The CIA and the Media

Moscow Plotted Assassinations

Cuban Spy Admits Drug Smuggling

CIA is said to be nearly certain Bulgaria knew of plan to kill Pope

The Miami Herald

Moscow Plotted Assassinations

The Washington Times

Soivet Role in Pro-Freeze Lobbying

Human Events

The National Conservative Weekly

Reader's Digest

Who is Yuri Andropov?

Sovets Work in Harnony

The IPS and the Media:

Senate Liberals, Unholy Alliance

The Rising Tide

Yuri the Terrible Exposed

Washington Inquirer

Did Andropov Plot Pope's Murder?
Editorial

Three years have passed since we last devoted an issue to the ties between the media and the intelligence complex. The need for such scrutiny now, we believe, is greater than ever, and this entire special issue deals with the subject.

As the U.S. government sinks deeper into an ideological morass, the watchdog role of the press becomes that much more important. Yet we see complacency rather than skepticism. The country is being run by people who lie unashamedly; yet most of the media wag their tails and accept everything. Cabinet officers who assert that Grenada is a threat to the national security of the United States should be laughed off the podium; senior military and CIA officials who fear an imminent invasion from the People's Republic of Mexico should be retired. Yet it seems that the administration can say almost anything and be taken seriously by a large segment of the Fourth Estate.

We do not demean the efforts of the excellent investigative journalists—of both the print and electronic media—who have helped to expose some of the more outrageous abuses of this government, especially the illegal war against Nicaragua. Indeed it is amazing, considering the way the deck is stacked against them, that they can expose anything. Truly, the administration holds almost all the cards. They can manipulate through selective background briefings and orchestrated leaks in a way that very few honest journalists can combat.

Most people in the media have not spoken out. When the present government seems hellbent on pouring many millions into the coffers of every fascist dictator in the world, on arming and financing regimes responsible for torture, disappearances, and thousands of deaths, on flagrantly breaking both U.S. and international law as a matter of course, the media must be intensely critical, not insufferably fawning. When someone lies outrageously, you have to say so, whether the speaker is the President or a famous foreign correspondent. Many journalists who accept every foolish bureaucratic utterance should know better; some, unfortunately, do know better. Some unwittingly spread administration disinformation; some create it. In this special issue of CAIB, we study the complex problem of disinformation from a number of perspectives. We include a comprehensive historical overview by William Preston and Ellen Ray and several current examples. We are especially pleased to present the devastating analysis by Edward Herman and Frank Brodhead of the "plot" to kill the Pope, exposing in meticulous detail a major current disinformation operation. We also review the new book by Georgie Anne Geyer, a leading disinformationist, and we dissect the media operation which the Reagan administration is mounting against Grenada. We present, after a long absence from these pages, Philip Agee's detective work which led to the exposure of a CIA wolf in journalist's clothing. And we conclude with news notes and Ken Lawrence's Sources and Methods column, all devoted to the media and intelligence operations. We hope that journalists are vigilant in rejecting the pressures to spread disinformation; we hope that our readers will be relentless in exposing it.

Table of Contents

Editorial 2 Grenada; Reagan's Big Lie 29
Disinformation and Deception 3 The Journalist Spy 33
The "Plot" Against the Pope 13 News Notes 35
Georgie Anne Geyer 25 Sources and Methods 40

Cover Art by Johanna Vogelsang.

Disinformation and Mass Deception: Democracy as a Cover Story

By William Preston, Jr. and Ellen Ray*

During World War I, the atrocity story came into its own as an instrument of foreign policy. In those simpler days, governments could turn public opinion against the enemy with tales of individual brutality: the rape of a nun, the bayonetting of a baby, or the execution of a Red Cross nurse. Such propaganda externalized the issues and focused national attention on an appropriate scapegoat. Doubters or dissenters were swept aside in the patriotic fallout, in an emotional downpour that insisted, "Once at war, to reason is treason."

This crude propaganda, however, had a temporary, war-related quality which often foundered on its own exaggerations. The idea of truth in those days had not yet been obliterated by the continuous covert manipulation of information in peacetime just as in war; nor had deception, secrecy, and lying come to be so much a part of the national menu as to be swallowed whole like the junk food that satiates the public appetite. Today there is no better example of the corrupted circumstances that now confront the consumer of news than the undercover campaign of official disinformation about Cuba.

Having failed to restore its hegemony over Cuba in the Bay of Pigs invasion or in the long, secret war waged under the code name "Operation Mongoose," the United States Central Intelligence Agency recently stepped up its 20-year psychological warfare operations to discredit and destroy the Cuban government and any other Latin American or Caribbean government which stands in ideological unity with them. Propaganda aimed at that small, struggling country intentionally manipulates emotions of horror, revulsion, and fear in the uninformed citizen of the Yankee Colossus. Cuba is falsely pictured by the U.S. as embracing in its foreign policy the contemporary apocalyptic trio: drugs, criminality, and terrorism—a far more terrible spectre than the individual bloodletting of the World War I propaganda. Images of corrupted American youth, gangsterism, and revolutionary violence sent from Cuba throughout Latin America are daily media fare for the American public.

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active part in disseminating and propagandizing an official point of view. To unite public opinion behind the war, Creel's CPI conducted "a fight for the mind of mankind." Fake intelligence suggesting that German spies were everywhere generated waves of hatred and hysteria against the "barbaric Huns." In disinformation coups reminiscent of today, the State Department used selective information to "prove" Germany was funding American pacifist organizations.

The capacity for covert conduct also gained ground as U.S. military intelligence expanded its role in domestic surveillance, laying plans in 1920 for a secret, domestic, counter-insurgency program aimed at radicals—an authentic progenitor of the COINTELPRO operations of the later Hoover years. Anticipating the CIA mania for cover, U.S. intelligence also dispatched agents to Europe as members of the International Red Cross.

By the end of the war, the country had acquired an institutionalized intelligence system, initiated the classification of sensitive information, and bitten into the apple of deception. The Committee for Public Information left a legacy of experience for later generations of disinformationists to apply, if not to duplicate.

Public Relations Is Born As Disinformation

During two subsequent decades of peace in which the trauma of an economic collapse followed the delirium of a perilous prosperity, a subtle yet significant development shaped the future of information: the rise of public relations and its professional advocates.

Exemplified by Edward Bernays, a man who began his career as consultant to the U.S. delegation to the Versailles Peace Conference which terminated World War I and ended it as a hired hand for United Fruit Company in Latin America, public relations and its covert marketing strategies quickly seeped into the very core of American life. As Bernays cynically stated in a PR manual in 1928, "The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen, mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country . . . it is the intelligent minorities which need to make use of propaganda continuously and systematically."

The New Deal Thirties witnessed further assaults on the integrity of information. In the U.S., the realities of the depression inspired a militant labor union campaign for recognition and power, one in which the Communists participated as allies. The conservative reaction to this movement was vicious, projecting an image of it as the secret "red" subversion of U.S. society—a mindless image which haunts the public consciousness even today. Imagined threats from front organizations and Fifth Columns brought further waves of tainted information. Thus the stage was set for the massive escalation of mistrust in any information not certified "pure" by the U.S. government. Since it could have the field to itself, all competitors were labeled un-American.

What the government would do with this power was not yet clear, but its existence and potential for abuse could not be denied—an incredible opportunity for any proponent of the Bernays school of manipulation.

Other trends in the years immediately preceding Pearl Harbor accelerated the information counter-revolution. The growth of classification expanded the domain of U.S. secrecy and the ability of government officials to conceal or selectively leak information on behalf of their own political agendas. Loyalty oaths and security checks came into being, designed to eliminate disclosure of this same material.

"Subversive activities" and espionage, meanwhile, became top priorities for the U.S. government, justifying generalized surveillance of a population considered suspect. Covert intelligence activity would soon come to serve the information management of successive U.S. Administrations.

World War II and the New Disinformation

On the eve of its second crusade to save the world, the U.S. was also poised on the brink of a new information era. How secret its policies would become, to what extent it would adopt the techniques of deception, and how each of these would affect democratic decision-making began to emerge as the war progressed. These questions were illuminated in the dramatic struggle for power which occurred between the Office of War Information (OWI), essentially a civilian organization charged with the mission of promoting an understanding of the war to the world at large, and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the wartime predecessor of today's CIA. These two agencies had irreconcilable differences over the nature and purpose of propaganda. The OSS victory in this struggle would foreshadow the growth of an Orwellian Ministry of Truth to be used as a covert instrument of Cold War policies against a new enemy—the Soviet Union. But all that came later.

Elmer Davis, OWI Director and ex-newsmen, began WWII believing his agency should deal in facts, not opinion, disseminating truths to friend and enemy alike—something the BBC's wartime broadcasts were attempting to accomplish. But neither President Roosevelt nor the Army, Navy, and State Departments believed that the public had a right to know what was really going on. (Documents recently obtained under the Freedom of Information Act even suggest U.S. foreknowledge of Pearl Harbor.) In any case, the war-related bureaucracy remained adamant about sharing information with the OWI, se-
Colonel William J. Donovan, head of the OSS, on the other hand, had an adventurer's enthusiasm for secret operations, dirty tricks, and disinformation of the crudest sort. Psychological warfare dominated the OSS approach to the war, though neither its costs nor its benefits to the American people were evaluated. Nor was truth considered a weapon of any potential.

Psychological warfare thus sold itself to the high command and the OWI was forced to adopt the methods of its competitor, subordinating all information projects to the expedient of winning the war. Interestingly, it was hardly this capitulation which influenced the course of the war, since the same methods of manipulation were carried to the extreme by the enemy—the Goebbels approach to information.

By the time hostilities ended, the OWI had become a converted exponent of American power, its liberal one-world ideology long since subordinated to the commitment of U.S. involvement in every region of the world. Nowhere, their propaganda now claimed, could the U.S. "renounce its moral and ideological interests . . . as a powerful and righteous nation."

In the OSS similar readjustments of priorities took place. Where once psychological warfare had at least been balanced by careful intelligence analysis to secure and interpret information, covert operations with their deceptive components of subverting and transforming facts became the new intelligence obsession.

In sum, a watershed had been reached. Information thereafter became Bernays's reality—an "unseen mechanism" by which "intelligent minorities" shaped the opinions of the masses by deceiving them.

The Intelligence Era: Information Goes Underground

During the controversy surrounding publication of the Pentagon Papers in 1971, Leslie Gelb, in charge of producing that voluminous and revealing report for the New York Times, commented on the continuing Cold War dedication to the philosophy of Bernays. "Most of our elected and appointed leaders in the national security establishment," he confirmed, "felt they had the right—and beyond that the obligation—to manipulate the American public in the national interest as they defined it." The same notion in abbreviated form slipped out in an exchange between Defense Secretary McNamara's press spokesman and a group of reporters in 1962: "It's inherent in the government's right, if necessary, to lie to save itself," the aide argued.

The right to manipulate and the right to lie have had other post-war companions: the right to plausibly deny; the right to a cover story; the right to conceal; and the need to know, a standard of classification that created another right, that of privileged access, with its step-child, the right to selectively leak.

In analyzing the period since the atom bombs leveled the Japanese will to resist, it is as if the intelligence agencies had not yet heard that the war was over, and are still hiding in caves on some Washington atoll. Yet the patterns which have unfolded are a logical outcome of the wartime experience, beginning with the failure to reorganize, control, or totally dismantle the secret coercive machinery which was created for that war. Quite the contrary. Stopping international communism provided the rationale for the even broader mandate for world-wide conquest—the neocolonialism and imperialism of the new empire. And to help in those operations, the U.S. intelligence agencies had no qualms about enlisting the support of their former enemies—the Gehlen intelligence network of Nazi Germany.

Documents of some of the early proposals to set up the central intelligence unit—the present CIA—give a flavor of the crisis atmosphere with which they viewed the future struggle against the Soviet Union: "the task of detecting . . . any developments which threaten the security of the world!" "to create a system in which every U.S. citizen who travels abroad . . . is a source of political intelligence;" "maintaining a constant check on foreign intelligence and propaganda, including propagandized U.S. citizens;" and "keep . . . informed on political trends inside the U.S. . . . because state legislatures are peculiarly vulnerable to outside influences and would be a logical objective of foreign intelligence services . . . ." It is small wonder that the CIA's fears became self-fulfilling prophesies.

Early CIA post-war victories over communism—such as the Italian elections of 1948, bought and paid for unwittingly by the American people—brought about unholy alliances as distasteful as those the intelligence agencies had made with the war criminals, dealings with the Mafia and the attendant corruption which comes with sharing a dirty secret with thugs.

Later the Korean War produced an equally important impact on the spy operatives' own psychological outlook. Korea revived the atmosphere of total war, and created an "anything goes" philosophy directed against the "enemy." It meant, as General Maxwell Taylor argued in 1961 with reference to Fidel Castro, there would be a policy of "no long-term living with . . . dangerously effective exponents of communism and anti-Americanism." Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), Vietnam (1954-1973), Brazil (1962), Indonesia (1965), and Chile (1973) were among the targets of covert operations encouraged by this philosophy.

But the strangest outcome of all in this web of deceit and disinformation was its coming home to roost. The intelligence establishment actually began to eat its own vomit. False propaganda fed into foreign outlets came to be reported back to the U.S. and the government began to make policy decisions based on its own lies.

U.S. Disinformation Today

In spite of the long history of U.S. government propaganda, disinformation, and lying, each succeeding Administration insists it is clean, inventing alternative sources on whom to place the blame for the corruption of communications and dialogue. None of them wants the public to find the pea under the shell in this age-old con game. President Reagan has naturally accused the Soviets of introducing the practice. The State Department has fostered the myth that disinformation is a Russian word. Dezinformatsiya, according to one of their busy little defectors, Ladislav Bittman, is the province of "Directorate A" of the KGB. Bittman, a Czech who left his country well over ten years ago, only recently began making these widely-reported pronouncements about disinformation. The au courant darling of the right-wing press, he conveniently confirms their suspicions about Soviet global intentions, while Reagan warns television audiences about Soviet-style runways and Cuban-style army barracks. The danger is that through incessant repetition of the word, disinformation has become synonymous in the minds of the American public with Soviet intelligence operations.

Historical facts, however, point to quite another conclusion as the preceding sections have indicated. Disinforma-
tion has clearly been part of the U.S. intelligence, military, and Cold War offensive waged in peacetime since the end of World War II, an integral part of national security which has no clear relationship to truth or the beliefs of its practitioners. And as the activists of U.S. foreign policy, the CIA is its chief author.

**Exposing Media Operations**

In 1975, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (the Church Committee), in an investigation of CIA wrongdoing, revealed just a tiny portion of the extent of CIA penetration of world media. It was patently obvious to the investigators that only U.S. intelligence agencies could practice the art of disinformation on such a grand scale, given the extraordinary expense of manipulating, influencing, and outright purchasing of news throughout the world. The number of organizations and persons who must be paid off to place fictitious stories across the globe is staggering. Almost ten years ago the Church Committee said it had found evidence of more than 200 wire services, newspapers, magazines, and book publishing complexes owned outright by the CIA. A 1977 *New York Times* expose uncovered another 50 media outlets run by the CIA, inside and outside the U.S., with more than twelve publishing houses responsible for over 1000 books, some 250 of them in English. Beyond the wholly-owned proprietaries there were countless agents and friendly insiders working in media operations around the world. These exposures are, of course, only the tip of the iceberg. The mind reels at what remained hidden from Congress and the *New York Times* and continues so to the present.

Estimates of the portion of the U.S. intelligence budget—kept secret from the American people and Congress—devoted to propaganda range from a few to many billions of dollars a year. An extremely conservative guess in the December 1981 *Defense Electronics* put the overall U.S. intelligence budget for that year at $70 billion, of which about $10 billion, they said, went to the CIA. Media specialists have estimated that at least one third of the CIA's budget is devoted each year to the spread of disinformation, conservatively placing CIA covert media manipulation alone for that year at almost three and a half billion dollars. None of this takes into account the myriad of income-generating proprietaries owned by the CIA, firms which make a profit which is then poured back into more covert operations: CIA banks, holding companies, airlines, investment firms, and the like.

Anyone who has even a casual knowledge of the world hard currency situation knows that the Soviet Union does not have the kind of foreign exchange which billion dollar operations entail. Only the secret U.S. intelligence budget—taken from unwitting American taxpayers—can pay for inventing news on such a mammoth scale. And invent they do, as we shall see below in an examination of a few of their hysterical scenarios.

**The Levels of Disinformation**

Spreading disinformation involves four levels of activity, a complex architecture that suggests how devious, costly, and important this activity has become. It currently runs from overt propaganda of the more traditional sort through covert operators and various public, non-governmental disinformation peddlers to the deliberate scapegoating of the enemy as the source of documents and events which have been manufactured domestically.

The most well-known overt propaganda outlet for foreign consumption available to the U.S. is the Voice of America (VOA) and other projects of the United States Information Agency (USIA). Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL), propaganda operations directed against Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, were originally covert U.S. intelligence operations. But when it became an open secret that they were financed by the CIA, they were taken out of the closet for direct Congressional funding in 1971. Though the government claims they are "private corporations," their employees must still go through extensive security clearances. Recent revelations about ex-Nazis who were absorbed into RFE/RL after World War II should invite closer scrutiny of these propaganda tools.

Inflammatory broadcasts by RFE in the 1950s misled a small number of Hungarian people to rebel in 1956, believing the U.S. was ready to intervene on their behalf. The ensuing uproar forced RFE to modify its broadcasting methods, though its recent diatribes against Poland are reminiscent of the Hungarian fare—but on a more sophisticated plane. Similarly, broadcast propaganda by the CIA's Radio Swan played a part in inducing the Bay of Pigs invaders of Cuba in 1961 to believe, quite incorrectly, that the Cuban population would support them. And, as the U.S. seldom learns from its mistakes, the energy the Reagan Administration has spent attempting to blackmail Congress into establishing Radio Marti against Cuba will surely backfire again.

In addition to its broadcasts, RFE/RL openly operate the largest "private" research facility in the west which concentrates on information gathering—or spying—on Soviet and Eastern European nations, and on communist and socialist affairs.

But perhaps the most chilling "overt" propaganda project of the U.S. government to date is the newly unveiled Democracy Institute.

This $85 million-a-year panorama of intelligence collection, recruitment, and training complete with a covert op-
erections section, rivals the CIA's most ambitious media plans. It was quietly begun in January after a classified Executive Order was signed by President Reagan. This plan is discussed more fully in the conclusion below.

The second level of media activities of the U.S. government are the covert operations in the traditional sense. In theory, these deception operations are directed at influencing foreign, not domestic, opinion. Prior to December 1981, domestic activities were theoretically forbidden by the CIA's charter and by the Executive Orders governing CIA behavior. For all practical purposes, however, the charter was systematically violated. But now under President Reagan's Executive Order 12333, the CIA can operate within the United States so long as what it does is not "intended" to influence public opinion domestically. Who or what determines CIA "intentions" is not specified, leaving a wide open field for more blatant manipulation of U.S. public opinion.

Even operations conducted entirely abroad are liable to cause "blowback," the situation wherein the U.S. media picks up reports from overseas, disseminating them at home, without realizing (or caring) that the reports are false and emanate from U.S. intelligence in the first place. Blowback is very dangerous; in Vietnam there was so much CIA disinformation being spread that U.S. military intelligence reports were often unwittingly based on complete fabrications which had been produced at CIA Headquarters. In other cases, the CIA itself performed as an anti-intelligence agency in which the covert operators had to supply the information that the policy makers wanted. Government thus became the victim of its own disinformation line, compounding the original damage and leading officials to be twice removed from reality. (Numerous examples of this are documented in Deadly Decrees: My 25 Years in the CIA, a recent book by Ralph W. McGehee [Sheridan Square Publications, New York: 1983].)

One of the most graphic examples of an intentional blowback operation was cited by former CIA officer John Stockwell in his book about Angola, In Search of Enemies. In order to discredit the Cuban troops who were aiding the MPLA government forces in that country's war with South Africa, CIA propagandists in Kinshasa, Zaire, came up with a story about Cuban soldiers raping Angolan women. Using an agent/stringer for a wire service, the Agency had the story passed into the world media. Subsequently it was embellished by further spurious reports of the capture of some of the Cubans by the women they had raped, of their trial, and of their execution by their own weapons. The entire series, spread out in the U.S. press over a period of several months, was a complete CIA fabrication.

Some covert media operations have been run on a very grand scale. One of the largest was Forum World Features, ostensibly a global feature-news service based in London, but in fact a CIA operation from the beginning. When its cover was blown it was forced to suspend operations. Similarly, the CIA owned outright, among other papers, the Rome Daily American, for decades the only English language paper in Italy.

In the third instance of press manipulation, the U.S. disguises its handiwork by engaging in the double whammy: accusing the Soviet Union of disseminating the phoney documents it has itself produced. Given the widespread coverage these charges receive, the "proof" is astonishingly contradictory. Last year, for example, a supposedly bogus letter from President Reagan to King Juan Carlos of Spain was publicly denounced by the State Department as a Soviet forgery because it had errors in language and, as one officer noted, "it fits the pattern of known Soviet behavior." The previous year, another document was called a Soviet forgery because it was "so good" it had to be a Soviet product. Periodically the government will call forth one of their stable of "defectors" to confirm that something is a forgery and the U.S. media buy it without much question. Several short-lived triumphs of the intelligence establishment show, however, that sometimes the people are not fooled, causing the press to reexamine their proffered themes. The State Department "White Paper" on Cuban aid to El Salvador, and the incredible Libyan "hit squad" saga are two examples. The White Paper, an unsuccessful attempt to recreate a Gulf of Tonkin situation, was shown by the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, and Philip Agee to have been based on government forgeries and mistranslations. The hit squad rumors which made headlines for several days disappeared—from the country and from the news—when Jack Anderson finally admitted he had been duped by his "intelligence sources."

The Disinformation Agents

Finally there are the disinformation peddlers—people who may or may not at a given moment be in the direct employ of the CIA or other intelligence agencies, but who can be counted on to repeat, embellish, or pass on whatever their disinformation masters in Washington decree. Here ideology is often as important as salary. Organizations like the Heritage Foundation and Accuracy in Media can be counted on to run with whatever balderdash the government wants spread, when they are not inventing it themselves.

The greatest assistance in disinformation—especially during the current Administration—is always forthcoming from the Reader's Digest. In 1977 the Times series exposed Digest editor John Barron as having worked hand in glove with the CIA on a book about the KGB. Other fraudulent journalists like Robert Moss, Arnaud de Borchgrave, or what determines CIA "intentions" is not specified, leaving a wide open field for more blatant manipulation of U.S. public opinion.

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Daniel James, Claire Sterling, and Michael Ledeen, among others, seem to pick up disinformation themes almost automatically. In fact, coordination between the development of propaganda and disinformation themes by the covert media assets, the overt propaganda machine, and the bevy of puppet journalists is quite calculated. A theme which is floated on one level—a feature item on VOA about Cuba for example—will appear within record time as a lead article in Reader’s Digest, or a feature in a Heritage Foundation report, or a series of “exposes” by Moss and de Borchgrave or Daniel James in some reactionary tabloid like Human Events or the Washington Times or Inquirer. Then they will all be called to testify by Senator Denton’s Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, repeating one another’s allegations as “expert witnesses.”

After that they are given credibility by the “respectable” Cold War publications like the National Review, Commentary, and the New Republic. And finally, since they have repeated the theme so many times it must be true, they are given the opportunity to write Op Ed pieces for the New York Times or the Washington Post.

These interconnections are by no means fortuitous. There is practically a revolving door policy from organization to organization, from the government, the CIA, to the “private” media, or the reversal of that process. The new director of VOA, Kenneth Tomlinson, for example, was formerly a Reader’s Digest editor, who is hosted at black-tie parties by his old friend, McCarthyite Roy Cohn. Arnaud de Borchgrave, who works actively with several governments’ security services, has a difficult time keeping his “journalism” and his spying separate. One of the reasons he was fired from Newsweek magazine was that he kept dossiers on the co-workers whom he suspected of being KGB dupes. Robert Moss has also had a longtime relationship with the CIA, which financed his book on Chile. He too was “let go” from his job as editor of the London Economist’s Foreign Report because his intelligence connections gave his columns a taint which could not be ignored. The Spike, a badly written novel by these two unsavory characters, presaged the disinformation era with all its ramifications.

The Plot Against the Pope

A year ago, USIA Director Charles Z. Wick commented that the U.S. is “waging a war of ideas with our adversaries,” whereupon he begged for more funds for VOA broadcasts. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Wick said “we are refuting the massive Soviet campaign of disinformation and misinformation about us and our intentions in the world.” In particular, according to Wick, the Soviets are guilty of spreading “rumors and lies” such as the contention that the United States was involved in the attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II. While no documentation was presented to Congress, it is now apparent that Wick and the Reagan government believe in the adage that the best defense is a good offense. At the same time he was testifying, the VOA had already prepared a major campaign to assert the contrary, that the KGB through its Bulgarian “surrogates” was behind the plot to kill the Pope.

All the disinformationists have now joined in. Claire Sterling wrote the first major article which espoused this argument, replete with “confirmations” from unidentified “confidential” sources. (Sterling’s disinformation efforts go back to postwar Italy when she worked with William Colby to ensure the defeat of the Italian Communist Party, spreading propaganda in the Rome Daily American, a CIA proprietary.)

Reader’s Digest ran the Sterling piece on the Pope, and variations on the theme soon appeared throughout the right-wing press. Then the TV networks picked it up, particularly Marvin Kalb of NBC who narrated a “documentary” following the Sterling thesis, though Kalb was forced to admit (rather unprecedented in a prime time “documentary”) that there was no proof whatsoever for the claim being advanced at that time. No matter, “proof” would soon be forthcoming.

The situation became even more complicated when, in the absence of any resounding denouement to the hysteria, conservative legislators, led by New York Senator Alfonse D’Amato, blamed the CIA for hampering efforts to prove the KGB guilty. The logic of this argument is missing. Nevertheless, Wick took to the air in February 1983 to say that the VOA believed the CIA was not hampering the investigation. This “news” was apparently based on assurances from Vice-President Bush, a former Director of the CIA.

Given the absurdity of the original charge, and the consequent absence of evidence, it remains a very clever ploy of
the right wing to assert a cover-up, keeping the whole story playing in the news.

The Nuclear Freeze Plot

Nearly all the cast of characters discussed above are involved actively in pursuing another major theme which strains credulity: that the nuclear freeze movement in part, and the disarmament movement in general, is also a KGB plot, and its proponents Soviet dupes or "agents of influence." The litany for this sermon was, once again, an article in Reader's Digest, cited by no less avid a reader than President Reagan. The President, however, was not eager to give his source. Having referred to "proof positive" at a press conference, he left it to aides later to reveal that his "intelligence source" was, in fact, Reader's Digest.

Some of the covert media experts who have pushed the nuclear freeze plot include self-described police agents and informants such as John Rees, a fanatical right-wing activist who spent much of the 1960s and 1970s infiltrating first the anti-war movement and then the anti-nuclear movement. He is now a writer for the John Birch Society's Review of the News, editor of a police intelligence report on the left called Information Digest and the editor of Western Goals Reports, a far right organization connected with Rep. Larry McDonald. Rees is the author of a book entitled "The War Called Peace," which advances the theory that Soviet disarmament proposals are in reality warmongering that must be countered with massive weapons buildups in the name of peace. This is the level of logic surrounding the entire anti-freeze movement, recently adopted even by the lunatic fringe of rightists, Lyndon LaRouche and his "National Democratic Policy Committee."

Cuba and the Drug Trade

One of the most insidious of the continually unfolding disinformation themes currently propagated by the U.S. government is the attempt to implicate high Cuban government officials—including the commander of the Cuban armed forces, Raul Castro—in international drug-trafficking. This campaign was recently escalated by the blatant covert manipulation of the U.S. judicial system on a scale hardly seen since the Rosenberg-Sobell proceedings.

The creation of this theme can be traced to the highest levels of the Reagan Administration: from a VOA campaign orchestrated by President Reagan's good friend, USIA Director Charles Z. Wick, to a trial in Miami sponsored by the Justice Department. The criminal charges—at least those purporting to show Cuban government involvement—were so ludicrous that at first only the Miami Herald (with deep ties to the Cuban exile community) saw fit to play them up. But in April, Sen. Alfonse D'Amato held "hearings" in New York and got big play in the New York Times and on national TV (see sidebar).

The VOA campaign began in early 1982 with a series of reports in February and March which suggested Cuba's involvement in drug traffic to the U.S. Some reports said that the purpose was to get drug smugglers to run guns to the FMLN in El Salvador or to the M-19 in Colombia; some said it was to raise money for those guns; and some said it was to drug the American people into a stupor, presumably to facilitate a takeover. None of the reports seemed concerned that one reason was inconsistent with another.

The VOA then broadcast an interview with the Foreign Minister of Colombia, who repeated the charges and speculated that the Cubans were working with the Mafia. This was rather ironic, considering that for more than twenty years the Mafia has worked hand in glove with the CIA trying to assassinate Fidel Castro, out of bitterness for having lost their drug, gambling, and prostitution empires to the revolution in Cuba. The VOA also gave extensive coverage to similar stories from a Colombian newspaper, suggesting that Cuba and the Mafia were cooperating in the drug business. These reports came from the same Colombian news outlets which had spread the scurrilous story that Celia Sanchez, one of the heroines of the Cuban revolution who had long been suffering with cancer, had been killed in a shootout between Raul and Fidel Castro.

In March, Deputy Secretary of State Thomas Enders was broadcast by VOA throughout Latin America repeating the Colombian news reports about drugs and Cuba almost verbatim.

While this disinformation was being spread in the hemisphere, a similar campaign was being waged within the U.S. But before analyzing that propaganda geared to domestic consumption, it is well to understand the significance of the campaign abroad. The goal, as with most propaganda directed against Cuba, is to isolate Cuba from the rest of Latin America, to make it appear a foreign—i.e., Soviet—entity, divorced from other Latin American or Caribbean countries. It is only by so isolating Cuba that the U.S. can encourage active measures against it—like the breaking of diplomatic relations—without creating contradictions in its own Monroe Doctrine pronouncements. Moreover, traditionally, both politically and culturally, Cuba has been in the mainstream of Latin American and, more recently, Caribbean thought, with an influence the U.S. has taken great pains to lessen.

During the middle of 1982, the campaign against Cuba was less intensive, because of the hemisphere's preoccupation with the Malvinas crisis. American disregard for Latin American opinion in aiding the U.K. in that war underscored the hypocrisy of the U.S. position. But the VOA's loss was the New York Post's gain. In June, the Post,
Rupert Murdoch's gutter paper, ran a three-part series entitled "Castro's Secret War," by Arnaud de Borchgrave and Robert Moss. The articles by these sleazy fabricators not only repeated the basic charge of Cuban involvement in the drug trade, but also gave minute details—names and dates and alleged meetings. Not sourced, the "facts" presented were that several middle-level drug smugglers had had meetings with Raul Castro and Nicaraguan leader Daniel Ortega. They hinted that this information might have come from a Colombian smuggler named Jaime Guillot.

Indeed Guillot starred in the next chapter of the saga, when, in July, Reader's Digest ran a five-page article by a Nathan M. Adams based on unnamed "law-enforcement and intelligence sources." This "expose," even more detailed than the Moss/de Borchgrave tripe, alleged that Guillot met with Rene Rodriguez, a member of the Central Committee of Cuba and the president of the Cuban Friendship Institute, and that Rodriguez "was in charge of coordinating the smuggling." It further claimed that Guillot traveled from Colombia to Cuba to Nicaragua, meeting with Raul Castro and receiving huge sums of money; that he was given $700,000 in Mexico for a flight to France, but that he was arrested by the Mexicans, whereupon he began "talking his head off," providing all the details for the article. What happened to the money—rather a large sum for a trip to France—and why Guillot was never extradited to the U.S. are not explained. Later reports suggest that Guillot was released by the Mexicans and went to Europe.

In August the drug story gained further dubious currency as the Washington Times, Reverend Moon's paper, reprinted the original Post series. By November VOA was picking up the theme again, and just before the U.S. congressional elections Vice-President Bush made a Republican campaign speech in Miami which reiterated the charges. Hot on his heels, on November 5, 1982, a Miami federal grand jury issued an indictment against Guillot, and Robert Moss. The articles by these sleazy fabricators not only repeated the basic charge of Cuban involvement in the drug trade, but also gave minute details—names and dates and alleged meetings. Not sourced, the "facts" presented were that several middle-level drug smugglers had had meetings with Raul Castro and Nicaraguan leader Daniel Ortega. They hinted that this information might have come from a Colombian smuggler named Jaime Guillot.

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In a carefully staged command performance, designed to keep the network cameras rolling, Sen. D'Amato (R-N.Y.) and the FBI, CIA, DEA, and other federal, state and local narcotics and investigative agents introduced a self-confessed Cuban "spy" to an audience of credulous New York journalists in early April—but this time Mario Estevez Gonzalez, who had testified in open court in Miami only two months before, was melodramatically hidden behind a guarded screen "for his own protection." The same federal informer who was described by the Miami Herald as a "short, stocky Mariel refugee" and a "chubby, balding witness" who stuttered, who was seen by millions, including those in Cuba who wished to watch Miami TV, was now tantalizingly secreted from New York cameras in a downtown Federal building, thus exciting the unwarranted interest of the media and moving the "Cuba Drug Connection" to a new low in disinformation.

Few of the journalists knew or cared that this was old news. Apparently unaware of the Miami trial and Estevez's previous charade, they stood at hushed attention filming a screen as the Spanish and then English translation wafted across. That night TV audiences across America were treated to clips of D'Amato questioning the screen. The following exchange took place, but was not telecast:

Q. How much money did you make for Cuba by selling cocaine?
A. Approximately $7 million in one year.
Q. How did the process work?
A. I got the cocaine from Cuba or from Colombian ships in Cuban waters, took it by "cigarette boat" (a long, narrow speed boat which goes 70 mph) from Cuba to Miami and then sold it and took the money back to Cuba by cigarette boat.
Q. How long did the whole process take?
A. 30 days.

Q. How many trips did you make?
A. I went 2-3 times a month.

No wonder D'Amato and the Feds are hiding Estevez from enquiring eyes. Anyone who can make a 30-day trip three times a month is really worth questioning a bit more closely. Though similar contradictions in his testimony were pointed out by defense lawyers in Miami to no avail, the press still failed to pick up the grossest of inconsistencies. But at one point in the New York side-show even the gullible had to chuckle. Estevez claimed that although most of his cocaine was bound for New York, he had made only one delivery there personally: to Studio 54. (The specter of a dumpy little drug dealer slipping into a New York disco with his baggies wouldn't have cut ice with the journalists, but then they couldn't see him anyway.)

Another major flaw in the federal scenario is that Estevez was arrested with marijuana, and not even in the same case as those he was paid to testify against. In addition, cocaine was never mentioned in the Miami trial.

The charge of Estevez that among the 125,000 Marielitos invited into the U.S. by then-President Carter were 3,000 Cuban undercover agents, at least 400 of whom were dealing drugs like himself, practically brought D'Amato to his feet. "These 300-400 Cuban agents show there is a pervasive, systematic movement by Cuba to destabilize our cities," he said. Furthermore, the Senator mused, if Estevez was delivering $7 million a year to Cuba, then "Cuba is making $2 billion, 800 million on these agents." News to Cuba, of course.

As the stories get wilder and wilder, and "investigative" journalists get increasingly docile, the U.S. government has unfortunately learned that the press will believe anything told them as long as it comes with the protective coloration of "national security."
nine other drug smugglers, mostly Cuban exiles, and—in an unprecedented move—four Cuban officials: Rodriguez, an admiral of the Cuban Navy, and two former officials of the Cuban Embassy in Bogota, one of them the Ambassador.

Eight of the nine smugglers were arrested in Miami, and one of them, David Lorenzo Perez, testified against the others. His statements, similar to those attributed to Guillot in the earlier articles, and those of another unindicted dealer, a self-described reformed Cuban spy, Mario Estevez Gonzalez (see sidebar) were the only evidence against the Cuban officials.

In fact, no drugs were actually introduced at the subsequent trial. It was said the drugs were all thrown overboard when the smugglers panicked. The Estevez confession, according to his own testimony, was given in exchange for “an unspecified amount of money and a short jail sentence” in another drug case.

The payment is extraordinary, almost unheard of. Four Cuban officials were indicted on the statement of a man who was paid to make the statement! What, if anything, happened to Guillot is not known; but it was reported that his drug dealing partner, who also “cooperated” with the U.S. Justice Department, got a twenty-five-year jail sentence all of which was suspended.

Although the indictment describes in great detail the movements and travels of the exiled drug dealer, the references to the four Cuban officials are extremely vague. It alleges that they agreed to let Cuba be used as a “loading station and source of supplies for ships” transporting drugs. The indictment, eight counts and nineteen pages, says nothing else about the Cuban officials. It does not say when this “agreement” was made, where it was made, who met with whom nor who said what to whom.

In the February 1983 trial, five of the seven hapless defendants were found guilty, on the testimony of the alleged former spy and the indicted smuggler who turned state’s evidence. The two told similar tales, of backslapping jovial meetings with the Cuban officials who, they claimed, said things like, “Now we are going to fill Miami with drugs,” and, “It is important to fill the United States with drugs.” (As if Miami were not already filled with drugs.) The “spy” said that he replied, “Well, if it has to be filled, let’s do it.”

Evidently this B-movie dialogue was sufficient to convict five of the defendants, who presumably were involved in some kind of drug trafficking.

The use of this trial by the U.S. government was blatant; there was no concern about Miami’s drug problem, only about Cuba. When Lorenzo Perez agreed to plead guilty and testify against the others, the spokesman for the Drug Enforcement Administration announced that “when you have people pleading guilty, it just disproves; the denials of the Cuban government. And when the five were convicted, the Assistant U.S. Attorney said that the outcome “demonstrates” the involvement of Cuba.

The Cuban government indignantly denied the charges, pointing out in government statements and broadcasts and in an editorial in Granma the idiocy of the charges. The Cubans also stressed a point which had been virtually ignored in the U.S. press—that for more than ten years, despite all sorts of ideological disputes, Cuban authorities had been cooperating with U.S. officials in tracking and capturing drug smugglers in the Caribbean. At least 36 ships and 21 planes had been taken in this endeavor and more than 230 drug smugglers prosecuted. Because of the insulting and specious indictment the Cuban government announced that it was discontinuing its cooperation with the U.S. Coast Guard.

Even Michael Ledeen, another disinformationist, pretended to be puzzled in his rehash of the Guillot story in the February 28, 1983 New Republic. He conceded that “Fidel Castro used to boast of his hatred of drug traffickers; he even cooperated with the United States by arresting some smugglers and turning them over to American authorities.” But, consistent with this season’s disinformation theme, Ledeen refers to the current situation as a “turnabout,” designed to provide hard currency for the Soviet Union.

There are countless other indications that it is the U.S. which is more interested in propaganda than in actually stopping drug traffic. During the aftermath of the Pope’s shooting it was learned that Bulgaria had been cooperating with U.S. narcotics control officials for twelve years, but that the program had been terminated by President Reagan shortly after he took office.

**Spy Budget Increase**

The **raison d’etre** of the Cuban drug/disinformation story becomes appallingly clear if one reads the newspapers in which the spy agencies selectively display their dirty linen. According to the New York Post of April 5, 1983—the same day as D’Amato’s coordinated sideshow—the tawdry daily reported that “President Reagan is planning to give U.S. intelligence agencies millions in new funds to crack Cuban spy and drug rings operating in the U.S.” The Post went on to say that Reagan made the request in the Administration’s secret 1984 budget for intelligence agencies, and that Sen. Daniel Moynihan (D-N.Y.) said that news of Reagan’s request “comes as a former Cuban intelligence agent testifies today in Manhattan about how he raised $3 million [sic—the testimony was $7 million] for Cuba by smuggling drugs into the U.S.”

Now how, we ask, is a request for more funds for the CIA, FBI, etc. made in a secret budget? Secondly, unless we’re missing something, the CIA is still forbidden by the National Security Act to work against Cuba or any other country, inside the U.S. Perhaps Reagan believes his Executive Order 12333 unilaterally repeals the Act. And finally, how come Reagan is already leaking 1984 Orwellian plans. Isn’t 1983 bad enough?
Elsewhere, as the democracy project unfolded, there were references to information as “a vital part of the strategic and tactical arsenal of the United States.” Wick again pictured ideas as the only useful weapons that could be shot at an enemy in the absence of hostilities—such as the Radio Marti venture aimed at Cuba. Other government officials elevated public diplomacy to the status of diplomatic and military policy in serving the needs of national security. But all spokesmen insisted that the United States at all times “must speak the truth, clearly, vigorously and persuasively.”

Since truth is the first casualty in war, whether total, limited, or ideological, as Woodrow Wilson put it, how is the Reagan Administration planning to pull off this miracle? They are not planning to, in all probability. What they are doing is building a new Trojan Horse so that the covert programs of deception, fake propaganda, slanted information, and disinformation can move forward without being under the suspect auspices of the CIA, DIA, and others of that ilk. “Project Democracy” and public diplomacy are clearly a rehabilitation process for government propaganda, an attempt to restore information manipulation under new sponsorship. Will it work? Will you believe it? Or are you ready to be fooled?

First of all, the proposal was born with original sin. Conceived in secrecy as a classified executive order, Project Democracy can hardly live up to its claim of democratic openness. A CIA covert feature initially existed in the plan, but was withdrawn, or so we and the Congress are told. Still, National Security Council Decision Directive 77 placed the program under the National Security Assistant’s control where it is “to support U.S. policies and interests.” Those chairing the top four committees come from agencies with long-time commitments to secrecy and the protective cover of classification. But there are more serious problems with this deformed Reagan progeny besides the wartime psychology that gave it birth and the secrecy with which it was raised.

On its face the idea is implausible because American foreign policies and CIA operations have not evidenced any connection with an infrastructure of democratic principles, except as they are manipulated to suit the purposes of the U.S. Democracies have had empires before, from Athens on. Whatever the U.S. may call its overseas political, economic, and cultural mission, its support of client regimes, its overthrow of leftist democratic governments, its active support of “moderately authoritarian” right-wing allies, its backing of powerful multinational corporations—none of that has ever been analyzed internally for its democratic fallout. The credibility of any government information must inevitably be tested against the deeds as well as the rhetoric of a nation.

What chance would the Democracy Institute have to gain access to the truth it insists it will disseminate? How will it know it is not part of the cover story, the way Adlai Stevenson was used at the U.N. during the Bay of Pigs? The very Administration that is increasing classification, unleashing the spy agencies, and restricting freedom of information now says it will spread the truth to the world to enhance democratic values out there. Tell that to the people of Chile.

Since the new proposals (budgeted at $85 million this year) call for a heavy reliance on non-governmental institutions, it is interesting to examine what has already been funded. One grant helped “media officials” from right-wing governments—including El Salvador—learn how to handle the U.S. press. Ian MacKenzie, a slick ideologue who was a registered agent for Anastasio Somoza is directing the program, at a cost of $170,000 to the taxpayers. (See CAIB Number 12.) Another grant gave Ernest Lefever’s Ethics and Public Policy Center almost $200,000 to run four seminars pushing the “ethics of nuclear arms.”

As these “democratic” projects went up to Congress, many of them smacked of the CIA’s old bag of dirty tricks finally getting laundered. A world-wide book publishing venture, a center for free enterprise (is business a democratic institution?), a foundation and organizations to promote Latin American “democracy,” and academic programs at two foreign universities. The announced objectives such as “leadership training,” sound like recruitment for covert futures, as the CIA does routinely with foreign students on American campuses. Project Democracy is the soft core version of hard core deception.

It is time the American people took a good dose of their own history to begin to understand what ails this society. One benefit might be a revival of old-fashioned American skepticism toward authoritative pronouncements. History has rebutted the argument of disinformation’s origin as a KGB plot, and traced its twentieth century development as a hidden partner of the imperial process and national security apparatus. We have learned that propaganda intruded itself into the democratic process long ago.

The most important lesson of history’s warnings, however, would be an understanding of what went wrong with information in the past to help people resist the inroads of further deception. The next time the government float a story, demand in each instance to know why it is propagating this information, whose interests it is serving, and what is being concealed. Then perhaps this country can abandon the process of government by the misinformed...
The KGB Plot to Assassinate the Pope: A Case Study in Free World Disinformation

By Frank Brodhead and Edward S. Herman*

Important sources of western power are the strength and reach of its mass media and the widespread belief that, in contrast with the Soviet bloc, the media are not instruments of propaganda. The belief rests on a partial truth, as the media do represent somewhat divergent interests and often disclose facts unpalatable to important power factions. But the mass media are an integral part of western power structures and, as such, they not only accept certain national/ western/ elite premises as self-evident truths, they serve as important cogs in periodic campaigns of "mobilization of bias." During such campaigns, useful half-truths or complete fabrications and myths are pressed home relentlessly and transformed into presumptive fact for the general public.

The mobilization of bias is made possible not only by a certain collective interest among western elites, but also by their domination of a centralized mass media which, in an age of national TV and improving techniques in advertising and mind control, enhances government and media power to "manage" the public. Particularly important in this process, now as in the past, is the exploiting of love of country, the will to believe one's own leaders, and the ready credence given to claims of enemy evil. In the 17th century, according to Daniel Defoe, "there were a hundred thousand stout countryfellows . . . ready to fight to the death against popery, without knowing whether popery was a man or a horse." In our day, there are millions of stout-hearted fellows ready to fight to the death against terrorism, without knowing whether terrorism is a man or a horse.

The point is confirmed by recent historical experience, including the Red Scare of 1919-1920, the hysteria of the Truman-McCarthy era, and the successful government claim of "aggression" by North Vietnam in 1964-1965. The Libyan assassination plot against President Reagan in 1982, given huge press coverage despite the absence of evidence, extreme implausibility, and the propagandistic convenience of this ploy, and then suddenly dropped without explanation or any follow-up assessment and reflection on what had transpired, is a very contemporaneous illustration of propaganda dissemination on a "print-and-run" basis. So is the recent claim of Soviet military superiority over the United States, a "follow-on" to a long series of fraudulent weapons "gaps" that are sustained in each case by the mass media just long enough for defense budgets to be passed and contracts to be let.

The institutionalization of outright lies occurs most readily in periods of conservative reaction, when liberals and radicals are on the defensive and without media access (or obliged to prove their patriotic credentials), and when the government and the business community tacitly agree on the need to work the public into a patriotic fervor. In such times, patriotic lies can be imposed by the sheer volume of the mass media's dissemination of unverified claims, and the simultaneous exclusion of inconvenient facts and opinions from public view.

The Bulgarian-KGB Connection—the alleged link of Mehmet Ali Agca and his attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II on May 13, 1981, to the Bulgarian government, the KGB, and thus the leaders of the Soviet Union—represents an almost perfect illustration of the mobilization of bias by means of a concocted Red Conspiracy. In this article, we analyze the alleged plot in its political and media context. In general, we will show that there are really two plots, but that neither of them involves the Soviet Union (except as the "fall guy"). The first plot is that of Mehmet Ali Agca and his fellow members of the Turkish Grey Wolves and National Action Party, who intended to kill the Pope for reasons of their own, quite explicable in terms of their ideology, traditions and record. The second plot, which is in the nature of a tacit conspiracy, is that which has evolved among political factions, intelligence agencies, governments, and important constituents of the mass media of the west, who have taken advantage of an opportunity to make a speculative (but fraudulent) case.

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1 While we assert this as a fact, it really represents our judgment that this is far and away the most probable scenario. A substantially lower but not negligible probability we would give to Agca’s having been recruited by another rightwing faction in western Europe, a number of which had ties to the Grey Wolves. In fact, one of the first investigations by the Italian police following the assassination attempt was into the possible involvement of the Armed Revolutionary Nuclei, the Italian rightist group that had carried out the Bologna railway station bombing.
against the Soviets in order to create a moral environment in the west which serves their ends.

The alleged Bulgarian-KGB Connection has become a focus of concentrated mass media attention in close parallel with two important political developments—namely, an intensified U.S.-Soviet propaganda conflict over the placement of new missiles in Europe, and the more critical stance being taken by the U.S. Roman Catholic Church as regards U.S. nuclear weapons policy. There has also been an additional remarkable correlation between the rising star of Yuri Andropov and an increasingly explicit "Andropov Connection" to the assassination attempt. Agca's late 1982 confession implicating three Bulgarian officials was extracted as Brezhnev neared death, and one Bulgarian official was arrested within three weeks of Andropov's assuming power. A Polish defector quickly assured the western that Andropov himself was personally the key to the plot, and Bulgarian defectors began to come on-stream in March 1983. Their testimony was treated by the press as objective news and to be taken at face value (Nicholas Gage, "The Attack on the Pope: New Link to Bulgarians,"

The political serviceability of the Bulgarian-KGB Connection to powerful forces in the west guarantees that the story will continue to be with us.

We give special attention here to the NBC TV programs on "The Man Who Shot the Pope—A Study in Terrorism," presented first in September 1982 and then repeated in sharply revised form in January 1983. These programs were not only influential, but they also typified much of the mass media's coverage of this issue in both style and substance. That style and the underlying methodology has strongly propagandistic qualities and conforms closely to what has been termed the "pseudoscience of terrorism."

Methodology: The Pseudoscience of Terrorism

In his Political Hysteria in America, a study of the Red Scare of 1919-1920, Murray B. Levin describes the methodology of the Lusk Report, a famous classic in the pseudoscience of terrorism, as follows:

The data is presented without any effort—serious or otherwise—to evaluate its validity or relevance. Generalizations and conclusions, unsupported by data, are sprinkled throughout. . . . The pseudoscholar proceeds to laboriously accumulate vast numbers of "details" and documents . . . Some of the details and documents refer to facts. Some of the details are fiction. Nothing remains unexplained. . . . Simultaneity is taken as proof of cause and effect . . . [V]ast historical forces [are assumed to be] set in motion by the mere will of a few monstrously evil but brilliant men. They pull puppet strings and duped and compliant millions act out their will.

This is a fair description of the essential qualities of the two NBC programs and of the writings of Claire Sterling, whose article in the Reader's Digest got the Bulgarian connection rolling and who served as a consultant to NBC in the preparation of its programs. By our count, which considered only the more egregious statements, the NBC program of September 21, 1982 included the following forms of manipulation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pure innuendo</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pure opinion or speculation</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inference based on no known evidence</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deceptive statement based on suppression of fact</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fact which NBC ignores in drawing its conclusions</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct misstatements of fact</td>
<td>6</td>
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Innuendo and speculation. A prime technique of Sterling and NBC, following the Lusk Report tradition, is the creation of atmosphere by the accumulation of details (often irrelevant), hints of "links," suppositions, and possibilities, and the expression or eliciting of opinion. For example, NBC noted that "The left also had a strong power base in Malatya [Agca's home town]. One of its leaders was Teslim Tore. His name is worth remembering" (Transcript I. [Tr.]-28). The only other reference to Tore in the NBC

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Pope John Paul II

New York Times, March 23, 1983), just as it did the findings of A. Mitchell Palmer in 1920 that (in the words of the New York Times) his raid "had blasted the most menacing revolutionary ploy yet unearthed" (Jan. 4, 1920) and the claims of Soviet invasion plans and intent to conquer the world by the numerous ex-Communists and defectors during the McCarthy era.2

We thus observe an impressive degree of fine-tuning of western "news" to the immediate propaganda needs of the more martial power factions of the west. It is now apparent that further revelations will inevitably appear around the time of major developments in the Geneva talks or in response to growing pressures for a U.S.-Soviet summit meeting. The listing of these propaganda ploys and violations of the rules of scientific evidence will be provided by the authors upon request. Send $1 to cover expenses to: Dr. E. S. Herman, 3238 Dietrich Hall, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104.

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program occurs when Agca, in one of his late “confessions,” dredges up the name of this home town leftist. Is the extreme rightist Agca, known in Turkey as a “notorious liar” (Marvine Howe), under interrogation in an Italian prison, a credible witness on this point? Or does this allegation that a name is “worth remembering” allow NBC to create the impression that a “leftist” is important without the listener being able to assess the value of the source?

As another illustration of this method of argument, NBC says that the Pope’s “nationalism has become indistinguishable from his Catholicism. During his time of trouble they have, for John Paul, become one. It is a dangerous combination” (Tr.-5-6). The first two sentences are mystification and unprovable; the last sentence creates atmosphere by asserting as a fact something still to be proved. Again, Agca’s escape from prison “is still a mystery with an intriguing question mark—could it have been related to the plot to kill the Pope?” (Tr.-37). Which plot? There was an Agca threat to kill the Pope in 1979 and a plot in 1981. As we will see, NBC never copes with a two plot sequence. But it keeps building atmosphere by a steady flow of rhetorical questions for which NBC has no answers based on evidence. Again, “Brezhnev, exasperated by the Pope, might have uttered the Russian equivalent of ‘Will no one rid me of this meddlesome priest?’” (Tr.-15). Such musings on what might have been in the mind of Brezhnev provide a continuous stream of implied conclusions without supportive fact. The same is achieved by asking selected Italian and Vatican witnesses to speculate on the plot. Most of them hint ominously that there was an international plot, but not only do they give no evidence whatsoever, most of them don’t even assert a KGB connection. But NBC uses this mass of nebulousness as manipulative background for its preferred scenario.

Uncritical use of disinformation sources. One of the main weapons of terrorism pseudoscience is the use of convenient facts from usually unreliable sources—most notably, intelligence agencies. Sometimes this is done knowingly—“planned gullibility”—but it is often a reflection of the loss of critical capacity in the search for proof of that which we know by instinct. It is well established that all intelligence agencies will forge and plant documents and lie where practicable, so that from at least one of them it is possible to obtain virtually any desired “fact.” Former CIA officer Ralph W. McGehee, for example, states that the CIA has “lied continually” and that “Disinformation is a large part of its covert action responsibility, and the American people are the primary target audience of its lies” (Deadly Deceits, p. 192). This is commonplace. E. Howard Hunt, a long time CIA agent working for the Nixon “plumbers,” with CIA knowledge and logistical support, even forged a document to implicate a former President of the United States, John F. Kennedy, in the assassination of Ngo Diem of South Vietnam. If CIA operatives will lie to discredit a U.S. president, of what would they be capable as regards foreign enemies?

Claire Sterling has been long noted for using, and serving as a conduit for, the Free World’s intelligence services. Conor Cruise O’Brien observes in a review of her Terror Network that Sterling “consistently assumes that anything she is told by her western intelligence sources must be true. Her copious but naive footnotes often refer to unnamed intelligence sources, whose veracity she simply takes for granted.” When it fits, her gullibility shows no limits. In that book she swallowed without blinking the “Tucuman Plan,” supposedly prepared “under KGB supervision” in Argentina’s Tucuman Province in May 1975, and calling for the mobilization of 1,500 Latin American “terrorists” to be sent to Europe for an orchestrated destabilization effort. This plan was uncovered by the Argentinian “security forces” just at the moment when the fascist junta was being subjected to worldwide criticism for its daily murders of trade unionists, journalists, priests, etc., and it conveniently suggested a Red Plot that demanded the solidarity of the Free World.

In the Terror Network Sterling also passed on the claims of unidentified “intelligence sources” that Henri Curiel, a Paris-based political activist, was a KGB agent. Sterling’s comrade-in-disinformation, Arnaud de Borchgrave, asserted that “all” western intelligence agencies agreed on Curiel’s KGB role. Curiel having already been murdered by unknown assailants, his family and other associates brought lawsuits in Paris against Sterling for slander. The
bear so clearly on Sterling’s credibility, were reported upon only in the back pages of the Washington Post, but were unmentioned in the New York Times, Time, Newsweek, or on the TV networks.

The fact that in the United States and Western Europe, Claire Sterling is a terrorism “expert,” and that NBC takes her on as a consultant, tells us a great deal about western standards of journalistic quality and integrity. In her article on the Bulgarian Connection in the Reader’s Digest, she asserts that the Soviet Union has been striving to destabilize Turkey, using terrorists of both the right and left, and spending upwards of $1 billion. This same set of bald assertions appears in the NBC program. We are also told there that Agca’s claim that he was trained in a PLO camp is “confirmed by Turkish intelligence” (Tr.-31). One would like to get Marvin Kalb on a witness stand to ask him about the basis for his faith in Turkish, Italian and U.S. intelligence sources. Marvin, do these services ever lie? How do you establish the truth or falsity of their claims? Is it possible that they might use you as a disinformation conduit? How do you know that the Soviets spent $1 billion to destabilize Turkey? If from an intelligence source, how were you able to confirm its accuracy? Marvin, like Sterling you accuse the CIA of dragging its feet on the KGB connection for ulterior motives. On what basis do you determine that they have no ulterior motives when they agree with you?

The key witness for NBC is Agca himself. In the latter part of 1982 Agca finally “confessed” satisfactorily—he had been aided by Bulgarians. This confession, allegedly “confirmed” by his identification of the photographs of several Bulgarians in Rome, along with his ability to describe the interior of the imprisoned Bulgarian’s apartment, is the new underpinning of the Bulgarian Connection. If Agca had been captured in Moscow and, after spending six months in solitary confinement, had implicated officials of the U.S. Embassy, with his new confession “confirmed” by photographic identification, we would not take the confession seriously. But of course the Soviets do not share our value system, and might coax, threaten and pre-identify the conspirators—whereas Italian intelligence shares our sense of right and wrong and would never do any such thing.

Agca actually made a number of confessions. NBC acknowledges that his first effort was false, as he allegedly tried to cover for his fellow conspirators. But NBC then proceeds to use Agca’s several confessions according to the convenience of the moment, failing to note the following problems: (1) In his first confession Agca mentioned both the Bulgarians and (more prominently) George Habash of the PLO, incompatible with covering for his Red masters. (2) Agca has consistently denied any involvement of the fascist National Action Party, the one group with whom he has been ideologically and personally closely associated since his high school days. (3) His bringing in of the Bulgarians followed numerous interrogations by the Italian security police in late December 1981 and through 1982. Italian newspapers reported that Agca had been threatened with release into the general prison population (largely Catholic, and not likely to look with favor on this Turkish

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5 See Jonathan C. Randal, “French Socialists Seek to Solve Slaying of Alleged Master Spy,” Washington Post, August 19, 1981, and “Court in Paris Fines Author of Terrorism Book,” Washington Post, March 30, 1982. Sterling made no effort to prove the truth of her case by innuendo—she and her publisher used her reliance on the methodology of terrorism pseudoscience to disclaim having said anything definite. It is noteworthy that the Moss-de Borchgrave novel The Spike, which makes quite analogous cases by fictional constructions attached to partially veiled real world figures, is hardly distinguishable in method and scholarly quality from the Terror Network and other works of the same genre. It is therefore entirely plausible that Accuracy In Media, an organization devoted to the “truth” as seen by Sterling and Moss, should pursue alleged error in the media and simultaneously press enthusiastically upon its members an openly fictional construction, The Spike.

6 Earlier, exclusive attention was given to Soviet motives plus Agca’s stay in Sofia, Bulgaria, as we discuss below.
murderer and assailant of the Pope). Moreover, a new "Penitent's Law" now allows magistrates to shorten the prison sentence of terrorists who cooperate with the police. (4) The whole case against the Bulgarians is built on Agca's photo identification and related detail, but there is only the word of Agca and the Italian secret police that Agca was not coached. (5) The Italian rightwing, well represented in the police, courts, and legislature (and on this issue including Craxi's "Socialist" party) has a powerful ideological stake and vested interest in pinning the assassination attempt on the Reds. They have been the key actors in discovering this new evidence. The fascist Agca should be amenable to cooperation in identifying his sponsors as Bulgarians.

None of these matters appear in any way in NBC's account, and in the mass media in general each of the above items is mentioned at best briefly and in passing. The consensus is that Agca, angry at an alleged betrayal by his

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**But How Does Agca “Know” All That?**

Commentators in the U.S. media maintain that the most persuasive evidence for a "Bulgarian Connection" lies in the fact that investigating magistrate Martella continues to hold the Bulgarian Antonov in prison. According to the Italian press, Antonov's imprisonment rests exclusively on Agca's identification of Antonov from a set of photographs, his knowledge of several phone numbers including those of the alleged conspirators and the Bulgarian Embassy, his ability to describe the interior of Antonov's and Ayvazov's apartments, and his description of meetings including one at which Antonov's wife and daughter were present.

In late March Antonov’s lawyer presented evidence to a “Tribunal of Freedom” in Italy that Antonov’s wife and daughter were out of the country on the date Agca claimed the meeting took place. The evidence included passport and visa stamps, and a motel registration in Yugoslavia authenticated by the Yugoslavian government. This evidence has not yet been ruled on by the tribunal.

Could Agca have been coached? This is suggested not only by his apparent lie about meeting Antonov’s family, but also by the Bulgarian claim that the apartment of one of the implicated Bulgarians, Ayvazov, had been broken into four times since September 1982, the same month in which Agca supposedly picked Ayvazov’s picture out of a photo album. Vassilli Dimitrov, First Secretary of the Bulgarian Embassy in Rome, noted in an interview with the Washington Post (Jan. 5, 1983) that Ayvazov’s apartment was in a building owned by the

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Todor Ayvazov

Sergei Antonov

Embassy and thus had extraterritorial status. “Italy would need permission to examine it,” he said, “and has not requested it.” Thus the Italian investigators do not even have legitimately acquired proof that Agca’s description of Ayvazov’s apartment is accurate. Nor does it seem credible, as Agca claims, that the assassination plot was hatched in this apartment or that a last minute stop was made there to pick up guns and a bomb before proceeding to St. Peter’s Square, if the Bulgarian assertion that the property was under continuous surveillance by the Italian authorities is true.

Agca, moreover, mistakenly described Antonov as having a beard and (as he does now) a mustache. Antonov’s lawyer presented witnesses and photographic evidence that Antonov was clean shaven in May 1981. If true, this would provide additional support for the coaching hypothesis.

Finally, what are we to make of Agca’s stupendous feat of memory in being able to repeat some half dozen telephone numbers after a year and a half in solitary confinement? (For we must reject out of hand the claim appearing in some Italian papers that the numbers were found in his pocket at the time of his arrest.) Bulgarian defense lawyers have pointed out that as Agca claimed to know the Bulgarians only by code names, his knowledge of the Embassy or consulate switchboard numbers was useless. The Bulgarians have also stated, in response to Agca’s alleged knowledge of Ayvazov’s “unlisted phone number,” that Ayvazov never had a phone at all.
Bulgarian employers, has finally been persuaded to disclose the truth.

**Suppression and distortion of inconvenient facts.** This is most notable in NBC's handling of Agca's fascist background and his link to the Grey Wolves or "Idealist Youth Association," a paramilitary arm of the fascist National Action Party (hereafter, NAP). As this fascist link is an alternative—and in our view, plausible—explanation of the basis of the assassination attempt, NBC suppresses and distorts this linkage without scruple.

**The Turkish Fascist Connection**

Within days of Agca's arrest on May 13, 1981, a fairly comprehensive picture of his short life was put together by the Italian police and press. It was quickly learned that Agca was Turkey's most notorious terrorist, and a lifelong associate of Turkey's mass fascist party, the NAP, and its affiliate, the Grey Wolves. Agca had been arrested and convicted for the assassination of Abdi Ipecki, one of Turkey's most influential newspaper editors in 1979, and a thorough investigation had then been conducted into his life and political connections. This evidence left no doubt that Agca had been closely involved with the Grey Wolves while still in high school, that he had been involved in a number of Grey Wolf armed actions while at the university in Istanbul, and that he had murdered the editor in a conspiracy involving at least two other members of the Grey Wolves. Finally, while in Turkey's maximum security prison during his trial, Agca escaped with the assistance of many soldiers and prison guards, also members of the Grey Wolves.

Much was also known about the NAP and the Grey Wolves. By coincidence a 945-page indictment of them was handed down in Turkey within two weeks of Agca's arrest in Rome. This indictment, immediately made public, contained extensive information on Turkish fascism and its elaborate network of supporting organizations in Western Europe. NBC makes no reference to this event or to this source of information, and fails to note that all of the people who apparently aided Agca between the time he left Turkey and the day he shot the Pope were associated with the Turkish fascist movement. Consider the following:

1. The person most frequently placed with Agca at the scene of the crime is Omar Ay, a longtime friend and a member of the Grey Wolves. NBC does not mention the Grey Wolf connection.
2. The supplier of the gun used by Agca, according to Italian police, was Omar Bagci, a member of the Grey Wolves. NBC attempts to divert attention to Horst Grillmeier, an Austrian gun dealer who was one of a half dozen people to buy and sell the gun through shops and between dealers before it reached Agca. Grillmeier is an attractive target because he obtained supplies from Eastern Europe. There is no evidence that Grillmeier had any connection whatsoever with Agca. Yet Sterling-NBC use his name as if relevant, as it provides Red Plot atmosphere ("The pseudo-scholar proceeds to laboriously accumulate vast numbers of 'details'... without any effort... to evaluate their validity or relevance.") At the same time, NBC fails to mention the fact that the man literally passing the gun to Agca was another Grey Wolf.
3. Agca's false passport was made out in the name of a Grey Wolf member, bore the picture of another Grey Wolf who closely resembled Agca, and was signed by a police official who was also a member of the Grey Wolves. NBC asserts that the passport was supplied to Agca by "Turkish gunrunners," a falsehood based on one of Agca's confessions (and which protects his Grey Wolf comrades).
4. The only known transfers of money to Agca during his travels came from members of the Grey Wolves, whose organizations extend throughout Europe and are well funded from their participation in smuggling and the drug trade. During his final period before the assassination attempt, Italian police intercepted a phone call in which Agca acknowledges receipt of money from Musar Cedar Celebi. NBC's updated version mentions this link, but fails to point out that Celebi was a high official of the Grey Wolves in Frankfurt, West Germany, and had previously been a leader of the NAP in Turkey. Besides this act of suppression, NBC frequently mentions sums of money readily available to Agca, as if this requires a mysterious (i.e., KGB) presence—failing to point out the large resources of the Grey Wolves and NAP, and the possibility that Agca, who shot two other persons during his Western European stay, was working in the smuggling network of the NAP, as simple explanations of the ready availability of funds.

5. NBC claims that Agca's escape from a Turkish prison in 1979 is "still a mystery." But one of NBC's more credible witnesses, a defector from the Grey Wolves, Ali Yurturslan, is quoted by NBC as saying that "I know this fact beyond any doubt—the Grey Wolves arranged Mehmet Ali Agca's escape from prison in Turkey, and his subsequent safe passage to Europe and Germany" (Tr.-46). At least three Turks are now in prison for aiding Agca's escape and many more were originally implicated. There is no mystery to Agca's prison escape—it fits a pattern that NBC evades by wearing blinders. Earlier, Claire Sterling's *Reader's Digest* article had stressed Agca's escape so as to connect him with an allegedly "radical" Minister of the Interior. Perhaps it was the belated discovery that the
The minister in question had been out of office for several weeks before the escape that led to this key link in Sterling's argument being quietly dropped in the NBC version.

(6) NBC assumes that the only reason why Agca would want to murder the Pope, other than as a hirings of the Kremlin, would be as an Islamic fanatic. Quickly establishing that Agca was not religious in this sense, NBC turns to its only alternative, the Soviets. Again, this is to ignore or misuse widely known evidence about Agca and the NAP. Agca, for example, had previously threatened to kill the Pope, shortly after his escape from prison in 1979. In a letter to a Turkish newspaper a few days after his prison escape, Agca wrote that "fearing the creation of a new political and military power in the Middle East by Turkey along with its brother Arab states, western imperialism has... dispatched to Turkey in the guise of a religious leader, the crusader commander John Paul." Without knowing Agca's precise motivation in first threatening and later actually shooting the Pope, his letter illustrates the connection between this act and the philosophical views of the NAP. Recall that Agca had been closely associated with the Turkish fascist movement since adolescence. The party aimed at establishing a fascist system on the basis of racism and chauvinism, behind the mask of 'nationalist-populism,' and it quoted from one of NAP leader Alparsan Turkes' books a passage saying that "the Turkish nation is a nation that is created with superior characteristics by God."

Ultranationalist and chauvinist, the NAP held Islam to be insufficiently Turkish. According to historian Feroz Ahmad, the ideological training of the Grey Wolves included an element of "hostility to Islam, described as the religion of the Arabs, and therefore alien to the Turkish character. If the Turks retained Islam, argued the ultranationalists, it must be Turkified" ("Agca: The Making of a Terrorist," Boston Globe, June 7, 1981). In training camps provided by well-to-do followers, thousands of young men like Agca were inculcated with the views of the Grey Wolves, who also came to dominate much of the school system in Turkey, particularly in the region where Agca grew up. There is every reason to believe that the Turkish fascists would regard Agca's act as did his brother, whom NBC quotes as saying: "I do not see my brother as a terrorist, he's a crusader" (Tr.-26). This clearly suggests sympathy with a political act—but NBC fails to explain or digest Agca's brother's view. It is incompatible with the fairy tale requirement that Agca had no politics or religion, and could therefore be easily recruited by an evil force as a hired mercenary.

In sum, Agca's affiliations and role were consistently and exclusively rightwing and centered in the Grey Wolves and NAP. And, as noted earlier, in his escape and travels through Europe, in his funding and in his contacts, Agca's links were to the same Grey Wolves-NAP network with which he had been associated from high school days. In conjunction with an understanding of the ideology of Turkish fascism, this provides us with a coherent explanation of Agca's links and motivation—one that NBC evades only by massive distortion and suppression of evidence.

The NBC Model (1): Soviet Motives

The initial NBC program rested its case heavily on Soviet motives. According to NBC, the Pope posed a threat to the Soviets because of his support of Solidarity and Polish nationalism, and more particularly from his alleged warning to the Soviet leadership that an invasion of Poland would cause him to lay down his crown and join the Polish resistance. The claim that an explicit message of that con-

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tent was delivered is neither plausible nor proven, but even assuming that it is valid, the strength of the resulting motive entails an assessment of benefits versus risks and costs. NBC ignores the latter issues entirely, and therefore begs the question.

On the advantage to the Kremlin of a murdered Pope, the NBC case is extremely thin. NBC claims that as far back as “early August,” 1980, the Pope feared a Soviet invasion and made this threat or promise to return to Poland if such an event transpired. According to NBC, the plot to murder the Pope was hatched in the late summer of 1980. Leaving aside the unlikelihood that the Pope would fear a Soviet invasion of Poland in early August, before the Gdansk shipyard strike had even started, it should be noted that Poland’s Catholic Church on the whole played a conservative role at that time in Poland, appealing to the strikers to return to work. Moreover, while the Soviet Union mobilized troops on the Polish border, “suggesting an invasion was imminent” (Tr.-15), there is no reason to suppose that this was more than bluster and a threat designed to support an internal resolution satisfactory to the Kremlin. An invasion would have been a disaster for Soviet foreign policy, given the fact that improving relations with Western Europe—to support the pipeline and to discourage the placement of Cruise and Pershing missiles—was of urgent importance to the Kremlin at that time. An invasion of Poland would have been a last resort contingency. The Pope’s threat would have been relatively insignificant in the entire spectrum of costs associated with an invasion.

On the risk side, if the Soviet Union had been caught and implicated in a Papal assassination attempt, the costs of such an act would be high. Would the second order benefits associated with a contingency plan—which was never in fact implemented—justify the risks of an attempted murder of a major western religious leader? NBC never details the benefits, never mentions their contingent character, and never assesses the costs. NBC also fails to consider the nature of the Soviet leadership, which serious studies suggest to be cautious, conservative, collective-bureaucratized in its decision-making, and not prone to adventurism. The NBC premise, as with Sterling and the Lusk Report, is of “a few monstrously evil men” pulling the strings of their distant puppets in a very simple world.

Just as NBC fails to weigh in the facts that the hypothetical plot turned out to be unneeded, failed, and was made public, so it also neglects raising any questions about western motives. An alternative model might start with a look at who benefited from the plot as it worked out in the real world, assuming that the real beneficiaries had a motive. This would include the Reagan administration and CIA, Italian rightist politicians, and assorted other western factions and interest groups. Western militarism benefits greatly from this disclosure of Soviet evil. The Pope and the Catholic Church have become more and more threatening to the western arms faction. An assassination, especially if it could be pinned on the Kremlin, would be a windfall. Here is solid motive with observably realized benefits. Has the CIA shown a willingness to engage in political murder? Were there any links of the CIA to rightist paramilitary groups in Turkey like the Grey Wolves? We think a superb case could be spun on the principles of terrorism pseudoscience, encompassing motive, actual payoff, and “links”—untrue perhaps, but more solid than the case put up by NBC. The point is that NBC never so much as hints at alternative political scenarios, and it naturally raises no question about its own political bias, the meaning of its gullible acceptance of statements of western intelligence services, and the systematic character of media bias, of which it is merely a blatant illustration.

The NBC Model (2): Agca As a KGB Agent

NBC states that “some” of its case is “circumstantial.” In truth, the only hard fact on which its argument rests is that during the year and a half between escaping from a Turkish prison and shooting the Pope Agca stayed in Sofia, Bulgaria for seven weeks! On this evidential base alone NBC builds its case, which means that innuendo plus inferences from the necessities of totalitarian evil provided the original leap to “proof” of Agca’s being a KGB agent. By the time of NBC’s second run, Agca had “confessed” again, more in tune with western demands and preconceptions. But his confession produced no hard facts, only assertions by a long-time fascist, murderer, and “notorious liar” held by the Italian police.

In the NBC analysis it is argued that Agca was “recruited” by the KGB in Turkey at some unspecified date, but prior to his imprisonment for the murder of Ipecki and long before his arrival in Sofia. But there is not a single fact put forward to show any kind of contact or political link of Agca to the Bulgarians or KGB during this period of alleged recruitment. NBC therefore relies solely on innuendo (unexplained large sums of money, Agca’s passing a difficult exam) and the theoretically possible (the KGB could have recruited him, secretly). The mystification here is extreme, as NBC requires that the large number of Grey Wolves who helped Agca escape prison, protected him, and supplied him with money in Europe, all must either be rootless mercenaries or unwitting victims manipulated by

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9 Implausible in the light of the Pope’s vigorous campaign against “temporal” involvements by Catholic Church representatives in all parts of the world, among other reasons.


rightwing journalistic hack” in pursuit of some leftwing purpose.

In the NBC analysis, it was the Pope’s letter to Brezhnev that precipitated the Kremlin plot. But Agca threatened to kill the Pope at the time of the Papal visit to Turkey in 1979, before the Pope’s letter Brezhnev. Is it not an amazing coincidence that Agca, already secretly recruited by the KGB for possible future use, could interpret his unknown master’s will before the master’s thoughts had yet jelled! In dealing with this “too early” threat to kill the Pope, NBC suggests that “perhaps Agca had established a new cover—as the religious zealot who wanted to kill a Pope” (Tr.-39). In the world of terrorism pseudoscience “nothing remains unexplained,” especially where the analyst of the forces of evil adjusts the “cover” to fit any awkward fact. The simple explanation, that the Pope was a genuine political target of particular elements of Turkish fascism, will not do. NBC needs not only “covers” but it must swallow the incredible coincidence that Agca, who wanted to kill the Pope in 1979, had already been secretly and unwittingly recruited by somebody else, who later desired the assassination of the very same person!

As noted, the only solid fact “linking” Agca to the KGB is that Agca stayed in Sofia, Bulgaria. He also traveled through and stayed in 11 other countries after leaving Turkey. The NBC “proof” that Agca must have been under KGB “discipline” by virtue of the evidence of his stay in Sofia, is as follows: (1) As totalitarian secret police know everything, they must have known of Agca’s presence. (2) They must therefore also have been “protecting” him ("Agca depended on the Turkish gunrunners for a passport and for protection in a communist satellite” [Tr.-43-44].) (3) The Bulgarian secret police are under the discipline of the KGB. (“Could the Bulgarian security service have provided that [protection] and operated without the knowledge of the KGB?" [Tr.-43-44].) (4) Therefore “it seems safe to conclude that he had been drawn into the clandestine network of the Bulgarian Secret Police and, by extension, the Soviet KGB—perhaps without his even being aware of their possible plans for him” (Tr.-44-45).

Let us note first that NBC forgets that in its fairy tale Agca had already been "recruited'" in Turkey, so that there was no need for his re-recruitment in Sofia. Having already been placed on the KGB payroll would it be wise for the KGB to bring him to a prominent hotel in Sofia and display him for several weeks to other intelligence agencies, or would they have carefully avoided this foolish loss of their "cover?" NBC and the Free Press never raise this issue.

Second, did the Bulgarian secret police know of Agca’s presence? In the quotes above from NBC it is stated that Agca depended on "Turkish gunrunners" for his passport—but, as we pointed out earlier, this is based on NBC’s accepting a fabrication by Agca. He got his passport through the Grey Wolves, and it was signed in Turkey by a Grey Wolf police officer who was later arrested. As Agca came into Turkey on a false passport—as do many other Turks in the voluminous traffic through Bulgaria by migrant workers and smugglers—there is no evidence that has yet been put forward that the Bulgarian secret police knew the individual in the Vitosha Hotel as Agca. (An ironical fact is that the West German, Swiss and Italian police clearly did know that Agca was in their countries, tapped his phone—and failed to pick up this wanted criminal. In the Sterling-NBC world, of course, only “totalitarians” “protect” for insidious purposes.)

If Agca was in a Sofia hotel, known as Agca or not, consider the NBC sequence: that he was therefore being “protected,” and that we may then conclude that he was “recruited.” All NBC knows is that he stayed in a hotel. Even in their own statement quoted above, vague as it is, it appears that the Bulgarians might have been “protecting” Turkish smugglers and their friends, so that even if they knew he was Agca, protection could have been a favor for their smuggler allies, some maybe under obligation to (or threatened by) the Grey Wolves. The NBC hotel sequence, with deduction from residence to KGB agent, is not merely blarney, it allows us to observe the pseudoscience of terrorism in full flight—with its greatest imaginative leaps. This is the heart of the case, worthy of Claire Sterling, Reader’s Digest, Modern Horror Comics—and NBC.

If the evidence is not so good, terrorism pseudoscience and NBC have one more fall-back position. That is, the KGB is a “highly professional operation” (Tr.-55) which uses remote proxies, so that “there is never any evidence” (Tr.-55), the crime is always “deniable” (Tr.-3), and the instrument may not even know his own master. (This theory is obviously also compatible with mystification and the pinning of crimes on the enemy by concocted plots.) But there are a number of problems that NBC and the Free Press have failed to address. First, as noted, bringing Agca to Sofia for a long and conspicuous stay was not profes-
Covert Action

The Carter human rights policy did constitute something of a deviation from this pattern, but it was a deviation. Furthermore, it was loaded with exceptions, weak in implementation against client states, and was subject to intense and ultimately effective opposition by the business community. Anthony Lewis, in a rare mention of the seemingly biased preoccupation of the press with Soviet victims, explained it by the fact that they are both “badly treated” and “more like us” than the Third World victims of state terror. But was Neil Aggett, tortured into another “suicide” at the hands of the South African secret police, better treated than Shcharansky, or was he less like Anthony Lewis? And the thousands of journalists and other professionals (ignoring here the more numerous peasant victims) tortured and murdered in Latin America? Is the fondness of U.S. business for South Africa and post-Allende Chile, and the episodic coverage of human rights abuses in those countries, only coincidental? We give Anthony Lewis credit for asking an important question; his answer reflects the inability of many decent people to face elementary facts about their own society.

The process of mobilization of bias depends heavily on the initiatives and power of the mass media, with perhaps a dozen entities capable of getting the ball rolling and sustaining interest. If several of these, like Reader’s Digest, NBC and the New York Times decide to push a story, it quickly becomes newsworthy. Many people hear of it by mass media outreach, and thus other members of the fraternity feel obliged to get on the bandwagon because this is the news. When one of the authors (Herman) wanted to write on both Cambodia and East Timor in 1980, not Cambodia alone, the editor of a liberal magazine objected on the ground that “nobody had heard of” East Timor. The Reader’s Digest had no article on the subject; William Safire, Hugh Sidey, and William Buckley had not discussed the matter; and the coverage of East Timor by the New York Times was inversely related to Indonesian state violence (starting from a modest level and a pro-Indonesia bias to begin with). With this silence at the top of the media power structure, and thus nobody’s “having heard of” East Timor, only eccentricity could cause the lesser media to bring up a subject so obviously unnewsworthy.

For news that is more acceptable to major power groups, if circumstances are ripe a propaganda campaign can be mobilized. Especially during periods when the business community is in an aggressive mood, eager to discredit unionism, regulation, and the welfare state, and has succeeded in bringing a conservative government into power and frightening liberals into a state of better than average quiescence, Red Scares and even repressive violence can occur (1919-1920, 1949-1953). The press will then provide daily coverage of the latest revelations of Red linkages, confessions, and newly found documents, and of speculation by notables on the intent of the conspirators. The mobilization of bias is helped along by the large number of rightwing syndicated and in-house columnists who come into prominence in conservative eras. It is the function of people like William Safire, George Will and Ben Wattenberg to take advantage of any opportunity that presents itself to shift the political spectrum farther to the right, and they leap into the fray without any encumbrance by intellectual scruple. They are quickly joined by rightwing syndicated and in-house columnists who come into prominence in conservative eras. It is the function of people like William Safire, George Will and Ben Wattenberg to take advantage of any opportunity that presents itself to shift the political spectrum farther to the right, and they leap into the fray without any encumbrance by intellectual scruple. They are quickly joined by rightwing academics and think-tank operatives (Walter Laqueur, Michael Ledeen, Ernest Lefever), who bring their “expertise” to the proof of Red Evil and to the important task of keeping the issue alive. In such an environment, with criti-
cal judgment by the mass media suspended, rightwing propagandists given free rein, and dissident opinion effectively excluded, lies can be institutionalized. As Levin concluded as regards the Red Scare of 1919-1920, millions of people were led to believe in the existence of a Red Conspiracy "when no such threat existed."

The mass media buildup of the Bulgarian-KGB Connection is a model illustration of the principles and processes just outlined. Once again, it is an alleged enemy act of villainy that is shown to be capable of generating day-in-day-out coverage. The process started with several key media entities pressing*the connection. Claire Sterling’s Reader’s Digest article of September 1982 gave the new campaign an important opening push, and the NBC program of September 21, 1982 added greatly to the newsworthyness of the new Red Plot theme. The fact that both the article and TV program were a blend of demagoguery and nonsense led to no audible criticism or negative repercussions—there are no “accuracy in media” constraints on real mass media fraud in cases of system-supportive mobilization of bias.

The real media buildup followed the new Agca confession made during the fall of 1982, which led to the arrest of Antonov in late November. The New York Times, for example, had only two articles on the Bulgarian connection in September 1982, none in October, two in November, then 20 in December, 15 in January 1983, and a modest fall-off to 8 in February. All the other major media enterprises—Time, Newsweek, the Washington Post, Wall Street Journal and the TV networks, had a comparable escalation of coverage in December 1982 and January 1983. The second layer of media followed in close order with a spate of articles; and commentators, humorists, and cartoonists attended to the Bulgarian connection frequently during the high intensity period.

Besides the intense coverage generated, another indicator of the propagandistic role of the Bulgarian-KGB connection is that the news content of this coverage was minimal, the proportion accounted for by speculation and the expression of opinion was high. Of the 32 news articles in the New York Times on, or closely related to, the Plot which appeared between Nov. 1, 1982 and Jan. 31, 1983, 12 had no news content whatever, but were reports of somebody’s opinion or speculation about the case—or refusal to speculate about the issue! (The Times carried one news article whose sole content was that President Reagan had “no comment” on the case.) More typical was the front page article by Henry Kamm “Bonn Is Fearful Of Bulgarian Tie With Terrorists” (Dec. 12, 1982), or Bernard Gwertzman’s “U.S. Intrigued But Uncertain On a Bulgarian Tie” (Dec. 26, 1982). In “news report” after news report unnamed officials are “intrigued,” their interest is “piqued,” evidence is said to be “not wholly convincing,” or “final proof is still lacking.” Four of the news articles in the Times were on peripheral subjects such as smuggling in Bulgaria or Papal-Soviet relations. Of the 16 more direct news items, only one covered a really solid news fact—namely, the arrest of Antonov in Rome. The other 15 news items were trivia, such as Kamm’s “Bulgarians Regret Tarnished Image” (Jan. 27, 1983) or another Kamm piece entitled “Italian Judge Inspects Apartment of Suspect in Bulgarian Case” (Jan. 12, 1983). All of these expressions of opinion, doubts, interest, suppositions and minor detail served to produce a lot of smoke—to keep the issue of possible Soviet involvement before the public. The New York Times was so aggressive in smoke creation that its article on smuggling in Bulgaria was placed on the front page, with the heading “Plot on Pope Aside, Bulgaria’s Notoriety Rests on Smuggling” (Jan. 28, 1983)—a little editorial reminder of the Plot for the benefit of the reader, plus a further editorial judgment on “notoriety,” all in a single headline!

Smoke was also generated by the large stable of rightwing journalists and scholars—Safire, Henze, Pipes, Ledeen, Sterling—taking advantage of the newsworthyness of the Plot, adding to it, and keeping the pot boiling. Another of their functions is to make it appear that not only is the proof clear, but that there is also a sinister coverup in high places of the true extent and horribleness of Soviet guilt. In a charming little game, the CIA, reported to be “not sure,” although believing that the Soviets “at a minimum” knew about the plot, is made to appear the epitome of caution and judiciousness, not as a longstand-
ing participant in rightwing disinformation (Tr.-61-62. Robert C. Toth, “Bulgaria Knew of Plot on Pope, CIA Concludes,” Los Angeles, Jan. 30, 1983). Time magazine played this game with considerable flair, suggesting Wash-
ing foot-dragging because of the fear that the true story “might scuttle any arms-control talks” (Feb. 7, 1983). This delightful gambit, which patriotically assumes Rea-
gan’s deep devotion to arms control, in the face of obvious facts, thereby converts a factor that might arouse suspicion as to the source of the plot into a basis of administration regrets and coy protection of the Soviets!

The primary smoke produced a large volume of induced smoke, as other commentators, editorialists, and car-
toonists were obliged to say something about that which had now been made news. Thus, James McCartney, nor-

mally a cautious but rational news commentator, put up a long and vacuous article on the Bulgarian Connection that contained neither fact nor discussion of the substance of the claims, but merely related worries among various Ital-
ian politicians of the effects of the connection if true (“‘Bulgarian Connection’ to Pope’s Shooting Worries Italy,” Philadelphia Inquirer, Feb. 6, 1983). Cartoonists trying to keep current drew cartoons that assumed that the KGB connection is valid. Liberals took the position that while there is a case, more evidence is required. Smoke was effectively proving the existence of the fire.

A further characteristic of mass media coverage of the Bulgarian-KGB connection has been the virtually com-
plete exclusion of dissenting opinion. The “debate” is con-
fined to assertions and speculations by western terrorism experts, intelligence sources, and politicians, on the one hand, and Soviet and Bulgarian denials on the other. Communist denials are obviously to be expected, and come from a source that the public will not find believable. Non-establishment western critics of the story, who might have greater credibility, are not admitted to the debate.

Time does a masterful job of building up its favored sources of evidence—“normally cautious Italian politi-
cians” who “exuded confidence,” “circumstantial evi-
dence” which “seems overwhelming” to U.S. intelligence, the British alone remaining skeptical—on the other hand, the Soviet reply “emotional,” “with attacks on western jour-
nalists, but not Marvin Kalb, “which tends to add credibili-
ty to the facts as well as to the tone [sic] of his reporting” (Feb. 22, 1983). There is the necessary playing down of the problem of the credibility of Agca, his confession, his photo identification, in the Italian police-prison-political context, but Time throws in just enough in the way of intelligence doubts and admissions of lack of final proof so that their completely uncritical use of sources and pack-
aged self of the connection is not obvious.

In the New York Times, Henry Kamm, continuing a long tradition, confines his questions to western intel-

ligence sources, propagandists, and politicians who will tell him what he wants to hear; and in the entire set of news articles and opinion pieces in the New York Times from Nov. 1, 1982-Jan. 31, 1973 not one serious opposition voice is to be found. The Times, like Time, conveys the views of the CIA, Italian politicians, the “terrorism” experts, other intelligence services, and of course Zbigniew Brzezinski. Brzezinski’s belief in Soviet involvement is put forth in a “news” article devoted solely to this enlightening fact; and the Times then gives Brzezinski Op. Ed. column space to repeat his opinion. This is a good illustration of the main form of editorial writing in the mass media—confining

questions and answers in purported “news” articles to those whose conclusions preclude the necessity of your own expressions of personal judgment.

Along with the exclusion of any dissenting view, another feature of mass media reporting is the dropping out of inconvenient facts that would disturb the preferred line. Thus, immediately after the assassination attempt, the New York Times ran articles by Marvine Howe (May 16, 1981) and R.W. Apple (May 25, 1981) that gave long and detailed accounts of Agca’s neo-fascist connections and the Turkish fascist background. As the story developed in the period August 1982-March 1983, with the stress on a KGB plot, the Turkish background—which we believe contains the heart of the story—has dropped out of sight entirely.

A further characteristic of mass media performance, implicit in some of the preceding, is the mass media’s suppression of the fact of its own suppressions, its reliance on biased sources, and the existence of vested interests in the west that have a huge stake in Red Scares. It casts itself in the role of non-partisan searcher for the truth, not as a biased instrument of western power interests. Few will know, for example, that both the New York Times and (more surprisingly) the Philadelphia Inquirer rejected a proposed Op. Ed. column by Diana Johnstone, the Eu-

ropean Editor of In These Times, which offered an alterna-
tive structure of facts and conclusions. Readers of the press and listeners to national TV will never know that Claire Sterling lost a slander suit in Paris, or that Michael Ledeen has ties to key members of the extreme rightwing P-2 Masonic Lodge of Italy, including its head, Gelli, wanted for questioning in Italy, living now in Uruguay. Careful-
ly kept under the rug is the historic role of Red Scares, and the extensive record of forged documents and defector and informer mobilization and coached lying in sustaining these Scares. The public will not know that in each Scare the mass media has passed along the assertions of the likes of A. Mitchell Palmer, Joe McCarthy (“205 card-carrying members of the Communist Party in the State Department”), Paul Crouch, Alexander Barmine, etc. as straight news, “objectively” transmitted, exactly as Nicholas Gage, Henry Kamm and Marvin Kalb now do for the Bulgarian Connection. The great serviceability of the Bulgarian-KGB Connection to Ronald Reagan and Caspar Weinberger, McDonnell-Douglas and General Electric, Craxi, Lagorio, and the Italian rightwing is nei-
ther mentioned nor examined as a possible source of the new disclosures and their unprocessed dissemination as “news.”

Finally, we have seen how the “factual” basis of the argument gradually changes during propaganda cam-
paigns, as new confessions, defectors, documents, and “links” come and go. This allows the pot to continue boil-
ing, and the refutations of earlier allegations to be ignored by the inundation of fresh unverified claims. We have suggested that the usefulness of the Bulgarian Connection will cause it to remain with us for a while. We also venture this dual forecast as of March, 1983: first, that Antonov will be freed in the near future, without fanfare; and, sec-
ond, that although his arrest was the central fact producing massive attention, his release will lead to no overall reassessment of the substance of the case or of the media’s role in giving it life and propaganda value.

The illusion of objectivity is a powerful weapon in the hands of the biased. We see in the case of the Bulgarian-
KGB Connection that it has helped a de facto propaganda system institutionalize a genuine Big Lie.
Uncle Sam’s Georgie Girl

By Fred Landis


"... I have never compromised seriously on any ethical or moral principle, and I truly believe that the women of my generation can bring a new and cleansing element to American public life. Whatever I have accomplished I could not have done it without profoundly analyzing myself—but I also find that in professional life the old injunction to 'Know Thyself' reaches women more than men. It has been a constant struggle, often with little personal approval or backing, which I feel also adds to a woman's inner strength."

—From Who's Who, entry under Georgie Anne Geyer.

Georgie Anne Geyer's credentials as a journalist might not be an issue if she did not tour Europe at United States Information Agency expense as an official apologist of U.S. policy in El Salvador, while arguing that this in no way compromised her objectivity as a journalist. The hostility she encountered from fellow-journalists during this tour, she bitterly reported in her syndicated column, was the most painful experience in her life. This didn't stop her, however, from making a similar USIA tour of Africa to attack UNESCO support for independent media in the developing world. Geyer simply cannot understand why people in the Third World should object to the current arrangement: Western news syndicates hiring people like Geyer to interpret events in their own "backyard."

Take an area Geyer claims to be an expert on, Allende’s Chile. Says Geyer, "I was meticulous in writing fairly about Allende." Herewith a sampler of Geyer’s idea of fairness: "Salvador Allende always reminded me a bit of a penguin. He was short and square and waddled slightly when he walked. He wore funny little hats that his vanity told him made him attractive to women. . . . he committed suicide. . . . a few days later the military exhibited all the bizarre sexual aids they found in the two grotesquely ostentatious mansions where Allende had lived with his mistress and his Cuban mercenary guards . . . . I somehow felt sorry for the fallen Marxist, in his funny little hats. . . . he was much like a meddlesome old lady."

Not coincidentally the single best documented USIA and CIA propaganda activity concerns Allende and Chile. The themes selected to use against Allende are the themes used by Geyer.

In the December 1982 Atlantic Monthly a staff member of the National Security Council admits having seen a proposal to assassinate Allende. Then Assistant U.S. Attorney Eugene Propper, in his book Labyrinth, identified Allende’s assassin as Captain Rene Riveros. But back in
1973 the CIA had a very specific line on this matter: Allende committed suicide, using a machine gun given to him by Fidel Castro. Says Geyer, “He shot himself with a machine gun given him by Fidel Castro.”

Another CIA theme was that Allende lived in a mansion. If you read the fine print of El Mercurio or other identified CIA media outlets this turned out to be either the Presidential Palace of La Moneda or the official residence of Thomas Moro. Geyer makes this two mansions.

Of great concern to the CIA was Allende’s obstinate refusal to allow himself to be easily assassinated, surrounding himself with a group of personal friends, longtime Chilean Socialist colleagues, who protected him. In Geyer’s “Bodyguard of Lies” they become Cuban mercenaries.

When members of the Senate Intelligence Committee asked how I first became aware of CIA fabrications in El Mercurio, I explained that it was hard to accept that Allende was simultaneously impotent, unfaithful to his wife, and having a homosexual relationship with Fidel Castro. Geyer is the only foreign correspondent to report this as fact.

Further comments by Geyer on Fidel: “My first impression of Fidel Castro... a strange mixture of almost abnormal sweetness... It was also strange to me that I felt virtually no normal sexual attraction for him at all.” Lest la Geyer be misunderstood (a constant problem) she hastens to add that she is no sexist: “Men are equal—they shouldn’t be sex objects, either.”

What about Che? Alas, this world is so monstrously unfair that Geyer was not provided a ringside seat to watch Che’s capture in Bolivia. She consoles herself by spending a whole page citing other historical examples of world-class journalists like herself who simply did not get there in time. She writes with the tone of a prima donna who missed the social event of the season. What she can’t understand is how others were not embittered by the experience: “I did not have the same gracious feelings about missing Che’s denouement. Besides, all my friends were there for it.”

Who exactly are Geyer’s friends? She mentions two scavengers who, having failed to bribe or steal their way into possessing Che’s diary, console themselves in a striptease joint. Other friends are American Special Forces (Green Berets) officers, who arrange for Geyer to have an exclusive interview with the remnants of Che’s guerrilla group. These same Green Berets were kind enough to act as her bodyguards and interpreters during the interviews.

Now given Che’s legendary reputation one might suppose that for every person in Che’s band there would have been a thousand leftists who would have given their eyes teeth to have been allowed to join. Not so: “All were lured from La Paz with a week’s advance salary and promises of high adventure...” Belately they discovered they were “guerrillas” fighting under autocratic Cuban leaders. Having recruited his men under false pretenses, Che picked the wrong spot in the jungle to set up camp. “It was a miserably difficult place, infested with strange bugs.” Nor did Che provide leadership. “While ‘El Che’ sat reading books in the camp, the disgruntled Bolivians began to desert.” So what was Che doing in Bolivia? He was looking for a place to die. “It was a suicidal state which I sensed from the moment I read about his death.”

One would have thought that if Che were suicidal, the CIA would not have had to go to such trouble to track him down. According to Time magazine, they utilized spy satellites with infra-red detectors to follow his movements by picking up the heat from his campfire; 600 U.S.-trained Bolivian Rangers; helicopters; napalm; and Green Berets.

Maybe 100 times as much CIA effort went into assassinating the character of Che as went into his physical assassination. The original plan was to seize his diary, make a tendentious translation of selected parts, dress it up with CIA-authored prologue, introduction, footnotes and appendix; dump an inexpensive, CIA-subsidized version on the market; and smear Che’s memory. These plans having been thwarted by the unexpected appearance of an honest Bolivian General who gave the intact original to Cuba, the CIA’s media assets on the scene had to muddle through as best they could.

For Geyer to say that Che was suicidal accomplishes the same thing as in the case of Allende, to suggest the U.S. had...
nothing to do with their death, that they really killed themselves. How does she know this? She "sensed" it. Here as throughout the book, Geyer wants to have it both ways. She claims practically to have discovered women's liberation, but at the same time lays claim to feminine intuition. Her feminine intuition told her Allende was sexually envious. In the book he was envious of Geyer's boyfriend. In her Chicago Daily News story (back in September 1973) Geyer states that she observed Allende looking with sexual envy at a Cuban couple walking along the beach. It is not everyday that one sees a newspaper story describing a national leader as being "sexually envious," especially the day after he has been killed in a bloody military coup.

In 1978 Mark Felt and other FBI officials were being prosecuted for black bag jobs against student radicals. The defense lawyers sought a justification by claiming a foreign intelligence link to the radicals. Both the FBI and the CIA had been ordered by Nixon to find such a link, but gave up after five fruitless years. Now comes Georgie Anne Geyer with a series of columns in which she claims to have discovered the missing link. Felt's lawyer went into court and used Geyer's columns as a defense.

Constantine Menges is currently the CIA's National Security Officer for Latin America. One of Menges's contributions was to identify a psychological weak spot in Chile, the fear by landowners that they would lose their land, either through expropriation by the government or guerrilla "expropriation." The intelligence gathering necessary to identify this "psychological opportunity" was conducted by Menges under cover of a RAND study of the Chilean Agrarian Reform. The CIA now knew how to spark a rebellion of landowners against the Allende government: by planting the story that some Chilean Che Guevara was running amok in the heart of farm country, plotting to seize your farm. They even invented a name, "Commander Pepe." The first U.S. appearance of this story was in William Buckley's National Review, followed by Georgie Anne. "Commander Pepe" became an inside joke among U.S. intelligence operatives in Chile in the same way that "The Man Who Never Was" became part of British intelligence lore during World War II.

On May 5, 1977 Buckley hosted an hour long discussion of Allende's Chile on "Firing Line." On the TV show were Buckley's Chilean correspondent and Georgie Anne, who sat around trading little digs at "Commander Pepe."

This CIA obsession with going into target countries and seeking out psychological weak points goes back to Edward Lansdale. Lansdale, the CIA officer immortalized in The Ugly American, operated on the philosophy that in each foreign culture there was some hidden psychological key which, if discovered, would permit the minds of the people to be easily manipulated.

Says Geyer: "As I watched Chile I was learning how to psych out a society, to find out where the weak points were."

As recently as the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war, our Mata Hari from Chicago was taking the night flight to Baghdad to get some critical questions answered. Why? "The answers to these questions were critical to the United States—and yet, having no direct diplomatic representation in Baghdad, we had no answers." This self-conscious, self-appointed role as Uncle Sam's little spy goes back to her first assignment, getting the dope on the Guatemalan guerrillas: "One must psych out the society and judge where are the weak points, the soft spots, the places where one can probe." Geyer gets her man, the Guatemalan guerrilla leader Turcios. In passing she mentions that shortly after her interview with Turcios, he died. She interviewed Camilo Torres. Shortly afterwards, he died. She interviewed Chilean journalist Agusto Olivares. Shortly after, he died. (Olivares is perhaps a different case, as Geyer claims him as a friend.)

On October 5, 1973 Captain Ponce and Naval Intelligence officer Millroy Strike gave me a tour of the bombed Presidential Palace of La Moneda. After leaving the Chancery area we passed through a kitchen on the first or ground floor level into an adjoining room where Ponce pointed to a blood-splattered wall. Ponce stated that on September 11 Agusto Olivares was executed by machine gun fire on that spot. Geyer says in her book that her "friend" committed suicide, just like Allende.
reviewer for Geyer's own newspaper to exclaim that she writes "as if she was working for the ladies' auxiliary of the CIA." The manner in which certain images and themes are developed in her three chapters on the U.S.S.R. is fascinating. First we are introduced to Russia, which becomes Stalin, who is resurrected to guide Geyer around Georgia. Russia is cold, huge, grey, looming, threatening. So is Stalin. So is her Georgian guide. Now this is very curious. Even more curious are the titles to these three chapters: "U.S.S.R.: The Well Fed Wolf," "Man of Steel," and "Men of Iron." Now let us free associate with these titles; what do the words "Wolf," "Steel," and "Iron" bring to mind? Cold, grey, threatening—exactly the image she sought to create of Russia, and her Georgian guide.

One would be hard put to find countries more geographically, culturally, ethnically, and temperamentally different than Russia, Chile, and Cuba. In Geyer's view, they are the same place, because she has no interest in these places or their people except as an excuse for launching into a political diatribe about the evils of some abstraction called Socialism.

The country Russia, the historical figure Stalin, and some Georgian who had the misfortune of running into Geyer, have absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with each other. In Geyer's descriptions they are one and the same. Which makes her either crazy or crafty. The logic behind all this is that most people do not have strong feelings about abstractions such as Socialism, or a particular Socialist country. So Geyer selects some prominent citizen of that country to whom she attributes all the negative characteristics the CIA would like the reader to associate with Socialism.

Is it really fair to say this sort of thing about Geyer? Absolutely! Because she literally asks for it. Geyer's book is explicitly offered to the public so that her career may serve as a model. Geyer has no time for the New Journalism. She lays claim to being more objective, more honest, straighter than journalists today: "Journalism was quite unlike journalism today. We quite simply 'reported' what was going on. We did not write columns or our own personal interpretations on the news pages. It was a much straighter and more honest job . . . But now the next generation of journalists came to feel that they had the duty and the right to make ever more astonishing judgments . . . They became very dangerous—and I am barely exaggerating when I say that they nearly destroyed the truth in journalism in the United States."

By these standards, Geyer is a public joke. Her insistence on forcing a grossly inflated self-image on the public makes her a joke. It isn't enough that Geyer thinks she is a world-class journalist; she wants to instruct us on what is journalism. Among those who do not measure up to her standards are Seymour Hersh and the Washington Post. It seems that they engage in something natty called investigative journalism today. We quite simply 'reported' what was going on. They did not write columns or our own personal interpretations on the news pages. It was a much straighter and more honest job . . . But now the next generation of journalists came to feel that they had the duty and the right to make ever more astonishing judgments . . . They became very dangerous—and I am barely exaggerating when I say that they nearly destroyed the truth in journalism in the United States."

All this is perfectly illustrated by an incident at the Naval War College, where both she and Seymour Hersh shared the platform. "Hersh, the hotshot investigative reporter," went first. What he had to say so upset Geyer that she departed from her prepared text to attack Hersh. "I was horrified by Hersh's speech. 'What Mr. Hersh is doing,' I said, 'is doing exactly what he criticized the U.S. military for doing during Vietnam.'" Poor Georgie says that at a party later at the admiral's house she was "further stunned. The military were not at all angry with Hersh, but they were completely miffed at ME."

Hersh is a real reporter, he does his job, reports the facts and lets the chips fall where they may. That was the first thing that stunned little Ge-Ge. Hersh had further won the respect of his audience as a serious professional. Geyer was stunned to learn that she had not. The military can handle criticism; they don't need Uncle Sam's little helper.

Geyer wants us to know how tough it is up there at the top: "All you need to do is make one mistake—or give one really far out interpretation—and you're finished." But look at some selected Geyerisms that should have finished her off long ago:

On the Cuban Revolution: "The Cubans did not understand their own revolution."

On Russians at the Hotel Astra bar: "Buxom and braless girls shook frenetically on the dance floor, and at the bar men pawed women like untethered wild animals . . . behaving as though they were in the Berlin bunker the night Hitler's Reich was falling."

On being a CIA agent: "Only once was I ever accused, anywhere, at any time, of being a CIA agent, and that was for a reason."

On the secret Sandinista master plan for Latin America: "Anyway, one evening I was returning from the pool about 10:00 P.M. and walking, very wet indeed, through the lobby [of the Intercontinental Hotel, Managua, Nicaragua] when I saw Tomas Borge. As I stood there dripping, unnoticed by the group, Borge actually outlined their entire plans for Latin America."

Geyer is like the National Enquirer, almost impossible to parody. Now for the facts. The Intercontinental pool closes at 9:00 P.M. Everybody else walks up the stairs outside to the second floor and takes the elevator. They do not walk through the lobby in their bathing suits. A blonde American woman in a bathing suit could not pass through the lobby without being noticed, especially if she stopped to gaze at Tomas Borge. According to Geyer, Borge was speaking in a "low, conspiratorial voice." That is not exactly Borge's style. Conspiracies are not conducted in public, in the lobby of the largest hotel in the country, with a crowd of foreign diplomats, journalists, and spies standing in attendance.

On the near-martyrdom of St. Geyer: In the first chapter, Geyer is in a hotel in Guatemala when a German businessman tries to enter her room. She interprets this as an assassination attempt. By the last chapter we are now 20 years later, in El Salvador, when the assassination of Archbishop Romero recalls to Geyer her own near martyrdom: "he was assassinated—as he said mass in his chapel—by the same sort that had tried to kill me in Guatemala."

*Buying The Night Flight* is the most embarrassingly self-revelatory autobiography since Norman Podhoretz's *Making It*. The Los Angeles Times said, "In all Geyer's writing, there's a touch of the malicious high school girl." One has the awful feeling that her editors deliberately let her puff herself up into a gaseous ball of hot air.
Grenada, Airport '83:

Reagan's Big Lie

By Clarence Lusane

The Reagan administration and western mass media have unleashed a tidal wave of negative propaganda against Grenada in recent months, a well orchestrated onslaught of innuendos and spectacular lies. From the bellicose speeches of President Reagan and nearly every high official in his administration to the front pages of the U.S.'s largest newspapers, Grenada has been insulted, maligned, and misrepresented.

- November, 1982, Vice-President George Bush, speaking before a Miami conference on the Caribbean, stated that Grenada's economy was bankrupt and the government was repressive.
- On February 22, 1983, in a speech before Florida Republicans, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-American Affairs Nestor Sanchez accused Grenada of being a surrogate of Cuba.
- In the USIA's March, 1983 publication, Soviet Military Power, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger claimed that the Grenadian government was engaged in a rapid military buildup.
- On March 9th, Weinberger told the Voice of America that military assistance from Cuba and the Soviet Union to the tiny island of Grenada had no other explanation than a projection of Soviet power in the region.
- On March 10th, President Reagan charged that Grenada was building a superior naval base.
- On March 14th, Under-Secretary of Defense Fred Ikle displayed aerial photos of the "Soviet-Cuban presence" in Grenada to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
- On March 23rd, in a televised statement, Reagan again referred to a rapid military buildup in Grenada and its threat to U.S. oil supply routes.

Going far beyond the economic and diplomatic obstacles erected after the March 1979 revolution, the U.S. government and its media allies have embarked on a sustained and hysterical campaign against the entire Grenadian people. In the past, administration and press assaults against Grenada focused on the usual human rights and press censorship bogeys. Additionally, in the last year the U.S. government accused the People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) of turning the island into a military base for Cuban and Soviet armed forces. At the heart of this media bombardment was the attempt to demonstrate the propaganda line that the new international airport being constructed at Point Salines with the aid of Cuban workers was really to be used as a refueling station for Soviet-built Cuban jets. From this perverse logic came the desired conclusion that the airport (and Grenada) threatened the national security of the U.S.

For U.S. military and political leaders the airport is a "cocked pistol." In his March 23rd speech before the National Association of Manufacturers, Reagan said as much. He argued that Grenada was building naval stations, air bases and army barracks to be used by "the enemy." Their goal, he said, was to tie down U.S. armed forces in defending the southern border if the Soviets attacked Western Europe. The Caribbean is our fourth border, he said.

Nestor Sanchez echoes his boss's sentiments. In a February 27, 1983 Washington Post article, he is quoted as saying that "The Cubans are constructing air and naval facilities there that far exceed the requirements of the tiny island."

Nestor Sanchez, a spy for 28 years, now concentrating his efforts against the Caribbean and Latin America.

Sanchez, a former CIA intelligence officer with a long history of organizing covert operations in Latin America and the Caribbean, helped to coordinate the bungled Bay of Pigs invasion and years of secret attacks on Cuba from Florida. In 1965, he was sent to Venezuela for counter-insurgency work and then on to Guatemala to crush the military advances of the Revolutionary Armed Forces.
(FAR). One of his proteges during that period was Efraín Rios Montt, now the psychotic president of Guatemala.

In 1981, Sanchez was also stationed in Madrid, Spain and then in Colombia. (See CAIB No. 4.) After 28 years as a CIA officer, he was named to his current position. A strident anti-communist, he still has close ties to the leadership of the counter-revolutionary Cubans operating out of Miami, often speaking at their gatherings.

The Truth About the Airport

Most of the U.S. press has accepted without challenge the fiction that the Grenadian airport is a Soviet-Cuban military base. But as we shall prove, the holes in this story are big enough to fly a B1 bomber through.

The tourist dependent economy of Grenada suffered under the pre-revolutionary regime’s refusal to construct an airport which would adequately accommodate tourist flights. The current airport, built in 1943, is only 5,255 feet long—too short to handle large commercial jets. Most tourists come to the Caribbean in large, wide-bodied passenger planes like DC-10s, Lockheed 1011s and Boeing 747s, which require runways from 8,000 to 10,000 feet. Grenada’s new planned runway will be 9,000 feet, the same as that of the airports on Antigua, Aruba, and St. Lucia. It will be smaller than that of Barbados (11,000) and Trinidad (10,900). The old airport has no night landing facilities and is an hour and a half from St. George’s, the capital. Surrounded by mountains and water, the old airport is not expandable. Over the years studies by Canadian, British, French and Grenadian engineers and by the World Bank all concluded that a new, modern and large international airport was essential to stimulating Grenadian economic development.

The Reagan administration claims that the airport is a Cuban-Soviet project for airlifting Cuban soldiers for battle in Africa. As the Grenadians have pointed out, this is a total fabrication. First, the Cubans already use the International airport in Barbados on their way to Europe and Africa. And Barbados remains one of the U.S.’s closest allies in the Caribbean. Second, aid for building the airport has come from all quarters. At least 16 countries are participating with finances or material. Libya, Algeria, Iraq and Syria have donated $50 million in cash; Venezuela has furnished $1.3 million in loans, a half-million gallon gasoline storage tank, and 10,000 barrels of diesel oil; Cuba has supplied 300 skilled technicians and engineers, heavy equipment, explosives, cement, and steel. The Soviet Union is not involved at all.

Although the U.S. refused to give any aid whatsoever two U.S. firms have been awarded over $11 million in contracts by the Grenadian government for engineering, architectural, and dredging services. One company has 30 American technicians on the island. Canadian and British firms are also involved in the airport construction.

Without a doubt, however, the principle support for the airport comes from the Grenadian people. The entire population, ranging from the conservative Chamber of Commerce to the radical trade unions, recognize the benefits promised by the airport.

Reagan attempted to paint the airport project as secret and clandestine in his television plea for his defense program on March 23. He intimated that the U.S. was forced to take covert aerial photos from spy planes to find out what was going on. Crying crocodile tears, he claimed he regretted that he had to release these “classified” photos but he felt that the public needed to know the “truth.” This is exactly the type of theatrics, misleading slander, and distortion of the reality of Grenada that has characterized the Reagan administration since it came to power.

The airport, far from being a hidden, barbed-wire operation, is a focal point for tourists and Grenadians alike. On weekends Grenadians come from all over the island to the airport site to picnic, tours of the site are conducted regularly, and there are no restrictions on photo or film taking.

Purpose of the Attacks

If the airport is in reality no threat to the U.S. then the question has to be raised why the U.S. has slandered it so vehemently. The PRG believes that the airport is simply a pretext on which the U.S. has built its plans for the destabilization of Grenada.

Plans to destabilize Grenada began under the Carter administration, within months of the revolution. Operations against Grenada escalated after the PRG supported the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and increased its ties and solidarity with Cuba. According to the Washington...
ton Post of February 27, former and current government officials said that Carter approved propaganda measures against Grenada, but was opposed to other covert actions. Headlines connecting Grenada and Cuba began appearing soon after the revolution and travel agents were encouraged by the U.S. State Department to warn tourists not to visit "unsafe" Grenada. In Grenada itself, several mysterious fires destroyed buildings in the heart of the tourist area, one of them the main tourist office.

Other destabilizing steps were taken during the Carter administration, including denial of military and economic aid and attempts to block relief funds from the OAS after devastating torrential rains battered Grenada in January 1980.

Needless to say, propaganda against the revolution increased significantly with the advent of the Reagan era. The American Security Council Foundation, a far-right supporter of Reagan, released a film entitled "Attack on the Americas" in January 1981. It attempted to portray Grenada as the newest surrogate of Soviet expansionism in the Caribbean and Central American region. Mutilated corpses in El Salvador—actually persons murdered by right-wing death squads—were intercut with provocative photos of Maurice Bishop and Fidel Castro.

The film was shown most recently in Washington, D.C. on March 22, 1983 on station WHMM, a Howard University-owned TV station. For the Reagan administration, this station was an excellent choice for antigrenadian propaganda because its audience is almost exclusively Black American, African, and Caribbean, the communities which have been the most supportive of the Grenadian revolution in the U.S.

Howard University's familiar relationship with the Reagan administration has caused some controversy and concern in the past. George Bush has spoken at a Howard graduation ceremony and Ronald and Nancy Reagan have both been honored by the school. Further, one of Grenada's sworn enemies, Stanley Cyrus, taught at Howard and used it as a base for his counter-revolutionary activities. (See CAIB No. 10.)

In June 1981 the U.S. International Communications Agency (which recently reverted to its original name, the U.S. Information Agency) helped to sponsor a conference to coordinate more systematic media attacks against Grenada. One of the seeds planted at this conference bore fruit on Sunday, September 27, 1981. On that day, all of the Eastern Caribbean's major newspapers published identical front page editorials condemning the PRG. Progressive journalists in the region immediately denounced the editorials and linked them to the Caribbean Publishers and Broadcasters Association (CPBA), a CIA-influenced group. The CPBA is linked to the Inter-American Press Association (IAPA), the organization with CIA links that planned and coordinated the attacks used by the right-wing papers El Mercurio in Chile and the Gleaner in Jamaica to destabilize the governments of Salvador Allende and Michael Manley.

During this same period, there appeared in Grenada a new publication calling itself the Grenadian Voice. After learning that the shareholders had met with suspected CIA personnel, the PRG shut the paper down. The government's suspicions were confirmed when CPBA protested the loudest and the longest.

Other major articles against the PRG began to appear in the U.S. media. One piece in the September 17, 1982 issue of National Review, William Buckley's widely read right-wing magazine, attempted to sketch Grenada as a Cuban-controlled puppet. The article, "The Castroization of Grenada," was filled with inaccuracies and slurs.

The CIA Plans
The extent to which the CIA's plans to destabilize Grenada had developed were revealed in the Post article referred to above. In the summer of 1981, the CIA had drawn up a detailed scheme to destabilize the government of Grenada politically and economically. The proposal, presented to the Senate Intelligence Committee, was "to cause economic difficulty for Grenada in the hopes of undermining the political control of Prime-Minister Maurice Bishop."

Reportedly the Committee rejected the operation. One member, Senator Lloyd Bentsen (D-Tex.), responded to the proposal by saying, "You've got to be kidding." While the Committee has supported some of the greatly expanded covert actions proposed by U.S. intelligence agencies under the Reagan administration, they claim to have thrown out the most blatant and harebrained ones.

Although the Committee was quick to insist (naively, it would seem) that the CIA was out of the business of overthrowing governments, it admitted that it did sanction the CIA to "cause a little economic trouble, a little publicity and give aid to opposition groups."

This is a remarkable admission because it has been precisely those tactics which have been used to overthrow and destabilize governments. A "little economic trouble" in Chile under Allende meant choking the economy to the point where the country literally came to a halt.

Grenada:
Nobody's Backyard

A sixteen mm., 60-minute color documentary celebrating the Grenadian Revolution on its first anniversary and examining the campaign of destabilization being waged against Grenada, the tiny "jewel" of the Caribbean. Includes interviews with Maurice Bishop, Cheddi Jagan, Isabel Letelier, Trevor Monrooe, and Philip Agee.

Produced by CovertAction Information Bulletin; directed by Ellen Ray; for rental information, telephone (202) 265-3904, or write to P.O. Box 50272, Washington, DC 20004.
Manley's government in Jamaica was brought down in part due to the "little publicity" assistance given to the right-wing newspaper, the *Gleaner*. The *Gleaner's* daily fabrications and misinformation—much of which was written at CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia—undermined confidence in the government and Manley's capacity to lead.

Finally, "aid to opposition groups" has often taken the form of arms, as in Angola or Nicaragua. CIA gun shipments to UNITA via South Africa and Zaire were made for the express purpose of toppling the MPLA-led government of Angola. Arms to the murderous ex-National Guardsmen of Somoza is causing terror and mayhem on the borders of Nicaragua today.

Already Grenada has been the target of economic troubles in the form of aid blocking, of negative propaganda via the *Grenadian Voice*, and of false statements from the establishment media here in the U.S. and throughout the region.

As to "aid to opposition groups," signs are becoming clearer every day that anti-PRG Grenadians are active and organizing in the U.S. Administration officials have admitted that they have been approached by expatriate Grenadians soliciting support in their efforts to overthrow the PRG. These officials did not elaborate on their responses.

The Grenadian government, however, feels that military attack backed by the CIA may be imminent. In a radio speech to the nation on March 3, 1983, Prime Minister Bishop stated that the PRG had uncovered fresh evidence of a plot to overthrow the government. He cited several facts discovered by the Grenadian intelligence services to support this contention. They included:

1. More frequent meetings by counter-revolutionaries in recent times to iron out their differences.
2. Discovery of the name and background of the main CIA case officer in charge of the operation.
3. Identity of the main base of the operation on a neighboring island.
4. Uncovering the approximate number of men involved, the approximate number and type of weapons they have and the kind of logistical support they hope to receive.

It has also been noted by the Grenadians that during the fourth anniversary of the revolution in mid-March, NATO forces were conducting intimidating military maneuvers in the region. According to U.S. Admiral Robert Watkins, 36 U.S. ships, 6 British ships, one Dutch ship, 300 aircraft and 34 patrol vessels were involved in the maneuvers. Watkins stated that "the construction of an airfield in Grenada for use by Soviet planes" was one reason why the maneuvers were being conducted.

As a result of this genuinely felt threat from the U.S., Grenada has been on military alert since late March. As Prime Minister Bishop has said, when the big U.S. says its national security is threatened by the tiny island of Grenada, whose population is only 110,000 and whose size is roughly twice that of Washington, D.C., it is time for serious concern. Bishop also pointed out that Grenada is the only popular revolution which has not yet had a physical attack. "It is clear the time has come," he said.

The Fight Back

Besides going on military alert, Grenada has taken several other actions to counter the Reagan assault. It has dispatched Foreign Minister Unison Whiteman to the U.S. to speak with and gather support from the progressive community. He has spoken in New York, Washington and other areas of the country to expose the truth about what is really happening in Grenada and the potential danger that the Reagan administration poses to the revolution. Grenada has also sent telegrams and letters to the United Nations, Congress and the White House putting forth its commitment to discuss the situation while at the same time not relinquishing its right to choose its own path of development and friends.

The real threat that Grenada poses to the U.S. is as a model of what can be accomplished by a society that concentrates on the progressive peoples of the world. In the face of economic and political aggression from the U.S., Grenada has managed to grow economically each year since the revolution (5.5% in 1982). Grenada's unemployment has already dropped from the 49% figure existing under the U.S.-supported Gairy dictatorship to 14% under the PRG.

Similar results have been achieved by other progressive governments in the region since their revolutions. Instead of building military bases in the area as the U.S. has charged, what is actually being built is a new future for the Caribbean and Central America that promises regional cooperation, self-determination and forward progress.

Finally, it is quite true that there is one military base that is a threat to the security of the region and that needs to be removed. That base is the one maintained by the U.S. in Cuba at Guantanamo Bay.
As the articles which follow demonstrate, journalists working for the CIA have paid us house calls on occasion. Philip Agee's memory and well organized files helped him to identify the heavily censored document he received under the Freedom of Information Act and led to the article which follows—an article which was written before the death of its subject but submitted to and cleared by the CIA's publications review board shortly afterwards. Ken Lawrence presents some additional research on the late, friendly journalist.

A Friendly Interview

By Philip Agee

Summer of '74 was going to be relaxation at last. After four years of struggle in four different countries, I'd finally finished my book. Publication was months away, and we took a small cabin in a Cornish hamlet alongside a lovely river leading out to Falmouth Bay. It was a time for sailing, bird-watching and walks along the cliffs.

But in early July my name and book project came out with the Senate's report on its Watergate Investigation. Suddenly we were swamped with press and television crews, our idyll and anonymity shattered. In the coming weeks and months I saw them all, never refused still another interview, and only in the case of Robert Moss did I ask for questions in writing.

Still, I wondered how many journalists the CIA would send. Still fresh was the memory of the young American "underground" journalist who, along with an attractive female "student," had befriended me two years earlier in Paris—only to turn out months later to be CIA spies.

In October, on returning from a trip, a letter was waiting for me. Another American journalist, a free-lancer named Robert Deindorfer, wanted an interview. I wrote him back, giving possible dates, and thought no more about it. Eventually he telephoned, and on the afternoon of November 16 he arrived with wife and young son in tow. He was writing a book for Random House, or so he said, and wanted to know what I knew about Mossad. I knew of a botched attempt to kidnap the Riga SS chief who had escaped to South America—he was murdered in the attempt—and I told him about it.

Deindorfer did little to control his hyper-active kid who climbed onto the roof of our landlord's house and started breaking the slates—which I eventually had to have repaired. But what was truly memorable about the visit was Deindorfer's glib stupidity combined with an exaggerated, gushy affability. He was a caricature of the "hale fellow, well met," the eternal sophomore at the class reunion. I remember how, through knowing glances alone, Angela, my two sons and I went into uncontrollable fits of laughter, tears and all—but at him, not at his jokes.

Unknowingly, Deindorfer gave us one of those special family expressions. For years afterward, a flubbed tennis shot was a "Deindorfer," when somebody did something stupid, you pulled a "Deindorfer," or when someone worthy of ridicule came around, he was a "Deindorfer"—although nobody ever quite equalled our visitor of that day.

I never saw him again, but a couple of years ago a curious document came my way through my FOIA lawsuit. It was a letter to Angus Thuermer, the CIA's press spokesman in the mid-1970's. The writer's name, return address, and half the letter were censored, but I had a clue. In the "Dear Angus" letter the writer described himself as a "half-assed writer temporarily a drift in the U.K." He went on: "I spent a couple of hours with your rogue agent Philip Agee, just this last weekend, out in his humble digs in Cornwall. He's a nice enough guy personally, of course, but do spare me these tiresome pro-Third World fanatics who desperately want to dismantle not only the CIA but, more important, the whole system of western capitalism. Dear God . . . ."

Something rang a bell. I got out my old correspondence files, and found Deindorfer's original letter asking me for the interview, along with my reply to him and his note of appreciation after his visit. Placing the "Dear Angus" letter
under his letter to me, the engraving of his Gloucestershire cottage and the lines of the letterhead fit perfectly with censored portions of the “Dear Angus” letter. And in his second letter to me, as in his “Dear Angus” letter, Deindorfer used that wonderful figure “hitting the spacebar” to describe the writer’s trade.

After putting it together I called Deindorfer several times at his cottage, but it was years after his visit and I got no answer. I wanted to ask him if the London Station had sent him out to interview me and what was in the censored paragraphs. I wanted to ask him if he’d been paid by the CIA for the interview. And, of course, I wanted to ask him what else he’d done for the CIA and for how long. I still wonder.

**Death Overtakes a Spy**

By Ken Lawrence

Just as we were preparing a number of hard questions to ask Robert G. Deindorfer came news of his death on March 26.

Though never exposed during his lifetime, Deindorfer was a spy for the CIA.

According to the *New York Times*, the 61 year old author and public relations executive had been a reporter for the United Press and a manager of the New York Stock Exchange’s magazine, newspaper feature and book department.

He had done public relations work for the City of New York, the Institute of Life Insurance, and the Foundation for Full Service Banks. At the time of his death he was with the Financial Service Group of Carl Byoir & Associates, an international public relations firm.

The *Times* left out a lot about Deindorfer, who also wrote under the names Jay Bender, Jay Dender, and Robert Greene. He had taught journalism at New York University and had served as a consultant to the Peace Corps.

He also had written several books on a variety of topics ranging from professional football and fishing to country life in England and espionage.

The *New York Times* didn’t mention that Deindorfer was a member of the CIA’s “old boy” network, although a hint of this has been on record for some time. In an introduction to the 1967 edition of *Secret Service: Thirty-Three Centuries of Espionage*, former CIA Director Allen Dulles wrote that Deindorfer was well qualified to complete the revision of Richard W. Rowan’s book after that author’s death because of his “accurate and objective sense of perspective.”

Until recently, the precise measure of his accuracy and objectiveness lay hidden from professional football and fishing to country life in England and espionage.

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Until recently, the precise measure of his accuracy and objectiveness lay hidden in CIA files, but a tiny portion was revealed in the uncensored fragment of the document released to Philip Agee under the Freedom of Information Act.

Deindorfer was a friend of Angus Thuermer, once a reporter for the Associated Press and later the CIA’s press liaison. After the events described above, Thuermer orchestrated the media disinformation campaign against Agee and this magazine’s predecessor, the old *CounterSpy*, falsely holding them responsible for the 1975 assassination of Richard Welch, the CIA’s station chief in Athens. It may have been Thuermer himself who dispatched Deindorfer to spy on Agee while he was living in England in 1974.

At the time of his meeting with Agee, Deindorfer was listed in *Contemporary Authors* with “two books on espionage” in progress, but to our knowledge these have not been published.

In 1977 Agee and a colleague, journalist Mark Hosenball, were issued deportation orders by then British Home Secretary Merlyn Rees for reasons that to this day remain secret. Agee and Hosenball, together with other journalists, had published articles about state security and intelligence in a number of magazines, and it is clear that intelligence agencies on both side of the Atlantic were eager to silence them. One may safely presume that the censored contents of Deindorfer’s report, denied to Agee, to us, and to our readers, were long ago shared with the British secret intelligence service MI-6, and very likely became part of the secret brief in the proceedings against Agee.

As Agee notes, we had hoped to ask Deindorfer a number of things: How long had he been doing this sort of work? Was this an exceptional assignment or was it routine for him? And so on. Unfortunately death overtook him just as we were preparing to call.

Robert G. Deindorfer has taken many secrets to his grave.
The “Poet” Cop

On his release from a Cuban prison in October 1982, Armando Valladares was hailed as a hero by western media and the Right. During his internment, Valladares complained of being tortured and mistreated by his Cuban jailers. His punishment was so severe, he claimed, that he had lost the use of his legs and was unable to walk. His supporters were therefore quite embarrassed when they met him with a wheelchair at the Madrid airport and he walked off the plane looking healthy.

Valladares has been characterized as a “poet” and “artist” of deep religious conviction by the press. In fact, he was actually a police officer in the Batista regime. The honors that he received were for his work as a cop and never as a poet. He was not arrested after the revolution first came to power, but was later jailed when he was caught red-handed in a plot to overthrow the new revolutionary government.

Beirut: Frontline Story

Beirut: Frontline Story, by Selim Nassib with Caroline Tisdall, photographs by Chris Steele-Perkins, is an exceptionally useful book that has just been published. It is an eyewitness, hour-by-hour account of last summer’s war in Lebanon from the siege to the massacre with excellent maps and illustrations. It costs $6.95 plus $1.00 for postage from Africa World Press, P.O. Box 1892, Trenton, NJ 08608.

NSA Listens In On Canadian Journalist

In the last issue, we reported on the Defense Intelligence Agency’s spying on the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Canada’s intelligence service. Now it seems that the National Security Agency has got into the act. Don Sellar, a Washington correspondent for the Canadian paper Souttham News, has evidence that at least one of his stories has been intercepted by U.S. intelligence.

Last year, he had written a hard-hitting series of articles on secret missile testing deals between the U.S. and Canadian governments. Imagine his surprise when he found himself in the strange position of being congratulated by a friend about a story he had called in but which had not yet been published. His friend claimed that he had been shown a transcript of the unpublished story by U.S. officials. Apparently, these officials thought that Sellar’s friend was leaking information about the secret talks.

The NSA had no comment when confronted with the charge of intercepting journalistic and (no doubt) diplomatic messages. Reportedly, the Canadian government has
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Jamaican Newspaper Shut Down

The Jamaica Daily News was closed down on April 21 by Prime Minister Edward Seaga. The immediate reason given for shutting the paper's doors was financial insolvency. Much of the debt was owed to the Commodity Trading Company, a government-owned enterprise.

The Daily News had been owned by the government since 1977 when Michael Manley was in power. When Seaga became Prime Minister in 1980, the paper's workers made an offer to buy it which was refused. A restructuring plan proposed by the workers was also denied.

On April 20, the paper went into receivership. The employees learned of the situation over the government's Jamaica Broadcasting Corporation. All the workers were fired except 30 who were to prepare a financial report. The entire editorial department was dismissed, including Ben Brodie, president of the progressive Press Association of Jamaica. With the closing of the Jamaica Daily News, Jamaicans are for the first time left with only one daily newspaper. That paper is the right-wing, CIA-supported Daily Gleaner.

The response by media workers in Jamaica has been militant. The PAJ passed a resolution to start an international campaign and a series of national actions to protest the closing. Messages of solidarity have poured in from progressive journalists in Suriname, Grenada, and other parts of the Caribbean, as well as from the International Organization of Journalists.

In Jamaica, the fired employees and their supporters are picketing the plant where the paper is located. In addition to getting statements of solidarity from the Workers Party of Jamaica and Manley's Peoples National Party, picket organizers have also met with the former Prime Minister.

This incident stands in sharp contrast to the report issued in March by the CIA surrogate Inter-American Press Association. The report summarized press freedom in 26 nations in the Caribbean and Latin America, a region thoroughly dominated by U.S.-backed right-wing dictatorships. After noting this there was "no" freedom of the press in Haiti, the progressive governments of Suriname, Nicaragua, and Cuba, received the harshest criticism.

drastically reduced the amount of information going into its Washington Embassy via phone and other electronic devices since the story broke. It has reverted to the slower, but more "secure" diplomatic pouch.
The story of how the CIA got "Khrushchev's secret speech," internally contradictory in many respects, is almost wholly false. If true, it would actually be an example of a colossal breakdown in intelligence, not a success at all. The plot of this legend, like any other good folk tale, changes according to the audience, the time or place it's told, and who's telling it, so it's never easy to be certain which story is intended as the official one.

In his book The Craft of Intelligence, Allen Dulles wrote:

An intelligence "document hunt" was instituted, as the speech, never published in the U.S.S.R., was of great importance for the Free World. Eventually the text was found—but many miles from Moscow, where it had been delivered. It was necessary in this case for headquarters to alert many kinds of sources and to make sure all clues were followed up. I have always viewed this as one of the major coups of my tour of duty in intelligence. Since the text was published in full by the State Department, it also was one of the few exploits which could be disclosed as long as sources and methods of acquisition were kept secret.

In that final sentence Dulles is blowing smoke in our eyes, because, while many CIA "successes" had been widely reported by the time of his claim, official policy was neither to confirm nor to deny them.

Besides, there has been a long parade of leaks concerning the alleged source of the document, again serving the needs of propaganda, not truth.

In his memoir Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA, William Colby relates a debate over what to do with the Khrushchev speech once it had been obtained:

The more conspiratorial elements of CIA, led by the counterintelligence experts, saw it as the basis for an operation to spread confusion and deception among the Communists of the world. As one move in this program they turned to the Italian station [Colby was stationed in Rome at the time] and its press outlets to plant a copy of it sourced in Italy, with subtle variations in the original text to increase suspicions and backbiting among Communists. But before it was published, more politic heads prevailed (among them Ray Cline, as an analyst looking at the over-all impact it could have on world political trends), and Allen Dulles delivered the true text to The New York Times. It is clear that the political approach was right, and that the speech marked a watershed in the appeal of the Soviets to other peoples throughout the world, unblemished by doubts as to how an obscure Italian publication might have obtained such a document, or as to the accuracy of its text.

Aside from continuing his feud with James Jesus Angleton ("counterintelligence experts"), Colby too is blowing smoke. One widely circulated rumor held that Italian Communist Party leader Palmiro Togliatti had sold a copy

2 Few U.S. writers have devoted sufficient attention to this concern. One of the best discussions is contained in Vitaly Petrusenko, A Dangerous Game: CIA and the Mass Media (Interpress: Prague, n.d. [1977]), available from Imported Publications, 320 West Ohio Street, Chicago, IL 60610.

3 Critics who have taken one or another version of this story at face value, and thereby themselves have contributed to the myth, include David Wise and Thomas B. Ross in The Invisible Government and The Espionage Establishment, Victor Marchetti and John Marks in The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, and William R. Corson in The Armes of Ignorance.
of the speech to the CIA for a large amount of money, undoubtedly intended to discredit Togliatti among Communists. In *Secrets, Spies and Scholars* Cline claimed the CIA had paid “a very handsome price” for the text, while Angleton told *The New York Times*, “There was no payment.”

In addition, Angleton has led some writers, including William Corson, to the conclusion that the CIA obtained it from Israeli intelligence sources “which, giving the Israelis their due, probably included a deep-cover European communist.” Angleton was the head of the CIA’s Israeli desk as well as the counterintelligence chief. Last year Iser Harel, former head of Israel’s Mossad, complained to the *Daily Ma’ariv* that Mossad had never been given credit for having obtained the speech and having supplied it to the CIA. Once a myth has been launched successfully, everyone involved wants to be its hero, it seems.

There is a variety of other published accounts of the source. Wise and Ross wrote that “a certain high Yugoslav official” almost was persuaded. “But then he thought better of it, and backed off.” Marchetti and Marks report it came from “an Eastern European communist official,” as does Peer da Silva in *Sub Rosa: The CIA and the Uses of Intelligence*. Andrew Tully in *CIA: The Inside Story* says a Moscow functionary named Andrei “was in a position where he had the opportunity” to give the speech to his CIA handlers—complete with lurid tales of a “dead drop” (a bench slat in Gorky Park), “live drop,” “safe house,” “cut out,” and most conspiratorial meetings in the lobby of the Bolshoi Ballet Theater. In *The Secret War Sanche de Gramont* says it was “smuggled out of Poland by a CIA agent.” This is clearly material for a thriller.

The truth, however, is both more obvious and more prosaic, though it has the distinct disadvantage, from the CIA’s point of view, of not enhancing the Agency’s image in the world of espionage.

In those days Dorothy Healey was an important leader of the Communist Party U.S.A. She recalls that on April 28, 1956, the late Eugene Dennis, then the party’s general secretary, had his political secretary read the speech aloud to a meeting of the party’s national committee at the Jefferson School in New York—a building permanently bugged by the FBI and CIA, as Healey points out. There was no need whatever for any of the international cloak and dagger business.

Nevertheless the legend is endlessly recycled. Some months ago William Safire included it in a column, suggesting that the CIA had tampered with Khrushchev’s text, perhaps to shore up Angleton’s version of the story. Healey says, however, that nothing in the published version differs from the text she heard at the Jefferson School meeting.

Now a new intelligence myth is undermining the credibility of the legend; occasionally one good tale must yield to another. This one is the FBI’s attempt to recoup its reputation in the espionage field.

For almost 20 years the FBI has been trying to find ways to link the government of Cuba to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, but until recently only rightwing propagandists considered that account worth repeating.

Supposedly J. Edgar Hoover sent an undercover agent codenamed “Solo”—a leading member of the Communist Party U.S.A.—to interview Fidel Castro in early 1964. “Solo” reported that Castro said Lee Harvey Oswald had told Cuban consulate officials in Mexico City of his intention to kill Kennedy. Castro denied this to the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and the committee believed him. “On balance, the committee did not believe that Oswald voiced a threat to Cuban officials. However reliable the confidential source ("Solo") may be, the committee found it to be in error in this instance.”

Unwilling to abandon this disinformation campaign, an FBI source gave historian David J. Garrow, author of *The FBI and Martin Luther King, Jr.*, from “Solo” to Memphis, the identity of “Solo” and an account of his background and recruitment. This, in turn, gave the FBI a renewed opportunity to promote the “Cuba connection” to the JFK assassination on an ABC television special with revitalized credibility, since the identity of “Solo” had been disclosed in Garrow’s 1981 book, sharply critical of the FBI.

Garrow identified “Solo” as two brothers, Morris Childs, one-time editor of the *Daily Worker*, and his brother Jack; Morris was the important one. (Oddly, in a small book with 82 pages of reference notes, one fourth of the total, there is no documentation for the allegation. Since Morris Childs is evidently still alive and hasn’t come forward to refute Garrow, however, it seems reasonable to accept Garrow’s description of him as a high-level undercover FBI operative since 1951.)

Although release of the “Solo” identity has failed so far to breathe new life into the FBI’s anti-Castro campaign, it has permanently, perhaps fatally, wounded the CIA legend. Morris Childs traveled so frequently to the Soviet Union that he was colloquially dubbed “the ambassador” by leaders of the Communist Party. Healey doesn’t recall whether he was personally present when the Khrushchev speech was read to the party leadership, but he certainly would have had access to it, and very likely before the rest of them heard it.

So much for secret sources in Moscow, Poland, Yugoslavia, or Italy. So much for the wizardry of Israel’s Mossad and the genius of spymaster James Angleton. So much for the CIA legend. If the intelligence agencies were doing their job at all, they got the text of Khrushchev’s speech from a microphone surveillance in New York or from “Solo” in Chicago.

What, then, is the CIA legend made of? Lies and deceit, like everything else the CIA stands for.

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Sources and Methods:

The CIA Legend

By Ken Lawrence

Lies and deceit have been the hallmark of the Central Intelligence Agency since its inception.

The late Frank Wisner, the CIA's Deputy Director for Plans (the Directorate for Plans was the old name for the clandestine service) was proud of his "Mighty Wurlitzer," as he called his worldwide propaganda and disinformation network. In 1976 the House Select Committee on Intelligence (Pike Committee) reported that media and propaganda projects were probably "the largest single category of covert action projects undertaken by the CIA."

There have always been prominent journalists who would help out, and some who justify publishing official lies as news. Former CBS diplomatic correspondent Marvin Kalb (now with NBC) once wrote, "Lying is a legitimate part of the defense mechanism of the administration, and the reporter goes along with it when in his opinion it is in the national interest."

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (Church Committee), reporting later in 1976, found two "reasons for concern" with the CIA's use of journalists. One was the problem of "fallout"—"the potential, inherent in covert

(Continued on p. 37)