allende, and set up DINA and SAVAK. The caller said no, and tried to appeal to Stuart's "patriotism." After some banter, he hung up, and had no further discussions with them. About two months later he was informed by the typesetters who had set the Appendix to *Dirty Work*—a firm whose name was not even known to Stuart himself—that they had been contacted by the Justice Department, asking a lot of questions about who was printing the book, when it would be done, etc.

The CIA and the Justice Department, of course, knew about this book from the beginning. If they didn't, their many taps and bugs on our phones and offices are a poor investment indeed. But they also knew what we knew, that the book was based upon journalistic research of publicly available documents, and not upon secret or classified information, and that it could not be stopped!

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

REGISTERED - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

Lyle Stuart Incorporated
120 Enterprise Avenue
Secaucus, New Jersey 07094

31 May 1978

Gentlemen:

The Central Intelligence Agency has learned that you may be prepared to publish a book entitled Dirty Work. It is our understanding that this book contains the names of many CIA employees, and we have some reason to believe that the author may himself be a former employee of CIA.

As you may know, all Agency employees execute secrecy agreements as a condition of their employment. Among other things, these agreements require that the manuscript of any book relating to the Agency's activities, based on knowledge acquired in the course of Agency employment, be submitted to the Agency prior to publication. The purpose of this requirement is to afford the Agency an opportunity to review such manuscripts to determine whether or not they contain properly classified information. To be of any value, and certainly if it is to secure to the Agency the legal rights created by employee secrecy agreements, that opportunity obviously must occur prior to publication, before any properly classified information is placed in the public domain. I should also note that secrecy agreements between the Agency and its employees have been recognized as valid and enforceable contracts, and that the obligations undertaken by employees pursuant to those agreements, to submit manuscripts to the Agency for pre-publication review, remain binding after the termination of employment. See United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1972).

Our interest at this point is to verify whether in fact the author of any book you may intend to publish is a former Agency employee, and to inform you that we would regard the publication of any such book, without prior Agency review, as a violation of our contractual rights. I have asked John Greaney, an Associate General Counsel of the CIA, to contact you promptly concerning this matter, and I would ask that you arrange to meet with Mr. Greaney at your earliest possible convenience.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Anthony A. Lapham".

Anthony A. Lapham
General Counsel

Lyle Stuart's Fan Mail From the CIA

TEN YEARS AS A CUBAN DOUBLE AGENT IN THE CIA

At the XI World Festival of Youth and Students, in Havana this August, five Cuban double agents testified about their infiltration of the CIA. One of them, Nicolas Sirgado Ros, worked with the CIA for *ten years*. During this time he was privy to information regarding many planned attacks against Cuba, and to the kind of information the CIA was desperately trying to learn—especially the movements outside Cuba of Fidel Castro. Sirgado was so adept at his infiltration that he passed three lie detector tests administered by the CIA, and at his last meeting with his case officers received a commendation from Henry Kissinger and a gold Rolex watch for his services to “democracy.” After the October 1976 sabotage of a Cubana Airline plane, Fidel Castro announced in a speech that a Cuban double agent had kept his government informed of the CIA’s interests in his movements. The double agent was Sirgado. During the Festival a lengthy interview with Sirgado was published, which we print here. It provides an unusual insight into Agency methods.

* * *

When and how did your work for Cuban State Security begin, and how were you able to infiltrate the CIA?

I started working with the state security bodies at the beginning of the Revolution. It was my task during that period to associate with counter-revolutionary organizations and individuals that have since left the country.

In 1962, while I was carrying out these tasks, I was ordered to start infiltrating the Central Intelligence Agency itself because of what Cuban Security already knew about CIA plots to assassinate the Commander in Chief.

It was necessary to know what the enemy would do at that time—not only the counter-revolutionary organizations that might ultimately be the executors, but the CIA itself, from within that main center of direction of all the infamous “dirty tricks” . . . how, who, what and when had to be answered with respect to the plot to assassinate Fidel. And that became the object of my mission from the end of 1962 on. The actual direct contact with the CIA was achieved at the end of 1966, after years of patient preparatory work, as you can understand.


When the CIA recruited me in London in 1966, my cover work in Cuba was as general director of supplies for the Ministry of Construction, headed at that time by Comrade Osmani Cienfuegos.

So the question of infiltrating the CIA was a meticulous, careful long-term concept right from the beginning, based on known information about plans for aggression against our country and concrete CIA plots to assassinate Commander in Chief Fidel Castro and, of course, on the Cuban Revolution’s need to protect the people, their leaders and socialism.

How were you recruited in London?

While I was on a trip to London for the Ministry of Construction at the end of 1966, I received a call from the alleged executive of a business firm we traded with asking for an interview with me to discuss “trade questions.”

The interview took place in a London hotel. A man who called himself Harold Bensen met me, said he was passing through London and that he was an Army colonel who was in the CIA. Shortly after the conversation began, he showed me a photo of my children, to prove that he had contacts with individuals I knew who were connected with counter-revolutionary organizations in Cuba.



Nicolás Sirgado Ros.

We had a long conversation and he openly and specifically asked me to collaborate with the CIA in the work it was doing against the Revolution. He offered me a salary to be paid in dollars and deposited in a checking account in the Chase Manhattan Bank in New York. He also assured me that, after a reasonable period of working for the CIA, I would have "the chance" to move to the United States.

Several other interviews followed this first one in London. In addition to outlining the intelligence interests they wanted me to undertake in my work for them, these interviews were used to train me in various aspects and techniques of espionage work.

Can you elaborate on the training you got from the CIA?

First they trained me in secret writing, a method the CIA at times considered to be safer than radio transmissions. That method includes the use of a white paper, similar to a sheet of regular bond, but chemically treated. It acts like carbon paper in the sense that it retains the letters written on it. The technique involves writing a regular letter, such as you might send to a friend or relative, as what they call the open text. On top of that letter or open text, you write the secret message using the chemically treated paper I mentioned. This message is, of course, invisible. It can only be read when developed by special chemicals that are used for this type of paper.

During these training sessions, I was given instructions in how to use a camera to photograph documents, maps, plans and places and objectives that might be of interest to the CIA because of the installations they had.

The training included preparing microfilm to send these photos abroad and a much more advanced photographic espionage method known as microdots whereby the photo is reduced to almost nothing so it can be hidden under the dot of an i in the text of a letter or post card sent through the regular mail, or in any kind of technical publications that might easily be sent from abroad.

I also received training in radio reception, in order to be able to receive and decode messages. In the first stage, music that had been predetermined with the agent was used to identify the real message. In this case I remember the song was, "You Are Always in My Heart." When there was no real message, they immediately played "Pomp and Circumstance."

That training continued throughout the years in various meetings with CIA officials and I was also given instructions in other more complex techniques.

I was taught how to collect information, how to provide the characteristics of the leaders of the Revolution, surveillance and countersurveillance . . .

Did they ever use a lie detector on you?

Yes, they used a lot of security measures. They used the lie detector three times. Sometimes there were lie detector sessions that were more than two and a half hours long.

Clearly, the CIA's aim in using this method is not so much to find out whether or not you're lying as to break you down, humiliate you, impose machine over mind. Whether or not it's effective, the method really seeks to humiliate and denigrate. It's a reflection of this espionage organization, built upon mistrust and of the lack of moral values to support its activities.

I passed every test. Instead of humiliating me they only succeeded in increasing my scorn for their methods.

They also used surveillance techniques in my hotel rooms abroad: constant surveillance that we easily detected, and some other measures as well.

I believe that both my training and the fact that I successfully passed their surveillance—thus destroying the CIA's "super-technique"—helped lengthen and protect the CIA infiltration for ten years, at the same time that it strengthened their confidence in the alleged agent.

What intelligence interests did the CIA raise with you?

The enemy always proposed concrete tasks in terms of its information interests. Because of the importance the enemy attached to it, my task with respect to Commander in Chief Fidel Castro can be considered of primary significance.

The CIA was interested in all the particulars concerning the First Secretary of our Party: his health and the doctors responsible for it, his state of mind, the moves he made and the routes he took, what worries he might have, where and when he might be traveling, etc. The whole question was made clear in the last message from the CIA read by Fidel in Revolution Square on October 15, 1976.

Enemy intelligence interests included constant requests for information on revolutionary leaders, particularly those I had access to, such as Comrade Osmani Cienfuegos. There were also frequent requests for information about Dorticos, Almeida, Hart, Carlos Rafael, Montane and a growing list of comrades who are leaders of our Revolution. There was great interest in Comrade Osmani Cienfuegos, because of his responsibilities as Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers and, therefore, his inside knowledge of important government questions. Such was the interest that, on one occasion Mike Ackerman, a US CIA officer I sometimes worked for, told me that if I managed to get closer to Osmani Cienfuegos I'd get a pay raise that would accordingly swell the bank account the CIA had opened for me abroad.

Another highly important intelligence interest involved information on Cuba's relation with Central American, South American and Caribbean countries. They were very concerned with what they called "exporting the Revolution," and sought, by every means possible, to prove that Cubans directly and materially promote subversion in this continent. They asked about the general opinion among revolutionary leaders concerning other heads of government in Latin America and the Caribbean. I remember when General Omar Torrijos' visit to Cuba was announced that they wanted to find out what the leaders of the Revolution thought about him.

CIA intelligence interests with regard to Latin America and the Caribbean have been extremely diverse during these ten years. For instance, they showed special interest in the Chilean process, Cuba's links with Allende, aid to Chilean refugees; and they wanted to know whether it was possible to determine or at least assume that Chilean refugees were being trained for infiltration into Chile.

They also asked for economic information. For instance, what contracts, what agreements, what relationships had been established or were being planned for the future. I remember that when the Latin American Economic System (SELA) and the Caribbean Multinational Shipping Company (NAMUCAR) were set up they were constantly inquiring about the role of Cuba and other countries.

During a 1976 work session with a number of CIA officers, I told them that my duties as a Cuban government official

would probably take me to a number of Latin-American and Caribbean countries. They assured me that was no problem, that the CIA would help me during the trip, since it had stations in some of those countries that could maintain contact with me.

Evidently, Latin America has always been high on the enemy's list of intelligence priorities and they hoped to use me in that work. They were also interested in our role in Africa, particularly in the internationalist aid that had been given to Angola, and in Cuba's participation in the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, and what kinds of secret agreements, if any, Cuba had made within that body. Without the slightest respect, these gentlemen referred to the "subversive" nature of this organization. They also showed special interest in Cuba's relations with the African countries, members of the OAU, within the framework of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. They wanted information on bilateral and other agreements, and technical or military assistance the Cuban government might be offering. As early as 1969 and 1970, the CIA asked its alleged agent for first-hand information that they said would be used to formulate a US policy on Africa designed to frustrate any revolutionary or even progressive movement.

They were also interested in knowing whether some leaders or popular sectors were attracted to the political line followed by the ruling Chinese clique. From the continuous interest the CIA showed in this matter from the very beginning of the decade it is clear that, even then, they were planning to play Peking off against socialism, the Soviet Union, our country and even such African countries as Angola and Ethiopia that have attained their independence.

They have shown a similar interest in obtaining information about our internal affairs: development, domestic policy, social problems, etc. They constantly asked for data on economic plans, short and mediumterm investments, agreements, participation in the CMEA and a number of specific economic questions.

They were particularly interested in information about both sugar and nickel—anything that could be obtained on those two items. The areas planted, investments in the sugarcane industry and agriculture, total volume of harvests, destination of exports, sugar prices subject to specific agreements . . . I remember very well that Mike, the CIA officer I mentioned before, once said that the US Government had to exert its influence on the sugar market, to make prices drop. Realizing the importance of sugar in our economy, they thought a price decrease would be another blow to the Cuban Revolution. According to Mike this was another form of fighting communism, especially Castro communism.

There were constantly all kinds of questions about nickel: development plans, organizational measures, investments aimed at increasing production and exports, markets, concrete projects for the mining area of northern Oriente, in short . . . many different aspects.

There was persistent interest in the organization of the Cuban Communist Party, the process and development of the Party Congress, agreements adopted, opinions on the feasibility of the agreements being fulfilled and other questions.

They asked for details on state organization, the process of institutionalization, the creation of enterprises, the new system of economic management, the organization of Peoples' Power, elections . . .

From the time I was recruited in London up to the end of

1976, the CIA showed persistent interest in obtaining military information, especially about our missile strength.



When Fidel unveiled your work as an alleged CIA agent, he specifically mentioned the task the US intelligence services had given you to place a microtransmitter in Comrade Osmani Cienfuegos' office. Could you explain in detail how that mission was accomplished?

It was early in 1974, in Italy during a CIA work session, that I was assigned the task of installing a highly sophisticated microtransmitter in Comrade Osmani Cienfuegos' office. I was told how important and significant that mission was for the US government, the CIA, especially for the CIA officers working with me at that time: in short, that this mission was of special significance for the organization and direction of US policy toward Cuba.

My instructions were simply to check out Osmani Cienfuegos' office in order to decide where I thought this microtransmitter should be placed and let them know.

After my return to Cuba, we made a careful study of the building where these offices were located and of the surrounding buildings, including a description of height and existing equipment in the neighborhood that might interfere with the microtransmitter broadcast. We made draft drawings of the furniture in Comrade Osmani's office and provided a description of the wood it was made of and the color . . . an exact microlocation of the office, with each door and window indicated and, of course, also the spot where I recommended installing the microtransmitter, and the direction in which it should be oriented.

I remember that it was also necessary to draw a small-scale map of the area around Comrade Osmani's office indicating the streets, avenues and nearest government buildings. Above all, the CIA asked me to indicate what embassies were located near where the microtransmitter would be placed.

After all these drafts and plans had been drawn up in Cuba, according to CIA specifics, I handed them over to US Central Intelligence Agency officials.

Later, at a meeting with some of the CIA officers I had been working with for several years, I was introduced to one named Dick who had been especially assigned to this mission to build the microtransmitter. It was Dick who directed all the training I was given at that time in how to use, and later install the microtransmitter in Comrade Osmani's offices.

Dick remained with me and other CIA officers until he thought I was ready to undertake the mission. I remember

that when we were going over some of the details of the operation, I told Dick—on purpose—that I could never enter Cuba with that equipment and that I also thought it would be pretty hard for them to get it to me in Havana. Then Dick said something so arrogant I'll never forget it: He said, "Don't worry. In the CIA we have a slogan: the difficult we do right away; the impossible takes a little longer!" They couldn't imagine how that operation would wind up.


He showed me a rock in which the microtransmitter would be hidden to be sent to me in Cuba, and told me they'd let me know by radio exactly where it would be left.

Shortly after my return to Havana following that meeting with the CIA officers, I received a message containing a detailed description of the exact spot where the rock containing the microtransmitter had been left, along with instructions to go to Cacahual, outside Havana, where it had been placed, I was to pick it up as soon as possible and set it up in Comrade Osmani's office, as planned.

Did you make any later trips abroad that allowed you to make contact with the CIA?

In 1976 I had one final meeting with the CIA officers I had been in contact with during my ten years of work in the Central Intelligence Agency. That was when I was introduced to another Army Colonel, Frank, a high CIA official who, I was told, had come from Washington especially for this interview.

Colonel Frank is a Chicano who lost his right eye—as he will proudly tell you—in the US war against the Vietnamese people. He told me genially not to call him Colonel Frank, that he preferred to be called Francisco, or Pancho, since he was Latin too.



When he began to talk, the other officers kept quiet. He stood up and, in a very conceited manner, explained that he had come to meet me and personally congratulate me. He conveyed the compliments of CIA headquarters in Virginia for the work I had done and the risks I had taken through all these years and, above all, for the contribution I had made to preserving the so-called "free world." He also brought a personal letter from Mr. Henry Kissinger congratulating me for my ten years of work on behalf of the United States. Kissinger's letter said that, in his opinion, the information that had been provided to the United States for its policy against our country, and even against other countries, had been very valuable.

After delivering Kissinger's message, Colonel Frank ordered several bottles opened and ceremoniously offered

toasts to the success that had been achieved and the future of our work. In that atmosphere of expectation, Frank presented me with a box containing a Rolex watch which he said was a personal gift from Henry Kissinger and the CIA leadership for the work I had done over so many years.

Was the equipment actually used for broadcasts to the CIA?

I shouldn't reveal details about technical matters that might show our hand. I can tell you that shortly after I informed the enemy that the microtransmitter was installed, I made a final trip abroad, which was when that meeting with the CIA officers and the interview with Colonel Frank took place and I was congratulated for my work and presented with a watch from Kissinger.

That makes it perfectly clear that what our Cuban State Security planned and carried out was just what was needed to pull the rug out from under the US intelligence services.

Does the microtransmitter require some auxiliary equipment in order to work?

My mission for the CIA consisted in making the studies I mentioned, selecting the spot where the microtransmitter was to be installed and, finally, placing it there.

Since they never told me, I don't know whether the microtransmitter required some kind of auxiliary equipment to activate it.

However, the messages could be picked up by equipment other than the CIA apparatus, but they couldn't be understood because they were scrambled and required a special

device to receive it, reconvert it and produce the actual message, as I explained earlier.

How was the equipment run?

The equipment was turned on and off by remote control from outside.

What kind of technical equipment did the CIA give you during those ten years to carry out your alleged espionage work against Cuba?

At first they gave a machine that was used at the time to record messages from the CIA center and decode them later.

Once they gave me some ordinary loud speakers that are used with record players or recorders, in which they had hidden Cuban money that I was to use in my espionage activities in Cuba. They provided me with a microscope built by the CIA's technical services department to read the microdots the Agency might decide to send. They also gave me a high-frequency radio-recorder with four bands on which I could receive and record messages simultaneously.

Earlier I explained that I was trained in photography. The CIA gave me an Asahi Pentax camera with all attachments and some Ansco color film, apparently ordinary film that can be purchased anywhere abroad. Actually, only the first part of the roll was regular film, in order to hide what followed, which was a special microdot microfilm worked up by the CIA.

During the meetings with CIA officers abroad, they gave me code pads with which to decipher the messages they sent.

The first time, in London, they gave me a Grundig high-frequency radio receiver made in the RFA with several bands. I used this equipment at the beginning to receive radio messages.

And as I said, they also sent me the sophisticated micro-transmitter equipment that was placed in Comrade Osmani Cienfuegos' offices.

This apparatus included long-lasting remote control batteries, the microphone and the broadcasting mechanism set up to mix signals, that is to receive the conversation, mix it and send it in such a way that it was difficult or impossible for any radio listener who might be tuned into that band to understand the transmission. They called this method scrambling. When the message was received on the CIA monitoring equipment, it reconverted the conversation by unscrambling it.

Does the fact that certain equipment, such as the sophisticated microtransmitter, has been smuggled into Cuba in special devices and placed in certain spots by third persons mean that there are other CIA agents in Cuba?

It's very hard to imagine that a clandestine agent could be used in this kind of an operation in Cuba. It would have to be either an agent sent in specifically for such an operation or a foreign intelligence agent based in our country.

How many CIA officers did you have contact with during the course of counter-intelligence work?

I worked with some 13 CIA officers, all US citizens, while I was infiltrated in the Agency. Sometimes the relationship was quite close, sometimes less so—as in the case of Colonel Frank, apparently an important CIA official at that time. Other officers would see me directly and systematically. Some limited their relationship to training and technical preparation sessions.

The CIA officer I worked longest with and with whom I established the closest relationship was Mike Ackerman, a US citizen of Russian-Jewish extraction, ambitious, very reactionary, with Zionist tendencies, and an expert in security measures. He was openly anti-Cuban and had very close ties with counter-revolutionaries in Miami.

Mike Ackerman was a CIA lieutenant colonel when we worked together, carried out missions against the Soviet Union, against countries in the Middle East and, especially, against Cuba. Now, he has apparently been dismissed from the CIA.

Toward the end, he was dabbling in US politics and working in US colleges and universities, which we all know are regular CIA recruiting sources; so we assume from this that he still maintains his ties with the Central Intelligence Agency.

I also knew a CIA lieutenant colonel who called himself David, and substituted for Mike when the latter, apparently, left the Agency. David was a cunning, crafty fellow, very revolting, who openly hated the Cuban Revolution and our people. He was a specialist in Latin-American affairs and economic matters.

My work in the CIA was also linked to Alan G. Morrill, Jr., one of the heads of the Agency's center in Spain. This gentleman, known as an expert on Cuba, was born on February 1, 1930, and speaks Spanish. We know he went to work for the State Department in 1966, was sent to Caracas, Venezuela, with an R-5 rating (one of the classifications for US diplomatic officials) and, in November of that year, he became a political officer in the Embassy. In May, 1971 he was promoted to R-4 rank and returned to the CIA in the United States. In December, 1973, he was sent to Spain, where he remained till late 1976. It was he who promoted and organized the meetings I had there with CIA officers.

During all these years, Alan Morrill has used his State Department cover for implementing his action against Cuba. In Spain, Morrill headed the anti-Cuba section of the CIA Station.

Francis Sherry III and Joseph Said Cybulski were among Morrill's underlings. Sherry, who was born on May 7, 1927, speaks both French and Spanish, and earlier worked for the FBI. He was an economic officer in Saigon between 1953 and 1960 when he became US Vice Consul in the city that now bears the name of the beloved Ho Chi Minh. He worked in the US consular office in Mexico in 1966, in France in 1969, in Spain as attache to the Political Section from 1973 to 1976; and from 1966 to 1976 he carried on intensive work against Cuba.

We learned that Cybulski was in Madrid in 1961; in Mexico, Argentina and Spain between 1962 and 1974; he worked in the Spanish capital between 1975 and 1977, supposedly for the Salisport firm, on Lopez de Hoyos Street. Cybulski's last address in Madrid was 51, Avenida Generalísimo; his phone number: 456-1469.

These, as we have said, are the most noteworthy.

What guarantee did the CIA offer you in case you were detected by the Cuban State Security Department?

The CIA offered me no guarantee and I believe it is unable to do so in any case. They trained me in certain self-protection measures, but beyond that there was no guarantee whatsoever.

At one point you said Mr. Henry Kissinger sent a letter through Colonel Frank indicating that the information you had provided would serve to formulate anti-Cuban policy . . .

Not only the supposedly true information I provided, but, in general, any information gathered by US intelligence is used by imperialism to work out its aggressive line against Cuba and other socialist countries, and even against the progressive countries of the Non-Aligned Movement.

However, in the case of the information I provided to the enemy, this was done according to a perfectly worked out plan

based on the need to misinform the CIA and serve our own infiltration work as well. But in every case, the information provided served the interests of the Revolution and the peoples of Latin America and the world.

Frank even went so far as to tell me that the synopsis of the information I sent went straight to Kissinger's desk. This is explained by a series of coincidental circumstances in 1975 and 1976; Cuba's internationalist help to Angola, the possibility of Fidel's trip to Africa, and so on. All were matters of the highest interest to Kissinger, who was, at the time, Secretary of State, presidential adviser on national security problems, chairman of the Forty Committee and head of the whole intelligence community.

Within the strategy drawn up by Cuban counter-intelligence, what was the significance of the last message you sent to the CIA?

Late in 1976, terrorist activity from abroad—led and encouraged by the CIA—had increased against our country. The CORU counter-revolutionary group had been formed. There was an attempt to blow up a Cuban plane in Jamaica, pirate attacks, bombings against Cubana de Aviacion offices in Colombia and Panama, against the Cuban diplomatic mission in Portugal and the Cuban Consulate in Mexico, the assassination of a comrade from the fishing industry in Merida, and the attempt to kidnap the Cuban Consul, the kidnapping of two Cuban comrades in Argentina, who were obviously assassinated . . .

In the United States, a traditionally difficult stage was coming to a close: the end of one presidential period and the beginning of another.

Thus, when the last message arrived (precisely three days after the criminal sabotage of a Cuban civilian plane in Barbados causing the death of 73 persons—Cubans, Guyanese and Koreans, there was a clear indication that a new plot was being hatched to assassinate the Commander in Chief. This was corroborated by the text of the message itself. They thought Fidel would visit Angola on November 11, so they asked for data in relation to that.

In that context, in the midst of the criminal offensive against Cuba, what was behind that request? What was the CIA's interest in finding out the exact itinerary of Fidel's alleged trip?

The revelations made by Fidel to the Cuban people and world public opinion were a solid denunciation of the CIA's activities; they ridiculed the machinery of US intelligence and enabled the fulfillment of very important objectives.

How do you feel after having infiltrated the CIA for ten years?

I feel really satisfied to have carried out such a mission for the Revolution. But we don't work for glory. None of us is an exceptional hero; we just try to defend our homeland. While I felt honored on hearing our beloved Commander in Chief himself mention the case publicly, I do understand that it is essentially due to the circumstances that made the revelation advisable. I think especially of the working people, those who day by day carry out production feats, of the workers and peasants, the militia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces, the revolutionary vanguard, all those that constitute the un-



conquerable bulwark of the Revolution. With or without CIA penetration, they are the ones who have made, are making or will make the imperialist enemy bite the dust . . . I think of the combatants of the Ministry of the Interior, the comrades who have done much more than I have been able to do, men who have even fallen in the line of duty and whose names, for reasons of security, cannot even be made public yet; I think of the comrades who are carrying out their work in the midst of the enemy itself, under the most difficult conditions, and are selflessly and devotedly serving in this anonymous task of defending our people. I always think of that and of the modesty, the sense of doing our duty with simplicity which is a condition in the training of the men in Security.

This interview will be made public at the 11th World Festival of Youth and Students. Do you wish to add anything to the youth of the world who will meet in Havana?

Yes, something which is very important. Certain CIA circles have expressed the belief—and have already sketched it out as a philosophy—that it is necessary to stress the work of penetrating the youth. This is because of the fact that every young person is a potential revolutionary and should therefore be detoured from youth's rightful path; and, secondly, because today's youth is tomorrow's man, tomorrow's technician, politician, statesman.

The enemy's work methods have shifted. More subtle methods have been introduced: diversionism, espionage, corruption, especially among youth. Part of the imperialist enemy's main effort is directed against youth. Every young person should be on the alert against this and should build a solid moral and revolutionary barrier against which all the efforts of the CIA and its western homologues will be smashed.

To be against the CIA is to oppose crime, moral corruption, injustice; it is to struggle against the lack of decency and the absence of human dignity.

BOOK REVIEWS


Don Thomson and Rodney Larson, *Where Were You Brother?: An Account of Trade Union Imperialism, War on Want*, July 1978, 141 pages, \$2.50 plus 50¢ postage. Order from: Transnational Features Service/Research Associates International, 182 Upper Street, London N1, United Kingdom.

"You can't dictate to a country from any angle at all unless you control the means of production. If you don't control the means of production, you can't dictate. Whether you control them through ideological methods or control them by brute force, you must control them." No, this is not Adolf Hitler speaking in 1939. It is George Meany, president of the AFL-CIO for more than twenty-five years, speaking before the U.S. Congress in 1963.

This book shows with the sharpest clarity how George Meany's doctrine has been implemented since the end of World War II. It traces the development of the AFL-CIO's international labor programs, some 95% of which are U.S. government-funded, bolstered by a financial input from nearly one-hundred American multinational corporations (which are listed). Where has the lion's share of the government money come from over the years? You guessed it: the CIA. The Senate Select Committee under Senator Church reported that before the scandals in 1967 arising out of the expose on the CIA in *Ramparts*, the CIA had "the cooperation of an American labor organization in selected overseas labor activities," and that after 1967 the Agency decided to continue funding "several international trade union organizations."

Through well-known CIA personalities like Jay Lovestone, Irving Brown, the late Serafino Romualdi, William Doherty, Jr., Morris Paladino, Andrew McLellan, and the recently-retired Agency veteran, Cord Meyer, Jr., Thomson and Larson nail down case after case of the CIA's campaign of subversion against the international trade union movement, both in Europe and the Third World. This campaign is channeled through the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), the African-American Labor Center (AALC), and the Asian-American Free Labor Institute (AAFLI), each set up and administered by the AFL-CIO's international affairs department, as well as the sixteen International Trade Secretariats (ITSs), the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (ORIT), the African Regional Organization (AFRO), and the Asian Regional Organization (ARO)—all of which are the pipelines for AIFLD, AALC and AAFLI programs. The book's credibility is further enhanced by information from an AIFLD five-year plan for 1977-81 programs in Latin America and the Caribbean. A 1973 AIFLD report said that in that year only, its costs were \$43 million. This suggests the present scale of the AIFLD (as well as the AALC and AAFLI) programs in the coming years.

Third World trade unions have been aggressively subsidized, trained, supervised and manipulated, always under the dual pretenses of supporting "free and democratic" trade unions and "fighting Communism." One tried-and-true method has been to pump large sums of money into selected trade unions (previously non-existent or inactive, or sometimes leftist-



oppositionist), building them up, pushing them to set up autonomous unions which then can be entirely controlled and made docile, and generally employing the old British colonial maxim of "divide and rule."

The authors reveal the intelligence-gathering side of the many-faceted activities. AIFLD has for years been involved in a controversial housing program. Thousands of houses that are priced far out of the reach of Latin American and Caribbean workers are constructed. Many unions have rejected the housing because of the strings attached.

The book quotes AFL-CIO international labor affairs wheeler-dealer, former Communist, and long-time CIA functionary, Irving Brown, speaking in 1977: "Why shouldn't covert action be acceptable in peace time to try and prevent the possibility of war?" It is of course no secret that in many countries where AIFLD, AALC and AAFLI operate in close cooperation with the government in power, all traditional trade union rights such as the right to strike for a living wage and better working conditions, as well as collective bargaining, have been totally outlawed. These countries are just coincidentally where American multinational corporations have huge investments. In those places, truly free and democratic trade unions are not in the interests either of the ruling government or the U.S. corporations, whose common objective is increased and sustained power and profit.

Published in London, this book discusses the role of the British Trades Union Congress (TUC), the AFL-CIO's counterpart body, in the furtherance of George Meany's programs, especially in countries that were once in Her Majesty's colonial empire, and which remain members of "the Commonwealth." The authors have interviewed a number of the people involved, and conclude that they know almost nothing about the Third World workers' movements to which the TUC budgeted approximately \$1 million for 1977. In Britain itself, the sudden emergence in the last few years of a "British Labour Committee for Trans-Atlantic Understanding," started by long-time American labor attaché Joseph Godson at a time when British trade union militancy is growing, has generated some questions in London trade union circles.

This book is must reading for all who want a wealth of documentation about the CIA's thrust in the labor field.

—LW

George N. Schmidt, *The American Federation of Teachers and the CIA*, Substitutes United for Better Schools (S.U.B.S.), 1978, 81 pages. Order from: S.U.B.S., 343 S. Dearborn Street, Room 1503, Chicago, Illinois 60604. Single copies \$2.00, 25% off on orders of ten or more, 50% off on fifty or more.

This pamphlet focuses on one American trade union, the 430,000-member American Federation of Teachers (AFT), and shows how it has been gradually taken over by the CIA, through the international affairs section of the AFL-CIO.

It is not a coincidence, therefore, that only two weeks after his election as AFT president in 1974, Albert Shanker officially applied to get the union into the American Institute for Free Labor Development's program and to get AIFLD money. By 1977, AFT had joined six other U.S. unions in AIFLD's "union to union" program in Latin America. The other unions are: the Brotherhood of Railway and Airline Clerks (BRAC), the Communications Workers of America (CWA), the Glass Bottle Blowers Association (GBBA), the Retail Clerks International Union (RCIA), the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers (ACWA) and the American Federation of Television and Radio Artists (AFTRA). By 1981, AFT anticipates \$100,000 annually from AIFLD, for training and other teacher-related programs in Latin America and the Caribbean. Similarly, the AFT works closely with both the AALC in Africa and the AAFLI in Asia.

President Shanker's chief assistant for "international affairs" is Al Loewenthal, who, among other ideological and organizational tasks, is active in the International Federation of Free Teachers Unions. That's not all. By his own proud admission, a lot of his time is taken up by the CIA. During a "labor education luncheon" at the AFT annual convention in Boston in August 1977, one of the veterans of the AFL-CIO "free trade union movement," Irving Brown, was invited to speak on "The American Labor Movement and the International Scene." As members of the United Action Caucus and the Black Caucus were handing out "Who Is Irving Brown?" leaflets to delegates, Loewenthal stopped to get a leaflet. "What's wrong with the CIA?" he asked. "I've been working with them for years."

Washington insiders say George Meany wields incredible influence in the formulation of American foreign policy, even at age 80. Every President has one eye on the millions of American workers and their votes, which Meany pretends to have in the palm of his hand. It was the AFL-CIO that almost single-handedly brought about the decision by President Carter to withdraw the United States from the International Labor Organization (ILO) last year, because it was becoming "too political" for Meany's liking. He has been quoted again and again saying that the development of "free" trade unions around the world is key to U.S. foreign policy. What are "free" trade unions, in the Orwellian newspeak of Meany & Co.? Thomson and Larson cite the notes of an October 1958 conference at Cornell University on American labor activities abroad. Professor John T. Dunlop, then an economics professor at Harvard University, laid the cards on the table thusly:

"When we go to a country like Iraq or Ghana, maybe the best advice we can give them is not to have any trade unions, at least for a time, or to have a controlled union. I think we have got to be reconciled to the notion that for a generation or more these unions are going to be kept unions. [Note: "kept" here means controlled.] It is completely consistent to say that, on the one hand, I am in favor of free and independent unions while, on the other hand, I recognize that in the face of the Communist threat there may be good reasons for these unions to be kept unions. In this argument, our traditional view of the trade unions is an impediment."

Dunlop either had a crystal ball or he was on Meany's payroll, because this is precisely what has come to be wherever the AFL-CIO international affairs people have set up shop in the Third World. In countries where the power is held by rightwing military dictatorships (in many cases CIA-engineered *coups d'etat* originally put and since have kept them in power, and where American corporations have large investments), the only trade unions that are allowed to function at all are those kept "free trade unions" sponsored by AIFLD, AALC or AAFLI.

Chile is a classic case. As part of the CIA-Kissinger destabilization campaign that targeted and finally overthrew the democratically-elected government of Salvador Allende, AIFLD was in charge of the labor part of the plan. The Schmidt pamphlet points to the fact that while almost all American economic aid and loans to Chile were cut off between 1970 and 1973, two programs were increased: military and police training for Chilean officers, and AIFLD training at the AFL-CIO "school" in Front Royal, Virginia. The number of Chileans trained in the U.S. in the year prior to the *coup* went up by 400%.

Not only does George Schmidt give us a good overview of the historical roots of the AFL-CIO's highly political international affairs activities that have operated in active cooperation with the CIA for more than twenty-five years. The pamphlet has a "scoop" in printing almost word-for-word a transcript of the August 1977 speech given to the AFT delegates by Irving Brown, one of the founding fathers of the whole shebang. The speech must surely go down in the annals of anti-democratic demagoguery and doubletalk. For example, "... when we speak out for human rights, when we speak out for the need to help those who are fighting for the preservation of democracy and freedom and human rights, we are speaking out for the only kind of foreign policy that can prevent war. ... It is where freedom does not exist, where repression and suppression is the rule of law that the danger of war comes."

What, then, are Mr. Brown and friends doing for the trade union and human rights of thousands of trade unionists and others who have been killed, kidnapped, tortured or imprisoned in countries where the AFL-CIO is most active, including Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Nicaragua, Haiti, Guyana, Kenya, Nigeria, Iran, Indonesia, the Philippines and South Korea?

CovertAction Information Bulletin readers should definitely have this pamphlet on their shelves for reference.

—LW

NEWS NOTES

Jamaica Expose Causes a Commotion

Our last issue exposed the new CIA chief of Station in Jamaica, Dean J. Almy, Jr. After notifying friends in Jamaica of this upcoming announcement, Mr. Almy was investigated. It was discovered that he had moved into a house with an unobstructed view of a country club where Prime Minister Michael Manley played tennis. One can imagine what sort of electronic equipment Mr. Almy had in his house. A photograph of the house appeared in *Struggle*, the newspaper of the Workers Liberation League in Jamaica just as the *Bulletin* came out.

Upon publication of the news, in the Jamaican papers and in the first issue of the *CovertAction Information Bulletin*, Mr. Almy apparently moved. Mr. Manley, we are informed, no longer plays tennis beneath his window. This is one example of the ways in which this information can help progressive forces around the world.

Speech in Canada Stirs Press

One of our members delivered a speech to the Law Union of Ontario in Toronto, Canada, last month. To demonstrate the methodology of researching CIA officers under diplomatic cover, the biographies of Stacy Hulse, Jr., the Chief of Station in Ottawa, and of Stephen Winsky, a senior case officer at the Station, were explained to the audience. Both of these gentlemen appear in the Appendix to "Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe," as they had played key roles in the CIA's operations on behalf of the Greek Junta, when stationed there. Minimal press coverage of the Law Union's meeting expanded within days to a nationwide story about these "revelations," with dozens of newspaper, radio and TV items.

All of which proves that the mere exposure of CIA people in one place is no assurance that their identities will be known at their next station. We were told that, although Hulse and Winsky had been in Ottawa for three and two years, respectively, their CIA connections had *never* been mentioned in the Canadian press, even though both had been named several times in Greek and other publications over the years. This all highlights the value of research not merely into the identification of CIA personnel but also into their movements. We continue to urge our readers around the world to send us new and current diplomatic lists as they are published. We would like (as we do in this issue's Naming Names column) to call attention to these people as soon after their arrivals as possible, to minimize the interference into the affairs of other countries of which they are capable.

Bechtel Corporation Exposed

A major investigative article on the Bechtel Corporation (by Mark Dowie, in the September-October 1978 *Mother Jones*) is the first to chronicle the vast range of this outfit's

operations around the world, and its "old boy network" relationship with the CIA.

The Bechtel Corporation is the largest engineering and construction company in the world. "Few unnatural forces have altered the face of this planet more . . . Bechtel would be important if for no other reason than its sheer size. If privately held firms were listed among the Fortune 500, Bechtel would rank about 25th—bigger than Coca-Cola, Lockheed or American Motors. Bechtel, however, is far more than just another large corporation. It is an empire that hires its executives right out of the Cabinet at huge salary increases, receives billion-dollar government contracts, maintains close ties with the powerful elites of most major countries and harbors the secrets of uranium enrichment."

Founded in 1898 by "an immigrant muleskinner" named Warren "Dad" Bechtel, the company was handed down to sons Ken, Warren and Steve. Ken and Warren died recently, and Steve, Sr., at age 77, with wealth of more than \$700 million is one of the five richest men in the United States. How did the Bechtel empire come to be?

For its first 40 years, it concentrated on the American market, mostly in the Western states, building railroads, irrigation canals, natural gas lines and earth-filled dams. In 1931, "Dad" Bechtel joined a consortium created to construct the Hoover Dam, and after his sudden death in 1933, the sons completed the dam in 1936.

It was during the planning for the dam that one John McCone, then a steel salesman, came to Bechtel. It was probably not a coincidence, since his old friend Steve Bechtel, Jr., was the project procurement officer. The dam required a lot of steel. Bechtel gave the business to McCone. After the dam was finished, they formed a partnership—Bechtel-McCone, and McCone became the president. While supposedly set up to build refineries, they made their big move in 1940 by contracting for the construction of the Liberty ship fleet, tanker shipyards, and a plant for the modification of airplanes. To get an idea how much Bechtel, McCone and friends made off the war, a General Accounting Office official gave evidence at the 1948 Senate confirmation hearing, when McCone was nominated to be Under Secretary of Defense, that the group made \$44 million in profits from wartime contracts, all from an initial personal investment of \$100,000.

From that time on, the special relationship between Bechtel and McCone meant a lot to both. McCone would hold such key posts as Under Secretary of the Air Force (1950-51), Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (1958-60), and Director of the CIA (1961-65). As AEC Chairman, McCone helped Bechtel get the contract for construction of the first commercial nuclear power plant in the U.S., and since then, the corporation has been in on the construction of almost half of the 68 nuclear power facilities in the country.

McCone assumed the CIA directorship at a key time. He got the job in November 1961, taking over after Allen Dulles was retired by President Kennedy for the ill-fated Bay of Pigs operation against Cuba. But the Agency had irons in the fire—in Laos, in Brazil, in Indonesia, where large-scale CIA political and/or paramilitary operations were set in motion during McCone's tenure at Langley. It was also in the early 1960s

that the CIA was setting up some of its wholly-owned "businesses" to provide cover for some of its operatives and operations abroad. Not that Bechtel was or is such a proprietary but, as Dowie shows, it was then and remains "a CIA director's dream come true" for the following reasons:

The head of Bechtel is an old and trusted crony.

The company has operations in more than 100 countries.

With only 56 shareholders (all company executives or their wives), it is privately-held, making it less easy to pin down with annual reports, stock transfers, etc. Even the Securities and Exchange Commission has no power to look into its affairs.

Bechtel has always been extremely secretive. Like at the CIA, employees are sworn to secrecy, both while in their employ and after they go.

Dowie's analysis of Bechtel's working ideology overseas hits the nail on the head: "Beyond American shores, Bechtel's only publicly expressed concern is for the safety of its employees. Its unofficial ideology is that technology is apolitical and brings the progress and well-being that inevitably lead to democracy and freedom. The Bechtel philosophy, of course, ignores the fact that repressive military dictatorships arose in Iran, Indonesia, Brazil and Saudi Arabia following the introduction of centralized technology into these societies. Even when, as in the case of Indonesia, the technology is supposedly owned by 'the people,' a new elite class of technocrats, middlemen and business leaders—many of them trained by Bechtel—take control of the government. One of their first moves is often to apply for U.S. military aid to protect their new technology and institutions—not from foreign invasion but from



Many of its overseas construction projects are outside of urban areas in places where revolutionary developments often begin, and where official cover for CIA personnel is a difficult proposition.

The company moves a lot of heavy equipment and material around the globe. Dowie quotes a Bechtel employee who spent four years in Libya: "One 30-foot section of large pipe will hold a lot of rifles."

The exchange of information is vital to both organizations. The CIA has industrial intelligence of great value to Bechtel, and Bechtel has political, on-the-ground intelligence that the CIA wants and, in some cases, may have no other way to obtain.

Dowie cites a confidential Bechtel memo, "International Job Strategy," dated March 4, 1977. It reveals the company's strategy will be directed in the near future toward nine countries, five of which are listed (Nigeria, Iraq, Algeria, Malaysia and Indonesia). Its biggest project at the moment is in Jubail, Saudi Arabia, "a sleepy little fishing village on the Persian Gulf" which Bechtel is going to transform in the next sixteen years into a major industrial capital. Originally slated to cost \$9 billion, the project has grown, costs have ballooned, and original estimates were far below anticipated realities. According to Dowie's sources, the final price tag will be in the neighborhood of \$55 billion or, as he points out, about 3% of the U.S. gross national product.

peasants, poor city dwellers and students, who can't always discern the beneficial effects of industrial development. All too often the result has been bloodshed, although Bechtel has usually received enough advance notice from the CIA to keep clear of the conflict."

CovertAction Information Bulletin is highlighting this article not only because it is the first expose of Bechtel's operations. We are anxious that CAIB readers, both in the U.S. and abroad, should know about Bechtel, and especially that our overseas readers should keep their eyes and ears open for any information about Bechtel operations or personnel in their country. If you do come across any such information, please send it to us.

The Bechtel approach to U.S. intervention in the internal affairs of Third World countries is much more sophisticated and less visible (to Congress at least, if not to victims of the programs in the various countries) than open intervention by, let us say, the U.S. Marines. This constitutes a rejuvenated and slicked-down model of covert action, one that we can expect will become ever more popular in the halls of both large multinational corporations and the CIA.

Let us not forget, as Dowie tells us, "through it all, Bechtel builds and builds and builds."

NAMING NAMES

This issue's research has uncovered a number of previously unreported CIA personnel, as well as transfers to new posts by persons already named in "Dirty Work." We hope that this regular feature of the *CovertAction Information Bulletin* will assist our readers to keep the information in "Dirty Work" up to date and expanding.

France

We have uncovered two case officers at the Embassy in Paris. The first is **Matthew E. Monczewski**, attache. He was born in 1934, served in the Air Force from 1956 to 1960, and, in 1960, became a Political Affairs Officer for the Department of the Air Force. This obvious cover position indicates the date of his joining the CIA. He served in Vientiane, Laos, from 1967 to 1971 as a Political Officer at the Embassy, spent a few months back at headquarters, and served in Bangui, then Central African Republic, from 1971 to 1973, again as a Political Officer. During this period he progressed from R-6 rating to R-4. In 1973 he appeared at the Addis Ababa Embassy still as a Political Officer, and, as of January 1978, he appears on the Diplomatic List for Paris. He is apparently a fairly high ranking case officer.

Another Agency man in Paris is **Barry R. Gibson**, born 1939. He served from 1966 to 1970 as a Program Officer for the Department of the Army, and then, after a year back in Washington, appeared as a Political Officer at the Brasilia Embassy, where he advanced from R-6 to R-5. In 1975 he appeared at the Quito, Ecuador Embassy, and as of January 1978, is also found on the Paris Diplomatic List, as an attache. He appears to be a mid-level case officer.

Italy

In September 1977, **Michael McGinnis** was transferred to the Rome Embassy as attache and First Secretary, and he appears on the March 1978 Diplomatic List. His biography lists 1961 to 1964 as private experience as an editorial assistant, and 1965 to 1968 as unspecified government experience. In 1968 he began serving as a Political Officer at the Santo Domingo Embassy, and in 1970 held the same office at the Buenos Aires Embassy, advancing from R-6 to R-4. He would also seem to be a mid- to high-level case officer.

India

Aaron William Johnson, a high-ranking CIA telecommunications officer has appeared at the New Delhi Embassy. He was born in 1929, served in Stockholm in the early 50s, was a Department of the Army Communications Technician from 1956 to 1958, and then spent several years as a Communications Assistant in Nicosia, Cyprus. From 1961 to 1971, he is listed as a Communications Engineer for the Department of the Army, and then in 1971 as a telecommunications engineer with the Monrovia Embassy. At this point, his S ratings changed to an R-4 rating, another sign of CIA membership. At least as of June 1978, he was transferred to New Delhi, presumably in telecommunications there.

Venezuela

As of August 1978, another hitherto unreported case officer appears in the Caracas Embassy, **Andrew Donald Rohlfing**. He served in the Army from 1957 to 1960, and spent the next three years in private experience. In 1963, he joined the Department of the Air Force as a Political Analyst, yet another clear indication of CIA sponsorship. In April 1974 he appeared as a Political Officer at the Sao Paulo, Brazil Consulate General, with an R-5 rating. Rohlfing, born in 1934, would also appear to be a case officer.



El Salvador

Another apparent case officer has been located at the San Salvador Embassy—**Cletis L. Mishler**. Mishler, born 1932, served in the Department of the Air Force as an Economic Officer from 1962 to 1964, and then spent three years “private experience” as a “corporation manager,” undoubtedly some form of cover. He then appears as an Economic Officer at the Consulate at San Pedro Sula, Honduras, from 1967 to 1970, progressing from R-6 to R-5. Between 1970 and 1978 he does not appear in Department of State public records, presumably returning to undercover work. As of June 1978, he reappears at the San Salvador Embassy.

Jordan

Ralph C. Hughes spent from 1965 to 1973 as a Program Officer for the Department of the Air Force, before appearing at the Beirut Embassy, where he spent two years. In early 1975 he returned to Washington (or Langley), and reappears as of June 1978 at the Amman, Jordan Embassy.

Transfers

Three persons listed in the Appendix to “Dirty Work” have recently been transferred. **Theodore Klein**, who was a case officer in Bonn, appears, at least as of June 1978, at the Consulate General in Zurich, Switzerland. Klein, who is 56 years



old, and has been with the CIA since 1951, presumably is the Chief of Base in Zurich.

A high-ranking telecommunications officer, **Robert F. Hoepfl**, who served in London from 1974 to 1976, was located, at least as of July 1978, at the Embassy in Manila, Philippines.

Joseph A. DiStefano, 51, a high-ranking case officer who has served in Caracas, Rome and Santo Domingo, appears, as of July 1978, at the Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina.

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PUBLICATIONS OF INTEREST

Some Interesting New Publications

Isabel Letelier and Michael Moffitt, *Human Rights, Economic Aid and Private Banks: The Case of Chile*, 16 pp., \$1.50, plus \$.40 postage, bulk rates available, from The Institute for Policy Studies, 1901 Q Street, NW, Washington, DC 20009 or Paulus Potterstraat 20, Amsterdam 1007, Holland. (A detailed look at Chile's foreign borrowing, naming the banks which have made loans to the Pinochet regime.)

National Lawyers Guild Task Force on Counterintelligence, *Counterintelligence*, 80 pp., \$2.50, from Flint Taylor, 343 South Dearborn, Chicago, IL 60604 or Margaret VanHouten, AFSC, 1501 Cherry St., Philadelphia, PA. (A documentary analysis of COINTELPRO operations of the FBI, with newspaper clippings and many COINTELPRO documents.)

Don Thomson and Rodney Larson, *Where Were You, Brother? An Account of Trade Union Imperialism*, 141 pp., 1.20 pounds sterling (or equivalent), from Transnational Features Service & Research Associates International, 182 Upper Street, London, N1. (An excellent and comprehensive history of the subversion, primarily by the CIA, of the international labor movement. See the review in this issue.)

Caroline Ross and Ken Lawrence, *The Politics of Repression in the United States, 1939-1976*, 44 pp., \$1.00, from American Friends Service Committee Program on Government Surveillance and Citizens' Rights, Mississippi Surveillance Project, 513 North State Street, Jackson, Mississippi 39201. (A history of the FBI's contingency plans for rounding

up dissidents, with copies of all the internal FBI index lists over the years.)

Milan K. Blatny, *The Proclaimers of False Liberty: Who Is Who at Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty*, edited by the Institute for the Study of Journalism, 70 pages, 1977, Institute for the Study of Journalism, Oktobrovenam 4, Vydavatelstvi Obzor, 800 Bratislava, Czechoslovakia. (Prefaced by a brief discussion of the history of the CIA's two best-known radio propaganda operations, whose targets are the countries and peoples of Eastern Europe, the booklet lists 67 RFE and RL operatives with ample background and biographical data on each. There are also a lot of photographs and RFE/RL documents reprinted. In French.)

George N. Schmidt, *The American Federation of Teachers and the CIA*, 81 pp., \$2.00. (10 or more copies/25% discount; 50 or more/50% discount), from Substitutes United for Better Schools, 343 S. Dearborn St., Room 1503, Chicago, IL 60604. (A detailed look at the CIA's infiltration and subversion of the AFT, and its control of the union's international programs. See the review in this issue.)

Corporate Data Exchange, *CDE Handbook on U.S. Bank Loans to South Africa*, \$5 (10-24 copies/\$3; 25 or more/\$2.50), from Corporate Data Exchange, 198 Broadway, Rm. 707, New York, NY 10038. (An analysis of all identifiable U.S. bank loans to South Africa, with details of the loans, and all

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