


Covert Action

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Special Issue on Israel and the Middle East



Intifada : The Palestinian Uprising

Editorial

Israel and Palestine

Most of this special issue on the Middle East is about the Palestinians and the Israelis—about a forty-year conflict which is just now searing the conscience of the world.

It is impossible to explain Israeli intransigence. It cannot be a question of "secure borders" in this age of guided missiles. Nor can it be seen as a question of religious fundamentalism, even though the Israelis justify the land grabs with biblical references.

The Israelis have themselves united the Palestinian opposition by 21 years of the daily humiliation of occupation and militarization, by creating a nation of homeless people, killing and maiming tens of thousands and jailing many thousands more, in a move to reduce and disperse the Palestinian population. This policy can be defined, under international law, as genocide. (Even the *New York Times* points out that most Israelis think of Arabs as less than human.) It is unquestionably a policy of wholesale terrorism.

Israel's critics are growing in number, like Albert Vorspan, the senior vice president of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, who called the conflict "Israel's Vietnam, Kent State, and Watts rolled into one." (*New York Times Magazine*, May 8, 1988.) But Israel's mindless apologists still abound, and they insist, like *New Republic* editor Leon Wieseltier (*New York Times*, June 12, 1988), that it is "effrontery" to compare the Israeli military to the Nazis.

But what other comparison can be made when an entire population is subjected to collective punishment and put under curfew or herded into camps, and people are tear-gassed to death, and captured prisoners have their bones broken, and houses of suspects are bulldozed to the ground, and people are called animals and buried alive, and the *announced* policy of the government is one of random beatings and general terror and shoot-on-sight orders? Are we supposed to exonerate the Israeli government just because it has not killed as many Palestinians as the Nazis killed Jews?

The Israelis have ruled the occupied territories for twenty-one years. Now, by standing up and raising their arms with stones against the occupiers, the occupied have forced even the most racist Israelis to call them by their rightful name—Palestinians. Despite Israel's refusal to bend to world pressure, it is only a matter of time before the Palestinian people have the nation-state they deserve.

Afghanistan

This issue also contains several articles relating to Afghanistan. It is ironic that as the Soviet Union attempts to disengage, as it attempts to cooperate internationally and bilaterally, the Reagan administration sabotages the Afghan settlement. This is the same reprehensible policy which the administration has applied to Nicaragua and Angola. ●

Table of Contents

Editorial	2	Israel in Africa	
Israeli State Terror		By Jane Hunter	38
By Naseer Aruri	3	Israel's Nuclear Arsenal	
The Assassination of Abu Jihad		By Meir Vanunu	45
Interview with Ghassan Bishara	7	Israeli Arms to the <i>Contras</i>	
The "Transfer" Proposal		By Jack Colhoun	46
Interview with Israel Shahak	10	The Buckley Affair	
The <i>Intifada</i> and Israel's Dirty War		By Edward J. Dobbins	49
By Ellen Ray	13	Destabilizing Afghanistan	
Israeli Occupation		By Steve Galster	52
By Katherine Watjen	22	The Afghan Pipeline	
Israeli Chemical Warfare		By Steve Galster	55
By Louis Wolf	26	The Afghani <i>Contra</i> Lobby	
The Israeli Arms Bazaar		By Sayid Khybar	61
By Jane Hunter	29	News Notes	68
Hakim's Connections		Disinforming the World on Libya	
By Peggy Adler Robohm	35	By Bill Schaap	76

Cover photo: Armed Israeli soldiers charge stone-throwing Palestinian demonstrators in Ramallah. Credit: Associated Press.

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Israeli State Terror:

A Policy of "Might, Force, and Blows"

by Naseer Aruri*

The U.S. and Israel have an interesting perspective on the meaning of "terrorism." President Reagan often describes terrorism as an international conspiracy (similar to his definition of communism) directed against the United States and its "way of life."¹ The State of Israel uses a similar definition when justifying its repression of Palestinian aspirations. While Israel and the U.S. share a similar definition of "terrorism," how they use the term depends very much upon to whom they are referring.

In his 1984 speech before the Jonathan Institute,² Secretary of State Shultz quoted the words of the late Senator Henry Jackson, who addressed the same forum in 1979. Senator Jackson had said:

The idea that one person's "terrorist" is another's "freedom fighter" cannot be sanctioned. Freedom fighters or revolutionaries don't blow up buses containing non-combatants; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters don't set out to capture and slaughter school children; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters don't assassinate innocent businessmen, or hijack and hold hostage innocent men, women, and children; terrorist murderers do. It is a disgrace that democracies would allow the treasured word "freedom" to be associated with the acts of terrorists.³

However, in his personal diary, which was published against the wishes of the Israeli establishment, former Israeli Prime Minister Moshe Sharett reveals that Israeli military operations against Arab civilian populations were designed to terrorize them and create fear, tension and instability.⁴ Sharett's documentation shows that Israel's territorial expansion (such as in the Suez in 1956) was facilitated by Israeli acts of provocation, which generated Arab hostility and created

pretexts for intervention. For example, the attack by Israeli Army Unit 101 led by Ariel Sharon on the Palestinian village of Kibya in October 1953, causing numerous civilian casualties and destruction of homes, was condemned by Sharett. He writes, "[In the cabinet meeting] I condemned the Kibya affair that exposed us in front of the whole world as a gang of blood-suckers, capable of mass massacres regardless, it seems, of whether their actions may lead to war."⁵

Israeli State Terrorism

More recent accounts by Israeli writers show how earlier acts of terrorism provided a historical background to the adoption of a policy of state terrorism by Israel.⁶ Benny Morris's explanation of the Palestinian exodus in 1948, based on state, military and Zionist archives, refutes the official Israeli version that the Palestinians bear responsibility for their own expulsion. An earlier work by Irish journalist Erskine Childers demonstrated that, contrary to the official Israeli version, there were no Arab radio broadcasts ordering the Palestinians to leave.⁷ And Israeli journalist Tom Segev reveals in his book how instrumental was Zionist terrorism in the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem. Sixteen months after 250 Arab civilians were massacred in the village of Deir Yassin (April 9, 1948) by the combined forces of ETZEL (known as Menachem Begin's Irgun) and LEHI (known as Yitzhak Shamir's Stern Gang) there was a debate in the Israeli Knesset in which, according to Segev, a member of Begin's Herut Party had boasted: "Thanks to Deir Yassin, we won the war."⁸

Another account by Lenny Brenner⁹ reveals that Israeli Prime Minister Shamir was a convert to the pre-Mussolini Betar (Zionist Brownshirts) in the late 1930s and that his Stern Gang had attempted to strike a deal with the Nazi regime in Germany in 1941 in which the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine on a "totalitarian basis" would be bound by a treaty with the German Reich.

Shamir's commitment to rightwing causes and to terrorism was unmistakably revealed in an article he wrote in the LEHI journal *Hehazit* (The Front) in the summer of 1943. This ex-

5. *Ibid.*

6. See Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Tom Segev, *The First Israelis* (New York: The Free Press, 1986); Simha Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities* (New York: Pantheon Press, 1987).

7. Erskine Childers, "The Other Exodus," *The Spectator* (London), May 12, 1961. Reprinted in Walid Khalidi, ed., *From Haven to Conquest* (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1987).

8. Segev, *op. cit.*, n. 6.

9. Lenny Brenner, *The Iron Wall* (London: Zed Press, 1984).

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1. Demonstrating a powerful command of the English language and characteristic open-mindedness, Reagan once described Nicaragua, North Korea, Libya, Cuba and Iran, as a "confederation of terrorist states" who make up "the strangest collection of misfits, Looney Tunes and squalid criminals since the advent of the Third Reich."

2. For more on the Jonathan Institute see *CAIB*, No. 22 (Fall 1984), p. 5.

3. Address by George Shultz, Secretary of State, "Terrorism: The Challenge to the Democracies," Washington: Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State (Current Policy No. 589), June 24, 1984.

4. From the personal diary of Moshe Sharett discussed in Livia Rokach, *Israel's Sacred Terrorism*, 3rd ed. (Belmont, Mass.: AAUG Press, 1986), pp. 28-33.

cerpt stands in contrast to Shamir's constant moralizing and condemnation of what he calls "PLO terrorism:"

Neither Jewish ethics nor Jewish tradition can disqualify terrorism as a means of combat.... [T]errorism is for us a part of the political battle being conducted under the present circumstances, and it has a great part to play: speaking in a clear voice to the whole world, as well as to our wretched brethren outside this land, it proclaims our war against the occupier.¹⁰

Shamir's cabinet colleague Yitzhak Rabin who, as Defense Minister in charge of the occupied territories, proclaimed the policy of "might, force, and blows" in January 1988 (which has so far resulted in an estimated 281 deaths, more than 50,000



Credit: Associated Press

Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir conferring in 1983 with then Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger.

injuries and 30,000 detentions) has also had a consistent record of terrorism for more than forty years. As the deputy commander of Operation Dani, he, along with the late former Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and the late former Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon, were responsible for the expulsion of between 50,000 and 70,000 people from the towns of Lydda and Ramleh in July 1948. The town of Ramleh had surrendered without a fight after the withdrawal of the Jordan Army but the inhabitants were rounded up, expelled and told never to come back. Benny Morris characterized that as the "biggest expulsion operation of the 1948 war." Rabin expressed empathy with "the great suffering inflicted upon" his men who caused the expulsion!

One of those expelled was a 13-year-old boy by the name of Khalil al-Wazir, later known as Abu Jihad. Yitzhak Rabin,

who was responsible for that act as a member of the Zionist militia, was one of the inner cabinet decision makers who decided, forty years later, to assassinate al-Wazir far away from his home in Ramleh. The man who headed the inner cabinet, Yitzhak Shamir, told an inquirer who wanted to know who killed Abu Jihad, "I heard about it on the radio."

It was typical of the official response to the killing; claims of ignorance, broad hints that Abu Jihad's responsibility for the Palestinian uprising could only trigger that kind of response, and the usual reference to a factional conflict within the Palestinian movement as being responsible for the assassination. In fact, the murder of Abu Jihad is the latest incident in a continuous pattern of Israeli assassinations of Palestinian leaders and intellectuals among whom are Karmal al-Adwan, Ghassan Kanafani, Kamal Nasser, Majid Abu Sharar, Abu-Yurif and many others.

In a *New York Times* article summarizing the official Israeli interpretation of its own policies, Thomas Friedman maintains that Israel endeavors to "turn terror back on the terrorists." This strategy has gone through several different stages. For the period of 1948-1956 the strategy was described as "counterterrorism through retaliation or negative feedback" and was employed against Egypt and Jordan to prevent border crossings by Palestinian refugees attempting, in the main, to check on the conditions of their former homes.¹¹ By 1972, Israel was striking against "the nerve centers and the perpetrators themselves" using letter bombs, exploding cars and telephones, and quiet assassinations of Palestinian leaders and intellectuals on the back streets of Europe. Later acts of terrorism including the destruction of entire villages in Lebanon, raids on Beirut, Baghdad, and Tunis have become typical of Israeli policy towards Arab non-acceptance of its regional hegemony. Such acts have rarely evoked U.S. condemnation. In fact the Reagan administration characterized Israel's raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunis as an act of self-defense.

U.S. and Israel — "Special" Relationship

Strategic cooperation between Israel and the U.S. was summated between 1982 and 1988 and has dramatically elevated Israel's role in U.S. global strategic calculation. By 1983, the Reagan administration had accepted the Israeli view that the Palestine question was not the principal cause of instability in the Middle East. Henceforth, it would not be allowed to interfere in the "special relationship" between a superpower and its strategic ally.

In the special relationship between the United States and Israel, the latter is considered a "unique strategic asset."¹² In the crucial Middle East, Israel is viewed as the cornerstone of American policy, which is perceived as a bulwark against the Soviet Union and radical revolutionary transformation. Outside the Middle East, Israel has emerged as the most important supplier of the technology of repression, anti-guerrilla

11. Thomas Friedman, "Israel Turns Terror Back on the Terrorists, But Finds No Political Solution," *New York Times*, December 4, 1984.

12. Reagan's description in a *Washington Post* article of August 15, 1979. He has adhered to this view consistently ever since.

10. Reprinted in *Al-Hamishmar*, December 24, 1987. See *Middle East Report*, No. 152 (May-June 1982), p. 55.

training, and infrastructure to combat revolution, all euphemistically phrased "counterterrorism."

Israel ranks as the fifth largest exporter of arms in the world, according to CIA estimates, and it has become an essential component of the global counterinsurgency business. "Hit lists" used by the death squads in Guatemala have been computerized with Israeli assistance and the Uzi machine gun is the standard weapon of the death squads.

The special relationship between the U.S. and Israel is a two-way street. Israel is the largest recipient of U.S. economic and military aid and in return Israel has much to offer the U.S.

The Reagan administration has publicly declared that Israel's substantial experience and "success" in coping with terrorism should provide guidance for the United States. When George Shultz spoke at a New York synagogue in 1984 he said:

No nation has more experience with terrorism than Israel, and no nation has made a greater contribution to our understanding of the problem and the best way to confront it. By supporting organizations like the Jonathan Institute, named after the brave Israeli soldier who led and died at Entebbe, the Israeli people have raised international awareness of the global scope of the terrorist threat.... [T]he rest of us would do well to follow Israel's example.¹³

The fact that the U.S. and Israel are so closely allied and use the same criteria for defining who are "terrorists" and who are not, necessarily makes the U.S. a dubious participant in mediating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and brings into question the possible results of U.S.-sponsored negotiations with George Shultz behind the wheel.

When Secretary of State Shultz became the Reagan administration's chief proponent of close strategic cooperation with Israel he went far beyond the initiatives of his predecessor Alexander Haig. Haig's framework for U.S. Middle East policy was the "consensus of strategic concerns," which would bring together a conservative constellation of regional powers that would include Israel. Shultz's framework, however, promoted Israel to the center of U.S. policy and assigned it a global role in addition to its regional duties on behalf of the status quo. Thus with Shultz in power, the United States conducted its Middle East policy on the basis of the "consensus of strategic concern" plus the special relationship with Israel.

With all the attention George Shultz received on his five trips to the Middle East in the last six months, and with the outcome never in question, it is important to ask, "What were the real objectives behind the 'Shultz shuttles?'"

Reagan's Commitment to Peace

American involvement in the Middle East since the 1967 war reveals a number of precedents for unimplementable

13. Address by George Shultz, Secretary of State, "Terrorism and the Modern World," Washington: Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State (Current Policy No. 589), October 25, 1984.

peace plans actually designed to justify U.S. obstruction of the global consensus and to contain Palestinian nationalism. An example was the Reagan plan of September 1, 1982, which denied sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza to both Israel and the Palestinians. Its territorial and confederal aspects evoked a swift yet predictable rejection from the Israeli cabinet.

The principal spur for the Reagan plan was the siege of Beirut, which tarnished Israel's image and at the same time provided a catalyst in the world community for linking PLO withdrawal to Palestinian statehood. To justify its virtual sole dissent from the international will, the Reagan administration felt obliged to launch its own initiative based on the "Jordan option," which proved to be a non-option.

More recently, Reagan has sent his premier ambassador of peace, George Shultz, to the Middle East to again make a public press for a settlement. However, knowing that Israel



Credit: Trippett/ SIPA Press

George Shultz with friends Yitzhak Shamir (right) and former ambassador Moshe Arens (left).

will not meet even the minimum requirements for a territorial settlement, what then does Mr. Shultz hope to accomplish in view of the fact that his initiative lacks any means of pressuring Israel?

The U.S. has three objectives:

1. The Shultz plan is an attempt to contain the Palestinian uprising and prevent its extension to U.S. allies and clients in the region. It is also designed to repair Israel's tarnished image in the United States.

2. The United States would like to set the terms before any other actor emerges with a plan for settlement. The Soviet Union, which has been trying to broaden its options in the region, is one such actor. The Arab states or the PLO are also possible sources of peace initiatives. The Shultz Plan represents a reaffirmation of U.S. custodianship over the Middle East. It serves as a reminder that the area is U.S. turf and hence it is designed to elbow out or preempt any genuine proposals for a settlement.

3. The plan also attempts to bridge the gap between the requirements of public opinion and those of public policy in the United States. The U.S. has broken barriers for the first time in the Middle East. The public mood in this country has changed and the people seem ready for a political settlement. Yet Palestine has never been high on the official agenda. There is no sense in Washington that the Palestine question is urgent. Unless it becomes urgent, there will be no movement towards peace.

America's policy objectives in the region center on oil and containment of Soviet influence as well as containment of the natives. As long as Palestine does not interfere with these objectives, the administration feels no compulsion to initiate peace proposals. But given that the public mood has changed in this country, the Shultz plan offers the U.S. public a rejectable plan, which would absolve Washington of responsibility for the impasse.

The Reagan administration clearly perceives the uprising as a political threat to its hegemony in the region and would like to check its potential for extension beyond the occupied territories into Arab countries ruled by conservative regimes. The administration is also concerned about Israel's repressive image—perhaps more than Israel itself—in the United States. Washington's strategic relationship with Israel must continue to have the blessings of American public opinion.

Hence, Shultz's sudden awakening to the fact that the unresolved Palestine-Israel conflict is a threat to the status quo and his embarking upon a mission to save Israel in spite of itself. The erosion of U.S. public support for Reagan's policy towards Israel is seen as a dangerous strategic step backward, and his administration is desperately trying to counter the bad publicity.

Shultz's endeavor turned out to be a series of diplomatic shuttles not only between Arab capitals and Israel but also between the two heads of the Israeli government. His diplomacy seems to operate on the assumption that the crucial choices are between Israel's Likud preference for functional autonomy (which keeps "Greater Israel" intact as the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are enfranchised in the Jordanian state), and Labor's "territorial" autonomy, which is a diminutive version of the Jordan option. His diplomacy also assumes that the only choices are between Labor's cosmetic international conference and Likud's direct negotiations.

The fact that the Jordan option is dead, that the concept of a Palestinian-Jordanian delegation is unacceptable, and that the Camp David formula is discredited throughout the Arab World seems to have escaped Mr. Shultz's attention. The outcome of Shultz's diplomacy has so far worked for the benefit of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. Shamir's visit to the U.S. in March 1988, ostensibly to discuss peace with the Reagan administration, enabled him to respond to U.S. critics of Israeli repression in the occupied territories, to raise funds in the American Jewish community and to solidify and upgrade the U.S. strategic alliance. In his visit, Shamir repeated the Israeli position that the Palestinian uprising was not a demonstration of civil disobedience but a war waged "against Israelis, against the existence of the State of Israel;"

hence, he declared the media coverage unfair and non-contextual.¹⁴ This theme was dutifully repeated by prominent American Jewish figures such as Morris Abram, chairman of the Council of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations, and New York Mayor Edward Koch, among others.

"Elder statesman" Henry Kissinger, who had erected the principal barrier to a Palestinian-Israeli settlement back in 1974, and who was willing to bomb Vietnam back to the stone age, was already on record one week prior to Shamir's visit as saying, "Israel should bar the media...accept the short term criticism...and put down the insurrection as quickly as possible—overwhelmingly, brutally, and rapidly."¹⁵

The recent dramatic ascendancy of the far right in the Israeli body politic, and the rampant anti-Arab racism sweeping the country, provide a fertile environment for the kind of state terrorism witnessed today on the West Bank and in Gaza.



Credit: Associated Press

Ariel Sharon touring the West Bank with his military entourage.

The orientation of this rapidly growing group toward brute force and its contempt for debate is partly the cause for the sharp increase in repression against Palestinian civilians under occupation. Worse yet is the tendency of members of the political and religious establishment to encourage such acts of terrorism.¹⁶

Given the close and special relationship between the U.S. and Israel, given the fact that no prominent U.S. politician is willing to condemn Israel publicly for its repression of the Palestinians and given that the U.S. and Israel share the same understanding of what terrorism is, it seems likely that if peace is to come to the Middle East it will be in spite of what the U.S. and Israel do.

14. *New York Times*, March 14, 1988.

15. Robert McFadden, *New York Times*, March 5, 1988.

16. Former Likud Minister of Science Professor Yuva Neeman, Knesset member Haim Druckman, and former Chief of Staff Bytan, among others, are on record justifying Israeli acts of terrorism in the West Bank and Gaza as far back as 1983. See *Christian Science Monitor*, May 10, 1983.

Interview with Ghassan Bishara:

Israeli Commandos Assassinate Abu Jihad

A respected Palestinian journalist, Ghassan Bishara, has covered Middle East affairs for many years for Al-Fajr, a leading Jerusalem-based Palestinian newspaper. In April of this year, Bishara was in Tunis, interviewing ranking members of the PLO, and was with Abu Jihad only hours before his assassination by Israeli commandos. Recently, CovertAction Information Bulletin conducted this exclusive interview with Mr. Bishara in Washington, DC.

CAIB: Ghassan, you were in Tunis during the assassination of Abu Jihad. Let me first ask you to describe for us what happened the day of the assassination.

GB: Well, I had been waiting for a phone call from the office of Abu Jihad himself because I wanted to interview him. I had been asking for an interview with him for some time. Around the fourth or fifth of April, I received a call inviting me to come to Tunis, to conduct the interview with Abu Jihad and other Palestinian leaders. I also intended to interview Arafat, the chairman, and Abu Luft of the political department. On the 8th, which was a Friday, I took off from here to Tunis, arriving there the next morning. I had the interview with Abu Jihad on Thursday, April 14th. I was taken up from my hotel to his office at about eleven o'clock. I stayed in his office with him and others. When I conducted the interview, I was with him alone, until three o'clock, three-thirty. Then we continued the interview at his house and I finished the interview about seven p.m.

CAIB: Abu Jihad was known as one of the founders of *Fatah* and identified as the number two in the organization. How do you perceive the significance of this Israeli-sponsored assassination? What does it mean? I thought that previously there was at least a silent understanding that one does not go after the leadership of a movement or of a country in the Middle East, but this seems to be broken now.

GB: I think that you made a very interesting point. There was and there is an agreement, an unwritten agreement for a very long time, that heads of states do not use power available to them to kill or knock out other heads of states. That also seems to have worked between the Israelis and the PLO. As a matter of fact, you probably remember that during the 1982 war, prior to the PLO's departure from Beirut, there were

photos in the media showing an Israeli sniper having Arafat in his crosswire sight. The hint was that they could have killed him but they did not.¹ I don't know whether that's true or not. But the idea or the theory that heads of state do not knock out equivalent people is correct. It still applies. Now this applies until or unless one looks at another event, a previous Israeli experience in 1973. Maybe we can come back to that later on.

CAIB: What do you think was the Israeli objective in assassinating Abu Jihad?

GB: Why did they do it now? I think they actually decided to violate this unwritten agreement because of several reasons. Most important in my view is the *intifada*, the uprising. I think the uprising has shown Israel's weaknesses. It has shown its inability to deal with the uprising, simply with people throwing rocks, burning tires; it has shown Israel's true face to the world whereby its harsh acts against the Palestinian people have made Israel look very bad. The world media has simply reflected or carried to their bases in the U.S., in Europe and Africa, wherever, what is happening in the territories. And what has been happening since December is something really that cannot be easily equated with any other such case, where you have a very powerful army shooting children right and left, killing something between, according to PLO figures, 280 and, according to world media, 170 or something like that, burying people alive, deporting people, putting people—half a million, sometimes several hundred thousands—under collective punishment. Town arrest, house arrest, curfews, cutting electricity, denying food and water, cutting telephone contact.

I mean, these are measures practically unheard of in modern times. All of this, of course, with the intention of quelling the uprising, has not worked. So Israel had in a way to find other means, hoping that they will succeed. One of those means, Israel's leaders believe, was to kill the man who they thought was most in charge of the uprising, who was Abu Jihad. That was the most important reason, to try to quell the uprising. Now, in as far as would it work or not, I don't think it will work. I don't think that disappearance of a political or a military leader in the midst of such an uprising can ever quell the uprising.

1. Ze'ev Schiff, an Israeli commentator for *Ha'aretz* newspaper in Tel Aviv, reported that the U.S. extracted Israel's promise "not to hit" the PLO leadership during the 1982 withdrawal. *Ha'aretz*, April 22, 1988.

CAIB: I just want to mention a brief commentary which was printed in *Yedi'ot Aharonot* newspaper in Tel Aviv on April 17th. It cites the motives for the assassination. First, it was to deter Palestinians and Arabs from escalating further. Second, it was to deter "would-be PLO terrorists" from joining that body. Third, the Israelis claimed that this was an effort to boost the morale of the population. What do you think of this?

GB: I accept fully the third reason. And it is not just the Israeli population, it is also the Israeli Army. The Army has been dealt a couple of setbacks. It is demoralized. It is one of the



Credit: March Simon/SIPA Press

Yasser Arafat and Abu Jihad.

most powerful armies, or at least it is supposed to be, and it simply does not know how to quell an unarmed population. There were a couple of cases actually where Israeli troops simply ran away. They ran away in front of Palestinian fighters. The hang-glider case is a very clear-cut one where one Palestinian killed six Israelis. Then, the Dimona operation where two off-duty soldiers left their car and ran away. Really, it is significant of the Israeli Army's morale nowadays which is apparently in pretty bad shape.

So this operation intended obviously, I think, as the number two reason, to lift up the morale of the Israeli Army, undoubtedly. I don't know about the other motives about escalating attacks on Israel. I don't think it's really valid.

CAIB: That seems to be negated by the whole history of the Palestinian movement in the occupied territories.

GB: I think that there are actually other reasons. There are those who believe that Israel, having been put under some pressure by world public opinion, U.S. public opinion, some mild pressure from the U.S. government to accept the Shultz

initiative, Israel thought that knocking out Abu Jihad, a Palestinian leader, would be the nail that would probably shut the coffin on this thing because they know that with killing Abu Jihad no Palestinian leader could come and talk peace, at least not for some time.

What is clear, I think, is that Israel wanted the Shultz initiative killed, and this is one way of killing it. I think there is another reason, which one should not fail to mention. Israel is going to have elections in November. If you look through the record of Israeli elections, prior to almost every election, there was some drastic move, something just for show, a showpiece of some sort that Israel's government undertook, whichever government it is, to boost its electability within Israeli society. Prior to the last election, if you remember, the Israelis flew over Baghdad and bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor, which gave a great boost to the Begin government at the time. Now, this operation would probably help Shamir's government also. I think that a combination of these reasons would answer the question as to why they may have done this at this point.

CAIB: As you know, there is also a long history of American-Israeli collaboration, even joint American-Israeli operations, for many of these secret activities, especially strikes; covert action against many Arab elements in the Middle East. This is seen in the revelations of the Iran/contras scandal. In the case of the American hostages, there was actual planning of joint U.S.-Israeli operations to bring out some of the hostages. Do you think that it is possible that the Israelis, by using their equivalent of the U.S. Delta strike force,² conducted this killing without any knowledge whatsoever on the part of the United States?

GB: Well, having been in Tunis through this tragedy, the belief in Tunis is one hundred per cent for the Israelis having informed the U.S. about what they were about to do, and that the U.S. at least did not say no.³ This is what the Palestinians in Tunis believe. You cannot convince them that things were otherwise.

CAIB: Perhaps the form of Israeli-American consultation in this case would be like in the case of Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982, where U.S. officials were told about it. They had no objection to it, so the Israelis went ahead.

GB: Right. Again, if we draw the analogy with 1982, Israel's leaders can sometimes maneuver their way, and extract what they want from the U.S. officials without even sometimes telling them what it is and without even the U.S. officials saying it outright. So they could go back to their government, to their cabinet meetings, and say, "you see, that's what my conversation with an American official was and that's what he said."

2. According to various sources, the unit involved is "Force 13," known in Hebrew as "Sayeret Matkal," made up of elements from the Mossad and from Regiment 269. The unit was attached to the Israeli chief of staff's office. The structural chain of command resembles that of the U.S. Delta Force.

3. According to CAIB sources, the U.S. provided very specific intelligence to Israel concerning the PLO's set-up in Tunis but it wanted Israel to strike the PLO main headquarters instead.

The American official may not be in fact approving it, but by not standing strongly against it the U.S. can be actually maneuvered into going along with Israel.

CAIB: The plane that Israel used, the 707 that was stationed off the Tunisian coast and interfering with local communication systems, weren't the Tunisians, and the Americans, and other parties able to pick up this interference? This took place for several hours.

GB: They did. The Tunisians did, the Italians did. The latter very clearly did. They actually read the markings on the plane, they knew what it was. The problem was that it was going through internationally recognized commercial airways. It did not penetrate Tunisian airspace nor did it penetrate Italian airspace. What the plane did was that it went through the normal commercial airways that El Al and other airlines go through. It was apparently so powerful that it was able to disrupt Tunisian telephone and other means of communications in the area that the Israelis were focusing on, which is the Sidi Busain area of Tunis.

The Tunisians and the Italians picked this up. There is no doubt that the Americans also were aware of it.⁴ The point is that one could not have assumed such a thing because it is a commercial airliner going through commercial airways, and it was late at night. One cannot assume that the plane is there to knock off communications in Tunis so that Israeli terrorists can undertake such an operation.

CAIB: I gather that the Israelis have sort of honed their skills in this assassination business for a long time. Elements of the media sometimes get the impression that this act was done only by the Likud government because of the more immediate pressure generated by the uprising? Could you elaborate on Israel's role and background in assassinations?

GB: Of course, to assume that this is just like, as some people try to say, the settlements on the West Bank and Gaza being the product of the Likud party, it is wrong. It is the Labor party which began the settlement drive in the first place. The 1973 operation which killed three Palestinian leaders in the heart of Beirut was done under a Labor government. Even in this case, the Defense Minister, Mr. Rabin, is himself a Laborite; and the Foreign Minister is a Laborite. Two of the top three in the Israeli government that eventually made the decision to assassinate Abu Jihad are Laborites.

It is a symptom of the Israeli government's behavior towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is to really treat the Arabs with such acts hoping that this would resolve the issue. Obviously, it did not. The point is that it is a symptom of Israel's government, not of a particular party in Israel's government.

Assassinations and acts of terrorism, it has been said by Jewish leaders themselves, were introduced into the Middle East by Zionist leaders. I think Ben Gurion—one can look for that quote—once is quoted having said that Begin is the first terrorist in the Middle East. Shamir, the present Prime Minister, his group, is responsible for the killing of Count Bernadotte, the U.N. Commissioner. His group was in charge of bombing the King David Hotel. One can go into the history of these things and find many cases which are symptomatic, not only of the government of Israel, but of the Zionist movement as a whole.

In this case and others, decisions in Israel are made collectively. We know the details in this case.⁵ It's very clear now that they voted on it. The only attending minister that seems to have expressed any views against it was Ezer Weizman. Mr. Rabin was enthusiastic about it, Mr. Peres apparently went along with it by not voicing any objection at all. And Mr. Shamir pushed it. Therefore, it was executed. To assume that it is only, as other people had assumed, the work of the Likud operatives, is wrong. It is the government of Israel which now represents, as a matter of fact, all of Israel's main parties. You have the two major parties approving the assassination of a political leader.

If anything, one has to apply the same yardstick to these things, if one wants to use state terrorism, one must use this case in the same context. It is a state that, in a supposedly official forum, sat and debated how to assassinate a human being who happened to be a Palestinian political leader. If this is not state-sponsored terrorism, I don't know what is.

CAIB: Given the assassination of Abu Jihad, how do you see it affecting the Palestinian-Israeli issue?

GB: For one, I think that the immediate outcome, as we have seen, was an escalation of the uprising that actually hasn't been seen before or since. Fourteen people died on that very same day. Since then, we have seen quite a few successful penetrations into Israel and other not so successful penetrations. Again, that's indicative of the will and determination on the part of the Palestinian people to escalate their struggle or to radicalize the whole area. I don't think what Israel hoped to achieve with it will be achieved, that is to quell the uprising or to humiliate further the Arabs or to dehumanize them.

And for those who thought that the peace process was somehow under way, I think that this will put a great damper on it. I don't think any Arab or Palestinian leader for some time to come now would feel comfortable—I don't want to say "will dare"—or actually any longer be convinced that Israel wants peace. Because a country that wants peace would not pursue such a policy. It's as simple as that. ●

4. The Boeing 707 was a flying command and control post with electronics designed for special warfare operations, i.e. communications links with Israeli commandos carrying electronic briefcases. Apparently, Gen. Ehud Barak, Israel's IDF Deputy Chief of Staff, was on the 707 supervising the assassination. Barak was the leader of the Israeli raid on the PLO in Beirut in 1973. *Washington Post*, April 21, 1988.

5. According to knowledgeable sources, the Israeli commandos involved apparently spoke French and Palestinian Arabic. The accompanying woman who videotaped the killing spoke Tunisian Arabic. After Abu Jihad was shot dead, four commandos came over to his body and discharged the ammunition clips of their submachine guns on the dead man, riddling his body with 104 bullets. *Washington Post*, April 21, 1988.

Israel Shahak on the "Transfer" Proposal

And the Process of Nazification

In February, CAIB co-editor Ellen Ray and other members of a delegation of American women visiting the West Bank and Gaza met with Hebrew University chemistry professor Israel Shahak, a leading opponent of Israeli government policies. The following are excerpts of his talk to the delegation, dealing particularly with the "transfer policy."

I will begin from the Israeli Jewish angle by telling you what, in my opinion, are the reasons why the Palestinian rebellion broke out in December 1987. There are very deep and immediate reasons, which proceed from the changes in the Israeli Jewish society in the spring or summer of 1987, when Jewish chauvinism began to increase enormously and in a visible way. Out of many open manifestations I will mention two.

Pogroms

From June to August 1987, a period during which the occupied territories were quiet — completely quiet — there were a series of pogroms against Palestinians in Israel itself. By "pogroms" I mean exactly the common use of the word. In a given neighborhood, usually quite a big neighborhood, all of a sudden all the flats or houses or rooms rented by Arabs were vandalized and burned. The Arabs were beaten and expelled from the neighborhoods. I mean all Arabs — both from the Palestinian territories and Israeli Arabs. The police did not give any protection, and the neighborhoods became free of Arabs. The Hebrew press at that time invented, or re-invented, using Hebrew characters, a German word, *Arabrein*, which means in German, "clean of Arabs," from the German word employed by the Nazis, *Judenrein*, "clean of Jews." They invented the expression in order to refer to what was happening — a process of Nazification.

The "Transfer Proposal"

The second deep manifestation was what we call the "transfer proposal." "Transfer," in the Israeli use of the word, refers to a proposal which has been current in Israel from July or August 1987, to expell all the Palestinians — I emphasize, *all* the Palestinians — from all occupied territories. Not from Israel, but from all occupied territories. By the way, I am not speaking about Kahane, as you will see; I am speaking about "respectable" members of Israeli society. Here the difference from Kahane comes out. This is not proposed for so-called reasons of security, but from so-called reasons of principle.

The one who proposed this plan is General Rahaban Zahevi, a very good friend of Defense Minister Rabin. Only last week he held a big symposium in Tel Aviv about this proposal which was attended by a former chief of military in-

telligence, General Shlomo Gazit. Also attending were the former chief of the Central Command of the West Bank, Uri Orr, and many other distinguished figures from Israeli military intelligence, retired of course, and even from the literary establishment. Another person who publicly supported this idea last summer was Mr. Michael Dekel, Deputy Minister of Mr. Rabin. And Mr. Rabin, who could, under Israeli constitutional law, dismiss Mr. Dekel and simply ask that the Likud nominate another Deputy, did not do it.

I want to emphasize, first of all, that from last summer, the idea of expulsion of all the Palestinians from all the occupied territories was supported by important people who are completely different from Kahane, and completely different also from the settlers. Second, this transfer idea is always supported for reasons of principle, not for reasons of security. One reason, given both by Mr. Dekel and by General Gazit, is opposition to assimilation. If Palestinians remain in the occupied territories, then sooner or later there will be mixed marriages between Palestinians and Jews. And since they believe that mixed marriages are the greatest calamity for the Jewish people that can be imagined — a proposition which, I am afraid, is accepted by a good half of Israeli society — this can be a very strong argument. Try to imagine how a similar argument would have gone in Mississippi and Alabama 40 or 50 years ago.

The second important argument made by those people, who are much more serious in their political approach than either Kahane or the settlers, comes from the history of Zionism. They make many references to Ben Gurion, and to other leaders of a labor or socialist type of Zionism who supported expulsion. They point out that expulsion was not carried out only during time of war, but also during the time of absolute peace, such as the expulsion which was carried out by Ben Gurion, from 1949 to 1957. For example, near Gaza there is a town now called Ashkelon which once was called Majdal, and from this town all the Palestinians — 15,000 of them — were expelled by an agreement with Egypt in 1951, at a time of complete peace.

A visible transformation of about half of Israeli society took place in the summer of 1987, as anyone who has followed the Hebrew press — and any Palestinian — will tell you. The treatment of Palestinians — the humiliation, the daily oppressions, the suffering — everything that the Palestinians have to endure in the occupied territories and to some extent also in Israel, has been changing rapidly for the worse since that time. This is, in my opinion, the most important reason for the rebellion of Palestinians. Thirty or forty percent of Israeli society, more among the young who are serving as soldiers in the occupied territories, are believing more and more that the Palestinians

are going to be expelled — the transfer idea.

Death Squads

There is another factor, beyond the usual aspects of an occupation, which is still unknown outside Israel. But in Israel the use of death squads to murder Palestinians has been discussed in some of the Hebrew press. It was not employed in the occupied territories until about September or October 1987, when we had one very well-documented case in the Gaza Strip. According to the Israeli Hebrew press, three Palestinians were discovered dead, in a car. One of them was a Palestinian guerrilla who had escaped from prison. The two others were collaborators [Palestinians who work with or support the Israelis] — well-known, rich collaborators. One of them had established a branch of the Tel Aviv stock exchange in Gaza. The other was of a similar background. So you can understand that such people are neither guerrillas nor helpers of guerrillas.

Since the families were very rich they could employ very good lawyers — Palestinian lawyers from Israel. And by using such lawyers, and with the help of a Hebrew weekly called *Koteret Rashit*, which is sensitive and courageous about corruption in the intelligence and security services, even if not so good about Palestinian national rights, the case was brought into the open. By now it is completely clear that *the two businessmen were murdered simply because they were accidentally eyewitnesses to the murder of the guerrilla.*

There was also a recent case in which Israeli television, against orders, photographed an Israeli Jewish civilian shooting straight into a crowd of Palestinians. But when it was discovered that the person was a member of the General Security Service, Shabak, there was not even the smallest judicial investigation. It was simply announced that he was reprimanded. And that was it.

It is well known that Israel is involved with death squads in countries like Guatemala, and many others, so it is only natural that this matter would come home. I think there is no doubt that the employment of death squads, especially in the Gaza Strip, was one of the sparks which ignited the violence.

The Palestinian Boycott

There is another subject we should discuss, the Palestinian boycott of the Israeli economy. In the beginning the Israeli government made light of the boycott, and there were also severe limitations on reports relating to it. But as the situation develops, it is very clear that the boycott is seriously harming the Israeli economy.

First of all, if you read the American press, you will hear that only seven percent of the workers in the Israeli economy are Palestinians from the territories. This is just a lie. The number is much greater. First of all, most of the Palestinians are self-employed, presenting themselves for work in what used to be called slave markets in the towns. Palestinians from the territories dominate some areas of the Israeli economy: construction, low-paying agriculture jobs like picking, and several other things, like what we call the cleaning jobs.

In Tel Aviv, 40 to 50 percent of the workers employed in



Credit: Michael Moore

Palestinian demonstrators confront the Israeli military.

garbage removal have been absent now for six weeks, although this fact was only published this week. The city literally stinks, but it was not reported for several weeks that it stinks. In construction work there are great differences around the country, but for example, in the area around Beersheva in the Negev, 80 percent of the construction workers are Palestinians.

Next week Israel is going to import 5,000 workers from Romania. There are also negotiations to bring workers from Portugal, Thailand, and the Philippines. I think that it all may be tied in to the transfer plan.

The History of Transfer

Two respected reporters in *Davar*, the paper of the labor organization Histadrut, wrote a two-page article (February 19, 1988) called "This is the History of Transfer." Because of censorship, I will have to describe it in full.

Most of the article is devoted to information which appeared for the first time in Israel in this paper. Apparently the Labor Party in 1967 had discussed on the highest government level the transfer of Palestinians for reasons of principle. In 1967, a few weeks after the Six Day War,

the Minister of Finance of the Labor Party with the support of Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Abba Eban, proposed that all the refugees be settled in Arab states, especially in Syria and Iraq. But because of the long discussion no decision could be taken for mass resettlement in that meeting. However, the spirit of the discussion was according to the ideas of the Deputy Prime Minister at the time, Mr. Yigal Allon, of the Labor Party, who proposed that the Palestinian refugees of the Gaza Strip be removed to Sinai, and once there, that an attempt be made to force them to emigrate. Allon also complained that we are not doing enough to encourage emigration of Arabs out of this country.

The rest of the article discusses attempts actually made between 1967 and 1972 to encourage emigration of Palestinians to Paraguay, Uruguay, and Brazil. In Paraguay—the country of Mengele and so many Nazis—the Israeli officers who were in charge of this plan cheated the Palestinians. They promised them that after going to Paraguay, money would be delivered to them there, to begin work. And then they did not pay the money. In 1970, some Palestinians who despaired entered the Israeli Embassy in Paraguay and tried to kill the Ambassador, but only killed his secretary. The program was transferred to Uruguay and Brazil and continued up until 1972.

After describing this history at great length and emphasizing the role of the Israeli Labor Party, the article jumps to the transfer plan which I have described for you. There is great emphasis on the notion that it is the Palestinian uprising which is causing part of the Israeli establishment to support transfer. The last paragraph says, and I must explain that the word “riot” is the official name in the Hebrew press for the Palestinian revolution:

The latest riots in the territories are causing polarization in Israeli public opinion, and especially in the Israeli establishment. On one side, more and more people understand that they cannot escape the need to find a political solution which will free Israel from most of the territories. But on the other hand, in the opinion of those people who welcome the mass expulsion as the most efficient means now remaining in the hands of Israel after the ballot, the clubbings and beatings are not sufficient. What will happen between those two points of polarization we cannot yet predict.

The Future

Now, about the future. The question to be asked is not so much about the Israeli government, but about the Israeli Jewish people. Even if there is enough pressure from the Palestinian people or from other, outside forces, we still are in great danger. Half the Israeli Jewish people are prepared to make a war, not only on Palestinians but on other states, in order to effect this transfer.

But there is also great hope. If the Palestinian people continue the uprising, a majority of the Israelis can be persuaded to withdraw from the territories. But, I must be clear, we are

now no more than 15 percent of the people with this moral consideration. We might increase to 30 percent, but that is not enough. However, by making things unpleasant for our society, we could capture the majority. Then it would not be a question of an international conference; we would speak directly with representatives of the Palestinian people, just as we did with Sadat. That was not because Sadat came to Jerusalem but because of the war of 1973; because the Egyptian army and the Egyptian society which supported the army had shown itself to be effective. If the Palestinian society continues to be as effective as it is now, they have a very great chance of achieving independence.

Now an international conference by itself is very unclear, because what the PLO and the majority of the world mean by the term “international conference” is completely different from what the Israeli government, Mr. Peres, and the government of the United States mean. Because of this, I am of the opinion that if anything real can be settled, it will not be by an international conference; it will be settled by negotiations between the elected and rightful representatives of the Palestinian people and the Israeli government.

Let me make one other point. Palestinians, in general, did not correctly analyze why Israel withdrew from Lebanon. Israel withdrew from Lebanon not because of Sabra and Shatila, and not because of the bombardment of Beirut. During the first half of 1983, Israel intended to remain in occupied Lebanon forever. It was already being called in Hebrew the North Bank. Israel left Lebanon because, from 1983 to 1985, 390 Israelis were killed, which was actually a bigger number than those killed in 1982, and because there was no end to it.

Under the rules of Israeli society an Israeli Minister must always attend the funeral of a fallen soldier. In the year of 1985 it happened not once but many times, that when a Likud Minister attended a funeral where the father of the dead soldier was also a Likud person, known to him, the father actually said, at the open grave, “I tell you, if you are a party supporter, let my son be the last.” This is a very, very powerful form of immediate pressure when you have elections.

Conclusion

In my opinion, the Israeli government, together with its military experts, is awfully stupid. Not just immoral, but also stupid. The Israeli government will try in the coming months to break the spirit of the Palestinians and to restore them to what in their opinion is the normal situation of servility. Meaning that they obey orders; that they go back to picking up the garbage. But for the Palestinians from the territories, it has been a state of slavery. You cannot use any other expression to describe their daily life. This is why they prefer to starve and to suffer all the things you know they are suffering rather than to go back to a state of slavery.

The Israeli government wants to reduce them to slavery again. I do not think they will succeed. It is only a prediction, and I admit that we cannot always predict Israeli steps. Do not ask me what the Israeli government will do. Accept that they will do horrible things; but they will not succeed. ●

Covering the *Intifada* and Israel's Dirty War

By Ellen Ray

The April 16 murder by Israeli commandos of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Fatah leader Khalil al-Wazir, known as Abu Jihad, has qualitatively changed the course of the Palestinian uprising—the *Intifada*,—the Israeli reaction to it, and the manner in which it is reported in the United States. To the Palestinian people fighting for their sovereignty in the occupied territories and abroad, and to the Reagan administration, which has persisted in trying to defuse the Palestinian uprising by compromises disguised as “peace” initiatives leaving out any PLO participation, the message of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and his Likud Party government is unequivocal—there will be *no* negotiation. The Israeli war has always been rooted in insatiable greed over turf, and it will not be ended for many Israelis until the last Palestinian has been driven out of what the Zionists claim is their Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) and Gaza.

The U.S. media in response, typified by the *New York Times*, have dropped what had been relatively sympathetic coverage of the *Intifada*,¹ and have resumed parroting Israeli government positions, referring, for example, to the killing in Shamir's terms as a “political assassination,” rather than the terrorist murder it was.

According to John Kifner's sources,² the Israeli Cabinet decided on April 13, after very little debate, to kill Abu Jihad because their intelligence had determined he was responsible for the direction of the uprising which they were (and remain)

desperate to circumvent. In a meeting which was reported to last only a few minutes,³ the death warrant for the 52-year-old military commander, a co-founder of Fatah, revered by his own people and respected by many others working toward a just solution in the Middle East, was figuratively signed. The decision to kill Abu Jihad was publicly justified by some who said they believed it would confuse and delay the Palestinian “riots” and by others who claimed they only wanted revenge for the PLO bus hijacking of Israelis working in the nuclear plant at Dimona. Whatever the reasoning, however, the killing resulted in an intensification of the rebellion⁴ and serious moves toward unity between the PLO and Syria and within the PLO itself.⁵

An International Conference

Equally important for the Israeli Right in an election year is the necessity to put an end once and for all to U.S. pressure for an international conference. Indeed, one of the more interesting aspects of internal Israeli politics is the announced decision by former United Nations Ambassador Benjamin Netanyahu to campaign for the Likud nomination as its candidate for Prime Minister in the November elections. This should not be viewed as a sop to the liberals who might be uncomfortable with the brutality—and often bestiality—of the unsuccessful attempts by the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) to crush the uprising. Netanyahu says there may be a “clearing of the air” after the election, but no fundamental shifts in policy. He believes the PLO is “not reformable,” and that Israel must maintain military control of the West Bank.⁶

It was Netanyahu who founded the notorious Jonathan Institute Seminars, annual events held alternately in Israel and the U.S. and attended by extreme-right policy-makers and journalists of both countries and a few others from the West.⁷

3. *Ibid.*

4. In the three days following the assassination, occupation troops killed some 22 Palestinians and injured more than 160, the bloodiest three-day period in the 20 years of occupation. Anita Vitullo, “Israel's Hit Squad,” *The Guardian*, April 27, 1988, p. 1.

5. See Ihsan A. Hijazi, “Arafat Regaining Supremacy in Embattled Beirut,” *New York Times*, May 25, 1988. And see, Phyllis Bennis, “New Moves for PLO-Syrian Unity in Wake of Abu Jihad Assassination,” *Frontline*, May 9, 1988, p. 1.

6. John Corry, “Two views on a Schism in the Middle East,” *New York Times*, May 11, 1988, p. C25.

7. One notable “exception” to the designation “rightwing journalist” is the *Washington Post's* star, Bob Woodward, who has often been a guest lecturer at Jonathan Institute events. Woodward, it should be remembered, served as a naval intelligence officer, presiding over “the encoding, decoding, and distribution of CIA, National Security Agency, State Department, National Security Council, and Defense Intelligence Agency communiqués, and was personally responsible for maintaining a daily journal of highlights,

1. The *Times* coverage was so unusually critical of Israel that as recently as May 1988, Jeane Kirkpatrick's syndicated column complained of its “marked bias against Israel.” *Washington Post*, May 9, 1988. Indeed, some of the best *Times* reportage in January and February was from John Kifner, one of their most objective writers. In March and April, however, more space was given to Alan Cowell, a decidedly conservative journalist, whose coverage from Palestine, as from South Africa earlier, has been subtly racist. By May and June, almost all the *Times* reporting from the occupied territories was by Joel Brinkley, even more pro-Israel than Cowell.

Kifner's reports gave more names and details than Cowell's, and they were not as snide and one-sided. In an egregious example in the February 28, 1988 *New York Times*, Cowell described a typical battle between armed Israeli soldiers and rock-throwing Palestinians, which left many wounded Palestinians and a number of prisoners. He concluded with this description: “That left only the mopping-up. Six prisoners, hidden in sweaters pulled over their faces, were marched away, while Palestinian men pushed Palestinian women out of the hospital to keen and wail for them.” And finally, “Out on the highway where it all started four hours earlier, a hurled rock smashed through the windshield of an Israeli car.... Two Israelis tumbled from it with automatic rifles in their hands and only an empty street to shoot at.” Cowell is possibly the only reporter with the temerity to equate submachineguns with stones. In the March 16, 1988 *New York Times* he wrote: “The conflict is fought with uneven, though potentially equal, weapons. Many settlers travel with Army-issue M-16 assault rifles or Uzi submachine guns. What they fear from Palestinian villages is rocks that could shatter windshields and skulls, or firebombs.”

2. *New York Times*, April 23, 1988.



Credit: Angela Gilliam

Palestinian woman, shot in the stomach by soldiers, flashes victory sign (see sidebar).

During the Reagan administration's first term, the most chilling example of the Jonathan Institute's influence on U.S. policy-making was its espousal of the efficacy of the Israeli doctrine of "preemptive retaliation," a policy of killing persons determined by the government to be terrorists before they can act.⁸

Palestinian reaction to the murder of Abu Jihad was carefully anticipated by the Israeli Knesset, which moved to the next stage in its war against the PLO. Harsher measures were introduced in the occupied territories and a new wave of beatings and maimings and killings ensued, even as massive arrests were undertaken. On April 24 the Israeli government announced that "4,900 Palestinians were being held in prisons and detention centers as a result of the unrest, including 1,700 in 'administrative detention,' ... who can be held for up to six months without formal charges, a hearing or a trial. At the end of the detention period, the order can be renewed."

The *Times* reported these numbers with feigned surprise that the Israeli military's figures were as high as they were, and said that even Palestinian leaders had no idea how many people were in jail. But in fact, Palestinian estimates of the total number of imprisoned range from 15,000 to 30,000, with the military court in Ramallah issuing over 5,000 charge sheets

as well as for deciding where, how, and to whom each communication should be routed." "Spurious," *Boston Phoenix*, October 23, 1987, p. 3.

8. See *CAIB*, Number 22 (Fall 1984), p. 5; Number 23 (Spring 1985), pp. 16-17. In a grandstand media ploy, Secretary of State Shultz urged acceptance and passage of this doctrine by the then Senate Committee on Security and Terrorism, to deter, among others, the PLO and the Libyans. The bill, fortunately, was never brought to the floor.

alone.⁹

Casualties of the *Intifada*

Another report, prepared by the Database Project on Palestinian Human Rights, covering the period from December 9, 1987 through June 15, 1988, lists 281 Palestinians killed in the uprising, 188 from gunfire and 93 from other causes such as beatings and the U.S.-manufactured poisonous CS gas.¹⁰ The overwhelming majority of those killed were young — over 85 percent under 30. According to the group's reports, at least 54 people had died from tear gas exposure by May 27. Although *Times* reporter Kifner admitted that "deaths attributed to tear gas have not been counted on the assumption that the gas might have aggravated an existing medical problem,"¹¹ the mainstream press saw fit to ignore the company in Saltsburg, Pennsylvania, which produced the gas — until massive protests and demonstrations outside the company's laboratories forced its parent company to announce a suspension of sales to Israel.¹²

It is curious that there is such a discrepancy in the number of Palestinians deaths reported, for example, by the *New York Times*, and the figures directly from sources in the West Bank. Although the *Times* has been careful to qualify their numbers with the words "at least," they have largely ignored deaths related to tear gas or, recently, even to beatings. Moreover, according to a report by Palestinian women from the occupied territories delivered to a June 1988 conference in Elizabeth, New Jersey, sponsored by the Union of Palestinian Women in the U.S., a new Israeli tear gas is being used. According to these reports, the new gas, delivered by spray guns, causes loss of consciousness for more than five minutes and frequently leads to severe nerve damage and sometimes death. The Palestinians view this new chemical warfare as an attack on future generations, like Agent Orange was in Vietnam.

It is also alarming that since the assassination of Abu Jihad, there has been very little reporting of Palestinian casualties in the western press at all, and victim totals and their names have almost completely disappeared. In part, this may be due to the increasing restrictions on journalists, discussed below. In part, it may be because vast numbers of Palestinian leaders and spokespeople have been arrested, leading to what the Israeli government hopefully describes as "relative calm" and Israel's intention "to try to bring life slowly back to normal."¹³

9. Figures from Database Project on Palestinian Human Rights, *Update*, March 21-April 5, 1988. This valuable resource, and other helpful material, can be ordered from: Beth Goldring, Database Project on Palestinian Human Rights, 220 South State Street, #1308, Chicago, IL 60604.

10. *Palestinians Killed by Israeli Occupation Forces, Settlers, and Civilians During Uprising (confirmed), December 9, 1987, through June 15, 1988* (Chicago: DBPHR, 1988).

11. *New York Times*, February 27, 1988, p. 4.

12. Associated Press, May 6, 1988. Variants of the dangerous gas — all produced by the same company, Federal Laboratories, a subsidiary of Trans-Technology of Sherman Oaks, California — have been around for many years. It was discovered that in 1980-81 the CIA supplied it to the Afghan rebels for use against the civilian population of Afghanistan supporting the Soviet intervention. See Phillip Bonosky, *Washington's Secret War Against Afghanistan* (New York: International Publishers, 1985), p. 225; and Iona Andronov, *On the Wolf's Track* (Moscow: Pravda Publishing House, 1984), pp. 144-145. (See article in this issue on the U.S. manufacturer of the tear gas.)

13. *New York Times*, April 25, 1988, p. A3.

Questions from the West Bank

Alicia Partnoy, an Argentinian writer and poet who was herself "disappeared" and tortured, was on the women's delegation with CAIB co-editor Ellen Ray. Here she describes some of her impressions.

That Thursday, the last one in February, started as a regular day for our delegation. We were not shot at, as had happened on Monday while we were joining in a women's demonstration. We were not the target of tear gas and bullets, as we would be the following day while trying to stop the soldiers from beating young Palestinians. True, we visited a hospital and were distressed at the sight of the wounded. Ittihad, in Nablus, was however the third hospital we had seen that week. We had already met too many people injured by explosive bullets and beaten up by Israeli soldiers.

A few miles from the hospital is Balata Refugee Camp. Almost as soon as we got there, we heard the sound of gunshots and saw children running down the street, escaping. A house opened to us for shelter. The sweet hot tea of hospitality was served. Men, women, children told us about the recent victims from that camp, from that family: a 56-year-old woman, another woman 19, a 13-year-old child. Their pictures were circulated. A woman recalled that that house had been attacked a few months earlier. For two hours soldiers had sprayed more and more gas into it while forcing the family to remain inside. "Until we all fainted," added a little girl.

While they talked softly, we heard the thud of soldiers' boots outside and shots, closer and closer. The members of our group looked at one another in fear, expecting anything: a bullet, poison gas, violence.

Almost two hours later we left Balata. It is hard to describe our relief. Yet we had been there for a short time. We could only imagine the feeling of breathing that air every minute of our lives.

But the day was not over. That evening the news came: Two hours after we left the Ittihad hospital, the soldiers had arrived. They had beaten up 30 doctors and nurses. They had taken away six patients and their families. They had beaten them systematically, cruelly, and thrown them back inside the hospital building. We heard in horror, unwilling to believe. Some cried, some tried to remember the faces of the possible victims, their stories.

Could the soldiers have chosen the 17-year-old wounded in the abdomen by a dum-dum bullet at a demonstration? Or the 15-year-old who had smiled at us while showing the wounds in his legs? Maybe the young man who, staying overnight in Tel Aviv without permission, was attacked in the middle of the night, soaked with kerosene, and set on fire? Perhaps the soldiers had chosen to punish the two women, 18 and 20 years old, who had tried to stop the Israelis from taking away their brothers and were shot in the stomach. Maybe it had been "unsuitable" to beat up the new arrivals, two boys aged 15 and 18 who were being treated when we left.

We had seen the pain in those faces. We were desperate at the thought of those wounds brutally hit. Many of us felt guilty. Had the Israelis attacked them because they had been brave enough to report their suffering to us, to ask for justice? Should we in the future abstain from seeing, hearing, recording? But even if the denunciation of the atrocities provokes punishment, if not even a hospital is a safe haven, if those who cure are to be themselves wounded, what is the way out? What can the Palestinian victims do? Where can we, the witnesses, turn for reassurance that justice exists?

The crimes we witnessed that last Thursday in February are still taking place. It is only natural to feel compassion for the victims; it is, however, a moral obligation to resort to action in order to stop that suffering. ●

But undoubtedly the major reason for the lack of detailed reporting on the casualties of the uprising has been a backlash by the pro-Israeli establishment press, particularly the *New York Times*, to the graphic reporting of Israeli brutality. The *Times's* ardently pro-Zionist columnist, A. M. Rosenthal, announced in his April 29 column that "Palestinians in Israel [must] realize that their future depends not on publicity but on the Israelis. Good foreign press does not last long and cannot meet a people's hopes."¹⁴

Was Rosenthal expressing *New York Times* policy with respect to their future coverage of the occupied territories? It would certainly seem so, as evidenced by a scandalous full-page piece a few days later in the May 2 issue of that paper by Joel Brinkley, cleverly entitled "Many Arabs Working in Is-

rael Voice Mixed Feelings on Unrest." A close reading of the article turns up only six Palestinians who are quoted by Brinkley, three from the same family and one who is described only as a waiter. The other six people quoted about Arab reluctance to join the uprising are Israelis: "They don't want to be doing this," an Israeli tour boat captain professes, "It's just a few outside people winding them up." Another says "I've been living with Arabs here and abroad, and they are of very good temperament — unless someone incites them."¹⁵

Reporters in the Occupied Territories

The Israeli government has given its armed forces the

15. These people may be more concerned about the drastic decline in tourism than anything else. See Joel Brinkley, "Dip in Tourism Has Israelis Worried," *New York Times*, May 16, 1988, p. A3.

14. *New York Times*, April 29, 1988, p. A39.



Credit: CBS-TV

Still from telephoto footage of Israeli soldiers breaking captive's bones with rocks.

power to ban journalists from any area. Although prior to the uprising this power was exercised sporadically, it has been used with regularity since February of 1988, and most reporters have been totally excluded from areas of known confrontation. The armed forces claim that the censorship relates only to military necessity, but in fact many officers express the belief that Palestinians will not demonstrate if there are no cameras or reporters in front of whom to demonstrate. This of course is belied by the fact that, of the hundreds of Palestinian demonstrators killed by soldiers during demonstrations, there has not been a single recorded killing on camera. And of all the thousands of severe beatings, only one was filmed.

Indeed, the uprising has continued unabated in areas where no journalists have been admitted. Ironically, the only violence which can be attributed to the presence of journalists is the punishment of some Israeli soldiers who were foolish or unlucky enough to brutalize prisoners on camera. As an Israeli soldier who finally refused to continue to serve with the occupying forces explained,¹⁶

I want it to be clear that the only men punished were those photographed by the television team. ...the television plays an important psychological role among the soldiers; it is always the principal guilty party.

16. *Ha'aretz*, Supplement, March 11, 1988; translated by the Palestine Human Rights Information Center, Jerusalem.

The harassment of journalists is comprehensive: "The ongoing process of the military simply declaring areas closed (either without supporting documentation or by documentation signed on the spot by the soldier refusing admission) combined with blocking cameras, confiscating film and occasionally physically attacking journalists may well close the territories to accurate reporting far more effectively than formal closure and without the accompanying international censure a formal order would produce."¹⁷ Moreover, in late March the Israelis "shut down the Arab-owned Palestine Press Service, which has been a major source of information on the daily clashes since the Palestinian demonstrations against Israel began...."¹⁸ The closing was protested by the New York-based human rights group, the Committee to Protect Journalists.

A leading proponent of the exclusion of the press turned out to be Henry Kissinger. Much to his dismay, notes of his remarks in a private, off-the-record meeting with some American Jewish leaders, including Lawrence Tisch, the chief executive of CBS, were leaked to the press. According to the notes, Kissinger said:¹⁹

Israel should bar the media from entry into the territories involved in the present demonstrations, accept

17. Database on Palestinian Human Rights, *Update*, March 3, 1988.

18. *New York Times*, March 31, 1988, p. A1.

19. *New York times*, March 5, 1988, p. 5.

Apartheid in the West Bank and Gaza

Angela Gilliam, Professor of Anthropology at the State University of New York at Stony Brook, was also a member of the women's delegation. The following is an excerpt from her testimony to the Congressional Black Caucus on April 26, 1988.

As I visited the region, what struck me was the consolidation of policies similar to what I had learned of *apartheid*. After a week in the occupied territories, I learned a difference between that situation and South Africa's. Because *apartheid* has no supporters who will openly embrace it in the international community, those who struggle for dignity in South Africa feel a communion with the rest of the world. The feeling is harder for those struggling in the West Bank and Gaza, partly because of the religious fervor associated with the problem.

Just as in South Africa, funerals are banned in the occupied territories. We learned of a teenage girl killed by the bullet of a settler; her body was returned to the family at midnight for immediate burial. Also as in South Africa, even religious services and attendance are controlled and subject to army invasion. One rightwing party, Tehiya, called upon the Israeli Defense Force to "cleanse the mosques of those who incite to rebellion."

In the occupied territories, settlers are razing Arab villages so that they no longer exist; they are also "disappearing" the names of Arab villages, even some that still exist,

from the maps.

Palestinians must carry ID cards at all times under threat of imprisonment, and are subject to strict curfews. Our delegation felt the curfews in a profound sense. We had to stop all gatherings with Palestinians at a certain time in the evening to allow them to get back to their homes. No one from the West Bank or Gaza, for example, could be in Jerusalem after midnight. Most Israeli towns depend on the Palestinians from Gaza and the West Bank for cheap labor, yet the workers cannot stay in those towns after dark.

I also learned of another analogy to South Africa when I met a young woman who lived "inside the Green Line," inside the pre-1967 Israeli border. Almost in passing she mentioned that as a Palestinian, she was not allowed to study her primary interest, computer technology. This reminded me of "job reservation," the South African government's practice of allocating jobs by ethnicity, the cornerstone of the Bantu Education Act, designed to perpetuate inequality.

Just as in South Africa, where a display of the flag of the African National Congress is a crime, so too reference to any symbol connected to Palestinian nationhood and sovereignty, or to the Palestine Liberation Organization, is forbidden in Israel. Any attempt by Palestinians to run their own lives is considered terrorist activity, because it promotes the notion of self-determination, in consequence a PLO principle. ●

the short-term criticism of the world press for such conduct, and put down the insurrection as quickly as possible — overwhelmingly, brutally and rapidly.

The insurrection must be quelled immediately, and the first step should be to throw out television, a la South Africa. To be sure, there will be international criticism of the step, but it will dissipate in short order.

Kissinger's views predominate in the Israeli cabinet. One cabinet member was quoted by the *Times* after a late February cabinet meeting:²⁰

I came to the conclusion after 80 days of riots that the presence of the media causes the riots. If the media will not be there, I don't think there will be any more riots.

In fact, the press ban is nothing but a question of image. The "appearance of the incident [of the Palestinian prisoner being beaten with rocks] on foreign television seemed more important to many Israelis than its actual occurrence. There has been virtually no public uproar here [in Israel] over reports that at least three Palestinians, and possibly more,

have been beaten to death by soldiers in recent weeks."²¹

Virtually all independent reports confirm that the theory is hogwash. The *Washington Post* noted:²²

Despite government claims that restricting residents and closing off the area to journalists would inhibit violence, military officials said there were major incidents in at least 23 locations, and witnesses said the army in the West Bank used more aggressive tactics and more firepower against rioters than in the past.

The more sophisticated Israeli officials must recognize that the uprising is a function of their occupation and oppression of the Palestinians. The media cover the oppression of the Palestinians because Israel has announced a policy of "force, might, beatings," in the words of Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin. But Israelis are concerned more with what the world thinks of them, than what may actually be happening. Even that is an overstatement; most Israelis are concerned only with what those members of the United States Congress think who vote them some \$4 billion every year.

They want their benefactors to believe that the beatings of

20. *New York Times*, February 29, 1988, p. A1.

21. *Ibid.*, pp. A1, A15.

22. *Washington Post*, March 31, 1988, p. A1.



Credit: AP

After beating Palestinian boy in Ramallah, furious Israeli soldiers drag him off for arrest.

Palestinians are aberrations, not, as is the case, standard practice. They want them to think that Arabs are treated relatively humanely; the Israelis and their supporters never tire of insisting that Palestinians were treated much more harshly by other Arabs. They do not want Congress to comprehend, as John Kifner quoted an Israeli officer, that most Israelis "don't regard Arabs as humans."²³

It is astonishing the extent to which Israelis and their supporters blame the existence of pictures for their troubles, rather than what the pictures depict. When a group of Jewish leaders in Florida presented a petition supporting a television ban to the local Israeli Consul General, they said, "There's a major difference between the camera and the press.... Television gives a distorted view of the entire conflict. You get a completely different picture from the print."²⁴ Ardent pro-Israel former journalist Marvin Kalb agreed. He said that TV images have "a resonance above and beyond the picture and the event."²⁵

The Israeli complaints are shrill and extreme. Former U.N. Ambassador Netanyahu told the *New York Times*:²⁶

23. *New York Times*, March 13, 1988, p. 12.

24. Associated Press, March 26, 1988.

25. Associated Press, January 24, 1988.

26. *New York Times*, March 20, 1988, p. 20.

Most modern wars of democracies are fought not only on the ground, but also in the living rooms of the western democracies, starting with the United States. Public opinion is the war. Because in terms of violence, Israel could put down what is happening in a day.

Some network executives accept the criticism; some do not. Some noted that the Israelis and American Jews had few criticisms of television coverage of the 1982 invasion of Lebanon. And Jack Lawrence of ABC News pointed out that "of the more than 90 Palestinians killed in the [first three months of the uprising], there was not a single picture, still or moving, of anyone being shot by a soldier."²⁷ On the other hand, in a rather contorted comment, Bob Simon of CBS News referred to a built-in bias in favor of the Palestinians. "The Palestinians start out with an enormous edge. They are civilians, unarmed and occupied, an enormous advantage compared to starting out as uniformed, armed and occupiers." He seems to be suggesting that being the underdog is an unfair advantage! Moreover, according to the *Times* reporter, Simon "said he tried to overcome that bias and avoid exploitation...."²⁸

Whether it was in an attempt to "overcome" the bias of their dramatic footage of the prisoners being beaten with stones or not, Bob Simon was also one of the two CBS reporters who, in violation of network rules, gave a copy of their outtakes to Maj. Gen. Amram Mitzna, the commander of Israeli West Bank occupation forces.²⁹ After an internal investigation, the network concluded that it was "an innocent mistake."

Without understanding the irony of his complaint, an Israeli Embassy spokesperson was quoted: "How do you fight those pictures? Even the best information campaign is no match."³⁰ In the Alice-in-Wonderland atmosphere of Israeli political life, you do not fight pictures of prisoners being tortured by stopping the torture; you do it by banning photographers!

More ominous is a campaign to dehumanize the Palestinians even more than Arabs are generally demeaned in the Israeli and American press. One aspect of this campaign, which has appeared in both the *New York Times* and the

27. *Ibid.*

28. *Ibid.* The charge that the U.S. press is pro-Palestinian is ironic, to say the least. There is even considerable debate within the American left over whether the progressive press in general is sufficiently attuned to the Palestinian arguments. See Rashid Khalidi, "Left Fails to Meet the Challenge of Palestinian Oppression," *In These Times*, May 18, 1988, p. 16. Khalidi argues that Ted Koppel's week-long ABC-TV *Nightline* broadcasts from Jerusalem and the reports of John Kifner and Anthony Lewis in the *New York Times* provided "crucial facts about the current situation that go unreported in more progressive organs." Some notable exceptions are: the fine reporting from the West Bank by Michael Moore in *Moore's Weekly* (P.O. Box 18135, Washington, DC 20036; \$24/year); a special issue of *Red Bass* (Number 12, entitled "For Palestine," \$4 from 2425 Burgundy St., New Orleans, LA 70117); Jane Hunter's *Israeli Foreign Affairs* (P.O. Box 19580, Sacramento, CA 95819; \$20/year); consistent coverage in *The Guardian* and *Frontline*; and, of course, Alexander Cockburn's columns and Noam Chomsky's articles and books. Unfortunately, many progressives who are willing to travel to Nicaragua would not consider a visit to the West Bank.

29. *New York Times*, March 3, 1988.

30. *Ibid.*

Washington Post, is the notion that Palestinians have developed a self-image as victims which can perpetuate their status as victim. Thomas L. Friedman wrote in the *Times*.³¹

The danger for Palestinians is that their visibility on television depends on their role as victims, and this role can become an end in itself—rather than a phase, or an instrument, to bringing about a peaceful resolution. At some point they will have to get off stage and collectively decide how they want to live with the Israelis.

The racism and arrogance of this comment is substantial. For one thing, it assumes that if the Palestinians were not being victimized, no one would care about them. Secondly, it seems to say that the Palestinians are deliberately putting themselves in the position of being brutalized in order to use that as “an instrument” in their political struggle.

The *Post*’s Stephen S. Rosenfeld also wrote that the Palestinians “have gotten accustomed to acting as the victim—a role which disables their capacity for self-discipline and initiative.”³² How does a victim not act as a victim? The Palestinians are being victimized and Rosenfeld thinks they ought to stop acting. But even more bizarrely, he wrote:

Does this [asking only for some form of self-determination rather than for a sovereign state] not leave Palestinians branded as less than the Israelis’ equal in the crucial matter of sovereignty, second-class sharers of a doubly promised land? Yes it does. That’s not fair to the Palestinians, but it’s good to the Palestinians. It’s what’s in the ballpark in the next few years. Those who encourage the Palestinians to insist now on statehood and a separate delegation and full justice by their standards do them a disservice by reinforcing the all-or-nothing tendency that has produced only a dead end.

In short, because they are not likely to get it from the Israelis right now, it is wrong for the Palestinians to demand justice. One can imagine the advice Rosenfeld might have given the slaves in the South before the Civil War—and perhaps during it.

One side effect of the televised beatings of prisoners has been, ironically, “a division of labor between the army and the settlers.”³³ Because the occupying troops are so schizophrenic about their role, they leave, by default, a great deal of decision making to the settlers, who “mock the army...and do what they want.”

The Refugee Camps as Concentration Camps

Refugee camps and Palestinian villages have been turned into virtual concentration camps through collective punishment, extensive curfews and the increasing policy of literally walling up the inhabitants, with as many as 400,000 people at



Credit: AP

Soldiers bash woman’s head against a wall during women’s protest in Al-Amari refugee camp.

a time sealed up.³⁴ In many villages considered troublesome, Israeli army bulldozers have filled the roads leading in with huge mounds of dirt, and in numerous camps concrete walls have been erected over the entrances and exits to the camps, leaving only one passage which is guarded day and night by Israeli soldiers. In many cases, for weeks and months on end, the camp inhabitants are not allowed to leave to shop for food, medicines and other necessities. All this combined with the constant anticipation of indiscriminate military or settler raids make the fabric of life for the Palestinians little different from that once experienced by the Jews themselves. The victims have become the executioners.³⁵

Economic Warfare

In addition, there is a serious form of economic warfare being waged by the Israelis against the Palestinians. While the Palestinians have tried to disengage their economy from that of Israel, the Israelis have banned foreign transfers, cut local and international telecommunications, closed printing shops, and more frequently cut off utilities, fuel, and even water.³⁶

The occupation-imposed bureaucracy became “the latest Israeli weapon,” when the Israeli army in Gaza demanded that more than 400,000 Gazans exchange their old identity cards for new Israeli identity cards, in a process which takes each

31. *New York Times*, March 13, 1988, Sec. 4.

32. *Washington Post*, April 15, 1988, p. A19.

33. *Op. cit.*, n. 1. See article in this issue on the settlers.

34. *New York Times*, May 15, 1988, p. 1. Many months before the start of the *Intifada*, according to an *Al Fajr* poll reported in *Canadian Dimension* (May/June 1987), p. 37, 17.6 percent of the Palestinians polled were from families which had experienced the demolition or the sealing of their homes; already 47.5 percent were from families which had experienced a political arrest.

35. For an excellent discussion of the “use and misuse of the Holocaust and anti-Semitism to serve Zionist ends,” see Cheryl Rubenberg, “The Holocaust and Anti-Semitism,” *Palestine Focus*, March-April 1987, p. 4.

36. Joe Lockard, “Economic Warfare in the Occupied Territories,” *In These Times*, April 27, 1988, p. 9.

person many hours on line. The reason, Joel Brinkley noted, was to let "Gazans know who makes the rules,"³⁷ but it was reminiscent of South Africa's pass laws.³⁸

In flagrant violation of international law, the Israelis are stepping up their forced "deportations" of Palestinians from their homelands in the occupied territories, depositing them across the borders of neighboring countries.

The "Transfer" Policy

Israel has developed its own version of a final solution. Unable simply to slaughter all the Palestinians, who will soon outnumber the Israelis (only 20 percent of the world's Jews have chosen to live in Israel), the government has decreed a policy of creating through terror and murder the conditions for a mass exodus of all Palestinians from Israel, from the West Bank, and from Gaza. The desire is to see them all resettled as many countries removed from their homeland as possible. (See the interview with Israel Shahak in this issue for a discussion of transfer.)

The policy itself is clearly a crime against humanity under the Nuremberg Principles. But the many facets of that policy are criminal in their own right, including the widespread use of torture and death squads, the use of dum-dum bullets, attacks on hospitals, and the use of deadly gas, noted above.

Reports of torture centers are common. In the Arab section of Jerusalem, Ariel Sharon bought an apartment last fall, in defiance of worldwide adverse publicity. On a number of occasions, observers—including members of the author's delegation—have seen as many as eight Israeli soldiers dragging Palestinian demonstrators into Sharon's house while beating them. When demonstrators surrounded the soliders, demanding that the beaten youths be released, they shot off tear gas and pulled the boys into the arched, fortress-like building, on the top of which Sharon has mounted a giant menorah—a perverse provocation in the ancient Arab quarter.

Another indecent case of Israeli brutality is that of Ansar III. More than 3,500 Palestinian prisoners,³⁹ "who have not been charged with a crime, given a hearing, or even told what offense they committed," have been imprisoned in the Negev desert, packed into tents where temperatures reach 120°, in primitive conditions with open pits for sewage.⁴⁰ Heat prostration is common when the prisoners are forced to assemble several times a day under the blazing sun to be counted Nazi-style by guards who know the prisoners only by numbers.

37. Joel Brinkley, "Latest Israeli Weapon: Bureaucracy," *New York Times*, May 11, 1988, p. A3.

38. The Israeli Defense Ministry has instituted an \$8.5 million data bank project "to keep tabs on the property, political attitudes and family ties of Palestinians under occupation. The information is used by the military authorities...in granting permits, licenses and travel documents." Alexander Cockburn, "Beat the Devil," *The Nation*, January 16, 1988, p. 43, citing the *Jerusalem Post* of September 19, 1987.

39. Joel Brinkley claims in the *New York Times*, June 3, 1988, that the number is "more than 2,000," but Israeli lawyer Felicia Langer confirmed the 3,500 number at a June conference in New Jersey. Langer was recently allowed to visit her clients at Ansar III for the first time and said that, as a survivor of the Holocaust, "It is the most terrible place I have ever seen in my life."

40. *New York Times*, June 3, 1988.

Palestinian lawyer Jonathan Kuttab accused the Israelis of violating the Geneva Convention, which stipulates that "persons accused of offenses shall be detained in the occupied country and, if convicted, shall serve their sentences therein." Chief of Staff General Shomron commented to Joel Brinkley, "The law of consequence here is the Israeli law, and according to Israeli law we have the right to transfer prisoners into the sovereign part of Israel if it is so required."⁴¹

The Dehumanization of Israeli Policy

The policy of terror undertaken by the Israelis toward the Palestinians for many years, and increasingly so in the last year, has come more and more to resemble that of their own oppressors some forty years ago. (See Israel Shahak interview in this issue.) The daily beatings and bonebreakings, the lethal gassings and assassinations, the collective punishments and tortures, all bespeak a racialism which was once directed against the Jews and for which they have rightfully received the world's compassion. But that special status is now giving way to the terrible and anguishing fact that in the Israeli microcosm, the victims have become the executioners as their own brutal occupation is finally exposed to the world. The list of Israeli military barbarisms is a long one.

In one shocking case in Gaza, an 18-year-old, Khader Tarazi, out to buy groceries, got caught up in a crowd fleeing soldiers. He ducked into the house of a friend; soldiers rushed in and dragged him out. Beating him mercilessly with clubs, they asked him his religion, and when he replied, "Christian," they answered that this was the treatment Christians got. They spread him, cruciform, on the hood of a jeep, beat him on the head, and drove him through the streets of Gaza for hours, as an example why Christians should not support the *Intifada*. He died from the beatings. Neighbors said, "He was so out of it, one soldier had to support his head while others beat him."⁴²

To understand the depth of the phenomenon, the local press is often helpful. Some interviews selected from the Israeli press by Professor Israel Shahak⁴³ amplify this:

"Sometimes I fully identify with the description I have read about the German intellectuals in the Weimar Republic," admits Dr. Ilana Hamerman [an Israeli who

41. *Ibid.* Conditions at Ansar III are so bad even Brinkley appeared somewhat appalled. But he did manage to quote several prison guards who claimed that they were proud of the way the prisoners were being treated. And Gen. Shomron lightly dismissed Ansar III as not up to hotel standards. The *Times* also balanced the bad publicity with a story on the same page that two and a half times as many Americans are sympathetic to the Israelis as to the Arabs.

42. John Kifner, "Medical Workers Say 4 Palestinians Died After Beatings by Israeli Army," *New York Times*, February 14, 1988; Francis X. Clines, "U.S. Envoy Meets Shamir on Peace," *Ibid.*, February 10, 1988. None of the reports pointed out that the murdered youth was the cousin of the United Nations Ambassador of the PLO, Zuhdi Terzi, or that he may have been marked for execution for that reason.

43. The interviews, selected and translated into English by Dr. Shahak, President of the Israeli League of Human and Civil Rights, are published in his *Press Review*, available from the League, 2 Bartenura St., Jerusalem 92184. Dr. Shahak's materials are also reprinted occasionally in the *Bulletin of the Comité Européen pour la Défense des Réfugiés et Immigrés*; for details, write to C.E.D.R.I., B.P. 42, 04300 Forcalquier, France.

led a fact-finding trip of 19 artists and writers to Gaza in January 1988].... She claims that when one examines the rise of Nazism within the political, social, and psychological context, one finds out how important were patterns of behavior and thought which had no connection with the atrocities. "At first there were not atrocities, only all sorts of 'small' crimes which can be regarded as acts of hooliganism by small marginal groups."...

Hamerman, a daughter of Holocaust survivors, finds many elements which can be compared. She compares in order to warn and sharpen sensitivities. "Evils which are far smaller than the crimes of the Nazis are bad enough to require strong opposition to prevent processes which may lead to them or make them possible. For a long time we disregarded the danger of Kahanism and now we know that Kahanism is not only Kahane but a long process...."⁴⁴

Another instructive piece is a *Ma'ariv* article by Jonathan Gefen about the famous and controversial Israeli philosopher, Isaiah Leibowitz:

If all the forecasts of this strange man, this true pollster of Israel's eternity have come true, would it not be worth while to continue to listen to him to know what will happen tomorrow?

Isaiah wrote twenty years ago that the territories are a cancer in the body of Israel...and that a day will come when all our energy, brains, and money will be spent for one purpose only, namely ruling another people; and today this is, indeed, our only occupation: to get up in the morning, to say they are not a people and to continue arresting them.... What shall we do to the Arabs today, that we have not done to them yesterday? Isaiah said that in the marriage between religion and state, there is no choice but to give birth to bastards, and today we have Gush Emunim [the extremist religious settlers' group]. Isaiah wrote on the seventh day, the day after the Six Day War: "The intelligence service and secret police will become the central institutions of the State of Israel." And today we are indeed the State of the Mossad, the GSS [General Security Service] land that celebrates its 40th anniversary with bonfires of burning tires, inaugurating new prisons, and with humiliations.

Isaiah argues that in the next stage all those who do not agree with the General Security Service will be arrested...and will be condemned as traitors on a charge of subversion against the state. "National hooliganism creates an atmosphere of violence that is also turned inwards. I think that concentration camps for Jewish traitors will be erected in the State of Israel." This stage is already happening. Everybody who has ears and eyes can hear and see it. Therefore, do not say "I did not know," but listen to this man who saw better than all of

44. From *Kol Ha'ir*, January 15, 1988.



Credit: AP

Ramallah women's banner reads "Empty the Prisons."

us the poison of the corrupting force. He was the first, the only true prophet in a country with false prophets who blow the khaki ram's horns in front of blind, poisoned generals. It is only in the present that one can prevent the disaster that the future holds in its wake...."⁴⁵

Conclusion: Palestinian Gains

Now, after more than half a year of the uprising, it is apparent to everyone in the world—except the majority of Israelis—that the Palestinians have created a united body of people with a national consciousness and program, everything which constitutes a nation-state. But at the same time the land and its people are occupied by a force which increasingly can only be characterized as fascist.

The rebellious Palestinian people have effectively disengaged themselves almost completely from Israeli institutions (except, of course, the ubiquitous security and police operations), and even most Palestinian collaborators have distanced themselves from the occupiers. The Palestinians have created 45,000 committees,⁴⁶ comprised of women, trade unions, neighborhood groups, merchants, medical people, agricultural workers, religious workers, and others, which function as a new way of life.

Palestinians have begun farming their own gardens, raising chickens and rabbits, policing their own communities—building a self-sufficiency not known before. "The *Intifada* is institutionalizing itself...setting down roots and building an alternate set of institutions," a Palestinian intellectual observed.⁴⁷

It is a contradiction, clearly, as the Israelis grow more frustrated and arrest more of those they regard as leaders.

What will happen from here? As Professor Shahak points out, it could go either way: outright fascism and genocide, or, after intense pressure on the Israelis, a grudging willingness to let the Palestinians shape their own destiny. Either way, the outcome will not be clear till after the November elections, if then.

45. From *Ma'ariv*, January 8, 1988.

46. *New York Times*, May 15, 1988, p. 16.

47. Ibrahim Dakkak, quoted in *ibid*.

Israeli Occupation:

Creating A Land Without People?

by Katherine Watjen*

On April 6, 1988, three young people—two Palestinians and an Israeli—died, suddenly and violently, in a West Bank Palestinian village near Elon Moreh, an Israeli Jewish settlement. Within hours, the name of the village, Beita, was known to millions of people around the world. So was the name of one of the dead—Tirza Porat.¹ All three, it turned out, had been shot to death by an Israeli settler, Porat apparently by accident. All had been born too late to know an Israel not an occupier, a West Bank not under occupation.

What brought these people together to die? "We're going to show [the Palestinians] whose land this is," said Romaim Aldubi, the adult leader of the young settlers' expedition to Beita, not long before he shot Tirza Porat in the head. The reaction of Israeli settler representatives was powerful, if not irrational. Beita "should be wiped off the face of the earth," said Rabbi Chaim Druckman of the National Religious Party.² Gush Emunim (settlement movement) leader Hanan Porat called for the expulsion of all youth from Beita. Six young men were in fact expelled. The army blew up 14 homes, including at least one belonging to a family that had sheltered the Israeli youngsters—eight of them after its own investigation concluded that the villagers had not harmed Porat.³

The deaths that day on the West Bank played out, simply and directly, the issues connected with the 21-year-old Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Settlement by Israelis, destruction of Palestinian property, and expulsion of Palestinians have constituted the Israeli way to create a land without people and claim it as their own. More than 180,000 Israeli Jewish settlers⁴ now live on property taken from Palestinians in those occupied territories.⁵ Outside the borders of Jerusalem, some 55,000 settlers live in 150 settlements in the West Bank proper, and some 2,200 in 22 settlements in the Gaza Strip.⁶

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1. The names of the others, 19 year-old Hatem Fayed Jaber and 20 year-old Mousa Saleh Bani Shamshe, did not become familiar to millions.

2. John Kifner, "Army Says Girl Was Killed by Her Guard," *New York Times*, April 9, 1988, p. 1.

3. Database Project on Palestinian Human Rights, "Second Revised Report on Beita Village Killing," April 19, 1988, pp. 2, 3.

4. That is, 10,000 to 12,000 settlers in Gilo—which is never counted as a settlement; 110,000 settlers in Jerusalem, 5,000 more in the immediate environs. (Conference with West Bank human rights worker, February 1988.)

5. The Golan Heights, also occupied in 1967, was annexed by Israel at the end of 1981, despite the vigorous protest of its original inhabitants. They still consider themselves Syrians.

6. U.S. State Department.

Settlers: By Divine Right and Government Subsidy

For 20 years, settlers who believe God gave the Jews the West Bank and Gaza Strip (along with everything else from Egypt to Iraq) have swaggered through the markets of Palestinian cities, the men with rifles slung from their shoulders, the women, heads modestly covered, selecting tomatoes and cucumbers from the stalls of Palestinian merchants.

Immigrants from the Soviet Union make up a sizable proportion of these religious settlers. More have come from the United States, moved by religious fervor and such enticements as the World Zionist Organization's call: "Settle on the mountain and open up the desert."

"We came to Hebron out of a sense of adventure and outrage," says one colonist from Boston, a computer programmer with a masters degree in physics. "The adventure is building a Jewish kingdom. The outrage is that Arabs still live here.... Western European values are bullshit! You can't create a messianic Jewish state with 1.9 million Arabs."

"The Arabs are worse than the niggers," is his wife's verdict. "But not by much."⁷ Another settler, this one from New York, maintains, "The Arabs have no claim to the land. It's our land, absolutely. It says so in the Bible. It's something that can't be argued. That's why I see no reason to sit down and talk to the Arabs about competing claims. Whoever is stronger will get the land."⁸

In the first five months of the Popular Uprising, settlers killed 24 Palestinians, one a girl of 13 who looked out the window when they knocked at the gate of her house.⁹ Two settlers who killed Palestinians have this spring been sentenced to six months' community service and six months' suspended sentence, respectively.¹⁰

Settlers openly threaten Palestinians with mass expulsion if they refuse to accept Israeli dominance. One leaflet they distributed in Palestinian areas asserted, "Our settlements...are the guarantor that you and your children will go on living in happiness in our land. If a war breaks out, will there remain a single Arab in the territories? The state you are dreaming of is on the other side of the River Jordan."¹¹

7. Robert I. Friedman. "In the Realm of Perfect Faith," *Village Voice*, November 12, 1985, pp. 16-17.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

9. Database Project on Palestinian Human Rights, *Uprising Update* (hereafter *Update*), May 14, 1988; "Settlers on the Rampage," *News from Within*, April 11, 1988, p. 16.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

Here's a sampling of settler activities during one month, March 1988.

- March 3: settlers celebrate the feast of Purim by singing and dancing in the streets of Palestinian towns and refugee camps.
- March 5: settlers smash the windows of more than 100 cars between Bethlehem and Hebron.
- March 6: settlers kidnap a 2 year old and a 3 year old from a village.
- March 8: settlers smash house windows and burn cars in a village.
- March 19: settlers uproot 500 olive trees and shoot up the solar heating panels of a mosque. The army's sole response to any of these incidents: to arrest Palestinians and to cut off the water to one village.¹²

Despite some jurisdictional disputes, in fact, the army and the settlers often work as a team. In a bizarre incident on April 24, settlers and soldiers killed 24 sheep and 1,200 chickens with toxic gas. The settlers then burned 3,000 chickens alive in their chicken house.

"We didn't invite the Palestinians to come and live in our country," says settler Yitzhak Shilat. "They infiltrated and invaded it, as foreign nomads, when we weren't home... If [in 1967] we had expelled all the residents of Judea, Samaria and Gaza to the other side of the Jordan... it would have been a righteous and just act, accepted by one and all... The distinction between soldiers fighting on the battlefield and the civilian population is an artificial one."¹³

"The only body that acts and makes decisions is the Israeli settlers," explains an Israeli soldier returning from West Bank duty. "They are not punished, not even when there is clear condemning evidence. They openly say that the army is impotent and that they will do the job for us."

"The settlers are the permitted arm, carrying out what the soldiers cannot. It must be clearly understood that the settlers do what they want. [They] view the army as an instrument for the achievement of their strategic goals and incite provocation to heat up the situation."¹⁴

The ideologically motivated settlers, however, number only a few thousand. Settlers by the tens of thousands are satisfied commuters in convenient suburbs—suburbs so handily located and so comfortable, in fact, that without heavy subsidies few of them could afford to live there. The government pays 75 percent of the cost of apartments near Jerusalem and Tel Aviv; further away, it pays more. The land costs 5 percent of actual value, and the infrastructure is provided without charge. An apartment 35 or 40 minutes from Jerusalem can be purchased for \$2,500.¹⁵

12. *Update*, March 20 and May 14, 1988.

13. "The Fear of Employing Force Stems from Moral Weakness," *Nekuda* (the publication of the settlers' organizations), March 1988.

14. Egal Schwartz, "The Wild West," *Ha'aretz* supplement, March 11, 1988.

15. Meron Benvenisti, *The West Bank Handbook: A Political Lexicon* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), pp. 49-50. The government also includes industrial and tourist development in the West Bank in its economic

Between 1982 and 1985, the proportion of all settlers who lived in the Jerusalem and Tel Aviv metropolitan areas (besides the 110,000 within the original boundaries of Jerusalem) rose from 57 percent to 75 percent. By 1984, the current demographic distribution was established. A fourth of the settlers were living in Ma'ale Adumim, a suburb of Jerusalem. Altogether, nearly three-fourths lived in the 15 large settlements of more than 180 families.¹⁶

From Security to Speculation

In 1967, a policy of settlement was not inevitable. Im-



Credit: Shlomo Arad/JB Pictures

Jewish settlement under construction at Efrat, West Bank, in 1986.

mediately after the war, Israeli President Chaim Herzog and other leading statesmen proposed that a Palestinian state be created on the West Bank, to become the first Arab state to sign a peace treaty with Israel. The Israeli Cabinet quashed the idea.¹⁷ At that moment, when Israel chose to become an occupier, settlement became inescapable.

The settlement policy was animated by Cabinet Minister Yigal Allon's idea of security: "A security border that is not a state border is not a security border. A state border that is not settled along its length by Jews is not a state border."¹⁸

Moshe Dayan held a similar view: "Borders are not set by markings on a map. Borders are determined by settlements."¹⁹ Within three weeks of the war's end, on June 27, 1967, Jerusalem and large surrounding areas were annexed to Israel. Within the city, 400 acres were confiscated for Jewish settlement. On the West Bank, the first settlements were sub-

development plan, offering incentives comparable to those for development of the most remote areas inside the Green Line. Some 20 percent of permanent building on the West Bank is constructed under the Build Your Own Home scheme of the Ministry of Housing and Construction, which provides the infrastructure and low-interest loans for cooperatives. *Ibid.*, pp. 111-115.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

17. Merle Thorpe, Jr., *Prescription for Conflict: Israel's West Bank Settlement Policy* (Washington, DC: Foundation for Middle East Peace, 1984), p. 25.

18. *Davor*, November 25, 1969, cited in Geoffrey Aronson, *Creating Facts: Israel, Palestine, and the West Bank* (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1987), p. 4.

19. *Jerusalem Post*, December 1973, quoted in Michael Adams, *Signposts to Destruction: Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Territories* (London: Council for the Advancement of Arab-British Understanding, 1976), p. 10.

urban, designed to increase the Jewish population of Greater Jerusalem and buttress it north and south.²⁰

The government²¹ then set out to build three settlement strips that would cut off the heavily populated Palestinian areas of the West Bank from easy communication with Jordan.²² Besides keeping the West Bankers in check, the chains of settlements, built for the most part in defensible horseshoe

First a Trickle, Now a Stream

Deportations carried out since the Uprising began December 8 have received wide press coverage. When four people were expelled January 13, the Red Cross protested: "The forcible transfer of groups or individuals from the occupied territories is forbidden by international humanitarian law, whatever the reason for it." After a pause apparently occasioned by international outcry, Israeli authorities deported another eight on April 11, and on April 19 six from Beita and two others were expelled. Four more remain under expulsion order, enforceable at any time.

In the fall and winter of 1985 a similar wave of expulsions followed the inception of the Iron Fist policy. Some of the deportees were charged with crimes—for example, throwing stones or throwing molotovs. Others—particularly labor union leaders—have been charged with "inciting." In other cases the lawyers and family of the accused are not allowed to know the charges. But expulsion is illegal as a penalty, even for convicted criminals, under the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. Altogether, Palestinian sources say, the Israelis have deported 2,263 people during the occupation.

"There is a movement in Israel for the so-called transfer of Palestinians, meaning the expulsion of all Palestinians from the territories...[and it] is a growing movement," according to Israeli human rights activist Israel Shahak. "In my opinion transfer is now possible if the outside world will allow it." — Database on Palestinian Human Rights, *Uprising Update*, May 14, 1988.●

shape and on defensible hilltops, could quickly be transformed into chains of fortresses.

The women and children once dispatched to safety, the walls would be defended by regular troops against the "armies from the East" whose invasion the occupiers envisioned even as they spoke of creating a Palestinian entity.²³ The resulting

20. The first two settlements, established in 1967, were in the Golan Heights. The first in the West Bank were Gilo and East Talpote just south of Jerusalem and Ramot Eshkol, French Hill, and Neve Yakov to the north.

21. In 1967 Israel's government was led by the Labor-dominated coalition that held power from the founding of the state until the Likud victory of 1977.

22. This pattern, called the Allon Plan after its designer, Cabinet Minister Yigal Allon, had several forms. Never officially adopted, they nevertheless shaped settlement during the first 10 years of the occupation.

23. Meron Benveniste, *The West Bank Data Project: A Survey of Israel's Policies* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1984), p. 51; Israeli tourist guide, 1988.

militaristic and monumental architectural style, like a nightmare of the future set against the age-old splendors of Jerusalem, provoked protests from architects' organizations worldwide. Still, however, a narrow settlement-free corridor allowed for possible eventual creation of a "Palestinian entity" connected to Jordan.

Even while this two-pronged strategy was the official policy, rightwing Jewish religious fundamentalists were literally laying the groundwork for the killings in Beita. In 1973, about the time Tirza Porat was born, a small band from the fanatical Gush Emunim ("Block of the Faithful") illegally occupied land near the Palestinian city of Nablus and brought in a few prefabricated shelters. They called their settlement Elon Moreh.

To secure outside support for the settlement, which the Israeli government condemned, the settlers brought in Jerry Falwell, whose presence occasioned much press coverage. Although the Israeli High Court of Justice condemned the settlement and ordered it removed, it was eventually reestablished on its present site.²⁴ The 1977 victory of the rightwing Likud-led alliance changed not only the settlement policy but the expressed rationale for it. The government dropped all idea of building settlements for temporary security while retaining the intention of one day trading land for peace. Both the integrity of Palestinian residential belts and the corridor to Jordan were discarded. The new plan divided up Palestinian areas, isolating the inhabitants of each from the rest. The Likud government, which found some 61 settlements built in the decade since 1967, built 103 in its six-year rule.²⁵

Making Way for Settlements

Wide, smooth roads sweep among the hilltops claimed by settlements, while in the valleys, narrow, rutted byways wind below terraced hillsides from one Palestinian village to the next. The facts make nonsense of the Israeli claim that the roads serve the local population, a criterion under international law for changing an occupied landscape—unless one defines the local population precisely as the inhabitants of the settlements.²⁶

Currently, construction is beginning on Road 60, which will connect settlements to Jerusalem and Hebron. Cutting

24. Geoffrey Aronson, *Creating Facts: Israel, Palestinians & the West Bank* (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1987), pp. 36 ff. Similarly, in April 1968, the basis for the religious settlement Kiryat Arba was established by religious Jews led by Rabbi Moshe Levinger, who occupied a hotel in the Palestinian city of Hebron. *Ibid.*, p. 17. In 1979, some 50 women from Kiryat Arba occupied the Beit Hadassah building in the middle of Hebron, a first step in the continuing campaign to take over and settle the city itself. *Ibid.*, p. 105.

25. Thorpe, *op. cit.*, n. 17, pp. 35, 38. Agriculture Minister Ariel Sharon and the World Zionist Organization, *inter alia*, proposed plans to split Palestinian areas and isolate Palestinian towns.

26. In 1985, for example, the occupation authorities introduced Road Plan 50, for a network of roads through the West Bank. The Plan is illegal under both West Bank regulations and Jordanian law, as the military made no claim that it was necessary for security and it could not be alleged to help the local population. Indeed, a study of one 20 kilometer stretch of the proposed road between Anabta and Tulkarem found that it would destroy some \$27 million worth of buildings and agriculture. (Shehadeh, Aziz, *et al.*, *Israeli Proposed Road Plan for the West Bank: A Question for the International Court of Justice?* November 1984.)

through a village near Bethlehem, it requires the confiscation of 1,600 dunums (one dunum = 0.247 acres or 10,760 sq. ft.) and the destruction of 20 houses.²⁷

Theft of water resources further destroys Palestinian property and strengthens the position of the settlers. By 1981, Israelis had drilled 20 deep-bore holes (between 300 and 600 metres deep) on the West Bank (most in the Jordan Valley).²⁸ Not only has the salinity of the Palestinians' springs and wells increased, but Palestinians are forbidden to drill wells or even to maintain those that existed in 1967. Without enough water to grow their crops, many have been forced to seek other work to supplement their incomes. Their ties to their land have been weakened.

Varieties of Theft

According to the Israeli High Court of Justice, expropriation of privately owned land for settlement is legal only if the expropriation is for security purposes and is temporary. These criteria have effectively limited confiscation for settlement to lands which can be declared public, that is, to which the Palestinian owners cannot produce title satisfactory to the authorities—but land registration is handled by the same agency that handles confiscations.²⁹

Expropriation may begin when soldiers mark off a piece of property, which the military governor then declares a closed area: No one can enter or leave without a permit. Or settlers simply come and fence off the land. Within Jerusalem's extending city limits, property may be confiscated for a "public purpose." Trees, crops, and homes are destroyed. Then settlers come in and take over.

What reasons are given? Perhaps the owner was not listed in the Israelis' 1967 census of the occupied territories and is therefore considered an absentee property owner. The land may belong to the Jordanian crown. Or it may have been owned by Jews before 1948. Later the authorities called on an Ottoman law giving the Sultan (read "Israel") ownership of all land neither registered with the Land Registry nor claimed by urban residents. This category covered 2 million dunums—40 percent of the West Bank—and 800,000 of these have actually been taken over.³⁰

Another means of acquisition, although not explicit appropriation, is private purchase. Since September 1979, when the Likud lifted the ban on private (that is, not by the Jewish National Fund) Jewish purchase of West Bank land, there has been a rush of speculation. About 125,000 dunums of land have been sold privately.

27. *Update*, May 14, 1988, p. 9.

28. These produced between 15 and 17 million cubic meters of water a year for the settlements. Although it is against Jordanian law (which nominally governs the West Bank), the Israelis drilled several wells next to springs. As one result, a spring which customarily gave 11 million cubic meters a year had gone dry by 1979. (Ibrahim Matar, "Israeli Settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Autumn 1981).

29. Meron Benvenisti, *op. cit.*, n. 15, p. 106; Mona Rishmawi, "Planning in Whose Interest?: Land Use Planning as a Strategy for Judaization," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Winter 1987), p. 108.

30. "West Bank Land Scam," *News From Within*, October 1, 1985, p. 3. The Himnuta Company, owned by the Jewish National Fund, bought another 100,000 dunums.

An estimated 20 percent of the private purchases have been fraudulent.³¹ Land developers may threaten to harm the family of the landowner or actually force the owner to sign a contract at gunpoint. The authorities may call the landowner in for questioning on random charges, then offer clemency in return for signing a "statement"—which turns out to be a property lease. Someone may forge the name of a village official or a dead landowner on a document transferring ownership.³²

More Land, Fewer People

The current Palestinian uprising makes clear, if it were not already, that the status quo of occupation cannot persist. Israel will have to annex the occupied territories or let them go. Israeli hawks want the land but not the people who have inhabited it for (at the least) centuries. And they can get what they want, by the measure the Palestinians most dread: transfer of the population.

In June 1967, Israel's Finance and Foreign Ministers, Pinhas Sapir and Abba Eban, proposed sending to Arab countries the residents of the captured refugee camps. Menachem Begin and Yigal Allon wanted to put them in Sinai.

It was not even then a new idea. In November 1939, Zeev Jabotinsky advised an assistant, "If it was possible to transfer the Baltic peoples, it is also possible to move the Palestinian Arabs."³³ The notion persisted.

Nearly half a century later, in the autumn of 1987, Cabinet member Yosef Shapira of the National Religious Party proposed encouraging Palestinians, especially the intelligentsia, to emigrate, if necessary paying them \$20,000 a head. In November Minister of Trade and Transportation Ariel Sharon revealed that the government had quietly carried out just such a scheme between 1967 and 1970—"but then they knew how to keep secrets."³⁴ He urged acting on Shapira's proposal, rather than discussing it. Deputy defense minister Michael Dekel of the Likud supported the idea, and Liberal Party minister Gideon Patt went a step further. If the Palestinians who are Israeli citizens misbehave, he said, they should be sent to the border in trucks and taxis.³⁵

Giving reasons both strategic and theological, Israelis are taking over and settling more and more of the occupied territories. At the same time, beyond the increasing deportations of Palestinian leaders (trade union leaders, women's association leaders, professors, journalists), they are killing more and more people.

But if Israeli strategists truly intend to create a land with a manageable fragment of the original people for a people that believes the difference between insecurity and security is 20 miles of territory, nothing short of a massive and bloody transfer of an unwilling and desperate population will bring them to their Promised Land. ●

31. *Ibid.*; Benvenisti, *op. cit.*, n. 15, p. 139.

32. Conversation with West Bank human rights worker, February 1988.

33. Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, "Expelling Palestinians: It Isn't a New Idea, and It Isn't Just Kahane's," *Washington Post*, February 7, 1988.

34. "Sharon's Grand Plan," *News From Within*, November 15, 1987.

35. Melman and Raviv, *op. cit.*, n.

Israel Wages Chemical Warfare With American Tear Gas

By Louis Wolf *

In the first five months of the *Intifada*, at least 50 Palestinians died from exposure to U.S.-made tear gas, and more than 150 pregnant women suffered miscarriages or fetal deaths.¹ Thus it was a major victory when, on May 6, the company producing the gas—the California-based Trans-Technology Corporation through its Federal Laboratories, Inc. subsidiary in Saltsburg, Pennsylvania—decided to suspend its brisk sales to Israel.

The decision did not come easily. Internal company documents underscore the continuing urgency Israel attached to its need for the tear gas. On December 16, Israel placed a priority order, assigned Number 161414 by Federal, for Model 519 CS Rubber-Ball grenades, a 9.8-pound spherical rubber device that when thrown at its target spews out peppery CS smoke fumes as it bounces and rolls along the ground. The document entry reads: "Rush for Israel." Federal kept seven people working full-time on the order. By January 10, 1988, 35,000 grenades were completed, with most of them already shipped to Israel before Christmas.

Illustrative of the ubiquitous supply from Federal's Saltsburg plant to the Israeli military was that, on January 13, 1988, while on a congressional fact-finding visit to Israel, Rep. Mervyn Dymally (Dem.-Cal.) was given a spent Federal canister used that week and returned with it to the U.S. On its shiny metal outer casing were the words: "Made in USA 123456789 Mfg 1988." Other U.S. delegations visiting the West Bank and Gaza since then also returned with the U.S.-made gas canisters.

A special viciousness has marked the behavior of Israeli forces deployed against the Palestinians. They have used expressly lethal weapons like Galil assault rifles and Uzi sub-machineguns, and long fiberglass batons have been used repeatedly as "bonebreakers" in beatings (modified from the wooden batons which gave Israeli soldiers splinters). Federal tear gas grenades and canisters have been shot or thrown at crowds or individuals in streets and alleyways, into elementary school playgrounds, and repeatedly inside of houses, hospitals, schools, stores, and mosques, as well as dropped from helicopters into teeming refugee camps. It must be remembered that based on repeated public pronouncements by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, and West

Bank military commander Maj. Gen. Amram Mitzna, individual soldiers are following their orders in these actions.²

The effects of Federal's patented pyrotechnics as they are employed by Israeli troops are profound and disturbing. A highly concentrated lachrymatory (tear-producing) agent dispensed in a finely pulverized, dust-like substance, the CS gas³ initially attacks the eyeball and the lachrymal gland which produces tears and is the passage from the eye to the nose. An intense burning sensation renders it exceedingly difficult to open the eyes, compounding the pain and blinding the victim to what is happening.⁴

Children can die from one-fourth the toxic level fatal to adults, death following pneumonia and loss of consciousness. The tear gas has also killed elderly persons suffering from asthma or heart problems.⁵

In three known cases, soldiers have fired the gas directly at people at close range, killing two and blinding one. One, a four year-old boy, was burned to death when a tear gas canister fired directly into his home ignited a kerosene stove. Dr. John Hiddlestone, a senior United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) official stated that 795 Palestinians had been treated for tear gas-related injuries by UNRWA hospitals and clinics since December, in addition to some 2,400 other injuries.⁶

In addition to its immediate effects, the food chain is contaminated weeks after the initial exposure. CS gas is known to break down into cyanide, particularly as food is cooked. Rice, flour, sugar, and other staples in every place where tear gas has been used are all repositories of gas residues which do not disappear for long periods.

Tear Gas is Lethal

At the end of Federal's 28-page manual, "Riot Control," which is distributed to each customer, there is a very revealing mathematical discussion. Titled "Formula For Determin-

2. "We are very proud of how we behave," Maj. Gen. Mitzna told Ted Koppel on *Nightline*, April 28, 1988.

3. The chemical name for CS is orthochlorobenzylidene malononitrile, and the chemical formula is $\text{ClC}_6\text{H}_4\text{CH}(\text{CN})_2$.

4. Quickly, the skin, sinuses, nose, and throat feel as if they are on fire, and rapid sneezing and coughing begin. From the respiratory system the gas permeates blood cells, fatty tissues, and mucous membranes. Hyperactive, disoriented behavior is induced. Soft tissues are damaged and bronchial constriction leads to vomiting of blood, while gasping for air. The condition can escalate to violent spasms and convulsions and, in many cases, death.

5. As of May 27, according to data compiled by the Database Project on Palestinian Human Rights, the 50 confirmed tear gas-related deaths break down as follows: 20 infants one week to one year, 5 between 1 and 21 years, 12 between 22 and 59 years, and 13 from 60 to 90 years. Thirty-two were males, 18 were females; 24, or nearly half, were living in refugee camps.

6. Official UNRWA press releases, April 14 and 15, 1988.

* John Krofcheck, a Pittsburgh-based researcher, contributed to this article.

1. Database Project on Palestinian Human Rights, "Intifada Martyrs: The First Five Months" (Chicago: DPPHR, May 27, 1988). The figures on fetal deaths are approximate; According to the DPPHR (May 31, 1988), physicians had reported 80 fetal deaths in Gaza alone as of the end of February.

ing Lethal Dosage of CN and CS in Confined Areas," the calculation reveals the "Median Lethal Dosage" of Federal products. In a room measuring 10' x 10' x 10' using a container with 25 grams of CS, the company acknowledges that at least one-half of the people in the room would die in 28.4 minutes. At least two of the five Federal products known to be in use by the Israelis — the 560 CS Long Range Projectile and the 515 CS "Triple-Chaser" Grenade — contain approximately 75 grams of CS.

Federal Laboratories and TransTechnology are quick to point out that their clients know full well about the dangers inherent in the product. Printed in English on each Federal cartridge or projectile in large block letters is the following:

For use by trained personnel only. Warning: May start fires. Do not fire directly at persons as death or injury may result. For outdoor use only.

When a company official was reminded that many of its overseas clients do not speak or understand English, he said, "That's not our concern."⁷ A senior State Department official who insisted on anonymity was unimpressed. "If they [Federal] were altruistic, they would print [the instructions] in English and the language of the country," he observed.⁸

On April 4, 1988, after several weeks of being confronted by the media and Arab-American organizations with detailed eyewitness accounts of how Israeli forces were using the gas, its effects on the Palestinian population and, according to a spokeswoman, "after a lot of pretty tough deliberations" among company executives, TransTechnology president Dan McBride wrote to Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. He referred to the many reports and inquiries, and asked for an explanation. However, he also noted that, "Our company values our role in supplying tear gas products to your country.... We look forward to continuing our longstanding business relationship with your military and police agencies." To that end, he offered "additional training information or assistance in training to you if you feel that this would be of benefit to your personnel." No explanation was forthcoming, and, on May 6, TransTechnology announced that its sales of CS tear gas to Israel had been "concluded."

This decision was not made simply because of media reports, pressures from Arab-American organizations, or an impressive public demonstration outside the Federal Laboratories factory April 16. In fact, Federal had several tear gas contracts with Israel, each of them renewable every month or so as supplies of the gas needed replenishing. By April, the last contract had been fulfilled, so it was an opportune time to make the suspension announcement.

TransTechnology chairman Arch Scurlock stressed that sales had been "concluded" rather than "terminated," leaving an option to resume sales in the immediate future if Israel were to agree to use the tear gas "properly."⁹

7. Interview at Federal Laboratories with the author, March 11, 1988.

8. Interview with author, March 23, 1988.

9. *Los Angeles Times*, May 10, 1988. "We want some breathing room," vice president Burl Alison told the AP, not realizing the irony in her words, Associated Press, May 6, 1988.



Credit: Ellen Hosmer.

Israeli soldier with Federal Laboratories CS tear gas grenade.

"We are in the riot control industry," a Federal executive told *CAIB*.¹⁰ "The undisputed leading manufacturer and developer of chemical riot control weapons" is how the company describes itself in its manual. Founded in 1923, today with only two domestic and several overseas competitors, Federal has good reason to be feeling its oats about the company's place in supplying a thirsty domestic and global marketplace; the company sells tear gas to some 80 countries. Ironically, one of Federal's overseas competitors, an Israeli company called Israel Product Research Company, Ltd., which manufactures CS gas both for domestic use and for export, including to South Africa, vies with Federal for Third World business.

In the U.S., Federal sells a wide range of tear gas products to local police departments primarily for use by the assorted "SWAT" teams that have blossomed in the last two decades, to state police in many states, to the military for "riot" contingencies, and to the Bureau of Prisons for distribution to hundreds of penitentiaries and jails across the nation. Since the 1930s, the company has led efforts to design and install built-in tear gas systems for prison dining rooms and other large enclosed areas where inmates gather. They also were the creators of the "tear gas billy club," which was discontinued in the 1960s due to complaints about the club's lethal capacity.

Data in Federal's open literature and internal documents show that the company manufactures at least 48 varieties of tear gas, and related law-enforcement products such as amplifiers, helmets, gas masks, handcuffs, and riot batons.

Tear Gas is Good Business

The lion's share of Federal's trade is overseas, with each sale licensed by the State Department and required by Congress to comply with a regulation¹¹ which states: "All security assistance [including tear gas and other licensed commercial

10. Interview, March 11, 1988.

11. 22 CFR, Chapter 32.

munitions exports] must promote and advance human rights and avoid identification of the United States...with governments which deny to their people internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms in violation of international law."

Since December, Federal has delivered to Israel 60,000 CS 560 long range tear gas projectiles, 60,000 CS 400 tear gas grenades ("reworked" from the Model 519), and 800 203A 37mm gas guns used to shoot the projectiles some 150 yards. These shipments, sent more or less weekly since December, were confirmed to *CAIB* by the Pentagon. Their records give the estimated total price tag of these purchases as \$1,693,800.

Significantly noteworthy is the way Israel pays for the tear gas. Israel and Egypt enjoy an unusual dispensation not found in any other U.S. military aid program. They are granted "credits" given in the form of loans under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, administered by the Defense Security Assistance Agency. Pentagon spokesperson Lt. Col. Jim Jannette put it this way to *CAIB*: "They [the Israelis] are given a bucket of money to spend and they can spend it however they see fit." In the case of Israel's tear gas purchases, the "credits" are generously being rolled over and "forgiven," which means free tear gas.

Federal's Parent

Just as Federal Laboratories is dependent upon the continuance of political unrest and repression both at home and abroad to sustain and increase its tear gas sales, Federal's parent, TransTechnology, is largely dependent on the American war machine and the military thrust of the space program for its rate of growth. U.S. government business has produced a very significant portion of the company's total revenues.¹² With operating revenues in 1987 of \$212.3 million, the company's net profits were up 53% from 1986.

TransTechnology has three main production divisions. Its Aerospace-Defense sector is the busiest and most lucrative, with over one-half the company's more than 2,600 employees and production facilities in 11 states. Among the many military contracts it has won from the government are components for the following:

MX Peacekeeper missile, Navy Tomahawk Cruise missile, Navy Harpoon Cruise missile, Navy Phoenix missile, Navy SeaLance missile, Navy A-6 Intruder aircraft, Navy F-14 Tomcat fighter plane, Navy Phalanx missile, Pershing II missile, Army Multiple-Launch rocket system, Patriot air-defense system, pyrotechnics for the Space Shuttle, and pyrotechnics for military and commercial satellites.

Environmental Dangers

Federal's business grew steadily, from its founding in 1923, with a flurry of activity during World War II. In 1964, when the White House and Pentagon decided to use tear gas in Vietnam, Federal's production line buzzed once more. By mid-

1965, they were making 3,000 pounds of CS a day.

When questions about the possible dangers of the gas were raised, in March 1965, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara insisted that the effects of CS only last about "five to ten minutes."¹³ Yet as early as December 1964, farmers living near the Federal factory had been complaining about various ill effects due to tear gas fumes which occasionally wafted across the area. In fact, CS production was discontinued from April to December 1965.

Neighbors experienced severe burning of the eyes, nose, and throat, and skin lesions. Some collapsed while at work. Livestock became irritated, foaming at the mouth, and not eating properly. It was discovered that Federal was burning CS sweepings and other waste material twice a week, and the residue was spread over the neighborhood. Township and county authorities called on Federal to remedy the problem and were rebuffed. Letters to the state environmental unit and the Governor's office received courteous but ineffective replies. Lawsuits were threatened if the company could not stop its unmistakable contamination of the area.

Finally, in June 1968, one farmer, sick from the fumes and increasingly unable to work, told a state agricultural officer that if the fumes did not stop blowing over his farm, he was prepared to blow up Federal's buildings one by one. His desperation may have caught Federal's attention; shortly thereafter, they installed new chimney piping and the outdoor gas fumes suddenly ended.

In fact, the spectre of long-term effects of CS on the body and on future generations, as well as on the environment, is just beginning to emerge in the scientific literature. CS and 17 other similar chemicals were recently tested for mutagenic content. It (and 13 other substances) showed "significant" mutagenic response.¹⁴ Moreover, the National Toxicology Program, part of the National Institutes of Health, now has a contract with Battelle Laboratories in North Carolina to test CS gas for carcinogenic potential.

Conclusion

The U.S. and international media have been extraordinarily lax in their coverage of the casualties of the *Intifada*, particularly in their failure to report seriously on the deaths caused by tear gas.¹⁵

As clouds of Federal Laboratories' tear gas filled the air in the West Bank and Gaza, a worried Austrian Foreign Ministry official sent an urgent message to the Embassy of Austria in Washington. With an embattled ex-Nazi, Kurt Waldheim, as President, Vienna was worried about "embarrassment" arising from rumors that neutral Austria was selling tear gas to Israel. A sigh of relief went out when it was learned that the manufacturer was in Saltsburg, Pennsylvania, not Salzburg, Austria. Austria was not implicated in this war crime. ●

13. Congressional testimony, March 23, 1965.

14. *Environmental and Molecular Mutagenesis*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (1988), pp. 91-118.

15. An Israeli occupation official, Dr. Shoshan of the Civil Administration, confirmed that gas had caused 30 abortions in Gaza. *Al-Hamishmar*, April 25, 1988.

12. Forty-six percent in 1984; 50% in 1985; 49% in 1986; and 32% in 1987.

Missiles for the Mullahs:

The Israeli Arms Bazaar

by Jane Hunter*

Even before the Iran/contras scandal broke it was well known that Israel was a key arms supplier to Iran. As the details of the scandal became clear, an accurate, if somewhat limited, picture of Israel's relationship with Iran emerged. Israel, which enjoyed a favored position during the reign of the Shah, wanted to maintain some kind of contact with the successor Islamic Republic. It also wanted to perpetuate the war between Iran and Iraq and hoped to get the U.S. involved in its arms dealings with Iran and thus bring the U.S. into line with Israeli policy.

Despite extensive probing by journalists and congressional investigators, some key questions about Israel's relationship to Iran remain. Was the Reagan administration always secretly supportive of Israel's pro-Iran policy? Were the Israelis—or the U.S. and Israel—really working toward overthrowing the government of the Ayatollah Khomeini, rather than supporting or trying to influence it? And what effect has the scandal and the subsequent deployment of the U.S. Navy into the Arabian Gulf had on Israel's pro-Iran policy?

Israel has a long history of alliance and cooperation with Iran. Iran was one of the key elements in Israel's "peripheral" strategy of leapfrogging over neighboring Arab governments to form relationships with non-Arab nations and subgroups in the Middle East. Israel always had a presence in Iran, through its operatives and through the large Iranian Jewish community. After the CIA installed Reza Shah Pahlavi on the Peacock Throne in 1953, that presence took root and grew. "In a sense, Israel came in on American coattails," writes Israeli analyst Aaron Klieman, "riding the crest of Iran's military expansion program."¹

As the U.S. raised Iran to the predominant regional power, Israel carved out its own particular niche there, befriending the Shah, building a major agricultural production center and providing military aid. An Israeli "expert" on Iran recounted a conversation he had with the Shah, when he asked why so much of Iran's budget was spent on arms, even though the country had no visible enemies. The Shah pointed out that if it came to fighting the Soviets in the Middle East, the U.S. would have to do the job, but that Iran needed defense from "the more real danger...our Arab neighbors, the Iraqis." The expert continued, "The Shah added that in a war against Iraq, the Americans wouldn't help him. It is a regional dispute in

which they will not wish to intervene. 'You the Israelis,' said the Shah, 'you enable me to prepare for that confrontation.' " The Shah was also glad to have the Israelis to counter-lobby U.S. critics of his human rights practices, said the expert.²

Israeli-Iranian relations were never "official"—they were always circumspect. Beginning with Ben-Gurion, all of Israel's prime ministers "paid secret visits to Tehran for consultations with Iranian officials, including the Shah himself."³ In 1973 Uri Lubrani became Israel's senior representative, its "ambassador in all but title" in Iran.⁴ Junior to Lubrani in rank, but almost certainly not in clout or access, was Ya'acov Nimrodi, who was sent to Iran as a young Lieutenant Colonel in 1955. When the Shah was insulted that Israel would send such a low-ranking military attaché, Nimrodi was given a promotion to Colonel.⁵

Nimrodi, who would later take part in the U.S.-Israeli arms sales to Iran, was a protégé of future president Yitzhak Navon, had taken the fellow Sephardic Jew into the intelligence service of *Haganah*, the pre-state army. Nimrodi was a founder of Israel's military intelligence, where as an officer in the Southern Command he met Sharon. Both friendships endured and would later be augmented by ties to Shimon Peres.

Ariel Sharon called Nimrodi "the architect of relations with far-reaching economic and political implications, including the Kurdish rebellion against Iraq,"⁶ which Israel aided on Iran's behalf. His influence with high officials, including the Shah, was unparalleled, to the point where Iranian military officers asked him to intercede on their behalf. It was Nimrodi who wined and dined visiting Israeli dignitaries and it was rumored that Nimrodi's plush lifestyle was built on gifts and bribes.

When he left the army—because he did not gain an appointment he said was promised him, command of the occupied West Bank—Nimrodi went back to Iran as a private businessman and soon became "the 'mister fixer' of the Israeli business world in Iran. Not one deal could be done without him. Those who tried found it was impossible."⁷ Nimrodi's own business was selling water distillation systems, a trade

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1. Aaron Klieman, *Israel's Global Reach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy* (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985).

2. *Hotam* (Friday supplement to *al-Hamishmar* [Tel Aviv]), December 12, 1986.

3. Michael Ledeen and William Lewis, *Debate: The American Failure in Iran* (New York: Knopf, 1981) pp. 107-108, cited by Klieman, *op. cit.*, n. 1, p. 158.

4. Gary Sick, *All Fall Down* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1986), p. 345.


5. *Ma'ariv* (Tel Aviv), December 5, 1986 translated by Shahak in *More on the Israeli Role in the Iran Contra affair*, collection of articles.

6. *Davar* (Tel Aviv), November 29, 1985, translated by Israel Shahak.

7. *Ibid.*

which is said to have made him a multimillionaire.⁸ Later, in partnership with Israeli arms dealers Al Schwimmer and Saul Eisenberg and *Penthouse* publisher Bob Guccione, Nimrodi tried, but failed, to obtain U.S. and Israeli sponsorship to develop a fusion reactor.

Of his 24 years in Iran Nimrodi said, "When one day we shall be permitted to talk about all that we have done in Iran you will be horrified. It is beyond your imagination."⁹ Perhaps he was referring to the persistent rumors that Israeli advisers taught the torture techniques which were used on critics of the Shah, rumors made more ominous by "ambassador" Uri Lubrani's 1980 disclosure that many of the Israeli officials to visit Iran (including the liberal Foreign Minister Yigal Allon)



Credit: Associated Press

Manucher Ghorbanifar, Mossad asset.

had been received by Deputy Prime Minister Nematollah Nassiri, head of the dreaded secret service Savak.¹⁰ Nimrodi himself helped train the Iranian military intelligence.¹¹

Israel was so eager to help the Shah that it offered to share some of its most advanced military technology in a joint program to develop a nuclear-capable intermediate range missile. The agreement was established in early 1977 during a trip to Iran by then Defense Minister Shimon Peres and the program was coordinated by Peres' successor Ezer Weizman and a senior Iranian general, Hassan Toufanian. Both Israel and Iran had been denied access to U.S. Pershing missile technology (because it was only useful for nuclear warheads). The technology used for the bilateral project, dubbed "Flower," was based on the guidance system of Israel's Jericho missile.

Work began in 1978 after Iran made a down payment of \$260 million—part of \$1 billion in oil it had committed for financing the project and sharing in the finished product.

8. In 1983, the People's Mojahedin Organization released copies of Contract No. 173164 of Nimrodi's International Desalination Equipment Limited signed by Nimrodi and Col. K. Dengman of the Iranian defense ministry on July 24, 1981: \$135,842,000.00 worth of Lance and Hawk missiles and 155 mm ammunition. It is a violation of U.S. arms export laws to resell the U.S. missiles.

9. *Op. cit.*, n. 6.

10. *Davar*, May 20, 1980, cited in Israel Shahak *Israel's Global Role: Weapons for Repression*, (Belmont, MA: Association of Arab American Graduates, 1982) pp. 32-33.

11. *Washington Post*, August 16, 1987.

Iranian engineers went to Israel to work on the design of the missile assembly plant. The final assembly facilities and test range were to be located in Iran. But time ran out for the Shah and the new government of Iran cancelled Flower.¹²

Israel's trade with the Shah's Iran increased steadily, going from \$33 million in 1973 to nearly \$200 million in 1976-77. That figure—other estimates are much higher—includes arms sales.¹³ The volume of the trade and its critical nature enabled Israel, the target of oil boycotts, to look to Iran for almost its entire oil supply.¹⁴

The Shah Falls

Although the U.S. was caught off guard, Israel seemed to know what was coming for the Shah. In early June 1978, Uri Lubrani warned of the deteriorating position of the Peacock Throne. The Israelis say Lubrani's report was passed on to Washington but it seems that no one remembered it.¹⁵

Even though Israel expected a change it was not well prepared for the fall of the Shah.¹⁶ Israeli personnel in Iran were expelled¹⁷ and 2,000 workers at an artillery plant in Israel were laid off "because of the Iranian revolution." Israel's lost export revenue during and after the revolution was estimated to be \$550 million for 1978 and 1979.¹⁸

Iran in those post-Vietnam, pre-Khomeini days was magnet and crossroads for a remarkable collection of militarists, intelligence scoundrels and arms dealers. Many of the actors in the Iran/contras operation were drawn to Iran by the Shah's colossal military spending program and the establishment of U.S. facilities there. Those who had extensive dealings with the Shah include Richard Secord and Albert Hakim,¹⁹ David Kimche, who was a Mossad station chief in Iran,²⁰ and Manucher Ghorbanifar, an Iranian who had been associated with Star Line Shipping, a company headed by the Israeli deputy prime minister and run by about 15 Israelis. Oliver North and others assumed Ghorbanifar to be an agent of one or more Israeli intelligence services.²¹ Albert Hakim said he met Ghorbanifar in the early 1970s right after the formation of "his new company," Star Line Shipping, and affirmed the Iran/contras committee counsel's characterization of the man as "a Savak agent who had worked for the Israelis."²²

Iran's new government inherited a \$17 billion arsenal that the Shah had purchased from the U.S.;²³ the need for U.S. military spare parts planted an important seed from which the Iran/contras scandal would grow.

12. *The Observer* (London), February 2, 1986.

13. Klieman, *op. cit.*, n. 1, p. 158. Klieman routinely gives extraordinarily low figures for Israel's arms sales.

14. Klieman, *op. cit.*, n. 1, p. 40.

15. Sick, *op. cit.*, n. 4, p. 37.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

17. Klieman, *op. cit.*, n. 1, p. 159.

18. *Ha'aretz*, February 12 and 18, 1979, in Shahak, *Israel's Global Role*, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 36.

19. Jonathan Marshall, Peter Dale Scott, and Jane Hunter *The Iran-Contra Connection*, (Boston: South End Press, 1987) pp. 149-158.

20. *Washington Post*, August 16, 1987.

21. *Boston Globe*, December 14, 1986; *Newsday*, February 4, 1987; Iran-Contra Hearings, U.S. Congress, various days.

22. Hakim testimony, Iran-Contra Hearings, U.S. Congress, June 4 and June 5, 1987.

23. *Time*, July 25, 1983.

Post-Shah

Even before the Iraqis invaded in September 1980, the new Iranian government had turned to Israel for weapons. One report states that, although Khomeini had asked for the money back, in May and August 1980 Israel delivered two consignments of weapons worth \$500 million that the Shah had purchased. In exchange for the remaining \$300 million of the Shah's deposit, Israel promised it would deliver more weapons—but only if Iran would bomb Iraq's nuclear reactor at Osirak. According to this account, the Iranians tried, but only managed to hit some laboratories. (When Israel subsequently knocked out the reactor, it used U.S. intelligence materials obtained as a sweetener for a request to help the *contras*, says the report.)²⁴

In early 1980 Israel's Deputy Defense Minister Mordechai Zippori met in Paris with representatives of Iran. He offered the Iranians a wide range of arms and insisted that guarantees for the Iranian Jewish community, one of whose leaders had been executed as a "Zionist spy," be a part of the deal. Iran reportedly agreed to protect the Jews and to allow those who wanted to emigrate to do so.²⁵

The meeting came shortly after Iranian revolutionary guards had seized 52 U.S. Embassy personnel and begun the hostage crisis which would dominate the U.S. political consciousness for the coming year. There is no question that once the hostages had been seized, the Carter administration did not favor Israeli arms sales to the new Iranian regime. The only question is whether Israel undercut the Carter administration's negotiations to free the hostages autonomously or in coordination with Ronald Reagan's presidential campaign organization.

In the negotiations for the hostages' freedom, President Carter promised to release some of the weapons ordered by the Shah, weapons that the Iranians needed for the war with Iraq. To increase the value to Iran of the Shah's weapons, the White House had urged its allies to withhold arms from Iran until the release of the hostages.²⁶

Reagan campaign aides including Robert McFarlane met with representatives of the Islamic Republic and made a deal to keep the hostages in Iran until after the elections;²⁷ as a result their departure from Tehran was later postponed until moments after Reagan was inaugurated. Meanwhile, Israel told the White House it had sent a load of weapons to Iran and asked "approval" to send a second planeload. "At a time

when every effort was being exerted by the United States on its allies to ensure the integrity of the embargo, this request was received with astonishment bordering on disbelief," wrote Gary Sick.²⁸ Carter was "beside himself" with anger over the Israeli shipments.²⁹

Even after Prime Minister Begin responded to Secretary of State Edmund Muskie's complaints with a promise to stop the shipments, Israel supplied Iran with ammunition and tank and aircraft parts for the duration of the hostage crisis. Former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote in his memoirs that the Israeli arms sales had a "negative im-



Credit: Associated Press

Former Israeli foreign ministry official David Kimche.

pact...on our leverage with the Iranians on the hostage issue."³⁰

Reagan's Role

An important but unanswered question is: did the deal that the Reagan campaign made with Iran involve U.S. arms sales or the sale of the U.S. parts through Israel? Was Israel acting at the behest of the U.S. government or was it, as it often does, pursuing its own foreign policy objectives without U.S. approval?

Possibly the new Reagan administration was committed to guarantee the political survival of the Khomeini government. According to former President Bani-Sadr, in 1982, the Reagan administration (through Michael Ledeen) expressed opposition to a *coup d'etat* being mounted against Khomeini even though the U.S. had been asked to remain neutral by Foreign Minister Sadiq Ghotbzadeh, who was executed a short time later.³¹ In 1983 the administration passed on the names of Soviet agents in Iran; soon after, Iran expelled 18 Soviet diplomats, executed 200 members of the Tudeh (Communist) Party, and outlawed the party.³²

Israel, on the other hand, was not that committed to

24. *Foreign Report*, cited in *Ha'aretz*, December 5, 1986, in FBIS Middle East & Africa, December 5, 1986, p. I-4.

25. *Sunday Times* (London), October 28, 1984.

26. *Time*, July 25, 1983.

27. *San Jose Mercury News*, April 12, 1987. In addition to the meeting, former Reagan campaign aide Barbara Honneger-Britain has recounted many times how, in late October 1980, she happened on a jubilant atmosphere in the campaign staff room and heard someone say, "We don't have to worry about an October surprise. Dick [Allen] cut a deal." (An October surprise would have been the release of the hostages before the election.) And well before the Iran/contras scandal broke, former Carter NSC staffer Gary Sick (*op. cit.*, n. 4, p. 309) noted that the Iranians had gone from urgent to glacial in their approach to the negotiations. Flora Lewis (*New York Times*, August 3, 1987) tells of a second meeting in Paris with Reagan people and quotes former President Bani-Sadr, who says high Iranian officials had decided they didn't want Carter to win the election.

28. Sick, *op. cit.*, n. 4, p. 359.

29. *Washington Post*, August 16, 1987.

30. *Time*, *op. cit.*, n. 24.

31. *In These Times*, January 21, 1987.

32. *Washington Post*, January 13, 1987, cited in *The Chronology*, compiled by the National Security Archive (Washington, D.C.: Bantam, 1987), p. 28.

Khomeini. In 1981, Ya'acov Nimrodi, David Kimche, and Ariel Sharon appeared on a major BBC television program and Nimrodi called for Israeli and Western involvement in an effort to overthrow Ayatollah Khomeini. Kimche called for a military takeover. As Israeli officials sought to quell the reaction to Nimrodi's statement it was pointed out that when he left Iran, Nimrodi had to abandon assets worth \$6 million. But, as Dr. Israel Shahak, a human rights activist and a keen observer of the Israeli political scene, notes, at the time Nimrodi was agitating for a coup, "Israel, according to some well-based reports in the Hebrew press, wanted 'to help' in an American-led invasion of Iran." Had such plans been decided upon, Nimrodi, who had helped a number of officers loyal to the Shah escape from Iran and who maintained contact with them in London, was well placed to further Israel's objectives.³³

Certainly, the Reagan administration was looser than its predecessor about the subject of Israeli arms shipments to Iran. On one occasion, it even rewrote history. In a letter to Charles Percy (Rep.-Ill.), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology James Buckley wrote, "During the hostage crisis, the U.S. urged all nations to refrain from trading with Iran. Israel gave us assurances it would respect this request, and we have every reason to believe Israel promptly made every effort to implement this policy in good faith." Elsewhere in his letter Buckley said that the administration had "found no credible evidence" to support press reports of Israeli sales of M-60 tanks or 106 mm recoilless rifles.³⁴

With the exception of a hiatus in 1984—due to a disagreement over Iran's payment schedule and when "Israel ha[d] run out of the spares that Iran wants"³⁵—Israel's arms sales to the Islamic Republic never slackened. The magnitude of Israel's business with Iran was a staggering 50% of Iran's war needs in the 18 months prior to March 1982 and, according to a late 1985 report, between \$500 and \$800 million³⁶ worth of arms per year.³⁷

Part of the confusion about the Reagan administration's position was caused by the Israelis, who shopped from U.S. official to official until they got a satisfactory response. One Israeli official involved with its Iran policy, while admitting he had no document to prove it, said Israel had received a "yellow light" to proceed with the sale of U.S.-made arms to Iran. This signal supposedly came when Morris Amitay, director of AIPAC, Israel's congressional lobby, asked Reagan's then incoming national security adviser Richard Allen how the new

33. *Washington Post*, August 17, 1987. *Davar*, *op. cit.*, Shahak quotation in note to translation of this article. Shahak notes that later Israel began supporting Khomeini.

34. Letter of March 10, 1982, declassified July 17, 1985.

35. *Sunday Times* (London), October 28, 1984.

36. *New York Times*, March 8, 1982, cited in Marshall, et. al., *The Iran-Contra Connection*, *op. cit.*, n. 17, p. 173; *Observer* (London), September 29, 1985.

37. One of the men involved in the deal, which was exposed when a chartered Argentine cargo jet went down over the Soviet Union on its third Tel Aviv-Larnaca-Tehran run, said the contract called for 12 loads (their worth given variously as 15 million [1981] pounds sterling or \$200 million) of spare parts for tanks and ammunition. *Sunday Times* (London), July 26, 1981.

Policy or Profit?

That Israel put geopolitical concerns second, behind arms sales, might not have been the considered decision of its leaders, but rather the result of the unchecked influence of arms dealers. In the wake of the exposure of the Iran/contras affair, an article in the major Israeli daily *Ha'aretz* focused on "the suspicion that the arguments which are raised and changed to justify the arms supplies to Iran conceal another reason. And the people involved in this affair only strengthen that suspicion."

"It is clear that the big arms dealers gain from the deals with Iran. Many of them—if not all of them—are very close to the people at the center of the Israeli political arena. One may even say that each of these politicians has his own arms dealer, and often more than one...Ariel Sharon has one or two arms dealers. Shimon Peres has his own arms dealer. Sometimes they are very close personal friends. Sometimes they are secret or not so secret consultants."

"Who can say how far these connections influence the policy? Do the political interests dictate the deals or do the commercial interests dictate the policy? And there are questions about the commercial interests: Are the arms deals, and especially the deals with Iran, dictated by the commercial interest of the state or those of the large arms dealers?"¹

Al Schwimmer, who during the time he was involved in the U.S.-Israeli arms sales to Iran (he, along with Kimche and Nimrodi, was later replaced with "terror adviser" Amiram Nir), held the official post of adviser to Prime Minister Peres and accompanied Peres on a visit to Washington in October 1985. Yoel Marcus, senior political correspondent for *Ha'aretz* who covered the visit, says that Schwimmer was present during talks between Peres and President Reagan and that he and his friends (other well-known arms dealers) "behaved as though they were part of the Prime Minister's entourage."²

As to the centrality of selling arms, Ya'acov Nimrodi, Ariel Sharon's arms dealer who made common cause with Al Schwimmer, Shimon Peres's dealer, had the politics of that issue down, "The only moral is if it helps the people of Israel...What do I care if the Iranians kill Iraqis? On the contrary, this is only for Israel's benefit."³

Just as the first U.S.-authorized sale of arms to Iran got under way, Peres, along with Sharon and former President Yitzhak Navon, attended the \$100,000 wedding—some called it lavish, some called it vulgar—of Nimrodi's son.⁴

1. *Ha'aretz*, August 16, 1985, translated by Israel Shahak.

2. *Ha'aretz*, November 18, 1986, translated by Alternative Information Center.

3. *Jerusalem Post*, August 23, 1985.

4. Aaron Klieman, "Israel's Global Reach" (Washington: Pergamon Brassey's, 1985).

administration would regard Israeli arms sales and Allen said "I heard what you said." Allen later denied this constituted permission.³⁸

Clearly, there was some contention. Apparently pressured by Arab governments, in the spring of 1982 the administration sent Israel a message asking it to stop arms sales to Iran. Moshe Arens, then Israel's Ambassador in Washington, warned the U.S. that "a rapprochement with Iraq might push Iran into the arms of the Soviet Union."³⁹ This was a frequent claim used by the Israelis (and later the administration partisans who joined the arms-for-hostages effort) but there is no indication that the Israelis really believed it.

Defense Minister Ariel Sharon used the occasion of a May 1982 visit to the U.S. (his main business was undoubtedly the forthcoming war in Lebanon) to proclaim that Israel did sell arms to Iran. "For months now we have been explaining this matter to U.S. administration officials and have been reporting to them on the limited supply of equipment we sent to Iran...The shipments were made with U.S. knowledge and agreement..." Sharon denied that the administration had criticized the sales.⁴⁰

Later that year Arens told the *Boston Globe* that Israel's arms sales to Iran were carried out "in coordination with the U.S. government...at almost the highest of levels." Arens asserted that small quantities of arms were traded with the object of overthrowing the Iranian regime. The State Department denied any coordination,⁴¹ although former Secretary of State Haig later said Israeli officials had asked his permission three times, but that he had turned them down.⁴²

In 1983, some administration officials expressed support for the embargo on arms to Iran but little commitment to stopping the ever increasing flow. "We don't give a damn as long as the Iran-Iraq carnage doesn't affect our allies in the region or alter the balance of power," one State Department official told *Time*.⁴³

Meanwhile, with Washington in a complaisant mode, Israel was selling arms acquired from the U.S. to Iran, some of them by deliberately ordering in excess of its own requirements.⁴⁴

In June 1984 Jack Anderson reported that the Reagan administration was undergoing a secret "tilt" toward Iraq and that Robert McFarlane's desire for a show of U.S. strength behind Saddam Hussein to "tilt the military balance against Iran" was worrying "experts" who did not want the conflict to escalate.⁴⁵ At about this time Israeli leaders began saying that Israel had stopped selling arms to Iran. Western intelligence

sources found that laughable, noting that Israel and South Korea had simply used the recently reinvigorated U.S. embargo to double the prices they charged Iran.⁴⁶

Soon after, an Israeli paper reported that Ya'acov Nimrodi had met in Europe with Iran's intelligence chief and deputy defense minister (and Rifat al-Asad, brother of the Syrian president) and concluded an arms deal involving aircraft landing systems and other military equipment. "Each day 40 trucks loaded with Israeli military equipment travel from Israel across the Syrian border," said the paper, adding that the convoys reached Iran through Turkey.⁴⁷

It was the shortage of the U.S. parts that Iran craved and which almost ended the lucrative business for Israel. Late in 1984 a series of meetings in London brought together Albert Hakim, Manucher Ghorbanifar and Cyrus Hashemi, a well-connected Iranian arms dealer who would later cooperate in a government sting against another band of arms dealers. They discussed how to get official U.S. sponsorship for arms sales to Iran. The following July, Hashemi, along with Saudi arms dealer Adnan Khashoggi, went to Israel to discuss the same subject with Prime Minister Peres.⁴⁸ That same month the Israelis began intensive efforts to win U.S. approval for arms sales to Iran.

What's In It For Israel?

Through the use of its agent Manucher Ghorbanifar, Israel tried to keep the U.S. from knowing its true relationship with Iran. Thus the strange briefing given Vice President Bush by Amiram Nir, about dealing with "the most radical elements" and Nir's musing that if all the hostages were returned then the administration's interest in channel-opening and arms dealing would come to an end.⁴⁹

The U.S. officials engaged in the Israeli arms sales were probably aware that Israel was using the joint arms sales as a cover for its own extensive arms sales to Iran.⁵⁰ Some of these

46. *Yediot Aharonot* (Tel Aviv) May 22, 1984, FBIS Middle East & Africa.

47. *Ma'ariv* (Tel Aviv), July 25, 1984 in FBIS Middle East & Africa, July 25, 1984, p. I-8. The report quotes Radio-Television Luxembourg and says the Nimrodi meeting was confirmed by Swiss authorities.

48. *New York Times*, January 16, 1987. *Washington Post*, January 6, 1987.

49. "Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition: A Chronology of Events and Individuals," (Washington DC: National Security Archives, 1987), p. 445.

50. Not only did the Israelis use the compromised U.S. position to justify their own arms sales but they were involved in another major arms deal, worth over \$2 billion, which travelled on a parallel track to the White House-Israeli arms deals.

That it was a sting, encouraged by indicted arms dealer Cyrus Hashemi, does not detract from the audaciousness of the Israeli role. Tapes made by Hashemi show that the arms dealers he approached were waiting on a change in U.S. policy before going ahead with the deal. They got that word on January 5, 1986, the day before President Reagan signed a finding authorizing U.S. sales to Iran.

According to Nico Minardos, one of the dealers caught in the sting, Israeli arms dealers and officials assured him and his partner Samuel Evans that U.S. policy approved arms sales to Iran. Minardos, along with 12 other men, including an Israeli general who had offered the Iranians a whole tank brigade, was arrested in April 1986. The mysterious death of Hashemi the following July and the lethargy with which the U.S. government has been pursuing the case leave unanswered questions about whether the Iran/contrajunta knew about or was involved in the deal. *Chicago Tribune*, August 19, 1986. Author's interviews with Minardos, court officials and attorneys. See also *Israeli Foreign Affairs*, June 1986, October 1986, February 1987.

38. *Washington Post*, August 16, 1987.

39. *Ma'ariv* (Tel Aviv), May 19, 1982 in FBIS Middle East & Africa, May 21, 1982, p. I-11.

40. Jerusalem Domestic Service, 0805 GMT, May 29, 1982, FBIS Middle East & Africa, June 1, 1982, p. I-1.

41. *Boston Globe*, October 21 and 22, 1982.

42. *San Francisco Examiner*, March 8, 1987.

43. *Time*, July 25, 1983.

44. *Time*, July 25, 1983; *Washington Post*, August 16, 1987.

45. *San Francisco Chronicle*, June 7, 1987. Anderson also noted the report of Soviet divisions massed on the Iranian border (as a cautionary against the U.S. entering and escalating the war) and that the U.S. was urging its allies to stop selling arms to Iran.

arms went through Karl-Erik Schmitz, the Swedish arms dealer now facing jail for exporting arms from his country to Iran.⁵¹ In September 1986 the Danish Sailors Union said that it had documents to prove that between May and August 1986 the Danish freighter *Ilse TH* had carried four 900-ton shipments of weapons from the Israeli port of Eilat to Bandar Abbas, Iran. The union said it was sure that the arms were U.S.-manufactured.⁵²

The question persists: Was selling arms an end in itself for Israel, or was it a way to change the Iranian regime? In his controversial interview with the *Boston Globe*, Moshe Arens said that the aim of the Israeli arms sales was "to see if we could not find some areas of contact with the Iranian military, to bring down the Khomeini regime." The following day he shifted, saying that "It's difficult for me to understand how you could topple the Khomeini regime with a few spare parts. The purpose was to make contact with some military officers who some day might be in a position of power in Iran."⁵³

Whatever the reason, the Israeli sales continued, long after the U.S. — to make amends with Arab governments after the embarrassments of the Iran/contras scandal — had put a good part of the Navy in the line of fire in the Gulf and had urgently asked Israel to stop selling arms to Iran. In August 1987 Israel was reported to be shipping Iran 106 mm artillery shells made under U.S. license and several million dollars worth of F-4 and F-5E aircraft parts every month.⁵⁴ Israel was widely

reported to have struck a new Jews-for-arms deal with Iran in September 1987.⁵⁵

In November Secretary of State Shultz told the Israeli president that the U.S. knew Israel was still selling arms to Iran, and the administration sent a letter stating its opposition to these sales.

Perhaps it is best to conclude that, had they been able, the Israelis probably would have removed or weakened the Ayatollah Khomeini and his Islamic Republic. They had their own brief flirtation with Islamic fundamentalism in the occupied territories, seeing it for a time as a good way to dilute progressive, pro-PLO nationalism. But in early 1985 Iranian-guided fundamentalists in Southern Lebanon began inflicting casualties on the Israelis.

Iran's investment in Lebanon has increased since then, and the question of fundamentalism resurfaced in the post-scandal discussion over Israel's relationship with Iran. Would it not be better to approach Iraq, and use the opportunity of its desperation to end the seven-year-old war to moderate Iraq's enmity to Israel? Some said Iraq was sending signals to that effect, especially after it restored diplomatic relations with Egypt late last year. Yet, except for some minor ministers who favor an approach to Iraq, the top leadership of both Israeli parties is still wedded to Iran — for reasons ranging from Labor's nostalgia for the days of the Shah to the Likud's fear that a walk down the peace path with Iraq might end up at the barrier of territorial concessions.⁵⁶

51. *Wall Street Journal*, September 4, 1987.

52. United Press International (UPI), 0835, September 13, 1986.

53. *Boston Globe*, October 21 and 23, 1982.

54. *Observer* (London), article in *San Francisco Examiner*, August 18, 1987.

55. *Observer* (London), cited in *Jerusalem Post*, September 13, 1987.

56. *Jerusalem Post*, November 16 and 20, 1987 and November 12, citing *Jane's Defense Weekly*. See also *Israeli Foreign Affairs*, December 1987.

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Hakim's Connection

by Peggy Adler Robohm*

In late 1971, a corporation called Multi Corp International, Ltd. (MCI), located in Tehran, Iran, was formed under Iranian law.¹ The founder of MCI was Albert Hakim. Hakim owned 50 percent of the company's stock and from 1972 through 1978, when he fled Iran, he was MCI's president.

According to documents filed by Hakim's attorneys in Superior Court in New Haven, Connecticut,²

In the mid-1970s, foreign companies that desired to make sales to the Iranian government or military were required to pay "kickbacks," — or payoffs — to government officials as a condition to doing business in Iran.... American firms would typically enter into commission arrangements with Iranian "agents," ostensibly for their specialized knowledge and local expertise in securing and maintaining business relationships, but in reality to serve as conduits for the payment of bribes.

Excessive commissions were negotiated with and paid to the Iranian agents. The agents, in turn, passed on a portion of the commission to Iranian government or military officials.

During the time when MCI was operating in Iran, General Mohammed Khatami, the Shah of Iran's brother-in-law, was the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Iranian Air Force (IIAF).³ Foreign firms that wished to do business with the IIAF were forced to deal with Nasreddin Nasseri,⁴ another

brother-in-law of General Khatami, who "was, in short, the 'cover man' for the General, handling his unofficial business affairs and arranging for the payment of kickbacks."⁵ Prior to April 1972, Mr. Nasseri used a company named Madaco as an intermediary between the IIAF and foreign companies, such as the Olin Corporation in Connecticut.

On April 17, 1972 Mr. Nasseri wrote a letter to the Olin Corporation, on the stationery of Multi Corp International Ltd., advising them:

I have discontinued my relationship altogether with MADACO and now I am working together with MULTI CORP INTERNATIONAL LTD. (MCI). MCI is formed by a group of young, experienced people with more than 12 years of experience in trade, salesmanship and market development for the sales of various professional products to the military and other sectors of the economy. MCI at present has a wide representation of foreign companies and is a forward looking, dynamic company and I am hereby requesting you to transfer the agency to MCI for better handling of your products not only in the IIAF, but in other Forces as well.⁶

From that time forward, MCI served as the intermediary for ammunition sales between the Olin Corporation and the IIAF.

By 1973, Hakim's MCI was, as Mr. Nasseri suggested in his letter to Olin, handling foreign companies' products "not only in the IIAF, but in the other Forces as well." In a letter to Albert Hakim, at his MCI office in Tehran,⁷ Olin set forth the terms and conditions under which Hakim's company would act as:

representative of Olin Corporation ("OLIN") in connection with the negotiation, consummation and implementation of a proposal...for the licensing by Olin to the Iranian Government's Military Industries Organization ("MIO") of industrial property rights, the design, construction and operation of a Ball Powder Plant and related facilities and the supply of equipment and personnel in connection with the foregoing....

5. Reply Memorandum, p. 7.

6. *Olin v. Castells*, Exhibit 27-A-7.

7. *Ibid.*, Exhibit 23-A-Hakim.

* Peggy Adler Robohm is a free-lance writer and researcher who lives in Connecticut.

1. It could have been early 1972; although Albert Hakim testified he founded MCI "immediately" after he left his previous job in "roughly 1971," and started MCI in "approximately 1971," the Nasseri letter referred to in the text is dated April 17, 1972, and implies that the corporation is newly formed. The precise date of incorporation of MCI does not appear in any of the court papers referred to in this article.

2. Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant Albert Hakim's Motion to Dismiss (hereinafter "Reply Memorandum"), January 20, 1984, filed in *Olin Corporation v. Raul Castells, et al.*, Superior Court for the Judicial District of New Haven at New Haven (hereinafter *Olin v. Castells*), No. 15 24 56 9, at p. 6.

3. From 1975 to 1978, Richard V. Secord was the Commander of the U.S. Air Force Military Advisory Group in Iran, where he acted as chief adviser to the Commander-in-Chief of the IIAF. According to the "Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair" (hereinafter "Report, Iran-Contra Affair"), at page 327, Secord "exercised substantial influence over" the IIAF's "purchasing decisions." (See sidebar.)


4. Nasreddin Nasseri may be related to Nematollah Nasiri, who was in 1953 the head of the Shah's personal bodyguard, and who subsequently became the chief of SAVAK. The Farsi name is transliterated variously as Nasiri, Nassiry, Nasseri, etc.

Bearer Letters

In the same letter, Olin agreed to pay Hakim a commission of \$1,200,000, and also agreed, "in accordance with your instructions," that the payment consist of three bearer letters signed by Olin in the amounts of U.S. \$670,000, U.S. \$306,000 and U.S. \$224,000 respectively. Olin then transferred \$670,000 to the First National City Bank in Geneva, Switzerland and \$530,000 to Banque Cantonale Vaudoise in Lausanne, Switzerland. Each bank received a letter of instruction from Olin along with the transfer of funds. The letter to the First National City Bank instructed it:

upon presentation and delivery to you of the bearer letter by the holder, please pay the amount of U.S. \$670,000 in accordance with the instructions contained in said letter. Immediately stamp the word "cancelled" on the bearer letter and return to us for filing.

A similar letter was sent by Olin to Banque Cantonal Vaudoise, advising them that the sums, one in the amount of \$306,000 and the other in the amount of \$224,000, were "made available to you so that you may affect payment for our account against delivery of two bearer letters."



Credit: Associated Press

Albert Hakim at the Iran/contra hearings.

According to a memorandum submitted by Hakim's attorneys in the Connecticut case,⁸

Bearer letters were as good as, or better than, cash; they would be converted to cash in the face amount of the letter, without questions being asked, to anyone in possession of the letters who presented them to the designated bank for payment. Such letters were therefore an ideal device for the anonymous payment of large amounts of cash to designated individuals without such payments being easily traceable.

What is most intriguing is that, throughout the Iran/contra hearings, while Committee members spent a considerable amount of time wondering about missing and unaccounted funds, neither Hakim nor anyone else was questioned, in any of the public sessions,⁹ about bearer letters, a way to transfer cash—in Switzerland at least—without the identity of the payee being known. Albert Hakim was not only familiar with the use of such a device, he had in the past *demand*ed that such a method be used.

Bechtel, Shultz, and Weinberger

By 1976, MCI's Iranian clients included the IIAF, the MIO, the Iranian Police, and SAVAK, the Iranian secret police, created under the guidance of the CIA and Israel. They were also the agents for twenty or so American companies, including Olin, Hewlett-Packard, Motorola, and General Electric's military division. On April 30, 1976, Hakim and two officials of the Olin Corporation met in San Francisco with officials of the giant multinational, Bechtel Corporation, regarding their company's becoming involved in Olin's Iranian brass mill project.

According to a "CONFIDENTIAL," internal Olin memorandum which was written on May 10, 1976 by Peter H. Kaskell, Olin's vice-president of legal affairs,¹⁰

Ed Nelson of Olin Brass, Raoul Castells ["Director, Business Development, International, of the (Olin) Winchester Group"] and Mr. Hakim met with Bechtel in San Francisco on April 30 to discuss the Iranian brass mill project. Ed reported that at the outset of the meeting several senior Bechtel executives, including their General Counsel, "grilled" Mr. Hakim intensively for about an hour regarding his business principles and practices. They were well satisfied with his answers, as was Nelson, and decided that Bechtel was prepared to enter into a business relationship with Multi Corp.

The same memorandum describes a meeting which took

8. Reply Memorandum, p. 10, n. 3.

9. According to "Report, Iran-Contra Affair," n. 22, pp. 328-29, the congressional committees' Exhibit AH43 is a "legal brief submitted on Hakim's behalf by his attorneys in the course of a civil suit" which explains what bearer letters are and how and why they are used. Unless there was some other civil suit involving Hakim and regarding kick-backs to Iranian officials *other than Olin v. Castells*, it appears that the committees were in possession of the same "Reply Memorandum" as the author.

10. *Olin v. Castells*, Exhibit 14-A-6.

place on May 3, 1976 at Hakim's suite at the Park Lane Hotel on Central Park South in New York City, between Hakim, Castells, and Kaskell. During this meeting, which "continued over lunch," Hakim parried their questions about the very high percentages of commissions charged which went to other "participants," and bragged that MCI was "high on the list of agents recommended by the U.S. Embassy in Tehran"¹¹ to American companies in the areas in which Multi Corp performs services."¹²

What is of more than passing significance is that the Bechtel General Counsel who was one of the senior Bechtel executives who intensively grilled Albert Hakim on April 30, 1976,

11. From March 1973 to January 1977 Richard Helms was the U.S. Ambassador to Iran. George W. Cave was posted to the same U.S. Embassy by the CIA in August 1973. Cave remained in Iran until sometime prior to August 1976 and during all, or part, of his tenure there, was CIA Chief of Station.

12. *Olin v. Castells*, Exhibit 14-A-6.

was Caspar Weinberger.¹³ What is equally significant is that at no time during the public sessions of the Iran/contras hearings was Hakim asked if he knew Weinberger; nor was Weinberger asked if he knew Hakim. Further, it does not appear that the possibility of any relationship between George Shultz and Albert Hakim was ever probed. In fact, both Weinberger and Shultz have been characterized repeatedly as opposed to the arms-for-hostages plans; one can only wonder if their reluctance had anything to do with their prior knowledge of, and experiences with, Albert Hakim. ●

13. Both Bechtel's public relations office and its General Counsel's office confirmed to the author that it has never had more than one "General Counsel" at a time. Therefore, there is no doubt that the General Counsel on April 30, 1976, referred to in Peter Kaskell's May 10, 1976 confidential memorandum, is Caspar Weinberger. Furthermore, Bechtel's president on April 30, 1976 was George Shultz. An excellent and comprehensive book on Bechtel has just been published: Laton McCartney, *Friends in High Places* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988).

A Few Selected Biographies

Albert Hakim

- 1955-56: High school, San Luis Obispo, California.
- 1956-59: California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo, California.
- 1962-71: With Telecom Ltd., Tehran, owned by Moïse Bassin.
- 1971-78: Founder and President of Multi Corp International, Ltd., Tehran.
- 1978: Fled Iran.
- Other businesses, past and present, include: Expantrade (Geneva); EATSCO; Stanford Technology Corp.; Stanford Technology Trading Group International.
- Hakim's attorney from at least 1971 has been William I. Zucker, who "provided banking-type services to Hakim," and who is "a United States citizen and former Internal Revenue Service (IRS) lawyer who has resided in Switzerland for 20 years." ("Report, Iran-Contra Affair," p. 332.)
- Business associates, past and present, include: Richard Wood, Richard Secord, Theodore Shackley, Edwin Wilson, Thomas Clines, Richard Armitage.

George Shultz

- 1970-72: Director of Office of Management and Budget under Nixon. OMB holds, and keeps secret, all arms licenses and transaction records. Shultz's Deputy Director was Caspar Weinberger. Their Associate Director was Frank Carlucci.
- 1972-74: Secretary of the Treasury; assistant to President Nixon.
- 1974-75: Executive vice-president, Bechtel Corporation, San Francisco.
- 1975-80: President and director, Bechtel Corporation. (During these years, Weinberger was general counsel.)
- 1981-82: President, Bechtel Group.
- 1982-present: Secretary of State, succeeding Alexander Haig. All arms export licenses are registered with the State Department's Office of Munitions Control (OMC).

Caspar Weinberger

- 1970-72: Deputy Director, OMB, under George Shultz; Frank Carlucci was OMB's associate director, 1971-72.
- 1972-73: Director, OMB. During 1972, Carlucci was Weinberger's Deputy Director.
- 1973: Counsellor to President Nixon.
- 1973-75: Secretary, HEW. Frank Carlucci was Undersecretary at

HEW, 1972-74.

- 1975-80: general counsel, Vice-president, and director, Bechtel Power Corp., Bechtel, Inc., and Bechtel Corporation. (During these years, Shultz was Bechtel's president.)
- 1981-87: Secretary of Defense. Weinberger was succeeded in this post, in late 1987, by Frank Carlucci, who had served as his Deputy Secretary of Defense 1981-82.
- March 1988: Joined the Washington law firm of Rogers & Wells, headed by William P. Rogers, Secretary of State in Nixon's first term.

Richard Secord

- 1955: Graduated from West Point; his company commander was Alexander Haig.
- 1962: Served in Vietnam with the First Air Commando Wing.
- 1963-65: Posted, intermittently, to Iran.
- 1966-68: Worked for CIA in Laos, directing and flying secret missions. There met CIA's Thomas Clines; through Clines met Theodore G. Shackley, then CIA Chief of Station in Vientiane, Laos.
- 1973: Detailed again to the CIA's secret war in Laos.
- 1975-78: Commander of the USAF Military Advisory Group in Iran, where he acted as chief adviser to the Commander-in-Chief of the IIAF and managed all USAF programs in Iran.
- 1978-81: Director of all U.S. military sales, worldwide, from the Pentagon.
- 1980: Deputy commander of the mission to rescue the U.S. hostages in Iran. Hakim worked on this mission inside Iran. Oliver North was also involved in this operation. (See Ellen Ray and William Schaap, "Deltagate?" *CAIB*, No. 28 (Summer 1987), p. 63.)
- 1981-83: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Africa, the Middle East and South Eastern Asia.
- 1981: Lobbied for the sale of AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia; assisted in his lobbying efforts by Oliver North.
- 1982: Removed from office, pending a lie detector test, regarding the EATSCO affair. Reinstated, without taking the test and without prior notice to the Justice Department, by then Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci.
- 1983: Retired from the military. During the summer of 1983, he went into business with Albert Hakim, as the President of Stanford Technology Trading Group International (STTGI). Secord and Hakim each owned half the shares of STTGI.
- Secord's attorney with regard to the Iran/contras affair is Thomas C. Green. Green's other clients have included Thomas Clines, Albert Hakim, Oliver North, and Rafael Quintero. ●

From Somalia to South Africa:

Israel in Africa

by Jane Hunter*

In the Middle East, Israel is perceived as the "strategic asset" of the Reagan administration; abroad, as the stalking horse of American imperialism. While Israel receives certain benefits from being portrayed as Washington's confidant and handmaiden, more often than not it has very different policy objectives than its benefactor. This has been especially true in Africa, where Israel has well-developed interests of its own.

Indeed, Israel had hoped that the Reagan administration would offer special assistance in pursuing its objectives in Africa. Partly to that end, Israel and the U.S. signed agreements in the early 1980s pledging cooperation in the Third World. In return, the Reagan administration hoped that these agreements would be a way of getting Israel to help it circumvent congressional restrictions on aid to the Nicaraguan *contras*. In the end, neither country was completely satisfied. Israel declined to take an overt role with the *contras*,¹ although it did agree to discreet arms sales and closer relations with the Honduran and Guatemalan militaries. And the Reagan administration, perhaps because of Israel's reluctance in Central America, failed to provide the funds or political clout to significantly improve Israel's position in Africa.

Africa, for a number of reasons, is a higher priority for Israel than Central America. From the 1950s to the mid-1970s, Israel had invested both a great deal of political energy and military assistance in Africa and had won many friends. However, Israel was stung when, in late 1973, 21 African governments complied with an Organization of African Unity (OAU) resolution to break diplomatic relations. The ruptures had begun after the 1967 war, when African countries began to perceive Israel as an outpost of Western imperialism, rather than as an emerging nation from whom they could learn to make the desert bloom. The OAU move, taken in response to the 1973 war, left only Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland, and South Africa with diplomatic ties with Israel.²

This mass defection was soon followed by the U.N.'s seating of a PLO Observer Mission³ and the passage of General Assembly Resolution 3379, equating Zionism with racism and

apartheid (a statement which Israel underscored after it concluded a series of military and economic agreements with South Africa).

Although banished from official sight, Israel never really departed from independent Africa. Indeed, during the late 1970s and early 1980s its trade increased. Koor, the giant conglomerate owned by the Israeli labor federation Histadrut, was put in charge of maintaining "contacts" in Africa.⁴ "Interest sections" under the auspices of European embassies looked after the hundreds of Israeli citizens engaged in economic activities in Africa⁵ and Israel never lost its desire to regain the respect it had enjoyed in the early years.

In 1981 Israeli officials believed things had changed. The 1979 Camp David accords, they argued, should obviate the OAU resolution, as it was premised upon Israel's occupation of African land, Egypt's Sinai, which Israel agreed to return under the accords. The Israelis thought that the new French President Mitterand, exceptionally amenable to Israel, might reverse the French policy of blocking an Israeli comeback in France's former colonies.⁶ There was also hope that the newly installed Reagan administration would be helpful.

Israel Gets a MOU

That hope seemed more of a possibility when in November 1981 Secretary of State Alexander Haig presented Israel with a Memorandum of Understanding on Strategic Cooperation (MOU). Arriving in Washington for the signing and fresh from a trip through Africa, Ariel Sharon, Israel's Defense Minister, hoped the pact would greatly enhance Israel's position there. Implicit in this agreement was the Israeli willingness to operate in countries where the Reagan administration could not.⁷

4. Report by Jim Letterman from Jerusalem on National Public Radio, *All Things Considered*, August 19, 1983.

5. *Christian Science Monitor*, February 6, 1984.

6. Mitterand never did deliver for Israel in Africa, perhaps because he saw nothing to assuage the historic French fear that Israel would be a stalking horse for the U.S. in the former colonies where France enjoys unchallenged status.

7. Zaire was exactly what the Israelis had in mind: a country under attack by Congress because of human rights and fiscal abuses, but one on which the Reagan administration placed strategic value. In May 1982, after Congress cut Zaire's aid in half, Mobutu Sese Seko said he would restore diplomatic relations with Israel. However, by mid-1984 both Liberia and Zaire had begun to complain about the skimpiness of Israel's aid (their move toward Israel had cost aid from Arab governments) and Foreign Ministry Director General David Kimche hastened to mollify them. By 1987 Mobutu still had not received the \$8 million worth of arms credits he said Sharon had promised him. *Jerusalem Post*, December 4, 1981; *Davar*, August 13, 1984, in FBIS Middle East & Africa.

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1. Jonathan Marshall, Peter Dale Scott, and Jane Hunter, *The Iran-Contra Connection: Secret Teams and Covert Operations in the Reagan Era* (Boston: South End Press, 1987) pp. 88-124.

2. Hilmi S. Yousuf, *African-Arab Relations* (Brattleboro, VT: Amana Books, 1986) Table 10, p. 94 and *passim*.

3. It is this Mission which Congress recently ordained be shut down. Congress mandated the closing of the PLO's Information Office in Washington late last year.

In addition to a U.S. commitment to help boost Israeli arms sales and a loose defense pact, the MOU contained a commitment to work for better U.S.-Israeli cooperation in Africa;⁸ Sharon contends that the U.S. had promised to fund Israeli activities there.⁹

But Washington then set aside the MOU in response to Israel's annexation of the Golan Heights, although some parts of the MOU were operative under the terms of a 1979 agreement.¹⁰

It is likely that neither Israel nor the Reagan administration paid much attention to Israeli projects in Africa during 1982. In May 1982 Israel invaded Lebanon and the quick war, which the U.S. had blessed, turned into a bloodbath which strained Israeli-U.S. relations.

In July 1983, however, the U.S. became interested in implementing the 1981 agreement on Africa just as *contra* aid looked bound for defeat in Congress. Joint working teams from the U.S. State Department and the Israeli Foreign Ministry's Africa division began regular meetings. And, according to an Israeli political journal, Secretary of State Shultz ordered that U.S. embassies in Africa be put at the disposal of Israeli representatives.¹¹

That summer the administration encouraged Liberia to restore formal ties with Israel. When Liberia's dictator Doe visited Israel in August he won a long list of promised Israeli aid. The Israelis hoped their largesse (only a small fraction of which was ever delivered) would tempt other African governments to reestablish relations.¹²

In October 1983, with the administration still casting about for a solution to its *contra* problem, President Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 111, establishing "strategic cooperation" with Israel.¹³ Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir said the new U.S.-Israeli pact¹⁴ contained "a dialogue on coordinating activity in the third world."¹⁵

Try as it may, however, the administration did not succeed in persuading another African country to make a gesture toward Israel until 1987, when it coaxed Mozambique to agree to accept an Israeli technical project. Interestingly, that effort stalled when the administration refused to fund it.

After the Iran/*contra* affair had been tucked away and official U.S. aid was again flowing to the *contras*, administration

8. *U.S. Aid To Israel*, U.S. Government Accounting Office, uncensored version released by American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, Washington, DC, June 1983, p. 38; *Jerusalem Post*, December 4, 1981, reproduced in Israel Shahak, *Israel's Global Role: Weapons for Repression* (Belmont, Mass.: AAUG Press, 1982), pp. 46-47.

9. *Ha'aretz*, May 20, 1982 in FBIS Middle East & Africa, May 21, 1982, p. I-1.

10. *Jerusalem Post*, *op. cit.*, n. 8.

11. *Koteret Rashit* (Jerusalem), August 3, 1983 in FBIS Middle East & Africa.

12. *Israeli Foreign Affairs*, February 1985 and August 1986.

13. *Washington Post*, August 5, 1986.

14. *Ma'ariv*, April 10, 1984, in FBIS, Middle East and Africa, April 10, 1984, pp. 1-2. The cooperation was only one of a number of concessions Israel received when Shamir showed up in November 1983 to announce the pact. As a result of the deal, Israel received technology, economic credits, a promise—later fulfilled—of a Free Trade Agreement and increased U.S. aid. That Washington received nothing visible in return suggests the pact was offered to tempt Israel into greater involvement with the Nicaraguan *contras*.

15. Interview with Shamir in *Hatzofe*, December 16, 1983, in FBIS Middle East & Africa.

officials told the *Washington Post* that the U.S. had declined to finance the Mozambican project out of its opposition to establishing "the principle of Israeli dependence on Washington to finance aid projects as part of its efforts to expand diplomatic ties in black Africa."¹⁶ Even a special U.S. AID program to fund Israeli projects in countries that were potential diplomatic partners,¹⁷ failed to unlock African doors.

Bodyguards for Brutality

Israel's primary entree into underdeveloped countries seemed to be its protective services arranging bodyguards for threatened autocrats. Israel not only trained palace guards but other crack regiments, as well as regular troops. Where there was money or a need to entrench its position, Israel would also gladly deliver arms.

That Israel would consciously seek this specialized niche in Africa was indicated as early as August 1983 by a commentary in the Labor Party's newspaper *Davar*. Titled "The Israeli Diplomatic Fight Will Be Decided in Chad," the piece said that African governments were "in somewhat of a panic" over the restrained response to the Libyan-backed attacks on Chad, then at their height. It alluded to a stream of visitors from African countries to Israel who were "prepared to buy everything and sign contracts without always going into details and without specifying upon whom the financial responsibility fell."

"This tells us," the piece concluded, "that in time of genuine trouble they will turn to Israel, because they believe that they will find more understanding and fewer risks in Israel. They also know that neither Washington nor France will do for them and their security what Israel is capable of doing."¹⁸

After Israel helped Zairian President Mobutu put down an attempted coup in 1984,¹⁹ he sent his top officers to Israel for training. Israel then dispatched at least 50 military personnel and established a military mission in the Zairian capital, Yaounde, and also assisted with the reconstruction of Mobutu's 6,000-strong army and paramilitary national police force.²⁰

President Paul Biya of Cameroon restored relations with Israel in August 1986. Togo renewed relations in June 1987, nine months after President Gnassingbe Eyadema was shaken by an attempted coup d'état. Eyadema told reporters that Israel would advise and train his presidential guard and also

16. *Washington Post*, November 13, 1987; Jane Hunter and Sarah Cave, "Mozambique to Accept Technical Aid," *Israeli Foreign Affairs*, December 1987. *Jeune Afrique* (September 10, 1986) reported that U.N. Ambassador Vernon Walters put in a good word with the government of Cameroon to persuade President Biya to formalize his relationship with Israel, but Biya himself said an Israeli rabbi had persuaded him.

17. The program, called U.S.-Israel Cooperative Development Research (CDR) was established in 1984 by HR 5424, introduced by Rep. Howard Berman, a liberal Democrat from California. For more about CDR projects in Central American hot spots, see *Israeli Foreign Affairs*, June 1986.

18. Commentary by Yehoshu'a Tadmor, *Davar*, August 10, 1983, in FBIS Middle East & Africa, August 12, 1983, pp. 1-4 (There were no corroborating reports of such visits in other media.)

19. *Christian Science Monitor*, August 26, 1986.

20. *Ibid.*, *Jeune Afrique*, September 10, 1986; *Boston Globe*, September 27, 1986; *West Africa* (London), September 1, 1986.

Shabtai Kalmanowitch: Israeli Spook?

The life of Shabtai Kalmanowitch reads like a spy novel. Until his recent arrest in Israel for spying for the Soviet Union, Kalmanowitch was an Israeli agent who made millions in shady international business deals, an indicted forger, self-proclaimed ambassador, and possible gold and diamond thief.

It is not at all clear that Kalmanowitch actually did spy for the Soviets, or, if he did turn information over to them, that he did not do so at Israel's direction. When Israel arrested him at the end of 1987, United Press International had just run two stories saying that Mossad was infiltrated by the KGB and that some of the material gathered by convicted spy Jonathan Jay Pollard had been passed to the Soviet Union.¹ Israel might have felt itself in need of a scapegoat.

Kalmanowitch came to Israel from the Soviet Union in 1971 and began working for a Knesset member who sought to redeem his criminal past by sponsoring prisoner trades. In 1978 he worked with East German spy-trader Wolfgang Fogel to get an Israeli, Meron Markus, out of Mozambique.²

Kalmanowitch then went into business and his company Liat employed a number of former military officers, including Dov Tamari, once head of Israeli military intelligence.³ Tamari was also heavily involved in military deals with the Marcos government in the Philippines.⁴

Then Kalmanowitch was introduced to Lucas Mancope, the "President of Bophuthatswana" and with his help

entered into South Africa's shady networks of trade and finance. With financing through Henry Landschaft, a Soviet Jew based in West Germany, Kalmanowitch built low cost housing in the bantustan. He made a tremendous profit either on the housing project or by manipulating a loan which came from Kredietbank in Belgium. Kredietbank is famous for moving funds for Muldergate, South Africa's big disinformation program, and some of the bank's directors are said to be members of Opus Dei. One bank official called the Liat loan "a bullshit loan which we made to our friends."

Landschaft also financed the Sun City resort, which was designed by Israeli architects⁵ and is guarded by Israeli rent-a-cops. Kalmanowitch became more powerful as he learned about "South African sanctions-busting that could expose Western European politicians and businessmen to Soviet blackmail" and "prominent European politicians who backed South Africa's efforts to break out of international isolation."⁶

Kalmanowitch's bantustan dealings would resurface, when, in February 1988, the government of Bophuthatswana was overthrown. In a radio broadcast the rebels gave as one of their reasons for the coup the corruption of President Mancope by Kalmanowitch. South Africa then jammed further broadcasts and quickly put down the coup.⁷

While operating in Bophuthatswana, Kalmanowitch opened an office in Israel in an elegant building known as

1. United Press International, December 13 and 27, 1987.

2. Jewish Telegraphic Agency, "Northern California Jewish Bulletin," January 15, 1988.

3. *Africa Confidential*, June 1987.

4. This was discovered in 1985 by the Progressive List for Peace.

5. *Africa Confidential*, June 1987.

6. *Ibid*; *Washington Times*, January 15, 1988.

7. Pacifica Radio (February 10, 1988) was the only outlet to report the jamming.

work with Togo's security forces.²¹

With the help of the flamboyant Israeli agent, Shabtai Kalmanowitch (*see sidebar*), President Joseph Mohmoh of Sierra Leone sent nine of his bodyguards for Israeli training,²² but did not renew relations. President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya, who has been attacked by Congress for human rights abuses, has had contact with Israeli officials, among them David Kimche, presumably about renewing ties.²³ Israel has just sent a former police inspector to head its "interest section" in Nairobi. The fact that he is leaving an ambassadorial level post in Liberia to go to the Kenyan interest section suggests that Moi expects trouble from dissidents and Israel expects full relations soon.²⁴

In early 1987 Israel made known a decision that it would

stop promising aid it could not deliver and instead concentrate on a few "important" countries.²⁵ However, Israel had already undermined its own case with Nigeria, preeminent among those nations it deemed important. Nigeria was offended by Israel's sale of Kfir fighter aircraft to neighboring Cameroon.²⁶

Israel had tried mightily to win over Nigeria by sending former Mossad agent Kimche on many diplomatic visits. At one point, Israel offered credit to the former Shagari government for an order of revolvers, tear gas, handcuffs and leg irons (for use during upcoming elections) after the U.S. demanded cash up front.²⁷

The lengths that Israel would go to win Nigeria back were revealed in July 1984, when British authorities opened a crate of "diplomatic baggage" at Stansted Airport and found an

21. *Jerusalem Post*, June 17, 1987.

22. *New York Times*, October 24, 1987.

23. *Israeli Foreign Affairs*, August and November 1987.

24. *Jerusalem Post*, November 30, 1987.

25. *Davar*, January 4, 1987, in FBIS Middle East & Africa.

26. *Africa Analysis*, June 26, 1987.

27. *New African*, op. cit.

the Bophuthatswana "embassy" where he functioned as the ambassador. When, in 1986, he went to Sierra Leone, the next step-up in his career, he became its "cultural representative" to Israel.⁸

After arriving in Sierra Leone, Kalmanowitch set up a network of business enterprises.⁹ Kalmanowitch's official connection to Israel was made more clear when in 1987 the Israeli government signed agreements with Sierra Leone to cover transport and low-income housing, sectors where Liat had broken ground. At the same time, Israel decided to train President Joseph Momoh's personal guards.¹⁰

All of this, according to the country's President, was being done without Sierra Leone investing a penny.¹¹ Later it turned out that Momoh had granted gold and diamond mining concessions to Kalmanowitch.¹² And when Kalmanowitch was arrested in London it was suggested that Liat was actually engaged in smuggling gold and diamonds out of Sierra Leone, an economic basket case.¹³

But it was not for stealing from Sierra Leone that Kalmanowitch and his business partner, William Davidson, were arrested in London. It was for forging millions of dollars worth of checks on a Merrill Lynch account at the North Carolina National Bank in Asheville, North Carolina. The FBI said that the total amount of bad checks written was over \$12 million,¹⁴ at least \$3 million of which had cleared before Merrill Lynch discovered they were

8. *Africa Confidential*, op. cit., n. 7.

9. *Ibid.*; *AfricaAsia*, December 1986.

10. *West Africa* (London), February 23 and March 2, 1987.

11. Interview in *West Africa*, December 1, 1986.

12. *Jerusalem Post*, January 11, 1988.

13. *West Africa*, June 15, 1987.

14. In the course of its investigation of the forgery case the FBI discovered that Kalmanowitch was calling himself an economic adviser for Sierra Leone's embassy in West Germany. One of his lawyers says Kalmanowitch represented Sierra Leone in the European Economic Community and the *Jerusalem Post* (July 29, 1987) referred to him as "Israeli diplomat Kalmanowitch."

forgeries.

Both pleaded innocent, and Kalmanowitch was represented by Nathan Lewin and Seth Waxman of the prestigious Washington law firm Miller, Cassidy, Larroca & Lewin. Lewin and Waxman were in the courtroom when Kalmanowitch arrived from London and won his release on \$50,000 bond. Lewin submitted numerous character references for Kalmanowitch, including one from Rep. Benjamin Gilman (Rep.-NY.). Lewin has been representing Attorney General Edwin Meese in his Wedtech difficulties. Before that he represented Col. Aviem Sella, the Israeli air force officer who has been indicted in the U.S. as Jonathan Pollard's control officer.

Ultimately, according to Lewin associate Seth Waxman, Kalmanowitch doubled his bail and had "several" of his passports returned. He was next seen in Sierra Leone and then, reportedly, arrested in Israel on his return from a trip to Moscow with a delegation from Sierra Leone.

Whether or not Kalmanowitch was a full-time Mossad agent or carried out his tasks as an Israeli cutout under the auspices of some other government agency is not clear.¹⁵ The Israeli press reported that he had contact with the Soviets in the course of his work in both South Africa (where they admired a stadium he built in the bantustan of Bophuthatswana) and Sierra Leone (where he helped the Soviet economic delegation strengthen its position.)¹⁶

The Israelis say they will give Kalmanowitch a secret trial probably because they are afraid that what might come out will be an embarrassment for all involved. ●

15. Wolf Blitzer of the *Jerusalem Post* (January 12, 1988) wrote that Kalmanowitch "was used occasionally by Mossad in various overseas assignments." In a character reference sent to the U.S. District Court, (quoted in Affidavit of Nathan Lewin, October 21, 1987) Rep. Benjamin Gilman (R-NY) wrote, "Mr. Kalmanowitch has held several highly sensitive posts in the Israeli government."

16. *Kol Ha'ir*, September 9, 1987, FBIS Middle East & Africa.

anesthetized former Nigerian transport minister, Umaru Dikko, inside. With him in the crate was an Israeli administering drugs through a tube; two other Israelis were in a nearby crate. The Nigerians wanted to try Dikko for corruption and a group of businessmen, including the Swiss-based Israeli Nisim Gaon, who wanted to recover millions of dollars they said Dikko owed them, had approached the Israeli government to help them snare Dikko.²⁸

To widespread disbelief, Israel insisted that the three were not its agents.²⁹ They were, however, convicted of kidnapping and sentenced to stiff prison terms. The incident brought Britain and Nigeria to the verge of breaking relations. Although Nigeria was later reported to have bargained with London for the release of the Israelis,³⁰ there was no consolation

28. Observer cited in *Jerusalem Post*, International Edition, July 15-21, 1984; see also *New York Times*, July 10, 12, and September 2, 1984.

29. *Ibid.*

30. *Expresso* (Lisbon), February 16, 1985, in Joint Publications and Research Service (U.S. Govt.)

prize of diplomatic relations for Israel.

U.S.-Israeli Cooperation

The U.S. and Israel have had several "joint" operations in Africa, including the CIA's evacuation of Ethiopian Jews from Sudan, where they had been stranded when Israel's U.S. supporters leaked word of "Operation Moses" in January 1985.³¹ The April 1986 attack on Libya, a foray Israel had been publicly mulling over for months before the administration carried it out, relied extensively on Israeli intelligence.³² A reported U.S.-British-Israeli effort in 1983 to stir up ethnic strife in Ghana³³ came to naught and a coup d'etat of uncertain

31. *New York Times*, March 23 and 24, 1985. For ostensibly unrelated reasons, the administration had frozen Sudan's aid shortly after the airlift was terminated; aid was resumed on March 23, the day the evacuation was completed.

32. David Halevy and Neil C. Livingstone, "The Ollie We Knew," *The Washingtonian*, July 1987. See also Seymour M. Hersh, "Target Qaddafi," *New York Times Magazine*, February 22, 1987.

33. *Afrique-Asie* (Paris), August 15, 1983.

The Nobistor Affair

Solomon Schwartz has a long and interesting history with the U.S. and Israeli governments. From Mossad agent to coup conspirator to arms dealer he has used his expertise to many dubious ends.

In 1984 he attempted to secure a T-72 Russian tank from Poland for the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Using his "close relations with key Polish government officials," Schwartz "was working secretly with the DIA to get two of the tanks from the Poles when he was arrested in New York for attempting to ship a planeload of firearms and ammunition to Poland."

Schwartz defended himself by claiming that the DIA had told him to do anything short of killing someone or trading high technology items to get the tanks. The DIA acknowledged "that they had expressed interest in the tanks to Solomon (sic)" but denied authorizing the arms shipment.¹

Schwartz was next jailed in early 1987 for violating the terms of his bail after he was again indicted for illegal arms sales, this time to Iraq, Argentina, Poland and the Soviet Union. According to a federal prosecutor Schwartz was also under investigation for arms sales to Iran and for his involvement in the attempted Ghanaian coup² which, besides overthrowing Ghanaian President Jerry Rawlings, was meant to free U.S. and Israeli intelligence agents jailed by his government.

Schwartz's bail violations included "plotting to sell aircraft parts to Iran," and unauthorized trips to Israel and the Dominican Republic. He claims that his trip to the Dominican Republic was at the request of a "freelancer"

attached to the National Security Council.³

The freelancer he referred to may well have been Kevin Kattke, whose "National Freedom Institute," a band of private citizen, after-hours, covert activists, incorporated at the suggestion of Oliver North in 1986, met with *contra* leader Adolfo Calero, Salvadoran President Duarte, and regularly with NSC staffers, one of whom said Kattke provided "very good" information. Kattke also claims that he introduced Schwartz to Godfrey Osei, the Ghanaian who was to replace Rawlings after the coup.⁴

Schwartz (and three co-defendants) accompanied their "not guilty" pleas with a motion asking permission to argue that their actions were authorized by the U.S. government—the "Ollie North defense" so much in vogue after the Iran/*contra* affair. Brooklyn Federal District Court Judge Thomas C. Platt Jr., wrote that Schwartz "had a relationship with certain agencies of the U.S. Government" but he denied the motion anyway.⁵

Ghanaian Coup

As the range of his secret activities came to light, investigators discovered that Schwartz was also a central figure in the attempt to overthrow the Ghanaian government of Jerry Rawlings in 1986. The "Nobistor Affair" could well have been one of the "other operations" carried out by the "enterprise," the free-standing intelligence outfit the late William Casey had set up. The Ghanaian pretender in the plot said he had the backing of Israel, Argentina, South

1. *Los Angeles Times*, January 24, 1987.

2. *New York Times*, February 27, 1987.

3. *New York Times*, February 27, 1987.

4. *Oakland Tribune*, November 16, 1986.

5. *New York Times*, December 27, 1986.

authorship was attempted three years later (*see sidebar*).

Israeli cooperation with the Reagan administration in Africa often serves the interest of both governments. A deal reportedly struck between then Prime Minister Shimon Peres and King Hassan II of Morocco was believed by some to be connected with the Reagan administration's uneasiness over Morocco's 1984 unity pact with Libya.³⁴ (After his historic reception of an Israeli official the King tore up the pact, which had never amounted to much more than words on paper.) This and the concession to Israel improved Morocco's chances of increased U.S. military aid.

But Israel was the major beneficiary of the encounter because King Hassan's acceptance of Israeli weapons and advisers for that effort gave Israel a new base of operations in North Africa. Israel also pledged to encourage its international supporters to mount a campaign against Algeria (which was not in line with Reagan's policy), but it didn't materialize.³⁵

34. *Afrique-Asie*, September 21, 1986. See also *Israeli Foreign Affairs*, November 1986.

35. *Afrique-Asie*, September 21, 1986.

Israel and South Africa

The question of whose interests are being served in any given instance is further complicated by the fact that a great deal of what Israel does in Africa is carried out in the context of its close partnership with South Africa.

Thus activities such as the reported 1985 Israeli military deal with Somalia involving weapons and training in exchange for fishing rights³⁶ might have been an effort to supplement U.S. military aid to President Siad Barre, whose armed forces U.S. sources were calling incompetent.³⁷ Or it might have been in connection with the concurrent South African operation involving the ferrying of arms for Renamo, Pretoria's proxy force in Mozambique, "by a secret airlift from the Middle East," making a refueling stop in Somalia.³⁸

After the Clark Amendment had passed in 1972, it was

36. Reports in March, June, July and August, 1985 on Radio Halgan, the clandestine voice of the Democratic Front for the Salvation of Somalia (FBIS) and author's conversation with former Somalian official.

37. United Press International, reported in the *Los Angeles Times*, March 17, 1985.

38. *Observer*, December 2, 1984. Also *Le Monde*, January 5 and 12, 1985.

Africa, and the U.S.⁶

Nobistor was the name of the weapons-laden seagoing tug on which eight U.S. mercenaries, veterans of Vietnam and Rhodesia, sailed from Argentina. The mercenaries, who believed they were recruited by the CIA to guard an arms shipment to Africa, say that they lost faith in the operation and forced the captain to turn back. Their voyage ended in Brazil.

The mercenaries assumed that Schwartz—whom they never saw but knew to be their control agent⁷—worked for Mossad. Jack Anderson said Schwartz's New York office, Bophuthatswana International Ltd., was "suspected of being a joint CIA-Mossad front." The company was registered in 1980 as an agent of the South African bantustan. Soon after the Nobistor affair, the name was changed to B International.⁸ Schwartz is an owner of Texas Armament Advisers, based in Brownsville, Texas⁹ and was also allegedly the middleman for the arms purchased in Argentina for the Ghanaian coup attempt.¹⁰

Schwartz's telephone records show that he was in continuous contact with the State Department's West Africa desk during the Nobistor operation. In Argentina, Godfrey Osei and Ted Bishop, another coup plotter, kept in contact with Schwartz. Schwartz was also reporting regularly to the FBI, the CIA, and the Defense Intelligence Agency.¹¹

The Nobistor plot itself had the flakiness which characterized much of what Oliver North did. The mercenaries

6. *Image* (Sunday magazine of the *San Francisco Examiner*), March 29, 1987. The Argentine participation seems to have been members of the military, who sold the perpetrators the weapons for the operation. Argentina later indicted the mercenaries and seemed ready to go forward with their trials—only they escaped.

7. *Ibid.*

8. Anderson, *op. cit.*, n. 4.

9. *New York Times*, January 4, 1987.

10. *Mother Jones*, August/September 1987.

11. *Image*, *op. cit.*, n. 6.

whose sinecure came to an abrupt end when Brazilian authorities boarded their ship, discovered the weapons and arrested them, said they had been hired simply to guard an arms shipment. They claimed that only when they were under way did they learn that they were to rendezvous with a shipload of Ghanaians off the Ivory Coast and proceed to an assault on Accra.

In interviews given in Brazil and in the U.S., several mercenaries said they had been promised payment from the Ghanaian treasury and state-owned mines. Osei, the Ghanaian centerpiece of the plot, had promised a seaside gambling concession to the "Chinese Mafia" in New York, from whom, with Schwartz's help, he had raised \$500,000.

Texas commodities broker Ted Bishop said he was to have cocoa and coffee marketing rights¹² in Ghana. He hired the mercenaries and helped Osei buy 6 tons of arms for the job in Argentina and bragged that he had "walk-in access" to the NSC.¹³ One of the mercenaries repeated what Bishop had told him, "I work for the NSC and I report to a Marine colonel in Room 357 of the White House Executive Office Building."¹⁴

According to another of the mercenaries, the CIA and the Israelis were hoping to spring their agents, held by Ghana after being identified by CIA employee Sharon Scrannage in 1984. "Jerry Rawlings has pissed off not only the 'Company' but its cousins in the Middle East," wrote mercenary Timothy Carmody in a letter from his prison cell in Brazil.¹⁵ Now, with the Nobistor affair having blown up in the CIA's face, it seems that Rawlings has reason to be a bit angry with the "Company." ●

12. *San Jose Mercury News* June, 22, 1986.

13. Jack Anderson column, *San Francisco Chronicle*, November 19, 1986.

14. *San Jose Mercury News*, December 27, 1986.

15. *San Jose Mercury News*, October 29, 1986.

reported that Henry Kissinger gave Israel the go-ahead to start arms shipments to South Africa to fight the MPLA in Angola.³⁹

However, Israel probably did not need Kissinger's invitation, as it was already dealing arms to South Africa and cooperating with the white regime's "secret information project" (later dubbed Muldergate).⁴⁰ Also, Israel had coordinated three arms shipments to UNITA and the FNLA with the CIA station chief in Israel.⁴¹ During this same period Israel collaborated with "former" CIA men in providing South Africa with a U.S.-owned 155 mm howitzer; the nuclear-capable G-5 is thought to have been used in the Israeli-South African nuclear weapons test carried out in 1979 and has been

39. *Economist*, November 5, 1977.

40. *Jerusalem Post Magazine*, February 21, 1986 and James Adams, "The Unnatural Alliance," *Quartet* (London) 1984, pp. 128, 131 in *Israeli Foreign Affairs*, July 1986.

41. "U.S., Israel Involved in Angolan Arms Affair, Too," interview with former CIA agent John Stockwell, *Jerusalem Post*, December 19, 1986. Stockwell said that the U.S. had paid for the (inoperable) Grail missiles Israel sent to Angola with a shipment of more modern Redeye missiles.

used extensively by South Africa in its current campaign in Angola.⁴²

Although Israel reportedly took part in a series of meetings with South Africa, UNITA, and the CIA beginning in 1983,⁴³ much of Israel's activity against the government of Angola has been carried out with South Africa and has consisted of such things as providing training to South African officers, and assisting in the occupation of Namibia.

In 1978 Israeli troops helped build an electric fence along the border with Angola⁴⁴ to deter infiltration by PLAN (the

42. Adams, *op. cit.*, n. 40, pp. 38-71; *The Middle East* (London), April 1981 talks of a second nuclear test in which the gun was used; others who have investigated the 1979 blast are positive it was used then too. *Israeli Foreign Affairs*, December 1987.

43. According to Phyllis Johnson and David Matson, who staff a research institute in Zimbabwe, such meetings took place in May 1983 and February 25-29, 1984 in Kinshasa, Zaire, and in Morocco in March 1984 and October 1985 (cf. National Security Archive Memo) a time frame which mirrors Israeli collaboration with the administration on the *contras*. According to the *Observer* of London, a meeting between those parties resulted in the signing of an agreement. *Observer*, cited by Luanda Domestic Service, 0500 GMT, April 27, 1984, FBIS Middle East & Africa, May 1, 1984, pp. U-1-2.

44. *Davar*, July 9, 1978.

People's Liberation Army of Namibia, the armed wing of the South West African People's Organization) and more recently Israel has been providing what is euphemistically referred to as community development assistance to South Africa's puppet government in Namibia.⁴⁵

In other instances, Israel's activities in Africa have run counter to U.S. policy and proved to be a source of diplomatic embarrassment. The black market in plutonium which Israel operated from Sudan was a potential source of embarrassment to the U.S. It became difficult for the U.S. to square its stated support of nuclear nonproliferation with its tolerance of Israel's nuclear weapons program, not to mention Israel's nuclear weapons collaboration with South Africa.⁴⁶

Israel and Liberia

There was more direct U.S.-Israeli competition in Liberia, even though Israel owed its foothold there to the Reagan administration. Israel was widely reported to have helped President Samuel Doe suppress a U.S.-backed *coup d'état*. An aide to coup leader Thomas Quiwonkpa recounted what occurred on November 12, 1985 when Israeli agents wearing Liberian army uniforms led the First Battalion to retake a radio station held by the insurgents, "Our forces did not shoot at the Israeli agents because they mistook them for members of the U.S. military mission who were impartially assessing the situation."⁴⁷

Despite an array of U.S. interests in Liberia, including landing and refueling rights and a VOA transmitter, Congress recoiled at the violence of the coup and moved to freeze aid. Doe then turned to Israel.⁴⁸ An Israeli general arrived in Liberia in early December 1985⁴⁹ and was soon followed by an Israeli military delegation which discussed "future cooperation."⁵⁰

How Samuel Doe is going to pay for Israeli "cooperation" is an interesting question. As a condition for the restoration of U.S. aid, U.S. auditors now must sign off on every check written by the Liberian government. Israel is sympathetic to

Doe's plight and recently Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir promised that he would help Liberia try to improve its image in the U.S. It is not clear whether Shamir offered help from Israel's congressional lobby AIPAC, but he did promise to bring Liberian students to Israel for training in public relations.⁵¹ Shamir, who, during a recent African tour "repeatedly" said that "democracy is unsuitable for Africa,"⁵² singled out for criticism Jewish members of Congress who voted against aid to African nations with human rights violations.⁵³

Liberia is hardly an aberration. Israel routinely undercuts U.S. policy with its arms sales to South Africa which inevitably contain U.S. technology that the South African government is barred by U.S. law from receiving. Israel also countered the Carter administration's "human rights policy" by selling arms to Latin American governments whose access to U.S. military equipment and training had been cut off.

Several months after the Liberian standoff, Israel reportedly foiled the U.S. again, blocking a first effort to remove Haitian dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier.⁵⁴ And in late 1987 and early 1988, Israel's refusal to recall Mike Harari, its agent in Panama, counteracted the strenuous efforts of both Congress and the administration to remove Noriega. Harari, whose duties had included organizing Noriega's security, was said to be fortifying Noriega against the U.S. pressure.⁵⁵

Whatever its role with Reagan's successor might be, Israel's position in Africa can now be summed up as South Africa's accomplice and as a last resort for tottering autocrats. And, as to how much Israel did autonomously and how much of what it did was part of "strategic cooperation" with the Reagan administration, that may some day be determined but it will never be of more than academic interest. Everything Israel has done has been charged to the U.S. account. ●

51. *Ma'ariv* (Tel Aviv) International Edition, June 19, 1987, translated by David Millstein.

52. *Jerusalem Post*, June 18, 1987.

53. *Jerusalem Post*, June 19, 1987.

54. *Die Tageszeitung* (West Germany), translated in *El Dia* (Mexico City), April 6, 1986.

55. *Israeli Foreign Affairs*, May 1987, February and March 1988.

45. *Israeli Foreign Affairs*, March 1985; *Windhoek Observer*, July 26, 1986.

46. *Jerusalem Post*, November 1, 1987, Associated Press and *Sacramento Bee*, October 31, 1987. According to these reports, after Israel learned to enrich uranium for its own use, it bought up quantities for sale in Sudan to prevent other countries from obtaining them.

47. Quoted material from *Africa Asia*, December 1985. As to the U.S. role, Quiwonkpa had found refuge in the U.S. after leading a failed 1983 coup against Doe. The State Department was first to report the coup and tell the world that people were "dancing in the streets." (*New York Times*, November 13, 1985.) Additionally, Moses Flanzamaton, deputy head of Doe's security staff and a CIA agent had earlier led an unsuccessful machine gun attack on Doe. cf. Bob Woodward, *Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987) p. 311. Reports on the Israeli role came to the author from West Africa and Europe (See *Israeli Foreign Affairs*, January 1986). The *New York Times* (July 27, 1987) noted that "it is popularly believed in Liberia" that Israeli intervention kept Doe from being overthrown.

48. An Israeli reporter covering a visit by Israeli Prime Minister Shamir to Liberia noted, "a thick blanket of security forces, with helmeted soldiers armed to the teeth and obviously tense... Many of the soldiers were carrying Israeli Uzi sub-machine guns and wore Israeli-made helmets, boots and flak jackets." *Quarterly Economic Review of Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi*, No. 4, 1985. *Jerusalem Post*, June 19, 1987.

49. *Israeli Foreign Affairs*, January 1986.

50. *Jane's Defence Weekly*, January 25, 1986.

To keep up on the dark side of Israeli foreign policy, we highly recommend *Israeli Foreign Affairs*. This informative and well documented monthly is available for \$20 /year from Israeli Foreign Affairs, P.O. Box 19580, Sacramento, CA 95819.

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Israel's Nuclear Arsenal

By Meir Vanunu *

Mordechai Vanunu remains in solitary confinement in an Israeli prison and he will stay there for 18 years. His crime was to confirm that Israel belongs to an elite club of nations capable of killing hundreds of thousands of people with a single bomb. The terms of his confinement are harsh; he is allowed one family visit per month, only under scrutiny by Israeli intelligence officers. He can see a priest once a month and cannot speak to him directly but must pass notes. His reading material is censored and his letters are read closely for fear he might reveal other Israeli "secrets."


Vanunu is now an international symbol in the fight against nuclear proliferation and there is talk of nominating him for the Nobel peace prize. How he was kidnapped and held *incommunicado*, is another example of Israel's disdain for international law. Soon after Vanunu told the *Sunday Times* of London about the nuclear weapons factory at Dimona, he met a woman from the U.S. named Cindy. Vanunu followed Cindy to Rome and when he entered her apartment was jumped by two men, drugged, and shipped back to Israel in chains.

Cindy was a Mossad agent whose real name is Cheryl Hanin Bentov, married to Ofer Bentov, a Major in Israeli military intelligence. Her role in the Vanunu kidnapping sparked a keen interest in her past. According to an AP article, after Vanunu disappeared, her high school principal was visited by two private detectives, a CIA agent, and the FBI.¹ Vanunu's kidnapping violated many tenets of international law. Prior to his trial, Jane Hunter of *Israeli Foreign Affairs* wrote, "the U.S.-based National Lawyers Guild argues that the charges...should be dropped because he was forcibly abducted, rather than legally extradited. There is no recorded case of a court deciding it had jurisdiction over a case involving security or ideology when the defendant had been forcibly abducted to stand trial. Thus in moving to try Vanunu, Israel would be setting a new precedent in international law."²

The lack of action by the British and Italian governments is also disturbing. Both governments have pledged to investigate Vanunu's kidnapping, yet neither government has condemned Israel for this blatant violation of international law. An Italian judge who was assigned to investigate Vanunu's kidnapping has come up with nothing. As in the past, Israel's disregard for international law goes unchallenged by western governments. It had been known for years that Israel pos-

sessed nuclear weapons and had considered using them on occasion; Vanunu only confirmed that fact. More importantly, Vanunu showed that the size of the Israeli nuclear arsenal (100-200 warheads) was far beyond anyone's best estimate and that it contained warheads 20 times more powerful than the Hiroshima or Nagasaki bombs. In other words, Israel has the power to destroy every major city in the Middle East.

Israel developed this complex technology with some help from its friends. The French built the eight story underground nuclear weapons complex at Dimona in the 1950s. Then in the early 1960s, over 200 pounds of highly enriched uranium disappeared from a plant in Apollo, Pennsylvania and there is little doubt it wound up at Dimona. A freighter carrying 200 tons



Credit: London Sunday Times

Israeli nuclear facility at Dimona.

of uranium ore disappeared at sea and U.S. intelligence sources assumed it reappeared in Israel.³ There is also the question of 20 tons of heavy water sold to Israel by the Norwegians. According to Gary Milhollin, a law professor at University of Wisconsin and an expert on nuclear proliferation, "Israel has been making plutonium with Norwegian heavy water for more than 20 years, and, according to recent evidence, [Vanunu's testimony] putting the plutonium into bombs."⁴

The case has received international recognition and many have spoken on his behalf. As one activist put it, "Mordechai Vanunu has rendered a great service to all mankind...[because] the possible existence of secret nuclear arsenals is an enormous obstacle to international arms control..."⁵

While Mordechai Vanunu sits in solitary confinement, the Israelis continue to build nuclear weapons. He needs support; letters and donations for his legal defense can be sent to:

Campaign for Mordechai Vanunu, P.O. Box 1328, London, NW6, United Kingdom. ●

* Meir Vanunu is the brother of Mordechai Vanunu, and lives in London. He has travelled around the world speaking on his brother's behalf and on the dangers of Israel's nuclear arsenal. He has been such a thorn in Israel's side that they recently issued a secret warrant for his arrest. He has been detained at a London airport for three hours while customs official interrogated him (probably at the request of the Israelis). He was finally released, but his passport was confiscated and he must now receive permission to travel.

1. Associated Press, March 29, 1988.

2. *Israeli Foreign Affairs*, March 1987.

3. New York Times, October 29, 1986.

4. *Israeli Foreign Affairs*, January 1988.

5. *Jerusalem Post*, January 20, 1987, in *Israeli Foreign Affairs*, March 1987.

Israel in Central America:

Arms to the Contras

by Jack Colhoun*

Over the last fifteen years, Israel has become a full-fledged covert partner of the U.S. in promoting counterrevolution in the Third World. When public opinion in the U.S. won't support direct intervention by Washington on behalf of some of the world's most odious rightwing regimes, Israeli intelligence agents, military officers and arms merchants have regularly appeared on the scene. Israel has supplied training and weapons to Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, South Africa and the Nicaraguan *contras*, to name a few of its more repressive clients.

Yaacov Meridor, chief economic coordinator in Prime Minister Menachem Begin's cabinet, declared in an August 1981 speech, "We are going to say to the Americans, 'Don't compete with us in South Africa, don't compete with us in the Caribbean or in any other country where you can't operate in the open.' Let us do it. I even use the expression, 'You sell the ammunition and equipment by proxy. Israel will be your proxy,' and this would be worked out with a certain agreement with the U.S. where we will have certain markets... which will be left for us."¹

Ha'aretz observed, "In Central America, which is now the main focus of U.S. activities, the U.S. administration has long wanted to use Israel as a conduit for military and other aid. One of the secret aspects of U.S.-Israeli contacts over Central America concerns the intention of the U.S. administration to get Israel to supply the armies of the pro-U.S. regimes there. The financial value of this aid, which the U.S. cannot directly transfer to its allies in the region, will be paid to Israel directly from the U.S."²

Israel and the Nicaraguan Dictator

An examination of clandestine Israeli support for the Nicaraguan *contras* provides a good example of how U.S.-Israeli strategic cooperation works.

Israel first broke into the weapons market in Central America in the 1950s by supplying small arms to the U.S.-backed Somoza family dynasty. The Somoza dictatorship, which assumed power as U.S. occupation troops were leaving Nicaragua in the 1930s, was highly dependent on Washington

for economic and military assistance. Nonetheless, Israel offered military aid to the Nicaraguan regime in the 1950s in part to repay a political debt to Anastasio Somoza Garcia for military support to Zionist forces in the 1930s and 1940s.

When the Carter administration cut off U.S. military assistance to Anastasio Somoza Debayle in 1978, Israel took up the slack as Nicaragua's chief arms supplier. During the last year of the dictatorship, Israel provided 98% of Somoza's weapons needs. "When it became an embarrassment for the U.S. to continue direct arms supplies to Nicaragua, a surrogate [Israel] rapidly emerged."³

The Israeli newspaper *Ha'aretz* reported: "An agent of the [Israeli] corporations which deal with arms export [Israeli censorship cut] continued supplying Israeli weapons to Somoza until the final stages of his downfall [censorship cut]. The agent employed one of his men in Nicaragua, who lived in the bunker of Somoza's army commander. This man presented himself as a commander in the Israeli army."⁴ Israel supplied Galil rifles to a special terrorist outfit led by Somoza's son which was responsible for murdering Somoza's political foes.⁵

Israel Shahak, a professor at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, summed up the significance of Israel's backing of the Somoza dictatorship in the last months before the triumph of the Sandinista revolution. "This fact assumes great importance if we recall that in the last two years alone, the Somoza regime killed about 50,000 people, or that his regime bombed the poverty slums of Managua, as well as other towns mainly with Israeli-made Arava and West Wind planes."⁶

After the Sandinistas drove Somoza from power in 1979, the Israelis provided critical assistance to the Nicaraguan *contras*. Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, in *The Israeli Connection*, wrote, "Given Israel's earlier support to the Somoza regime, it is not surprising that it has been active in backing the *contras*. When the CIA was setting up the *contra* organization in Honduras in 1981, the Mossad was there with members of one of Israel's leading commando outfits training the first units."⁷

Even after the Reagan administration escalated its support for the *contras* in the early 1980s, Israeli backing remained crucial. The Israelis opened a clandestine arms channel in 1983 to the Costa Rican-based *contra* guerrillas of the Democratic

*The writer is Washington bureau chief of *The Guardian* newsweekly. He has a Ph.D. in U.S. history with a specialty in post-World War II foreign and military policy.

1. *Ha'aretz*, August 25, 1981. Quoted in Jane Hunter, *Israeli Foreign Policy: South Africa and Central America* (Boston: South End Press, 1987), p. 16. See also *Boston Globe*, August 18, 1981.

2. *Ha'aretz*, November 6, 1983. Quoted in Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, *The Israeli Connection: Who Israel Arms and Why* (New York: Pantheon, 1987), p. 202.

3. George Black, *Triumph of the People: The Sandinista Revolution* (London: Zed Press, 1981), p. 55.

4. *Ha'aretz*, November 14, 1979. Quoted in Israel Shahak, *Israel's Global Role: Weapons for Repression* (Belmont, Mass: AAUG, 1982), pp. 16-19.

5. *Davar*, November 13, 1979. Quoted in Shahak, *ibid.*, p. 17.

6. Shahak, *op. cit.*, n. 4, p. 16.

7. Beit-Hallahmi, *op. cit.*, n. 2, p. 92.

Revolutionary Alliance led by Eden Pastora. Israel provided weapons captured from the PLO in Lebanon and supplied military advisers to Pastora's troops.

In July 1983, the *New York Times* reported that, "American officials said the Reagan administration, concerned about congressional limitations on involvement in Central America, had encouraged the Israeli activities as a means of supplementing American security assistance to friendly governments. In addition, the officials said the administration wanted to establish new lines of support to the Nicaraguan rebels in case Congress cut off covert support."⁸

When Congress ended U.S. military assistance to the *contras*, Israeli support for the counterrevolutionaries became even more necessary. An example of how Israel helped fill the vacuum created by the termination of U.S. arms aid is provided by a covert CIA-Mossad operation to supply the *contras* with anti-aircraft missiles.

Missiles to the *Contras*

The Sandinistas gained the initiative in the fighting in 1984 as a result of the effective use of helicopter gunships. The helicopters provided the Nicaraguan army with a rapid deployment capability to send troops to areas where the *contras* had initiated hit-and-run attacks. The *contras* were taking heavy casualties as Sandinista forces fired from helicopters hovering overhead.

The Reagan administration, in the fall of 1984, decided to supply the *contras* with surface-to-air anti-aircraft missiles to neutralize the Sandinista battlefield advantage. The *contras* requested U.S.-made Redeye missiles, but the U.S. arranged for the delivery of Soviet-manufactured SA-7 missiles in an effort to circumvent the Boland amendment, which prohibited "direct or indirect" U.S. military aid.⁹

The SA-7 missiles were obtained for the *contras* by Sherwood International Export Corporation, a Los Angeles-based arms merchant with ties to the CIA and Israel. The SA-7s came from Israel's vast stockpile of weapons captured from the PLO during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.¹⁰ The Soviet-made missiles were provided to give the administration "plausible deniability" by camouflaging the origin of the missiles. Sherwood International, which is known to traffic in Israeli surplus weapons captured on Middle Eastern battlefields, is well connected to the Israeli military-industrial complex.¹¹

Sherwood International is part of a vast clandestine arms network. According to investigative reporters Jack Anderson and John Spears, "In 1969, the CIA set up a front called Associated Traders, which funneled millions of dollars through the First National Bank of Maryland to pay for huge arms shipments. Two weapons brokerage firms, Sherwood International

al and Shimon Ltd., handled the transactions for the CIA." The weapons were shipped from Israel. Sherwood International in 1982 and 1983 delivered \$5 million worth of rifles, which "may have been delivered to CIA-supported rebel groups in Nicaragua, Angola and Afghanistan."¹²

Sherwood International's method of operations has all the markings of a CIA-Mossad covert operation. Beit-Hallahmi observed, "One joint U.S.-Israeli project involves covert deliveries of arms around the world. The CIA and Mossad have been collaborating on a scheme to deliver Soviet weapons to groups that are fighting forces equipped with Soviet weapons. The logic of the scheme is clear. When Soviet-made weapons are used, they cannot be easily traced to their



Israeli advisor in Central America.

sources. The claim is always that they have been captured locally."¹³

The Israelis frequently use "private" arms merchants to conceal the government's role in covert weapons transactions. These dealers are usually well connected, as is the case with Sherwood International, to the Israeli government and the military-industrial complex. Many are "retired" Israeli Defense Force (IDF) or intelligence officers. These middlemen account for as much as one-third of all Israeli weapons exports. "Hence a good part of its [Israel's] arms negotiations must be conducted through these backdoor channels, most of which are officially sanctioned, although some are not,"¹⁴ Klieman pointed out.

Sherwood International's operations fit this pattern. *Ma'ariv*, a Hebrew language newspaper in Israel, identified

8. *New York Times*, July 21, 1983.

9. *Miami Herald*, January 18, 1986.

10. Jack Colhoun, "Contra Weapons Conduit Goes Through Tel Aviv," *The Guardian* (New York), April 16, 1986.

11. Patrick Brogan and Albert Zarca, *Deadly Business: Sam Cummings, Interarms and the Arms Trade* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1983), p. 151 and Jack Anderson and John Spears, "Arms Deals and the Israeli Connection," *Washington Post*, November 25, 1986.

12. Jack Anderson and John Spears, "Maryland Bank Tied to CIA Arms Deals," *Washington Post*, Oct. 16, 1986 and Anderson and Spears, November 25, 1986.

13. Beit-Hallahmi, *op. cit.*, n. 2, p. 204.

14. Aaron Klieman, *Israel's Global Reach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy* (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassy's, 1985), pp. 168-69.

two Israelis—Phinas Dagan and Amos Gil'ad—as “senior” representatives of Sherwood International in Central America. Gil'ad is a retired IDF transport officer and Dagan is a former sales representative in the region for the state-owned Israeli Aircraft Industries (IAI).¹⁵

Dagan and Gil'ad are linked to Pesakh Ben Or, another Israeli arms dealer operating in Central America. Ben Or, whose Eagle Israeli Armaments and Desert Eagle have offices in Guatemala and Miami, Florida, has sold at least three arms shipments to the *contras* through the Honduran armed forces.¹⁶

Ben Or in turn is connected to David Marcus Katz, the “godfather” of Israeli weapons dealers in Latin America, who is known for his close ties to Israeli cabinet ministers and for his friendship with the late Anastasio Somoza. Katz, based for years in Mexico, has represented IAI and 16 other Israeli weapons manufacturers and dealers. Katz is reported to have “brokered” at least one weapons shipment to the *contras*.¹⁷ Edgar Chamorro, a top *contra* leader who quit the Nicaraguan counterrevolution in 1984, acknowledged that Israel channeled Soviet-made AK-47 rifles to the *contras* “through a private arms dealer.”¹⁸

Israelis also served as military advisers to the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN) *contras* based in Honduras. “Retired or reserve Israeli commandos have been hired by shadowy private firms to assist the rebels,” *Time* magazine noted. The *Manchester Guardian* reported Israeli mercenaries are “paid up to \$10,000 a month” to train and supervise the *contras*, noting these “mercenary activities are not only known to the IDF but [are] also aided by IDF manuals and catalogues. The mercenaries appear to be IDF-seconded personnel.”¹⁹

Israeli Foreign Policy

However, Israel's interventionist role in the Third World outside the Middle East signifies more than a desire to act as a surrogate for the U.S., upon whom the existence of the Zionist state is dependent. Israel has become “a co-equal type of proxy”²⁰ with its own foreign policy agenda, which it believes it can advance by forming a covert partnership with the U.S.

After the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, in which Israel seized Gaza and the West Bank, Israel's reputation suffered greatly among less developed nations, which increasingly viewed the Palestinians as victims of Israeli colonial oppression. To combat this isolation, Israel began using weapons transactions and other military services on behalf of rightwing regimes and guerrilla movements as a form of diplomacy.

“Arms transfers by Israel as a rule have tended to be a more effective short-term instrument for maintaining and expand-

ing its influence, especially in the third world, than have economic aid or trade,” Klieman wrote. “Arms from Israel serve as a gesture of symbolic political support. They suggest that it pays to be on good terms with Israel; that Israel has something more tangible than moral support to offer governments prepared to deal with it; that it has a global reach.”²¹

The growing role of Israel as an arms merchant and provider of military assistance springs in part from the imperatives of Israel's highly militarized economy. The military-industrial complex is a mainstay of Israel's shaky economy. Israel's military spending, as of 1982, accounted for 21.3% of the country's gross national product.²² Klieman calculated that between 58,000 to 120,000 Israelis are employed in the “defense industry.” Using the lower figure of 58,000, Klieman observed “no less than 2% of the entire industrial workforce and 5% of the country's employed workers are connected directly or indirectly to an expanding military industry with markets at home and abroad.”²³

Israeli arms sales abroad in 1981, which reached \$1.2 billion (up from \$400 million in 1977), have enabled Israel to become one of the world's top five exporting nations. Weapons exports have played a critical role in sustaining the Israeli balance of trade, a trade relationship characterized by chronic deficits. Arms transactions have also helped stem “the outflow of gold reserves to pay for fuel, arms purchases from the U.S. and, not least, the unabated inflow of consumer goods.”²⁴

Since the late 1950s, the U.S.-Israeli “special relationship” developed as Washington began to appreciate Israel's role “as a barrier against indigenous [Arab] radical nationalist threats to American interests” and continued U.S. control over the vast oil supplies of the region.²⁵ A 1958 National Security Council memorandum referred to a “logical corollary” to progressive Arab nationalism, which “would be to support Israel as the only strong pro-West power left in the Near East.”²⁶

Israel has become a powerful surrogate in the Middle East for western imperialism, but at the cost of a nearly continuous state of war in the region. By demonstrating its worth as a “strategic asset” elsewhere in the Third World, Israel is striving to prove its value as a proxy for the U.S., its chief imperial patron. “Israel's self-image is that of a significant Middle East component in the system of anti-communist containment and collective security. But because the other members of the Western Alliance also perceive of Israel as problematic if not a liability in the narrower regional and Arab-Israeli contexts, there is always the need for Israel to demonstrate its usefulness short of the event of war and to reconfirm the positive contribution it makes to the security of the West.”²⁷ ●

15. *Ma'ariv*, December 13, 1985. Quoted in Colhoun, *op. cit.*, n. 12.

16. *Ibid.*

17. Jonathan Marshall, Peter Dale Scott and Jane Hunter, *The Iran-Contra Connection: Secret Teams and Covert Operations in the Reagan Era* (Boston: South End Press, 1987), pp. 115-117; Victor Perera, “Uzi Diplomacy,” *Mother Jones*, July 1985 and Klieman, *op. cit.*, n. 14, p. 118.

18. “An Israel Connection,” *Time*, May 7, 1984.

19. *Manchester Guardian*, October 11, 1985 and *Time*, May 7, 1984.

20. Hunter, *op. cit.*, n. 1, p. 15.

21. Klieman, *op. cit.*, n. 14, pp. 37-38.

22. [U.S.] General Accounting Office, “U.S. Assistance to the State of Israel,” uncensored draft report, June 24, 1983, Washington, D.C., p. 29. See also Michael Saba, *The Armageddon Network* (Vermont: Amana Books, 1984), pp. 146-54.

23. Klieman, *op. cit.*, n. 14, p. 57.

24. *Ibid.*

25. Noam Chomsky, *The Fateful Triangle: The U.S., Israel and the Palestinians* (Boston: South End Press, 1983), p. 20.

26. Quoted in Chomsky, *ibid.*, p. 21.

27. Klieman, *op. cit.*, n. 14, pp. 42-43.

The Buckley Affair:

Anatomy of an Intelligence Disaster

by Edward J. Dobbins*

Early morning, March 16, 1984, Rue Tannoukhiine, Ras Beirut: The lanky William Buckley walked out of his apartment building towards his beige Honda parked nearby. As he drove the car away, a white Renault 12 darted from a side street, quickly blocking the Honda's path. Three men with drawn guns jumped out. One of them put his revolver at the American official's head and ordered him into the Renault. Within three minutes, the kidnapping of William Buckley was completed.¹ Moments later, the Renault, with occupants claiming to be journalists, cleared the checkpoint at the Khaldé intersection which was controlled by the Shi'a Amal Movement. It was seen heading for southern Lebanon.

The kidnapping of William Buckley—the third Westerner taken hostage in Lebanon in 1984—was a critical juncture in the Reagan administration's "counterterrorist" policy in the Middle East. The Buckley affair, as it was known, accelerated the administration's covert involvement in Lebanon. It set into motion a series of amateurish activities by the White House's National Security Council, the notorious "arms-for-hostages" policies leading to the Iran/contras scandal and its explosive revelations.

The "High-Grade" Political Attache

A day after Buckley's kidnapping, the Department of State released a terse biography of him. It mentioned that the Massachusetts-born diplomat had been employed by the U.S. Army in 1965 as a civilian, serving in Vietnam. According to this release, he joined the Department of State in 1983. The biographic cover was paper-thin, even to outsiders. The Lebanese media knew that Buckley was liaison with numerous political groups and militias in Lebanon. He was also seen frequently at the Beirut headquarters of the Lebanese Intelligence Service. Two days after the kidnapping, *L'Orient-Le Jour* ran an initial article that speculated about the intelligence background of the 55-year old U.S. Embassy employee.²

In 1965, when Buckley joined the CIA, the Agency was rapidly expanding its station in Vietnam, which employed more than 800 people. He served there as a ranking "counterterrorist"³ specialist. Buckley trained and ran teams of professional Vietnamese assassins to "root out" cadre of

the infrastructure of the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam, initially under the joint Army-CIA "Counter Terror" program and later in 1967 under the infamous Phoenix program.⁴

William Buckley retired from active CIA service in the wake of his Vietnam tour. In the early 70s, he was recalled and asked to run one of the most sensitive CIA security assistance programs in the Middle East: he was to train bodyguards and build the security network for Anwar Sadat after the Egyptian president had expelled his Soviet advisers in 1972.⁵ Herman F. Eilts, a Middle East specialist and U.S. Ambassador to pre-Camp David Egypt, apparently requested Buckley for this task. For almost a decade, this special "security" relationship made Sadat's Egypt a junior partner in the U.S. covert action programs throughout the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and Africa. But in October 1981, Anwar Sadat was fatally struck by a barrage of bullets from commandos belonging to an Islamic fundamentalist group within Egypt's military. The Agency had failed in its mission to protect Sadat by underestimating the internal threats posed by Islamic fundamentalism.

However, by the time Sadat had signed the Camp David accords in March 1979, Bill Buckley had already left the Middle East for another choice Agency station: Islamabad. Pakistan's Zia-ul-Haq, another key American ally in South Asia, provided useful information about the twists and turns in the Arab world. Pakistan also permitted the U.S. to station listening posts to monitor the southern areas of the Soviet Union. During his five years as Islamabad chief of station, Buckley oversaw the build-up of Zia-ul-Haq's security net and controlled a growing covert operation to support friendly elements within the government of neighboring Afghanistan, well before the Soviet intervention in December 24, 1979.

Crippling Blows in Lebanon

These apparent successes and Buckley's last position at Langley eventually led William Casey to select him for the most dangerous, and his final, assignment in Beirut, Lebanon. When Bill Buckley left the Agency's Executive Review Board

4. The Phoenix program, the brainchild of former CIA analyst Robert Komer, was implemented by William Colby. Under the supervision of Theodore Shackley (1969-1972), it resulted in more than 20,000 indiscriminate assassinations of Vietnamese. Publicity over the excesses of the operation eventually led the CIA to withdraw the program.

5. After Sadat's about-face in regional and international policy, the U.S. sought to protect him from assassination attempts and coup plots by elements within the military who were either sympathetic to Moscow or against Sadat's policy of rapprochement with Israel.

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1. See *L'Orient-Le Jour* (Beirut, Lebanon), March 17, 1984 for an early chronicling of the Buckley kidnapping.

2. *L'Orient Le Jour*, March 19, 1984, p. 2.

3. The CIA first used the term "counterterrorism," not "anti-terrorism," to define its program in South Vietnam.

for the Beirut station in the fall of 1983, the administration was reeling under the shock of bomb attacks against the U.S. Embassy and the U.S. Marine headquarters in Lebanon.

The April 18th attack on the Embassy occurred during a high-level CIA meeting, which annihilated the Beirut station. In addition, several high-grade Agency officers posted to neighboring Arab countries, a key Middle East CIA analyst and three of his aides were killed. The analyst, Robert Clayton Ames, had shaped key intelligence assessments which guided American policy in the Middle East, including the Camp David negotiations.⁶ Moreover, in the late 1960s, while based in Beirut, Ames had established an intelligence and security relationship with elements of the PLO's leadership which apparently survived until the recent assassination of Abu Jihad. The April bombing attack also cost the "counterterrorist" Delta strike force the loss of its first commando.⁷ Further, over a dozen Agency-trained Lebanese agents, tasked to steal some Soviet SAM-5 missiles from Syria, suffered the same fate. Ironically, the April 18th CIA meeting dealt with terrorism.⁹

The October 23rd attack on the U.S. Marine headquarters resulted in the largest number of casualties in one day the U.S. has suffered since World War II. The attacks evidently were executed with a great deal of professional planning and precise intelligence, and must have had the logistical support of some intelligence services in the Middle East.

A shadowy organization, "Islamic Jihad," with undefined ties to the Shi'a Hizbullah organization, claimed responsibility for the attacks. Given the fact that these deadly actions targeted the two powers behind the Multinational Force (MNF)—the U.S. and France—and the Lebanese-Israeli agreement of May 1983, speculation flew about the role of Syria and Iran, whose common objective was to force the MNF out of Lebanon.

In early 1984, Beirut witnessed another form of warfare, the kidnapping of foreign residents. The first target was a Saudi, Consul Hussein Farash; he was followed by three Americans, Frank Regier, a professor at the American University of Beirut, Jeremy Levin of the Cable News Network, and then Bill Buckley. This sequence of kidnappings underscored Islamic Jihad's interest in the fate of three condemned Shi'a prisoners in Kuwait.¹⁰

The Hizbullahis, from which Islamic Jihad drew its manpower, appeared as an organized movement in Lebanon only in recent times. Their emergence as a powerful Islamic movement began in 1982, with Iranian and Libyan support. With its control of the eastern land access to Lebanon and its pivotal role in Lebanon, Syria also provided the Hizbullahis with criti-

cal political and tactical support. In 1984, this movement comprised several Hizbullah groupings and the Iranian Pasdarans (Revolutionary Guards), which were concentrated in Beirut's southern suburbs, in Ba'albek and the Beka'a, and in south Lebanon. Sheikh Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah—the spiritual leader of Hizbullahis—had known the Ayatollah Khomeini since the latter's years in the holy city of Najaf, Iraq, while other Hizbullah leaders had belonged to the same network as the Ayatollah's son, Ahmad.¹¹ Furthermore, according to Western sources, out of the Hizbullahis in south Lebanon emerged the powerful Islamic Jihad, headed by Imad Mughniyyah,¹² himself a member of a south Lebanon Shi'a clan founded by the late cleric Muhammad Jawad Mughniyyah. Though Iran exercises a great deal of influence on Hizbullah through financial support, training and other means, most Hizbullah leaders seem to assert their own positions on issues affecting Western interests in Lebanon.

The "Counterterrorism" Offensive

Well before the kidnappings began, the Reagan administration had stationed in Lebanon members of the Delta strike force and the super-secret Intelligence Support Activity (ISA) unit of the Army to gather intelligence on Syria's military defenses and on the Iran-backed Hizbullah organizations for possible "counterterrorist" reprisals.

Sheikh Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah was one of the principal targets. An ISA unit mapped the activities of the Bir al-Abed suburb of Beirut where Sheikh Fadlallah lived, and even used psychics to attempt detailed sketchings of Fadlallah's inner sanctum. A CIA reconnaissance satellite was ordered to a lower orbit, zooming in on Fadlallah's neighborhood activities.¹³ This offensive later resulted in another major American intelligence disaster in Lebanon.¹⁴

Even with the sophisticated and expansive technical abilities of the U.S. to target these forces, American understanding and analysis of the dynamics and inner workings of the Shi'a movement in Lebanon was almost non-existent. In this deadly context, the U.S. sought to increase its covert and "counterterrorist" capabilities in the area.

The Buckley kidnapping triggered the administration's renewed "counterterrorism" offensive. Bill Casey, who had personally picked Buckley, ordered extensive intelligence coverage of Lebanon via the use of informants, NSA intercepts and satellite coverage for months on end, but to no avail.¹⁵ At the same time, the Reagan White House leaked news of a new, tough policy directive on terrorism, which in practice stimulated the rebuilding of the CIA's covert opera-

11. In 1971, Ahmad Khomeini married the niece of Imam Musa Sadr, the founder of the Shi'a Amal in Lebanon. Sadr later helped train key Iranians in Lebanon who became responsible for the training of Iran's Pasdarans (Revolutionary Guards) in Khomeini's Iran. In 1979, Imam Sadr vanished during a trip to Libya.

12. Not much is publicly known about Imad Mughniyyah. According to Counter-Terrorism Report (Jan. 11, 1988), he has close ties to Khorshid Hamad Ali Badr, the Iranian security chief of Hizbullah and one of the commanders of the Pasdarans in Lebanon. He was also reported to have traveled to France last year to negotiate the release of French hostages.

13. Emerson, *op. cit.*, n. 7, p. 197.

14. See p. 51.

15. Woodward, *op. cit.*, n. 6, pp. 394-395.

6. Bob Woodward, *Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), pp. 244-245.

7. Steven Emerson, *Secret Warriors* (New York: G.P. Putnam & Sons, 1988), p. 184.

8. Annie Laurent and Antoine Basbous, *Guerres Secretes au Liban* (Paris: Gallimard, 1987), p. 253.

9. Woodward, *op. cit.*, n. 6, p. 245.

10. The three who were sentenced to death were part of a group of 17 Shi'as belonging to Al-Da'wa. They planned the 1983 bombing attack on American and French installations in Kuwait. One of the three is the brother-in-law of Imad Mughniyyah, head of Islamic Jihad.

tions division.¹⁶ The directive called for an expanded infiltration of secret operatives in the Middle East, Central America and the Caribbean. Because Buckley was instrumental in placing deep-cover operatives throughout the Middle East and had knowledge of U.S. "counterterrorism" techniques and programs in that region, the White House directive also attempted to reshuffle operatives compromised by Buckley's capture. Moreover, a joint Pentagon-CIA "counterterrorism" strike force was built along the Israeli model.

Despite the "get tough" policy and expanded U.S. intelligence operations, the Beirut kidnappings continued. Soon after, the first contact with a potential Iranian intermediary with Islamic Jihad was established on November 19, 1984. Ted Shackley, Buckley's old Vietnam connection and now an Agency consultant on terrorism, made contact through his former Savak connections with Manucher Ghorbanifar, who was widely publicized in the Iran/contras scandal.¹⁷

A Failed Policy and Disaster

What followed the Ghorbanifar-Shackley meeting is now part of the public record of the administration's arms-for-hostages opening to Iran. Enormous frustration permeated the Reagan White House in early 1985 in its fruitless search to locate Buckley. The Agency's Terrorist Incident Working Group (TIWG) gave way to a broader inter-agency Hostage Locator Task Force (HLTF) under the National Security Council's umbrella. Lt. Colonel Oliver North was the principal mover behind the HLTF. Apparently, the HLTF was receiving timely intelligence on the conditions of the hostages by way of informants and video tapes from the captors. This stimulated planning of rescue operations. The administration concluded it did not possess sufficient critical operational intelligence to permit it to send in the Delta strike force.

Consequently, William Casey opted for a retaliatory measure: a bombing attack on Sheikh Fadlallah. However, the assassination attempt backfired.¹⁸ The plan was compromised even before it was ever executed. The ISA unit which had gone into Beirut in late 1983 had briefed Bill Buckley on its way out, barely three months before the latter's capture.¹⁹ Apparently during Islamic Jihad's lengthy interrogation of Buckley, he provided vital technical intelligence and information about the monitoring of Fadlallah's activities. The CIA-backed bombing attack that targeted Fadlallah killed close to one hundred Lebanese, while Fadlallah escaped harm. Hizbullah reacted immediately, by putting up a huge banner stating "Made in USA" across the destroyed building, probably meant for the CIA satellite. One can only speculate about the consequence of this failed attack upon Buckley's condition.

At the same time, the White House asked the Israelis for help.²⁰ Successive events have shown that Israel's participa-

tion in the arms-for-hostages policy only amplified the flaws and contradictions of the White House's "counterterrorism" policy. Under the cover of the tough directive on terrorism, Bill Casey and Oliver North improvised every possible move to retrieve Buckley and the other American hostages. Aside from the Iranian channels who have been disclosed—Ghorbanifar and later Ahmad Kashani, the nephew of Iranian Speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani—North had contacted intermediaries of the PLO and of Abu Nidal²¹ for possible payment of ten million dollars to Buckley's captors. He also asked the DEA for assistance. When the DEA specialist on Middle Eastern affairs expressed skepticism as to the credibility of leads to Buckley's whereabouts,²² North ignored the advice. North fell for the hostage scam.

The fate of Buckley, however, occupied a smaller and smaller place in the administration's improvised policy toward Iran and the hostages by mid-1985. The CIA learned about William Buckley's fate, soon after he died in June 1985²³ of either pneumonia or two heart attacks.²⁴ Nevertheless, the policy of covert arms sales to Iran, which partially financed Nicaraguan *contras*, was shifted into full gear in September 1985. One month later the U.S. received credible intelligence, probably from Syrian sources, about Buckley's death. North and his associates engaged themselves in the most incredible confusion of roles and objectives in the area of covert action and "counterterrorist" operations.

The whole affair points to the pathetically reactive and weak conduct of American policy in the Middle East. At the intelligence and "counterterrorism" level, it became a graveyard for the Agency; the CIA lost more senior officers, chiefs and deputy chiefs of station in Lebanon in the 1980s than during the entire thirty years of war in Indochina. The resulting scandal has brought down two national security advisers and scores of NSC and CIA personnel at relatively minor cost to Buckley's captors. It was, in the words of Bud McFarlane, a "disaster of a major magnitude." The new CIA director, William Webster, seems to be bent on rebuilding Agency morale and capabilities as the Iran/contras scandal continues to unfold in the courts. To emphasize continuing interest in "counterterrorism" in the Middle East, Webster recently appointed Thomas Alan Twetten as the second-ranking official in covert operations. Twetten, a contemporary of Buckley, was a crucial player in the arms-for-hostage policy and close to Oliver North.²⁵ As the Iran/contras scandal continues to unfold in the courts, will the next administration learn from this failure? ●

21. Interview of Steven Emerson, author of *Secret Warriors*, on the Diane Ream Show, WAMU-FM, March 24, 1988. Emerson's information came from Lt. Colonel Oliver North's notebooks.

22. Deposition of John C. Lawn, Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, "Report on the Iran-Contra Affair," Appendix B: Volume 15, pp. 750-751.

23. Deposition of Clair George, "Report on the Iran-Contra Affair," Appendix B: Volume 15, p. 7.

24. Judging from events in Lebanon, this writer assessed Buckley's death at some time after the conclusion of the hijacking of TWA Flight 847.

25. The National Security Archive, *op. cit.*, n. 20, p. 233.

26. *Los Angeles Times*, April 7, 1988.

16. *Philadelphia Inquirer*, April 22, 1984, p. 1.

17. Report on the Iran-Contra Affair, U.S. Joint Select Committees (Washington, D.C.), Appendix A: Volume I, pp. 1016-1020.

18. Woodward, *op. cit.*, n. 6, pp. 395-396.

19. Emerson, *op. cit.*, n. 7, p. 197.

20. The National Security Archive, *A Chronology, Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Contras* (Washington, D.C., 1987), p. 147.

The Spynest Documents:

Destabilizing Afghanistan

by Steve Galster*

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 was regarded by the United States then, as it still is today, as a blatant, unprovoked act of Soviet aggression and "expansionism." As a secret intelligence report issued several days after the invasion put it, Moscow's "key motivation was to bring its long-standing strategic goals within reach. Control of Afghanistan would be a major step toward...domination of the Asian sub-continent."¹ For the past eight years the White House and Congress have continually invoked this view to justify their consistently increasing support for the Afghan covert aid program — a program that now dwarfs U.S. covert activities in Nicaragua, Angola, Kampuchea and the rest of the world combined. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan is seen merely as a sign that the application of the Reagan Doctrine there has foiled the Soviets' "grand" strategy.

However, classified documents seized in Iran during the takeover of the U.S. Embassy, along with an abundance of declassified materials, reveal that the Soviet decision to invade did not stem from a thirst for expansionism; rather, it was a response to actions by the United States and its allies who, starting shortly after the April ("Saur") Revolution in 1978, tried to destabilize the new pro-Soviet regime in Kabul by covertly supporting the anti-Soviet Afghan resistance. The case of Afghanistan illustrates how U.S. covert action can be disastrously counterproductive.

The communist takeover in Afghanistan in April 1978 presented the U.S. with a policy dilemma summed up in a secret memo to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance at the time:

"We need to take into account the mix of nationalism and communism in the new leadership and seek to avoid driving the regime into a closer embrace with the Soviet Union than it might wish. On the other hand, anti-regime elements in Afghanistan will be watching us carefully to see if we acquiesce in or accept the communist takeover."²

The memo also noted that "Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and others of our friends will see the situation clearly as a Soviet coup."³ Thenceforth, a debate ensued within the Carter administration as to how the U.S. should react to the situation

in Afghanistan. Moderate elements, led by Vance, urged self-restraint in Afghanistan so as not to attract more Soviet attention there; hard-liners led by National Security Adviser Brzezinski warned the President that to stand back from Afghanistan, especially in light of the growing instability in Iran, would project the image to America's regional allies that the U.S. had written off the region as not essential to American interests.

Not knowing which way to lean at first, the President compromised (perhaps by not deciding) by allowing Brzezinski to seek an alternative regional strategy while the State Department was to establish "correct" relations with the new Afghan regime (Democratic Republic of Afghanistan or D.R.A.). Brzezinski took advantage of his strong supervisory role of the CIA and proceeded immediately to establish a covert support network for the resistance consisting of several anti-Soviet governments. (Brzezinski maintained close supervision of these and other CIA activities through the NSC's Special Coordinating Committee (SCC).⁴ In May, one month after the D.R.A. came to power and nineteen months before the Soviet invasion, Brzezinski met with Deng Xiaoping in China and reached an "understanding" on mutual security issues, including Afghanistan.⁵ This "understanding" must have included Pakistan because the following month the first Afghan rebel camps were set up in Peshawar (soon to be staffed by Chinese military instructors).⁶

Initially Brzezinski and the CIA found it difficult to provide significant assistance to the guerrillas. Pakistan refused to allow too much outside support on its soil out of fear of Soviet retaliation, and the State Department, with the President's tacit approval, was still trying to pursue normal relations with the D.R.A.. But Brzezinski pressed the issue with both the President and the State Department and by the end of March 1979 he had "prevailed."⁷ Several weeks later, he notes in his memoirs, Brzezinski pushed a decision through the SCC to "be more sympathetic to those Afghans who were determined to preserve their country's independence."⁸

While deliberately opaque as to what this meant, it is clear when examining the surrounding evidence that the decision entailed stepping up assistance to the Afghan rebels in order

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1. Declassified United States Defense Intelligence Agency Summary Report, January 7, 1980.

2. Declassified United States Department of State Memo, April 30, 1978.

3. *Ibid.*

4. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principles: Memoirs of the National Security Council Adviser, 1977-1981* (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1983), p. 73.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 212.

6. See Bruce Amstutz, *Afghanistan: The First Five Years* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1986), p. 40.

7. Brzezinski, *op. cit.*, n. 4, p. 426.

8. Brzezinski, *op. cit.*, n. 4, p. 427.


to destabilize the D.R.A.. Apparently, however, Brzezinski was able to do more than just convince State Department officials that the rising Soviet influence in Afghanistan threatened American national security. He also got them to see that the Afghan situation presented a valuable political opportunity for the U.S. As a State Department report later put it, "the overthrow of the D.R.A. would show the rest of the world, particularly the Third World, that the Soviets' view of the socialist course of history as being inevitable is not accurate."⁹

Starting no later than April 1979, several weeks after Brzezinski's SCC decision, U.S. foreign service officers began to meet with Afghan rebel leaders on a periodic basis to determine their needs.¹⁰ The rebels' most obvious problems were their lack of weapons and their inability to create a unified opposition. The obvious answer to both problems was more money and a sure supply of weapons. The rebels had already made one attempt at unifying in June 1978. However, because of the incongruous nature of the different factions, who were as used to fighting each other as much as they were the government, the coalition crumbled within six weeks.¹¹

By May, after having directed several resistance leaders to potential donors for their cause, the State Department reported that China, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Iran had pledged their assistance.¹² Saudi Arabia offered the rebels several million dollars up front if they could quickly re-forge an alliance.¹³ The rebels used these and other funds to purchase weapons from the Pakistanis and the Chinese, whose supplies were close at hand. Also, pressure was applied to Pakistan to relax its restrictions on being a sanctuary and a supplier. CIA field reports show that Pakistani Director of Military Operations, Brigadier Mian Mohammad Afzal, was brought onto the CIA payroll to ensure Pakistani cooperation.¹⁴ Afzal reported to the CIA in October that in a series of meetings between President Zia ul-Haq and Chinese officials, plans were developed to ensure Pakistan's continued role as a sanctuary and to further supply the resistance with weapons from Pakistan's stock.¹⁵ The CIA closely monitored subsequent transactions between resistance leaders and

Pakistani military personnel in Peshawar.¹⁶

In addition to facilitating the funding by other countries, the CIA itself was almost certainly funding the resistance as early as August 1979. At this time, the U.S. Embassy in Kabul issued a secret report which concluded that "the United



Credit: Associated Press

Pakistani dictator Zia ul-Haq

States's larger interests... would be served by the demise of the Taraki-Amin regime, despite whatever setbacks this might mean for future social and economic reforms in Afghanistan."¹⁷ The State Department had obviously swept aside any inhibitions it may have had about deliberately destabilizing the D.R.A.. Weeks later, the CIA office in Los Angeles wired to Kabul a request from a CIA-paid Afghan to send money to an Afghan rebel account in Iran with the name of the bank and the account number included.¹⁸ This cable also revealed that many Afghans had been undergoing "Douglas" espionage training in Washington to assist the CIA in Afghanistan.

The U.S. Pushes Ahead

On the propaganda front, the CIA was busy funding and orchestrating public demonstrations throughout South Asia and Europe to denounce the "Soviet puppet" regime in Kabul.¹⁹ And deep inside Afghanistan, the CIA was helping

9. Classified Department of State Report, August 16, 1979. This document and many others were captured in the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in 1979 and are still being published as part of a 60-plus volume set entitled "Documents from the Den of Espionage" (sometimes simply referred to as the "spynest documents"). Few of these sets are available in the U.S. as they were initially considered contraband by the U.S. government and are now difficult to obtain because of the U.S. embargo on Iranian products. Herein referred to as *Spynest Documents*.

10. Classified Department of State cable, May 14, 1979, *Spynest Documents*, vol. 29, p. 99. This cable refers to a previous meeting with a rebel leader in Islamabad on April 23, 1979.

11. *New York Times*, July 1, 1978; Amstutz, *op. cit.*, n. 9, p. 92.

12. *Spynest Documents*, *op. cit.*, n. 9.

13. *Washington Post*, January 5, 1980; United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office Background Briefs, "Afghanistan Opposition Groups," August 1980, p. 3.

14. Classified CIA Field Report, October 30, 1979, *Spynest Documents*, vol. 30, *op. cit.*, n. 9.

15. *Ibid.* During this meeting the Chinese officials requested that Pakistan halt the supply of Chinese-made weapons to the rebels while China was involved in sensitive negotiations with Moscow. The Chinese re-emphasized to President Zia, however, the importance of continued Pakistani assistance for the rebels.

16. Classified CIA Field Report, October 31, 1979, *Spynest Documents*, *op. cit.*, vol. 30.

17. Classified Department of State Report, August 16, 1979, *Spynest Documents*, vol. 30, *op. cit.*, n. 9.

18. Classified CIA cable, August 31, 1979, *Spynest Documents*, vol. 30, *op. cit.*, n. 9.

19. Classified CIA cables, September 28, October 2 and October 3, 1979, *Spynest Documents*, vol. 30, *op. cit.*, n. 9.

Afghan expatriates set up a dissident radio station to broadcast anti-government messages throughout the country.²⁰

The decision by the U.S. to ignore its original warning to "avoid driving the [Afghan] regime into a closer embrace with the Soviet Union" and to instead covertly aid the regime's opponents is especially curious in light of two things. First, the U.S. was well aware that the resistance could never serve as a viable alternative to the D.R.A. leadership. The rebel leaders themselves had confided to State Department officials in secret meetings in Pakistan that they likened a dissident provisional government to "putting five different animals in the same cage."²¹ Second, and more significant, while the U.S. was clandestinely supporting the military efforts of the resistance, U.S. officials in Afghanistan were discovering that the Soviets were making desperate attempts to bring about a political solution to the situation.

One month after Brzezinski's SCC decision, American intelligence reports suggested that "the Soviets [were] already moving forward with plans to engineer replacement of the...Khalqi leadership."²² Shortly thereafter, East German Ambassador Hermann Schwiesau told the American Embassy in Kabul that the Soviets were hoping to replace the unpopular Amin with a broader-based government.²³ At about the same time, the U.S. Embassy reported that the Soviets were including a former Afghan royal minister in their "National Front" negotiations, implying that the Soviets were trying to forge, as they are today, a broad-based coalition government in Kabul that would be willing and able to respect their security interests (i.e., remaining outside an American alliance), thus rendering a Soviet presence unnecessary.

Instead of concluding from these observations that the U.S. should refrain from intervening in Afghanistan in the midst of the Soviets' troubles there, hard-line U.S. officials saw the situation as an opportunity to stick it to the Soviets while they were vulnerable. Such an approach, it was believed, would not provoke Soviet intervention. The Soviets themselves had told U.S. officials that an invasion "might solve one problem but would create another."²⁴ The American Embassy in Moscow strongly agreed with that assessment and doubted the Soviets would risk their other foreign policy priorities for a war in Afghanistan.²⁵

But as hard as they both tried, neither the Soviets nor the resistance were able to unseat Amin. This and the growing instability in both Afghanistan and Iran were making the Americans and the Soviets very nervous about each other's in-

tentions in the region. Seeing that the resistance alone could not protect America's regional interests from Soviet "aggression," the U.S. decided to cover all bases by courting President Amin. If the U.S. could lure Amin out of the Soviet sphere, it was thought, then the Soviets would be unable to use Afghanistan as a launching pad for invading Iran or Baluchistan.

Washington Courts Amin

The U.S. knew that Amin was becoming increasingly wary of the Soviets, especially after he deposed and assassinated Communist Party leader Nur Mohammad Taraki, the Soviets' favored choice for President, in September. So beginning in September 1979, Bruce Amstutz, the American chargé d'affaires in Kabul, began to hold friendly meetings with Amin to show him that he need not worry about his unhappy Soviet allies as long as the U.S. maintained a strong presence in Afghanistan.²⁶ The strategy worked. On September 27 Amin made a special appeal to Amstutz for improved relations with the U.S.²⁷ Two days later in New York, Afghan Foreign Minister Wali quietly expressed the same sentiments to State Department officials David Newsom and Harold Saunders.²⁸

The Soviets became increasingly concerned about the war below their border and Amin's stubbornness and incompetence in dealing with it. Amidst the growing instability, it appeared to the Soviets that Amin was preparing to leave the Soviet orbit and approach the U.S. for help. They were probably right. On October 30, the American Embassy in Kabul reported after having talked with Amin that he seemed extremely eager to improve U.S.-Afghan relations and was "painfully aware of the exiled leadership the Soviets [were] keeping on the shelf."²⁹ Suddenly realizing the potential consequences of their strategy, the American officials quickly backed away from Amin. Abandoned, Amin then turned to Pakistan for help. In early December he sent "frantic messages" to President Zia asking for an immediate meeting, obviously making a last-ditch effort to escape the Soviet grasp.³⁰ Zia declined to go but planned to send his foreign minister, Agha Shahi, who was to have flown to Kabul on December 22 but was prevented from doing so by bad weather.³¹

When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan three days later, Congress immediately decided to fully back the Afghan rebels to oppose what President Carter called "the greatest threat to world peace since World War II." What Congress and other Americans failed to realize then, as they still do today, is that the U.S. was not only a victim of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan—by covertly challenging Soviet influence there before the invasion—it was a cause as well. ●

20. Classified State Department cables, May 14 and August 9, 1979, *Spynest Documents*, op. cit., n. 9, vol. 29; Selig Harrison, "The Soviet Union in Afghanistan in Containment: Concept and Policy" (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1986), p. 464.

21. Classified State Department cable, August 16, 1979, *Spynest Documents*, op. cit., n. 9, vol. 30.

22. From a declassified cable cited in Raymond L. Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985), p. 902.

23. Classified State Department cable, July 18, 1979, *Spynest Documents*, op. cit., n. 9, vol. 29.

24. Classified State Department cable, June 25, 1979, *Spynest Documents*, op. cit., n. 9, vol. 29.

25. Classified State Department cable, May 24, 1979, *Spynest Documents*, op. cit., n. 9, vol. 29.

26. Classified State Department cables, September 11, September 22, September 23, two on September 27 and October 28, 1979, *Spynest Documents*, op. cit., n. 9, vol. 30.

27. Classified State Department cable, September 27, 1979, *Spynest Documents*, op. cit., n. 9, vol. 30.

28. Classified State Department cable, September 29, 1979, *Spynest Documents*, op. cit., n. 9, vol. 30.

29. Classified State Department cable, October 30, 1979, *Spynest Documents*, op. cit., n. 9, vol. 30.

30. *Indian Express*, February 13, 1980.

31. *Ibid.*

The Afghan Pipeline

by Steve Galster*

While revelations of Reagan's covert war in Nicaragua continue to dazzle the American public, a far bigger and more complex covert program has gone relatively unnoticed in Afghanistan. After nearly nine years of covert involvement, the U.S. has poured over \$2 billion into the Afghan war, far more than the total amount that has gone to Nicaragua, Angola, and Kampuchea combined.¹ In fact, the estimated amount of money "lost" in the Afghan pipeline by the CIA's own estimates easily exceeds the total amount of U.S. support that has gone to the *contras*.²

Congressmen who strongly opposed *contra* aid have not only supported Reagan's covert war in Afghanistan but have teamed up with Reagan Doctrine advocates to expand the administration's program. Whereas the war in Nicaragua is now the "bad" war, Afghanistan has from the start been viewed as the "good" war, and as the rebels call it, a "holy" war or *jihad* . Thus, with their broad base of support and their strategically placed war below the Soviet border, the Afghan rebels have earned the forefront position in President Reagan's global strategy of "rollback" and billions of dollars in CIA support.

Officially, the Reagan administration's policy toward Afghanistan is to "seek the earliest possible negotiated political settlement there to effect the withdrawal of Soviet forces."³ This policy, which is a continuation of that set up under Jimmy Carter, is ostensibly pursued along two tracks: covert aid and negotiations. Carter believed that a "modest" amount of secret military aid would enhance the prospects for a negotiated settlement.⁴

The Reagan administration, on the other hand, has reasoned that the more aid the U.S. can provide to the rebels the better the chances are of bringing the Soviets to the negotiating table. Even with a Soviet withdrawal assured today, the administration has vowed to pursue this strategy of "peace through strength" by continuing its support of the rebels. However, a closer look at the administration's seven-year secret war in Afghanistan reveals that it has been little interested in peace there. In fact, the evidence strongly suggests that U.S. policy has been to sabotage attempts at a negotiated

settlement until the Soviets have been, in the view of some, "sufficiently bled."

The Policy and the Pipeline

In March 1981 CIA Director Casey proposed to President Reagan that the CIA upgrade and expand the Afghan covert aid pipeline.⁵ Under Carter, the CIA had coordinated the Afghan weapons supply line with Pakistan, China, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The U.S. and Saudi Arabia provided the funds, Egypt and China provided the weapons, and Pakistan served as the conduit and sanctuary.⁶ Initially the U.S. and Saudi Arabia provided about \$30 million each to purchase Soviet-style weapons manufactured in Egypt and China.⁷ Retired American military officers contracted out by the CIA, along with Chinese and Pakistani officials, were on hand to train the rebels.⁸ But the secrecy of foreign involvement was the most important element of the program. "The Afghan struggle (was) an 'Islamic' struggle," President Carter told his aides, "and U.S. assistance should not disturb that impression."⁹

Much has changed in the CIA's Afghan war under Reagan. Most of the same countries are still involved, and the cultivation of the war's image as a fight between Islam and communism remains crucial to maintaining the rebels' broad support. But with the rapidly expanding political and financial support for the program, the U.S. Afghan policy and its covert aid pipeline have been significantly altered.

After Casey's proposal to expand the Afghan program in March 1981, the U.S. looked directly to Saudi Arabia for more assistance. With the promise that Reagan would get Congress to approve the sale of AWACS to them, the Saudis immediately doled out \$15 million to the resistance, mainly through private bank accounts in Oman and Pakistan.¹⁰ In October, when the U.S. delivered the first five AWACS to Saudi Arabia, King Fahd agreed to increase assistance to both the Afghan rebels and the Nicaraguan *contras*.¹¹

5. *Miami Herald*, June 5, 1983.

6. *Boston Globe*, January 5, 1980; *Daily Telegraph* (London), January 5, 1980.

7. *Wall Street Journal*, April 19, 1984.

8. *Washington Post*, February 2, 1979; *Maclean's* (Toronto), April 30, 1979.

9. ABC News, "20/20," June 18, 1981.

10. Sam Bamieh told of this deal during his sworn testimony before the U.S. House Foreign Affairs committee in July 1987; also see Bruce Amstutz, *Afghanistan: The First Five Years* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1986), p. 202; the information about the Omani and Pakistani bank accounts came from several confidential sources.

11. See Bamieh testimony, *ibid.*

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1. *Philadelphia Inquirer*, February 28, 1988.

2. *Newsweek*, March 23, 1987.

3. United States Department of State Special Report, no. 112, December 1983.

4. See James Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* (Bantam: New York, 1982), pp. 473, 475.

The role of Pakistan, which worried about its vulnerable position *vis-a-vis* the Soviets, was also enhanced. To allay President Zia's concerns and to ensure further Pakistani cooperation, the Reagan administration secretly offered to station U.S. troops in Pakistan.¹² However, Zia stated that he preferred weapons to troops.¹³ The next month, in September, the U.S. agreed to a six-year, \$3.2 billion program of U.S. economic and military assistance.¹⁴ It was also agreed that Pakistan would continue its coordinating role in weapons supply. This agreement, which is still in effect today, went as follows: once in Pakistan, whether at the port of Karachi or the Peshawar airport, the weapons would be handed over to the National Logistics Cell (NLC) of the Pakistani Interser-



Credit: Tass

Afghanis display weapons captured from the *contras*.

vice Intelligence Directorate (ISID), the equivalent of the CIA and FBI combined. CIA station officers in Karachi and Peshawar would examine the receipts for the weapons but would not even check the crates to see if they were accurate.¹⁵ The NLC officials would then drive the weapons to either Quetta in the West or Peshawar in the East. Once there, the ISID, under CIA supervision, would distribute the arms to the seven rebel groups recognized by the Pakistani government. These groups would then drive the weapons to either their arms depots along the border or to the local arms bazaar where they could make a healthy profit selling their new AK-

47s and RPG-7s to drug dealers and local tribesmen.¹⁶

In this early period the CIA looked largely to Egypt and China for supplies. Both countries handed over weapons from their own stocks while CIA-supervised factories outside Cairo turned out Soviet-style arms to add to the flow.¹⁷ Hughes Aircraft Company was contracted out to upgrade some of Egypt's weapons, particularly the SAM-7 anti-aircraft guns.¹⁸ The Egyptian arms stock was replenished with new American weapons and China earned much-needed hard currency, in addition to fulfilling one of its own foreign policy goals of containing the Soviets.¹⁹ A fair amount of the rebels' weapons were also captured from and sometimes even sold by Afghan government troops.²⁰ Still, getting outside weapons to the rebels in Pakistan remained an important task. Eventually China made some use of the newly opened Karokoram highway and continued to load CIA-run planes and ships destined for Peshawar and Karachi.²¹ Egyptian weapons continued to be flown directly to Pakistan but were sometimes landed in Oman, from where they were shipped to Karachi to avoid being traced.²²

The Reagan administration was quite impressed with the rebels' surprising show of force during this first year. Members of the 208 Committee (the restricted inter-agency committee that handled covert operations) suddenly saw tremendous prospects in Afghanistan for gaining a global strategic edge on the Soviets. This elite group included Vincent Cannistraro, an ex-CIA official who served as White House head of covert operations; Morton Abramowitz, State Department head of intelligence; Bert Dunn, Chief of the CIA's Near East and South Asia Division; Oliver North, and alternating members from the Defense Department including Elie Krakowski, head of Regional Defense, and Richard Armitage.

These and other administration officials thought that by tying down and "bleeding" the Soviets in Afghanistan the U.S. could divert Soviet attention away from other Third World hot spots like Nicaragua and Angola, making room for the U.S. to maneuver. If the Afghan rebels could keep up their fight for several years (if not decades), the Soviets would eventually incur serious financial, military, and political problems. Little danger was seen in the Soviets expanding their war out of frustration into Iran or Pakistan because of Iran's intransigence and Pakistan's beefed-up military, not to mention its mutual defense pact with the U.S.²³ It began to appear, as one Congressman put it, that "the U.S. [had] a real chance to make Afghanistan the Soviets' Vietnam."²⁴

16. *Philadelphia Inquirer*, February 29, 1988; *The Nation* (Pakistan), January 8, 1987.

17. *Philadelphia Inquirer*, February 29, 1988.

18. *Ibid.*

19. *Washington Post*, September 25, 1981.

20. *Christian Science Monitor*, September 29, 1981; also see Edward Girardet, *Afghanistan: The Soviet War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985).

21. *New Republic*, July 18, 1981; *Daily Telegraph*, January 5, 1980.

22. *Le Monde*, in Joint Publication and Research Service (JPRS) (U.S. Gov.), October 9, 1981; *Chicago Tribune*, July 23, 1981.

23. *New York Times*, May 4, 1983; *Eight Days* (London), in JPRS, October 31, 1981.

24. *Philadelphia Inquirer*, March 1, 1988.

12. *Baltimore Sun*, April 4, 1982.

13. *Ibid.*

14. Richard Cronin, "Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance Facts," Congressional Research Service, July 20, 1987, p. 2.

15. This inadequate accounting process was discovered in January 1986 when, at the request of Senators Humphrey (Rep.-New Hamp.) and Chic Hecht (Rep.-Nev.), a group of Senate intelligence staffers visited Pakistan (Confidential Source).

Where's The Money Now?

While no one is asking it, the obvious question still stands: were funds from the \$600 million Afghan account used for "other purposes?" Are we to believe that a secret team that tried every trick in the book to scrape up funds for the beleaguered *contras* was not tempted to dip into a virtual gold mine to which it had access? These questions become even more intriguing in light of others. Throughout the CIA's involvement in Afghanistan the rebels there have continuously complained about the lack of weapon supplies. While it is generally reported that diversions take place in Pakistan, it is hard to believe that even a leaky covert program as huge as the Afghan one would ever leave a guerrilla force militarily deprived. The often-accused Pakistani military claims that frequently the weapons destined for the rebels are "lost at sea." One has to wonder whether there isn't some truth to that allegation.

In 1985 Jonathan Pollard, who was convicted of spying for Israel, told Congressman LeBoutillier that he had evidence the CIA was diverting Afghan funds to the *contras*. John LeBoutillier (Rep.-New York), and the media disregarded Pollard's statement as one of his many "red herrings." But like several other of Pollard's claims, this one may have been true. In January 1987 investigators for the Iran/*contra* affair received unconfirmed reports that CIA officer Duane "Dewey Maroni" Clarridge had diverted secret stockpiles of weapons intended for the Afghans to the Nicaraguan *contras*. Again, however, as the hearings

neared the subject was dropped.

But if the reports were true they would make perfect sense. Clarridge was initially in charge of the *contra* program and worked closely with Oliver North on the restricted interagency committee that oversaw all covert operations, including Afghanistan. Clarridge was moved to the directorate of European operations in 1985 when it was discovered that he was responsible for instructing the *contras* on how to "neutralize" key Sandinista officials. From his new position he facilitated the arms sales to Iran. But with his feet in Europe, Clarridge's heart may have remained in Nicaragua. As head of European operations he would have had the bank account number for the Afghan funds in Switzerland and could have given it to North when he first used the account, as well as on other occasions, to help feed the *contras*.

Adding to this speculation is a rumor circulating within a tight Washington circle that Robert Owen, North's "courier" in Nicaragua, was present at a restricted interagency meeting that dealt specifically with Afghan supply logistics. Could these men have arranged to steal from the rich Afghan program to give to the poor *contras* or, for that matter, to other under-funded "freedom fighters" around the world? Rumors and speculation aside, it is still curious that neither Congress nor the media have looked further into the possibility of Afghan money serving other purposes. It seems only logical that the CIA would. ●

Sabotaging a Settlement

The only thing standing in the way of creating a morass for the Soviets in Afghanistan was the near-term prospect for peace. Although some U.S. officials have, since the beginning of the war, wanted to negotiate a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the evidence suggests that they were not very influential. Following the first formal U.N.-sponsored peace talks in the summer of 1982, U.N. mediator Diego Cordovez announced that the negotiating parties, Pakistan and the Afghan government, had made important concessions and that he planned to present a broad outline of an agreement that fall.²⁵ However, just before Cordovez was to unveil his peace plan, President Reagan ordered the CIA to increase the quantity and quality of weapons to the rebels.²⁶ The "bleeders" had been at work. Several months later, in December, Yuri Andropov told President Zia at Leonid Brezhnev's funeral that the Soviet Union would leave Afghanistan "quickly" if Pakistan ceased its support of the resistance.²⁷ Subsequently the White House ordered the CIA to immediately provide the rebels with increased amounts of bazookas, mortars, grenade

launchers, mines, recoilless rifles, and shoulder-fired anti-aircraft guns.²⁸

It appears that this trend of sabotaging peace negotiations as long as the resistance was willing and able to fight became the unofficial Afghan policy in the White House. Proof of this policy manifested itself in 1983 when an end to the Soviet occupation seemed as certain as it does today. In late April of that year, the negotiating parties gathered in Geneva to map out another plan for a Soviet withdrawal. To enhance the prospects for a settlement, the Soviets secretly told the Pakistani government in late March that they would begin to withdraw by September if the Pakistanis ceased their support for the resistance.²⁹ The Pakistanis took the Soviet pledge seriously and several weeks later issued a directive to the rebels to move their headquarters from Peshawar and to disperse their groups.³⁰ The resistance alliance, which has been dominated by the radical fundamentalist factions, was furious. The withdrawal of Soviet troops was only one of their goals; the militant fundamentalists also intended to purge the country of everything that smacked of communism, including anyone who had served the government in any way. For them

25. *New York Times*, July 24, 1982.

26. *New York Times*, May 4, 1983.

27. Richard Cronin, "Afghanistan: United Nations-Sponsored Negotiations," Congressional Research Service, July 23, 1986, p. 8.

28. *New York Times*, May 4, 1983.

29. *Christian Science Monitor*, May 10, 1983.

30. *Ibid.*

the war was far from over. These groups had even stated their intention to carry their *jihad* into the Soviet Union.³¹

Meanwhile U.N. officials Diego Cordovez and Javier Perez de Cuellar shuttled to the Soviet Union and China where they received guarantees for a possible settlement.³² By late April, the Pakistani and Afghan governments had "virtually settled" the simultaneous withdrawal of outside support which would begin in September.³³ But one week later, the White House for the first time leaked to the press the fact that it was covertly aiding the resistance and would continue to do so until the political aims of the resistance alliance were met.³⁴ Needless to say the talks came to a screeching halt.

Embarrassed, but still hopeful about salvaging a settlement that June, Pakistani Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan scurried to Washington in May to enlist the Reagan administration's cooperation. Khan told Vice President Bush and Secretary of State Shultz that the Soviets wanted to withdraw from Afghanistan but with minimal humiliation.³⁵ Bush and Shultz apparently convinced Khan that the U.S. was not interested in facilitating a graceful Soviet withdrawal. The following next month the U.N.-sponsored talks broke down immediately when Khan wanted to re-open discussion on clauses concerning "non-interference."³⁶ Two weeks later Shultz visited Pakistan to reassure both the resistance and the Pakistani government that the U.S. would not abandon them "in their fight against Soviet aggression."³⁷

Congress and the *Jihad*

With Pakistan now cemented into the "bleeders" camp, the U.S. was well positioned to turn up the heat on the Soviets. Starting in 1984 and continuing to the present, the administration has received continual boosts to pursue this strategy from Congress. Congressman Charles Wilson, (Dem.-Calif.) a high-ranking member of the Defense Appropriations Committee who claims "we owe the Soviets one for Vietnam," visited President Zia in late 1983 to see what the U.S. could do to strengthen the rebels.³⁸

In the spring of 1984 he and his colleagues summoned Deputy Director of Central Intelligence John McMahon to explain why the CIA wasn't doing more for the rebels. McMahon, who was neither interested in providing the rebels with sophisticated weaponry nor in expanding the already large paramilitary operation below the Soviet border, claimed that the rebels were being adequately supplied.³⁹ The Congressmen, realizing that they had allies in the State Department (Abramowitz), the White House (Cannistraro) and the

Defense Department (Krakowski and Armitage), and that CIA Director Casey was supportive of their cause, proceeded to draft legislation that would force high-level bureaucrats like McMahon to cooperate in expanding the Afghan program.

In the Fall of 1984 Congress passed a resolution calling for "effective" aid for the Afghan rebels and immediately doubled the administration's request for aid.⁴⁰ To handle the growing amount of funds, the CIA established a joint bank account with the Saudis in Switzerland. The Saudis promised to match the U.S. funds dollar-for-dollar, and both governments began by pledging \$250 million each.⁴¹ The CIA began to upgrade the quality of weapons for the rebels. In January 1985 it purchased 40 Oerlikon anti-aircraft guns from the Swiss firm Oerlikon-Buhrle at a cost of \$50 million.⁴² Also, many of the Chinese weapons destined for the rebels were being upgraded. Some were sent to Egypt while many were flown to a CIA weapons plant somewhere in the midwestern United States.⁴³ In addition, a New Jersey company was contracted to make explosives for the rebels.⁴⁴

As the CIA upgraded the covert pipeline, the Soviets again began to hint that they wanted out of Afghanistan. In March 1985, new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev told Pakistani President Zia at Konstantine Chernenko's funeral that the war could end as soon as Pakistan ceased its support of the rebels.⁴⁵ But in keeping with U.S. policy, President Reagan several weeks later signed National Security Decision Directive 166 calling for efforts to drive Soviet forces from Afghanistan "by all means available."⁴⁶ One of the "bleeders," Morton Abramowitz, succeeded in inserting language into the directive calling for an expansion of the program every year.⁴⁷

Thus, with \$250 million in newly appropriated funds, the CIA's mission was clearer than ever. The only problem was finding the weapons to spend all the new money on. Neither the Chinese nor the Egyptians could fill the increasing requests. So to quickly expend a large portion of the new money and to satisfy the constant demand for better anti-aircraft guns, the CIA in late 1985 purchased 300 British-made Blowpipe missiles from Short Brothers Company in Belfast, Northern Ireland.⁴⁸ Since the United Kingdom has had no official policy to militarily support the rebels, the weapons were sold to a third country who then handed them over to the CIA for a profit.⁴⁹

But the rebels were still in need of more AK-47 rifles and SAM-7s, among other types of unsophisticated weaponry. The problem was finding another supplier. Someone sug-

31. Some of the more radical fundamentalist groups have already succeeded in carrying out cross-border attacks against the Soviets and have vowed to continue (*Arab News*, April 6, 1987). For a more thorough discussion of the goals of the resistance see Olivier Roy, *Islam and the Afghan Resistance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

32. *Washington Post*, March 30, 1983.

33. This news was leaked by the Soviets to the *United News of India*, cited in *Christian Science Monitor*, May 10, 1983.

34. *New York Times*, May 4, 1983.

35. *New York Times*, May 27, 1983.

36. *Washington Post*, December 29, 1983.

37. *New York Times*, July 4, 1983.

38. *Washington Post*, January 13, 1985.

39. Confidential source.

40. This was the Tsongas resolution which was finally passed on October 4, 1984.

41. *Washington Post*, January 13, 1987.

42. *Afghan Update* (published by the Federation for American Afghan Action), July 13, 1985.

43. *Philadelphia Inquirer*, February 29, 1988.

44. Confidential source who travelled with the resistance and showed the author photographs of explosives with the name of this company on them.

45. *FBIS*, May 14, 1985.

46. *New York Times*, June 19, 1986.

47. *Wall Street Journal*, February 16, 1988.

48. Thames Television (London), "The Missile Trail" on *This Week*, September 17, 1987.

49. Rumor has it that Nigeria was the third country, but it could have been Chile who sold Blowpipes to the CIA for its operation in Nicaragua.

gested Poland, and judging by documents from the Iran/*contra* hearings it was probably the ever-present John Singlaub. Through the GeoMilitech Corporation, Singlaub and his associate Barbara Studley had arranged to get Polish weapons to the *contras*. And Studley had proposed a plan to DCI Casey in December 1985 for GeoMilitech to facilitate the supply of weapons to the rebels.⁵⁰ By early 1986 weapons were being purchased in Poland and quietly shipped out of the northwest port of Stettin.⁵¹ To handle the increasing flow of weapons into Pakistan, the Pakistani government built a new network of roads from Peshawar and Quetta to the small border towns that act as arms depots.⁵² To transfer the weapons from these towns over the border into Pakistan, the Afghans initially had to rent mules and trucks. In order to cover the rebels' transportation expenses the CIA counterfeited and provided to the rebels millions of dollars worth of Afghan currency.⁵³

Leaks In The Pipeline

As the pipeline was expanded it began to spring big leaks. Problems with the pipeline had existed from the beginning, but by 1985 they were becoming more obvious. Twenty-nine of the forty Oerlikon anti-aircraft guns the CIA had purchased in Switzerland at over \$1 million a piece never made it to Afghanistan.⁵⁴ Somewhere along the line these and many other weapons were put to other uses by either the Afghans, the Pakistanis, or the CIA itself (*see sidebar*).

A significant amount of the leaking was (as it still is) coming from within Pakistan, where corrupt government and rebel officials have suddenly become quite rich. Pakistani General Akhtar Abdul Rahman, head of the ISID up to 1987, and his successor, General Hamid Gul, are suspected to have been prime benefactors of the pipeline. They and their subordinates within the ISID's National Logistics Cell (NLC) could easily have made a fortune off CIA supplies.

Since the genesis of the pipeline, the NLC has had the sole responsibility of transporting newly arrived weapons from Karachi to Quetta and Peshawar (weapons that come by plane, especially those that are American or British-made, are flown directly to these cities).⁵⁵ NLC trucks have special passes that allow them to travel unharassed by customs or police officials on their several hundred mile-drive.⁵⁶ Along the way it is very easy for the NLC officials to exchange the new weapons and other supplies for old ones from the government's stock.

Widespread corruption also exists among the rebel leaders but has gone practically unnoticed in the U.S. thanks to CIA propaganda. The same kinds of things that tarnished the

contra's image, such as killing civilians, drug smuggling, and embezzlement are practiced by many Afghan rebels. Taking no prisoners, assassinating suspected government collaborators, destroying government-built schools and hospitals, killing "unpious" civilians are just a few of the inhumane acts they have carried out. But the picture we receive of the rebels in the U.S. is of an uncorrupt, popular group of freedom-loving people who aspire toward a democratic society.

The CIA and the State Department have worked hard to project this image. In 1984 Walter Raymond, on loan to the NSC from the CIA, "suggested" to Senator Humphrey (R-NH) that Congress finance a media project for the rebels that would shed favorable light on the rebels' side of the war.⁵⁷



Credit: APN

Local militia with *contras* who were caught sabotaging truck.

Humphrey got Congress to easily approve the new "Afghan Media Project" which was handed over to the United States Information Agency (USIA) and Boston University. At Boston University the project was headed up by a man named Joachim Maitre, an East German defector who had close connections with International Business Communications and the Gulf and Caribbean Foundation (both of which served important roles in illegally raising funds for the Nicaraguan *contras*). He also had worked closely with Oliver North to make TV commercials attacking Congressmen who had opposed aid to the *contras*.⁵⁸ Maitre escaped criticism for his *contra* connections and proceeded to train Afghan rebels to report on and film the war.⁵⁹ Since it is illegal for the USIA to disseminate

50. Joint Senate Congressional Hearings on the Iran-Contra Affair, May 20, 1987; Exhibit JKS-6. The proposed plan would allow the CIA to acquire Soviet-bloc weapons for the Afghan rebels, the *contras*, UNITA and other "freedom fighters" without Congressional appropriations or approval.

51. *The Wall Street Journal* on February 16, 1988 revealed that weapons for the rebels had been purchased from Poland. A confidential source informed the author that Stettin was the port they were being shipped out of.

52. *The Nation* (Pakistan), January 8, 1987.

53. Jack Anderson in the *Washington Post*, May 12, 1987.

54. *Washington Post*, January 13, 1987.

55. *Philadelphia Inquirer*, February 28, 1988.

56. *The Nation* (Pakistan), January 8, 1988.

57. Confidential source.

58. *Columbia Journalism Review*, May/June, 1987; it is also worth noting that Maitre was a senior editor for CIA-connected Axel Springer Publishing Company in Germany. He also, for no apparent reason, has military clearance. After the bombing of Libya, Maitre was one of the people who debriefed the American pilots.

59. Announced at USIA conference on Afghanistan in Washington, D.C., May 5, 1987.

information in the U.S., the Afghan Media Project's films and reports were to be sold only to foreign news agencies. However, American journalists who have a quick story to write or don't want to enter Afghanistan have often found the rebels' information too tempting to pass up. CBS, the station that has covered the Afghan war the most and in a very pro-rebel light, may have been one guilty party. CBS used footage



Credit: Associated Press

Morton Abramowitz, key State Department lobbyist for increased funding for the Afghan *contras*.

provided by the rebels claiming that it was taken by its cameraman, Mike Hoover.⁶⁰

Corruption surrounding the CIA's Afghan program has begun to surface during the last several years. For example, the fact that the rebels have been harvesting a large amount of opium was brought to light by the *New York Times* in 1986.⁶¹ And DEA officials have privately admitted recently that the shipment of CIA weapons into Pakistan has allowed the trade in heroin—three tons of which reaches the U.S. every year—to flourish as never before.⁶² One DEA official noted that virtually no heroin was refined in Pakistan before 1979, but “now Pakistan produces and transships more heroin than the rest of the world combined.”⁶³ Neither U.S. nor Pakistani drug enforcement officials are any match for these heavily armed drug dealers.

In spite of these problems, from 1986 to the present, the CIA has expanded the pipeline to handle over \$1 billion in new monies. As part of this package the CIA is sending the rebels highly sophisticated American-made weaponry. Ironically, the CIA—particularly its former Deputy Director John McMahon—originally opposed this idea and insisted on continuing the supply of average Soviet-styled weapons.⁶⁴ But by

March 1986 the impasse was broken. On March 4, McMahon resigned from the CIA; one week later UN negotiator Diego Cordovez announced that he had “all the elements of a comprehensive settlement of the Afghan problem.”⁶⁵ With McMahon gone and the prospects for peace again on the horizon, members of the 208 Committee, with the President's approval, decided immediately to send the rebels several hundred of the world's most sophisticated anti-aircraft gun, the American-made Stinger.⁶⁶

Although the Stingers are delivered more carefully than other weapons (they are flown on U.S. airplanes through Germany en route to Pakistan), once in Pakistan they can easily fall into dangerous hands. Initially the Stingers were safeguarded by keeping them from the rebels. Although the media began in April 1986 to report on the rebels' immediate successes with the Stingers, the rebels hadn't even touched one yet. Ethnic Pushtuns in the Pakistani Special Forces, disguised as rebels, were the ones firing the Stingers then, and many probably still are today.⁶⁷ Meanwhile, a group of “ex-Army specialists” hired by the CIA were training the rebels to use the new weapon.⁶⁸

Once the rebels were adequately trained, the politics of the pipeline began to come into play. The ISID distributed a disproportionate amount of the Stingers to the more radical fundamentalist groups.⁶⁹ ISID has skewed the distribution of weapons to favor the fundamentalists all along, but it took the Stinger issue to highlight this fact. These are the groups that were responsible for selling nearly a dozen Stingers to Iranian Revolutionary Guards in July 1987 and who are stockpiling their weapons to continue their *jihad* if and when the U.S. cuts off its supply.⁷⁰ The CIA was aware of the Iran connection two months before it was revealed and before Congress approved sending more Stingers.⁷¹ It is also aware now that by arming these same groups, the U.S. is setting the scene for a major post-withdrawal bloodbath.

But today President Reagan is flaunting the covert operation in Afghanistan as the prize of the Reagan Doctrine. The Soviets are finally negotiating in “good faith,” he claims, because U.S. aid allowed the “freedom fighters” to keep up their fight. Although the war has had its costs, the benefit of driving the Soviets out will make them worth it. The costs of intentionally prolonging the Afghan war have been a flourishing drug trade, an estimated one million dead, and the provisions for a bloody Islamic revolution. Unfortunately, in light of the administration's hardening stance in the current negotiations, we must wonder whether the “bleeders” are really ready to end it now. ●

60. *Los Angeles Times*, January 13, 1988. CBS contract journalist Kurt Lohbeck also has strong ties to “Behind the Lines News Service,” an operation set up by arch-conservatives Hugh Newton and Antony Campaigne.

61. *New York Times*, June 6, 1986.

62. *Philadelphia Inquirer*, February 28, 1988.

63. *Ibid.*

64. McMahon was the focus of attacks by rebel supporters on the CIA's Afghan program (especially by the Federation for American Afghan Action which claimed responsibility for McMahon's eventual resignation). Also see Bob Woodward, *Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987* (NY: Simon

and Schuster, 1987).

65. FBIS, March 18, 1986.

66. Warren Carroll, “The Freedom Fighter,” (Heritage Foundation), cited in *Afghan Update*, May 27, 1986.

67. Confidential source.

68. *Washington Post*, February 8, 1987.

69. *Strategic Investment Newsletter*, March 9, 1987; *Philadelphia Inquirer*, March 1, 1988.

70. *Independent* (London), October 16, 1987.

71. *Philadelphia Inquirer*, February 28, 1988.

The Afghani Contra Lobby

by Sayid Khybar*

The Afghan *contras*, like their counterparts in Nicaragua and Angola, have received vast amounts of U.S. governmental aid. In its largest operation since the Vietnam war, the CIA has sent the Afghan *contras* billions of dollars.¹ In addition to the support they have received from the United States, its NATO allies, and Saudi Arabia, by 1987 the Afghani *contras* were receiving political and material support from at least 160 "private" groups around the world.²

Among these private groups, the most notorious is the World Anti-Communist League (WACL). Established in the mid-1960s, it started as a coalition of four principal networks: Asian gangsters backed up by the remnants of the Japanese arm of the Axis and the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, former West German Nazis and their East European collaborators, Latin American neo-Nazis and fanatical anti-Communists associated with local death squads, and elements from the Western intelligence community who were anxious to reorganize these groups for a post-war World War II anti-Communist crusade.³

In early 1981 a number of people with close ties to WACL were working to form the Committee for a Free Afghanistan (CFA). With support from a variety of rightwing organizations, CFA quickly became the most prominent and powerful Afghan *contra* lobby.

The Committee for a Free Afghanistan and WACL

In 1980 Karen McKay,⁴ a young staff member at Accuracy in Media (AIM), an organization headed by Reed Irvine

which specializes in rightwing propaganda,⁵ approached AIM board member Charles Moser with an idea to create an organization in support of the Afghan *contras*. Both Moser and Irvine would be reliable supporters of this noble cause since they had worked together on the executive committee of the U.S. branch of WACL in 1973: the year that the head of the British branch resigned because the organization was so heavily involved with "neo-Nazi, ex-Nazi, fascist, neo-fascist, and anti-semitic groups."⁶

In February 1981 they created the Committee for a Free Afghanistan (CFA) as a project of the Council for the Defense of Freedom (CDF), of which Irvine was a member of the board of directors. In addition to CDF's sponsorship, initial funding for the Committee for a Free Afghanistan came from the Heritage Foundation and Paul Weyrich's Free Congress Research and Education Foundation, of which, coincidentally, Charles Moser was the founding director and treasurer.

With Karen McKay as executive director, the original CFA board of directors was:⁷

- Maj. Gen. J. Milnor Roberts: The current Chair of the CFA board of directors, a member of the board of the U.S. branch of WACL (now called the United States Council for World Freedom, USCWF) during the 1980s, and executive director of the Reserve Officers Association.
- Charles A. Moser (Secretary-Treasurer): Professor of Slavic Studies at George Washington University (no longer on the board of CFA).⁸
- Marx Lewis: Chair of the Council for the Defense of Freedom and a former member of the board of directors of the American branch of WACL (current CFA board member).⁹

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1. See Steve Galster, "The Afghan Pipeline," this issue.

2. See generally "A Directory of Organizations Concerned With Afghanistan" (1987) published by The Afghanistan Forum, New York. The *Wall Street Journal* of December 18, 1984 cited fifteen European organizations providing aid to the *contras*.

The best available history of the recent events in Afghanistan and the propaganda, disinformation, and counterinsurgency operations generated by the U.S. against the socialist government in Afghanistan is Philip Bonosky's *Washington's Secret War Against Afghanistan* (New York: International Publishers, 1985).

3. For more on WACL and its ties to the Reagan administration see a forthcoming monograph by Russ Bellant entitled "Old Nazis, the New Right, and the Reagan Administration" (available from Political Research Associates, 678 Massachusetts Avenue, Suite 205, Cambridge, MA 02139); Jon and Scott Anderson, *Inside the League* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1986); and on Sun Myung Moon's connection to WACL see Fred Clarkson, "God is Phasing Out Democracy" in *CAIB*, No. 27, Spring 1987.

4. McKay was an agriculture graduate who joined the U.S. Army in 1967, spent four years training in unconventional warfare and foreign military operations, lived nine years in Greece and Israel as a "freelance journalist," and has been a Major in the U.S. Army Reserve in an active unit within the Rapid Deployment Force. Louis Wolf, "Inaccuracy in Media: Accuracy in

Media Rewrites the News and History," *CAIB*, Spring 1984, no.21 p.37; and McKay's interview in "The Coming Revolution" publication of Elizabeth Clare Prophet (see below), Summer 1986, p.60.

5. For more on AIM and Reed Irvine, see Wolf, *op. cit.*, n. 4.

6. Draft document by Geoffrey Stewart-Smith.

7. The board of directors listed on the May 1982 CFA letterhead is understood to represent the original Board. This is reflected in the Charles Moser memorandum of September 18, 1982. See *CAIB*, No. 22, Fall 1984, p.31; the date of the memorandum is incorrectly given there as September 24, 1982.

8. Moser was subsequently forced off the CFA Board by McKay, allegedly because of Moser's support of a rival group headed by Andrew Eiva, the Federation for American Afghan Action (see below). Moser is currently chairman of the Resistance Support Alliance, a group sponsored by the Free Congress Foundation, and is working with the Freedom League, another group housed and sponsored by Free Congress.

9. The Council for the Defense of Freedom (CDF) evolved from the Council Against Communist Aggression (CACA), established in 1951, during the Korean War. Marx Lewis, the chair of the CACA, later became the chair of the CDF.

- David Isby: When he joined CFA, he was working for U.S. Congressman Bobbi Fiedler (Rep.-Calif.). Isby became a contributing editor and "Soviet Analyst" for *Soldier of Fortune* magazine in May 1981 following an article he wrote for the magazine about "Afghanistan's Winter War" (current CFA board member).¹⁰
- Kathryn Coe Royce: Member of the Young Republican National Federation when she joined CFA (no longer on the board).



Credit: Associated Press

AP photo of February 21, 1965; caption reads: "Col. Theodore Mataxis... inspects... part of a haul of communist material uncovered February 20 near remote cove... in an area where a large mystery vessel was sighted and sunk earlier.... It was by far the biggest haul of Red weapons intended for the Viet Cong." In fact, as former CIA officer Ralph McGehee described it in *Deadly Deceits* (pp. 140, 181), these weapons were planted by the CIA and the Army, which faked a firefight, sunk its own ship filled with CIA-supplied Communist-made weapons, and then called in western reporters to "prove" North Vietnamese assistance to the NLF. Two weeks later President Johnson ordered two Marine battalions to South Vietnam and began bombing of North Vietnam.

CFA's Council of Advisors are also an interesting lot. Council members include rightwing activist Paul Weyrich,¹¹

10. See Ken Lawrence, "Nazis and Klansmen: Soldier of Fortune's Seamy Side," *CAIB*, No. 22, Fall 1984. The back page of the May 1981 issue of *Soldier of Fortune* carried a full page advertisement illustrated by a drawing of an Afghan *contra* plunging a bayonet into the stomach of a Soviet soldier. The advertisement, which raises serious questions about violations of the Neutrality Act, reads: "Soldier of Fortune's Afghan Freedom Fighters' Fund. Buy a Bullet, Zap a Russian Invader. These funds will be used to purchase arms, ammunition and medical supplies depending on the specific need of the Afghan resistance group receiving the funds. All funds collected will be donated to an Afghan resistance group selected by the SOF staff."

The July 1984 issue of the magazine carries an article by David Isby about his trip to the Afghan border with CFA Executive Director Karen McKay.

11. Weyrich was also the president of Coalitions for America, which CFA listed as one of its addresses, and whose board of directors included Moser.

USCWF chair Gen. John Singlaub, USCWF vice-chair Gen. Daniel Graham, and other senior USCWF officials including former Senator John McCain, Representative Gerald Solomon, and conservative black activist J. A. Parker.

CFA has its offices in the Heritage Foundation and Jeffrey Gaynor, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at Heritage, is a member of CFA's Council of Advisors.

WACL Conferences

Not surprisingly, Afghan *contras* often show up for WACL functions. At the September 1983 WACL Conference held in Luxembourg, Homayoun Majrouh, a member of the Paris-based Centre de Documentation et d'Information Afghan, presented a film and lecture about the Afghan *jihad*.

A year later, at the 1984 WACL Conference, incoming chair Gen. Singlaub, specifically citing the Afghan *contras*, announced his intent to "...go on the offensive and help the resistance forces around the world who are now struggling to bring about their own liberation." Singlaub declared, "...we have opted for the course of action which calls for the provision of support and assistance to...the active democratic resistance movements inside the Communist Empire."

The WACL Conference had a panel on Afghanistan and the four panelists were CFA's Maj. Gen. J. Milnor Roberts; U.S. Army Brig. Gen. Theodore C. Mataxis; Alexander Alexiev, a Soviet emigre and RAND Corporation "expert" on Soviet affairs¹²; and Col. G. Wardak, representing the Afghan *contras*.

During the Conference a meeting of the North American Regional group (NARWACL) adopted a "...plan of action to create a central press office for the seven resistance groups: Nicaragua, Angola, Mozambique, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam. Action to be taken initially by U.S. Council for World Freedom, in coordination with Gen. Theodore Mataxis (Committee for Free Afghanistan)."¹³

Mataxis had joined CFA in 1983 at the invitation of Milnor Roberts, following a brief stint lecturing at the Beijing Strategic Studies Institute, and is currently a member of CFA's Board of Directors. He has served as CFA's representative in Peshawar, where he coordinated work with the Afghan *contras*.

Mataxis is well equipped to give advice to the rebels.¹⁴ From 1968-1970, he was a senior officer with the Army section of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in

12. Alexiev had served as an original member of the board of directors of adventurer Jack Wheeler's Freedom Research Foundation (*CAIB*, Fall 1984, No. 22, p.31). Wheeler is a member of the CFA Council of Advisors.

13. Official report on the 17th WACL Conference at p. 145.

14. See generally his entry in *Who's Who in America*. A photograph of Mataxis posing with four Afghan commanders in Peshawar appeared in the Summer 1986 issue of the Committee for a Free Afghanistan's *Free Afghanistan Report*.

According to William Shawcross's *Sideshow* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), p.191, "Mataxis' service in Vietnam had been mainly with the Americal division which had become notorious after the story of the My Lai massacre was published."

During the Vietnam War he was reported to have been in contact with Otto Skorzeny, a former SS Colonel, who had operated under the direct personal orders of Adolf Hitler. (Anthony B. Herbert, *Soldier*, New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1973, pp. 84-85.)

Iran and then went on to serve in leadership combat positions in Vietnam. From 1971-1972 he was extensively involved in the U.S. covert war in Cambodia.

Two weeks after the WACL Conference ended, Singlaub spoke at the 1984 annual *Soldier of Fortune* convention, again praising the Afghan *contras*. That month *Soldier of Fortune* magazine featured a cover story from Afghanistan, written by a reporter who travelled with the Peshawar-based Jamiat-i-Islami, one of the main *contra* fundamentalist factions.

The following year, at the 1985 WACL Conference held in Dallas, Haroon Wardack (sic) from Afghanistan was listed as a "Youth Committee Member" of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN). ABN was created by Jaroslav Stetsko, former head of the Nazi puppet government in the Ukraine, which has been one of the most active organizational members of WACL. Afghan *contra* Habib Mayar, who heads a group called "Afghan Community in America" based in New York City, also gave a presentation at the WACL conference. Mayar then attended the *Soldier of Fortune* convention which followed the WACL Conference.

One example of WACL-CFA collaboration is the solicitation of funds for a joint project of CFA and USCWF. "Project Boots," which was under the direction Ted Abbott at the USCWF, was designed to serve much the same purposes as similar programs to bring "humanitarian aid" to the Nicaraguan *contras*. The program was announced in the September 1985 issue of CFA's "Free Afghanistan Report" complete with a fund raising pitch for it.

CFA and *Soldier of Fortune* seem to especially admire the fundamentalist group Jamiat-i-Islami, and its military commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, who visited the CFA offices in Washington, D.C. in early 1982. Massoud's political advisor also spent several weeks at the CFA offices in late 1983.¹⁵

CFA Gets Around

With extensive backing from WACL, CFA rapidly gained prominence within the domestic and international right wing. One of CFA's first projects was a joint press conference held February 24, 1981 with The Conservative Caucus (TCC) featuring Sayed Ahmed Gailani, then head of the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan. Representing TCC were Executive Director Andy Messing and National Director Howard Phillips. By May 1982 CFA's council of advisors included Jack Abramoff, Arnaud de Borchgrave, Gary Jarmin and two prominent academics, Louis Dupree and Thomas Gouttierre.

Louis Dupree has been described as "the CIA man in Kabul,"¹⁶ and is also on the board of the Federation for American-Afghan Action (see below). Dupree says he was recruited by Karen McKay and is identified on CFA's letter-

15. *Free Afghanistan Report*, undated, apparently June or July 1982, with the lead story titled, "From the Panjsher"; and *Free Afghanistan Report*, March 1984.

16. Bonosky, op.cit., n. 1, p. 184, writes, "After April 1978, Pakistan teemed with CIA men... Among the early ones... was Louis Dupree, the CIA man in Kabul, whose activities there among the counter-revolutionaries made him *persona non grata* to the Afghan government, and he was forced to leave in 1978, but only as far as Peshawar where he assumed his work directing counter-revolutionary forces in an attempt to bring a happy ending to his book, *Afghanistan*, otherwise so woefully unended."

head as being with the U.S. Military Academy. He and David Isby wrote articles about Afghanistan for the April 1988 issue of *Soldier of Fortune*.

Thomas Gouttierre, who is a Peace Corps veteran of Afghanistan, has been the Director of the Center for Afghan Studies at the University of Nebraska for many years. The Center has been denounced by the Afghan government radio as "one of the connecting circles with the CIA."¹⁷

In February 1983 Karen McKay escorted six Afghan *contras* into the Oval Office to meet with Reagan, a discussion that prompted a call by Reagan to Andropov the day after the meeting to "urge him to change Soviet policies in Afghanistan and elsewhere."¹⁸

In June 1985, Heritage Foundation Trustee Lewis Lehrman arranged for Angolan *contra* Jonas Savimbi to host a meeting with Adolfo Calero and other international *contra* leaders. Karen McKay accompanied Colonel Ghulam Distagor Wardak, of the Afghan *contras*, to the meeting. Wardak attended the 1984 WACL Conference with CFA's Generals Roberts and Mataxis. The group was flown from Johannesburg on South African airplanes to Jamba, in South African controlled Angola, where the meeting was held.¹⁹

A Gala Event

By 1985, CFA had garnered support from high-ranking generals, Congressional leaders, political activists, and, of course, the White House. CFA was ready to start a big public relations push and on December 9, 1985, they hosted a dinner gala at the Marriott Hotel in Washington, D.C.²⁰ Billed as a "Dinner for Afghan Relief," it featured an opening prayer and introduction by Maj. Gen. Roberts, followed by opening remarks by Executive Director Karen McKay.

Senator Gordon Humphrey, Chairman of the Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan, presented an award in honor of Dr. Charles Thornton, a medical reporter for the *Arizona Republic* who died inside Afghanistan, accused by the Soviets of being a CIA agent.²¹

Another award was given to Dr. Robert Simon, an Assistant Professor of Emergency Medicine at UCLA, who founded and chaired the International Medical Corps. Simon, who had co-sponsored the event, received half the money collected during the evening.²²

In June 1985, CFA had organized a fundraiser for the International Medical Corps and in July Simon was a star witness at a briefing arranged by CFA during which he claimed to have three "hospitals" inside Afghanistan. On March 24,

17. *Afghan International Update*, August 1984, published by Federation for American Afghan Action (see below), quoting BAKHTAR radio.

18. *Free Afghanistan Report*, May 1983.

19. *Free Afghanistan Report*, September 1985; Official Report of the 17th WACL Conference, p.76; *New York Times*, June 6, 1985; *Newsweek*, June 17, 1985.

20. The Dinner Committee, in addition to Singlaub, Daniel Graham, and Lew Lehrman, included, among others, Pat Robertson, Richard V. Allen, Angier Biddle Duke, Elliot Richardson, and Charles Lichenstein.

21. Thornton was inside Afghanistan with a group of doctors sponsored by American Aid for Afghans (AAA). See *Free Afghanistan Report*, December 1985; and *Afghan Update*, September 16, 1985 published by Federation for American Afghan Action.

22. *Free Afghanistan Report*, Summer 1986.

1986 the Moon-controlled *New York City Tribune* reported that IMC had "recently received financial assistance from the U.S. government's Agency for International Development (AID)."

Another medical award recipient was "paramedic" Jim Lindelof. Nearly two years later, on October 11, 1987, "soundman" Lindelof and film maker Lee Shapiro, (a graduate of Reverend Moon's Unification Theological Seminary) were killed inside Afghanistan. They were taking film footage in strategic areas near the Soviet-Afghan border under a \$250,000 grant from Moon's CAUSA organization with additional funds from the Bradley and Olin Foundations.²³

In June 1986, Roberts fired Karen McKay and she went on to become the president of Americans for Freedom, a right wing "think tank" in Washington, D.C. Her replacement was Henry Kriegel, a CFA staff person who had formerly worked with Young Americans for Freedom at Columbia University.

CFA and CUT

Kriegel has been actively involved with the "New Age" rightwing cult Church Universal and Triumphant (CUT) run by Elizabeth Claire Prophet.²⁴ CUT's theology is taken directly from the old I AM cult which flourished in the period leading up to World War II and whose original cadre was made up of former neo-Nazi Silver Shirts.²⁵

CAIB has obtained a copy of a letter Kriegel wrote in September 28, 1987 to "Mother," the name given to Prophet in much the same way as Sun Myung Moon is referred to by his followers as "Father." In the letter, Kriegel gives Prophet details of his recent trip to Pakistan and indicates that he gave a letter to the *contra* leaders that she had read earlier and approved.

Mimicking neo-Nazi rhetoric, Prophet attacks both capitalism and communism and calls on her followers to:

...[take] hold of this government at every level, beginning with the White House, the Supreme Court, the Congress, state governments, local governments. The mighty Elohim are just waiting to be invited by you to come in to turn this government upside down, inside out, to shake it up and down, right and left, until when the dust settles, the right hearts, the Christed ones, will be in positions of authority.²⁶

23. See *Washington Post*, October 28, 1988; Fred Clarkson, "From Nicaragua to Afghanistan: The Long Arm of Reverend Moon," *Extra*, December 1987.

24. Prophet's daughter, Erin Lynn Prophet, has made an audio tape of songs about the Afghan *contras* which CFA distributes. Literature with the tape states that, "Soviets Commit Atrocities More Brutal than the Nazis" and concludes, "To find out how you can help the Afghan people, write or call the Committee for a Free Afghanistan... [Y]ou can put a pair of boots on a freedom fighter by sending \$20 to American Aid for Afghans." American Aid for Afghans was run by Don Weidenweber, a founding director of Andrew Eiva's Federation of American Afghan Action (see below).

25. See George Thayer, *The Farther Shores of Politics* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967) pages 263-271; Gerald B. Bryan, *Psychic Dictatorship in America* (Los Angeles: Truth Research Publications, 1940).

26. From a Prophet newsletter, February 1, 1988. The newsletter addresses its recipients as the "Beloved Keepers of the Flame of America and Lightbearers of the World."

With a unique flair, Prophet recently denounced Ronald Reagan for:

...[giving] the enemy [the Soviet Union] all of the ground and the rope and the technology and the money and the moral support that allows him to achieve his ends! He [Reagan]—is the greatest enemy the nation has known since the discovery of America by Christopher Columbus...²⁷

Additional documents indicate that Kriegel is working closely on the Afghan issue with Gene Vosseler, who in 1980, signed a CUT-sponsored advertisement in the *Los Angeles Times* as "Chairman of the Department of Theology" of CUT. Vosseler serves as a senior adviser to Daniel Graham's Americans for the High Frontier.²⁸

In a *Los Angeles Times* article on the Ban The Soviets Coalition, David Balsiger, describing Vosseler as "like a right arm for me," said he was among those responsible for coalition finances, but denied knowing that he was then a "minister" of CUT. According to the article:

...[a] psychiatrist John Hochman, a member of the Task Force on Cults and Missionary Efforts of the Jewish Federation Council of Los Angeles, said he is concerned that Vosseler is becoming a public figure without disclosing his involvement with what the task force considers a "destructive cult."²⁹

As prospects for an Afghan settlement neared in late 1987, CFA became hysterical. A full-page advertisement in the *Moonie Washington Times* of December 7, 1987 demanded an "immediate" Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan before an INF treaty is signed and ratified. One month later, *Afghanistan Update* included a "CFA Writers Alert: NSC/State Dept. Sell-Out of Afghanistan" calling for letters to the CIA, State Department, White House, and Defense Department which would "...state your support for increased military aid to the Afghans including long-range mortars," and "...opposition to a sell-out of the Mujahideen and UNITA for the sake of a paper treaty with the Soviets."³⁰

Kriegel obviously has friends in high places because when pro-*contra* militants organized a last-ditch effort to block the recent Afghan accords, Kriegel was part of an eight-man delegation which held a 50 minute meeting in the Cabinet room with President Reagan, Frank Carlucci, Lt. Gen. Colin

27. From a Prophet pamphlet entitled "Instructions of the Ascended Masters: Keepers of the Flame," Disciple Lesson 29.

28. Vosseler has also worked extensively with right wing activist David Balsiger, a militant defender of the South African regime. Their joint projects include the Ban The Soviets Coalition (which worked to keep the Soviet Union out of the California Olympic competition), and the RAMBO Coalition. See CAIB, No. 27 Spring 1987, p.31. Another CUT stalwart and former Heritage Foundation staff member, Tom Gulick, is now managing editor of the rightwing publication the *Washington Inquirer*.

29. *Los Angeles Times*, May 21, 1984.

30. Around this time, most of the issues of *Afghan Update* had articles with this theme.

L. Powell, and Howard H. Baker, Jr.³¹

The delegation included Heritage Foundation Chairman Shelby Cullom Davis; Heritage analyst William W. Pascoe, III; the President of the Free Congress Foundation, Paul Weyrich; and Gen. Daniel Graham, Vice-Chairman of the U.S. branch of the WACL. Unable to convince Reagan, Kriegel began a lobbying campaign which, most recently, took him to Pat Robertson's 700 Club, where he denounced the accords on television.³²

The Federation for American Afghan Action

One of the more militant organizations sheltered for some time under the Heritage Foundation umbrella is the Federation for American Afghan Action (FAAA). FAAA was launched in Washington D.C. in 1983 with an initial grant of \$2000 from the Coalition for America (Paul Weyrich was its president and Charles Moser is on the board of directors).³³ FAAA's first executive director was Andrew Eiva. Soon after its founding FAAA was transferred under the financial and political umbrella of Free the Eagle (FTE) and whose president Neal Blair became FAAA's chairman, providing office space in the Heritage Foundation.

Both Blair and FTE Chair Howard Ruff are part of the influential Mormon right wing which also includes columnist Jack Anderson. In 1984, Anderson wrote in his Washington "Merry-Go-Round" column:

[in response to]...the magnitude of the Soviet crimes in Afghanistan, I tried to influence public opinion by sounding several alarms...The resulting columns inspired Neal Blair, an indefatigable champion of lost causes, to form the Federation for American Afghan Action, which has raised money and shipped supplies to the Afghan resistance.

Meanwhile, Neal Blair and his stalwarts, skilled in the ways and rhythms of exerting pressure, have taken their plea to Congress. In response Sen. Paul Tsongas and Rep. Don Ritter [both on the Council of Advisors of CFA,] have introduced legislation calling for effective U.S. aid for the Afghan resistance.³⁴

Like Karen McKay, Andrew Eiva had the necessary conservative credentials: young and fervently anti-communist with a penchant for para-military operations. Eiva is also the grandson of Lithuanian General Kazimieras Ladyga, "who had fought the Russian revolutionaries at the end of World War I" and his parents had taught him about post-WW II guerrilla networks in Lithuania "which 'enjoyed' CIA support" and were finally shut down by the Soviets.³⁵

Eiva was born in a refugee camp in Bonn in 1948, and in 1964 received his "political baptism" by reading Barry Goldwater's *Why Not Victory*. In 1972, he graduated from West Point and went on to command paratroops in the 82nd Airborne Division and to lead a detachment of the Special

Forces "specializing in Soviet weapons, tactics, and languages."³⁶

In 1980 Eiva gave up his West Point commission "and went off to secret sites in Afghanistan and elsewhere to train Afghan guerrillas...He says he trained Afghan guerrillas in bases in West Germany and the United States."³⁷ Later that year he met Louis Dupree and by 1982 he was president of the Free Afghanistan Alliance in Massachusetts.

From Massachusetts Eiva became acquainted with Charles Moser, who then brought him to Washington, and arranged for funding from Coalitions for America. The initial board of directors for the Federation of Afghan American Action included:

- Thomas Gouttierre, founding and current board member (see above).
- Don Weidenweber, founder for American Aid for Afghans (AAA) then based in Portland, Oregon. According to FAAA's biography of him, he has "personally delivered...combat support supplies to Afghan *contras*."
- Matthew D. Erulkar, former Peace Corps volunteer in Zaire. He worked as the legislative director of FAAA and Executive Director of FAAA's American Afghan Education Fund until he split from Eiva in early 1985 and set up an organization called Afghan Support Team in Washington, D. C. He is reported to be in regular contact with the Special Forces and claimed to have entered the Soviet Union November 11, 1985 with the Afghan *contras*.

FAAA in Action

Working closely with Senator Tsongas and others, FAAA helped push pro-Afghan *contra* legislation through Congress in 1984 and 1985. By May 29, 1985 they had extended their contacts to a number of private rightwing organizations and brought them together for a three day conference. The "International Conference on Afghanistan," held at Marymount College in Arlington, VA discussed "all aspects of humanitarian and military aid...sending planes into Afghanistan to land and deposit arms was one proposal seriously considered."³⁸ Many right-wing notables attended the conference including:

- Louis Dupree, FAAA board member (see above).
- Edward Luttwak, the militarist from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
- Col. Robert Downs (USAF, ret.), "an expert in clandestine air resupply operations."³⁹
- Anthony Arnold, a former CIA officer and author of *Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective* whose overseas service included two years in Afghanistan.⁴⁰
- Ralph Magnus, who had known Andrew Eiva since

Committee's National Security Subcommittee, Dallas, Texas.

36. *Ibid*.

37. *Op. cit.*, n. 35.

38. *Afghan Update*, September 16, 1985.

39. *Afghan Update*, May 13, 1985.

40. *Afghan Update*, September 23, 1985.

31. *Washington Post*, April 13, 1988

32. Television broadcast of the 700 Club, May 20, 1988.

33. *New York Times*, May 25, 1983.

34. Jack Anderson "Washington Merry-Go-Round," June 14, 1984, reprinted in FAAA newsletter, June 1984.

35. Remarks of Andrew Eiva August 13, 1984 to the Republican Platform

- Ralph Magnus, who had known Andrew Eiva since Eiva's days in Massachusetts, is currently on the board of directors of FAAA. Magnus worked in Kabul with the United States Information Service (USIS) from 1962-1965 and is now at the Department of National Security Affairs of the Naval Postgraduate School in Pacific Grove, California.

From 1983-84 Magnus served as the original Project Director of *Americares For Afghans*, a project of the *Americares Foundation*, and was responsible for establishing ties between *Americares* and the Peshawar offices of the Swedish Commit-



Karen McKay on Afghanistan junket.

tee for Afghanistan and the Belgian group *Solidarite Afghanistan*.⁴¹

- Angelo Codevilla, legislative assistant to Sen. Malcolm Wallop. At the conference Codevilla argued that "weapons supply by air is feasible." Nine days later he was off to Brussels where he served as a rapporteur for a conference entitled "International Security and the Brezhnev Doctrine" which was sponsored by the International Security Council, a Moonie pseudo-think tank.
- Mike Utter, executive director of the International Medical Corps (IMC) (see above) and currently on the FAAA board of directors. IMC had worked closely with American Aid for Afghans until mid-1985 when IMC's "efforts to get government funding for medical training and supplies has required them to stop any involvement with Americans going into Afghanistan."⁴² (IMC is also one of the groups that U.S. AID has contracted to help supply the Nicaraguan *contras* during the ceasefire. Not surprisingly, the Sandinistas objected to IMC presence in Nicaragua.)

41. Magnus is no longer on the board of *Americares*. For more on *Americares* see *CAIB*, No. 25, Winter 1986, p. 35.

42. *Afghan Update* September 16, 1985.

Perhaps the two most highly publicized projects of FAAA were the campaign to send Stinger missiles to the Afghan *contras* and the campaign to force CIA Deputy Director John McMahon out of office. In mid-1985, McMahon reportedly came under attack from the far-right for his hesitancy to send Stingers to the Afghan *contras*.⁴³ FAAA went on the offensive and in countless issues of *Afghan Update* Eiva charged that McMahon was blocking Stingers and increased military aid to the Afghan *contras*.

McMahon had also been in conflict for some time with Oliver North's CIA liaison, Duane Clarridge, and had opposed Clarridge's attempt to use South African support for the Nicaraguan *contras*.⁴⁴ *Free The Eagle*, which has close ties to South Africa, used its monthly journal, *State of the Nation*, to echo Eiva's attacks on McMahon.

The August 1985 issue of *State of the Nation* claimed, for example, that, "...McMahon has run a program of disinformation and interference that prevents effective aid from reaching the Afghan freedom fighters..."

When McMahon was finally forced out in March 1986, the *Washington Post* gave credit to *Free the Eagle* and the FAAA;⁴⁵ and in his column of May 10, 1987 Jack Anderson reported, "McMahon's resignation from the CIA...was partly the result of a lobbying campaign by the Federation for American Afghan Action, which generated 10,000 letters to President Reagan objecting to McMahon's policy."

Freedom House and the Afghanistan Relief Committee

Rosanne Klass is the director of the Afghanistan Information Center (AIC) which is located at Freedom House in New York. She is also the vice president of the Afghanistan Relief Committee, and was a founding member of the Afghanistan Council of the Asia Society (disbanded in 1982).

Since its inception in 1981, the Afghanistan Information Center (AIC) has been effective in disseminating pro-*contra* propaganda throughout the western media. Their success is in part due to access provided by Freedom House where the honorary chair is Leo Cherne, a close associate of the late CIA Director William Casey. Cherne is also vice-chair of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, which is charged with oversight of the CIA.⁴⁶

Klass is also the vice president (and one of the original founders) of the Afghanistan Relief Committee (ARC) which is housed in the New York offices of attorney John Train. Visitors to the ARC headquarters seeking more information

43. A useful compendium of references to McMahon's conflicts with Oliver North & Co. is found in *Secret Military Assistance To Iran And The Contras: A Chronology of Events and Individuals*, (Washington, DC: National Security Archive, July 1987).

44. *New York Times*, August 20 and 21, 1987.

45. *Washington Post*, March 5, 1986.

46. Klass works closely with Ludmilla Thorne, who had directed the Freedom House Center for Appeals for Freedom until it was dissolved in 1985. Thorne is now the resident Soviet "expert" at the Freedom House journal *Freedom At Issue*. (The secretary of the Center was former CIA agent and former head of Radio Liberty, George Bailey, and the Center's board of consultants included Vladimir Bukovsky).

Born in the Soviet Union, but educated in the United States, Thorne claims to have travelled four times clandestinely inside Afghanistan since 1983, and has published a pamphlet on "Soviet POWs in Afghanistan."

works of Rosanne Klass and told to contact her at Freedom House. The ARC co-chairs are Jeane Kirkpatrick and James Michener and honorary directors include Professors Dupree and Gouttierre.

The National Endowment for Democracy, in the midst of its involvement in the Iran/*contra* scandal, reported in its Annual Report for 1984 a grant to ARC of \$60,000 for a project to operate schools inside Afghanistan; the project will reportedly be monitored by the French organization *Medecins sans Frontieres*.

ARC in turn raises funds for *Medecins sans Frontieres* as well as *Aide Medicale Internationale* and is formally affiliated with Freedom Medicine which "trains Afghan paramedics in Pakistan who then return to their own country." The Committee has been helping to operate schools in Afghanistan since 1984.⁴⁷

According to Philip Bonosky:

"Humanitarian organizations of one sort or another in Asia were almost all of them CIA conduits, or in some degree CIA collaborators and, after the April 1978 Afghan Revolution, sprang up like mushrooms after the rain. These included the International Rescue Committee⁴⁸ and CARE, already in existence, as well as a newly-minted organization, the Afghan Relief Committee, set up by Robert Neuman,⁴⁹ one-time U. S. ambassador to Afghanistan, along with the widow of Adolph Dubs, Mary Ann Dubs."⁵⁰

Bonosky suggests that the impetus for the creation of ARC in 1980 was to organize support for Zia Khan Nassery, "a monster created by the CIA...whose father, Nasrulla Khan, had been chief of intelligence for King Zahir," to head a puppet regime:

"...in those hectic December 1979 days...the problem of supplying Nassery with money (to buy guns) presented some sticky legal problems to those masterminding his ambitious schemes. But only momentarily. The Afghan Relief Committee was promptly invented for him, headed by Theodore Eliot, another ex-ambassador to Afghanistan...and through its generous and humanitarian offices Nassery received almost im-

47. ARC literature distributed in October 1987.

48. The International Rescue Committee itself has had a long association with the CIA. Leo Cherne is its current Chairman and William J. Casey served on its Board of Directors and as president. The *New York Times* reported November 8, 1984 rumors that IRC Vice President Lionel H. Olmer, formerly of Naval Intelligence and a close friend of Casey's, was being considered as CIA Deputy Director, adding that Olmer's wife works for the CIA. IRC sent out a brochure in April 1988 claiming to already operate in border camps of Afghan refugees, adding, "If talk about a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan becomes a reality, IRC relief, medical and rehabilitation teams will be prepared to return with the refugees to help them rebuild their shattered lives."

49. From 1976 to 1981 Neuman was associated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), serving as vice-chair from 1980-1981. Since 1983 he has been director of Middle East Programs at CSIS, where he worked with Michael Ledeen, one of the principal architects of the Iran/*contra* affair. Neuman is also a member of the IRC (see above).

50. Bonosky, *op. cit.*, n. 2.

mediately a donation of \$19,500,000 authorized by Carter himself, as 'food aid'—an extraordinary compliment to Nassery's appetite."⁵¹

Conclusion

The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan marks the beginning of a new stage of the struggle to liberate Afghanistan from feudal backwardness and religious fundamentalism. Whether the Afghan *contra* lobby will be successful in organizing continued U.S. aid for the *contras*—directly or indirectly through Pakistan and in violation of the Geneva accords—is yet unclear. However, what is clear is that the lobby will continue its efforts—an enterprise which will make the Iran/*contra* scandal pale in comparison. ●

51. *Ibid.*

Because of space constraints we were unable to print this article in its entirety. However, the complete text is available from CAIB for \$3. If you are interested in learning more about the connections between the Right and the Afghani *contras* then order this article from: CAIB, P.O. Box 50272, Washington DC 20004. Don't forget to enclose a check for \$3.

Corrections

In the last issue of *CAIB*, in the article entitled "Death Squads in the Philippines," there was an error of fact. The second paragraph of the story, on page 23, should read: "While the film crew was filming an interview with Lt. Col. Calida, an American walked into Calida's office. Calida identified the American as 'my good friend.' The American identified himself as Bill, the director of the U.S. Information Service [in Davao City]."

We wish to clarify a point in the article entitled "The Cold War in Tibet." Due to an error in editing, the third from last paragraph of the article implies that the military force "Establishment 22" was defeated by the Nepalese army and disbanded. The Nepalese army *in fact* defeated the remnants of the original Tibetan *contra* force; to the best of the author's knowledge, Establishment 22 was never disbanded.

News Notes

CIA Officers As Role Models

It was interesting to learn of the "Officer-in-Residence Program" when a June 3, 1987 letter from the chairman of the CIA's Training Selection Board, Stanley M. Moskowitz, to the political science department at the University of California in Santa Barbara (UCSB) came to light last October. Moskowitz offered the free services of George A. Chritton, Jr., an active-duty CIA covert operations veteran who had worked under diplomatic cover in Turkey, Nepal, Malta, and undisclosed posts in Africa and Latin America.

Agency spokesperson Bill Devine claimed that the appointment was simply to give students "the foreign policy insights of CIA officers." (*Los Angeles Times*, November 7, 1987.) Moskowitz's letter was more up front:

Our expectation is that the officer, by his presence, will demonstrate the quality of CIA people and our commitment to providing U.S. leaders with the very best intelligence we can. The program also serves to strengthen our ties to a fertile and indispensable source of ideas and technical expertise and to enhance CIA's recruiting efforts by providing an opportunity for experienced officers to serve as role models, to counsel interested students on career opportunities with CIA, and to respond to concerns students may have about the Agency and the intelligence profession.

Last spring, Chritton was proposed by the CIA and secretly accepted by UCSB chancellor Barbara Uehling. The CIA proposal was also approved by Provost David Sprecher, a former member of Israeli intelligence. The strangeness of the process was cited by a long-time faculty member, who told *CAIB*, "no experienced university administrator would ever just blindly accept someone whose salary is already paid."

In October 1987, after learning of the appointment, students and faculty vociferously protested. Over 800 people rallied, 150 sat in, and 35 persons were arrested as they occupied Uehling's office demanding that Chritton be banned from campus. Faculty members signed petitions protesting the danger to faculty and students going overseas, who could be mistakenly identified as CIA-connected. The university has "every right to question whether a CIA officer is intellectually a free person," said professor Richard Flacks. Students' Legislative Council member Mike Lupro noted, "The CIA does things with a purpose in mind. It chose to keep an eye on UCSB because it's one of the more active campuses around. It's here to get information, not give it." (*Daily Nexus*, October 27, 1987.) Letters also came from faculty at other universities in support of the effort to oust UCSB's resident spy.

The outcry resulted in a sudden change of Chritton's formal status from visiting lecturer to visiting fellow, a cancellation of his scheduled course in intelligence-gathering, a prohibition against "active" recruitment by him, and a reduc-

tion of his term at the school from two years to one. UCSB officials were also concerned that the American Association of University Professors was taking up the Chritton case as a violation of academic freedom.

The CIA has officers at three other institutions—Laurie Kurtzweg at the Georgetown University school of foreign service, James T. McInnis at the Lyndon B. Johnson school of public affairs at the University of Texas, and William Kline at the John F. Kennedy school of government at Harvard University. The latter appointment comes as the CIA publicly confirmed financing a three-year, \$1.2 million project at the JFK school on intelligence assessments and decision making. There are also reports that the Officer-in-Residence Program will commence in 1988 at George Washington University, Howard University, and the school of advanced international studies at Johns Hopkins University.

At a November rally, Chritton stood by CIA regional recruitment officer Jim Green; he later approached a campus journalist complaining with a straight face that the tape he had made of it was incomplete, "so would you lend me yours?"

Chritton spent a few hours in his campus office each day and generally kept a low profile. He told people his "specialties" were Africa, intelligence-gathering, and terrorism, and that he was ignorant of CIA involvement in the Iran/contras scandal. A biography of his career appeared in the 1978 book, *Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe*. According to *The Nation* (December 12, 1987), students who went to read the entry in the library copy were surprised to discover the book had been checked out until April 1988. By George A. Chritton, Jr.

The case of the 35 arrested students went to the Santa Barbara Municipal Court in March. Judge Frank Ochoa ruled they could use the "necessity" defense in seeking to prove their act of trespassing/civil disobedience was necessary to prevent greater harm to academic freedom and the community by the CIA appointment. This defense had been used successfully the previous year in Northampton, Massachusetts, by students blocking CIA campus recruiters. The UCSB students' attorney, Richard Frischman, subpoenaed Chritton to testify and to produce documents on the Officer-in-Residence program.

The CIA's Acting General Counsel, J. Edwin Dietel, however, wrote, in an April 14 letter, that, "The Deputy Director for Administration (DDA) has made a decision to refuse to allow you to testify at the trial of this action or produce any documents therewith. The Director of Central Intelligence has expressly approved the decision made by the DDA."

This action, combined with public opinion on campus and in Santa Barbara generally, doomed the prosecution. The students were all acquitted except for nine who resisted arrest; they received probation. Chritton's time at UCSB was up; the political science department voted to not renew his contract, and informed him to vacate the campus by June 30.

The UCSB community is on the alert. "If they try it again we'll do the same thing," said valedictorian Sara Nelson. "We're going to keep fighting."

—Louis Wolf •

(continued from page 76)

in *Newsweek* a few weeks earlier. But the most fantastic and seemingly indestructible disinformation against Libya was launched in its wake. Within days, Jack Anderson reported that the CIA was plotting the assassination of Qaddafi; shortly thereafter, he announced that the National Security Agency had intercepted a conversation between Col. Qaddafi and Col. Mengistu, the Ethiopian leader, in which the Libyan had mentioned a plan to assassinate the American President.⁴ Then David Martin⁵ reported in the November 30, 1981 *Newsweek* that Col. Qaddafi had already sent a "hit squad" to the United States to kill the President. Anderson followed by distributing to the press what purported to be sketches of the members of the alleged hit team and discussion of a secret CIA report confirming the arrival of the team on the continent.⁶

The mainstream media picked up the story, having already forgotten the exposure in August of the initiation of a disinformation campaign against Libya. The White House "authenticated" the story on December 2, and articles were published describing alert border police studying the composite sketches of the hit team members. Col. Qaddafi appeared on television and called President Reagan a liar (something the press in the U.S. has been unable to do, under even the most compelling circumstances). Michael Ledeen chastised the press for carrying Qaddafi's denial, calling it irresponsible to provide a forum to terrorists. And on December 17 the President responded by stating that "We have complete confidence in the evidence, and he [Qaddafi] knows it."⁷

By the end of December, however, the *New York Times*, the *Los Angeles Times*, and Anderson himself were all describing the story as a hoax. Years later, during the Iran/contras hearings, evidence was presented that the source of much of the false material was Manuchar Ghorbanifar, the Iranian-born Israeli agent, who had passed his fabrications off on the Americans—always willing to believe anything about the Libyans.⁸ It was evident that the CIA knew, during the height of the currency of the story, that it was a fake. Seymour Hersh has gone further; he has written that CIA Director Casey, Secretary of State Haig, Assistant Secretary of State William Clark, Michael Ledeen, and the President himself all knew that the "evidence" against Libya was fabricated.⁹ Despite



Credit: Dick Bancroft

Col. Qaddafi surrounded by delegates to solidarity conference on first anniversary of bombing.

this, of course, the White House was surrounded with concrete bunkers which remain to this day.

Campaigns to disinform, destabilize, and overthrow the government of Libya abounded in the ensuing years. On several occasions the U.S. schemes have been exposed. The Hugel-Casey plan of August 1981 was updated in mid-1984, in a plan exposed in the December 4, 1984 *Newsweek*. It called for political isolation, economic boycott, destabilization, and, if necessary, direct military action. In mid-1985 a plan was discussed which involved the assistance of Egypt in an invasion of Libya.¹⁰ And on November 3, 1985, the *Washington Post* reported the existence of yet another covert plan to undermine the Libyan regime.

The Rome and Vienna Airport Bombings

On December 27, 1985, coordinated terrorist bombings occurred at the Rome and Vienna airports, allegedly by Palestinians who had been trained in Lebanon and who had traveled through Syria. Despite this, the Reagan administration announced it had "irrefutable" proof that Libya was behind the incidents, and sent Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead on a tour of Europe with a confidential folder containing the "proof" of Libyan perfidy and yet another plan for the destabilization of the Libyan regime.¹¹

Rather than supply evidence, the Americans continued to refer to the Libyan guilt as "obvious" and the U.S. Ambassador in Bonn, Richard Burt, said it was ridiculous to insist on proof.¹² The U.S. was undeterred when the Austrian and Italian Ministers of the Interior held a joint press conference and explained there was no evidence that any of the terrorists

10. This plan was exposed in the February 20, 1987 *Washington Post*.

11. It is unclear whether this plan, devised by Donald Fortier of the National Security Council, was the same plan as that disclosed in the November 3, 1985 *Washington Post*. See "Muammar Khadafy's Three-Ring Circus," *In These Times*, February 12, 1986, p. 7.

12. *Ibid*.

4. August 25, 1981; October 8, 1981. See also Bill Schaap, "Deceit and Secrecy," *CAIB*, Number 16 (March 1982), pp. 24-25.

5. Fred Landis has noted that Martin, *Newsweek's* Pentagon reporter, is the son of a career CIA officer. "Disinformationgate," *L.A. Weekly*, March 13, 1987, p. 16.

6. See Noam Chomsky, "Libya in U.S. Demonology," *CAIB*, No. 26 (Summer 1986), p. 15; the sketches are reproduced at page 19. Chomsky notes that the August 16, 1985 *New Statesman* described the alleged members as people belonging to the passionately anti-Libyan Lebanese Amal.

7. See Landis, *op. cit.*, n. 5.

8. *Washington Post*, January 31, 1987, p. A1: "One intelligence source with firsthand access to the CIA reports of the incident said, 'Though not an agency [CIA] asset, Ghorbanifar was a source of the Libyan hit squads in 1981. He was in the middle of it; it was his idea.'"

9. Seymour Hersh, "Target Qaddafi," *New York Times Magazine*, February 22, 1987.

involved at either airport had ever had anything to do with Libya. Indeed, despite such disclaimers—which were given very little play in the U.S. press—even liberal journalists like Tom Wicker of the *New York Times* wrote columns assuming Libyan guilt for the “unspeakable Vienna and Rome airport crimes,” even as he noted that the incidents were undoubtedly “at least in part a response to the Israeli air raid on PLO camps in Tunisia.”¹³ Wicker saw no need to explain why Palestinians responding to such an attack would have to be acting on Libyan orders.

The Disco Bombing and “Retaliation”

But perhaps the most significant disinformation coup of the decade occurred in April 1986, as the Reagan administration asserted that Libya was behind the April 5 bombing of the La-Belle discotheque in West Berlin. A Black GI and a Turkish woman were killed and 230 others were injured. Almost immediately the White House referred to the bombing as “but

the latest act in Colonel Qaddafi’s reign of terror.” Once again the President announced that “our evidence is direct, it is precise, it is irrefutable.” As BBC-TV producer Tom Bower noted,¹⁴ “‘irrefutable’ has a unique connotation in the President’s vocabulary.”

Not only was there no evidence of Libyan involvement, there was considerable evidence to the contrary. Every western European government except Mrs. Thatcher’s—which would support President Reagan if he said the sun rose in the west—expressed skepticism, as did the West Berlin police authorities in charge of the investigation.¹⁵ In fact, U.S. Ambassador Burt, Secretary of State Shultz, and Secretary of Defense Weinberger all lied to bolster the story that the U.S. had clear proof of Libyan involvement. They said that the U.S. evidence—intercepts of coded messages between Libyan People’s Bureaus—was so compelling that prior to the bombing U.S. military police in West Berlin had been put on the

13. *New York Times*, January 10, 1986, p. A27. The article, ironically, praises President Reagan for his “admirable restraint” in not retaliating by bombing Libya, because such an armed strike would “almost surely be indiscriminate.”

14. Tom Bower, “Was the Bombing of Tripoli a Misguided Vendetta by Reagan?” *The Listener*, April 2, 1987, p. 4. Bower produced an excellent television program on the same subject, “Twelve Minutes Over Tripoli,” which aired on BBC1 April 3, 1987.

15. *Ibid.*, and see Chomsky, *op. cit.*, n. 6.

Libya, Qaddafi, and Chad

By Samori Marksman *

Like desert gnats lodged deep in the ears of the imperial camel, Libya and its leader, Muammar Qaddafi, have posed considerably more than a ticklish problem for the Reagan administration, which, from its very inception, set about to dislodge Qaddafi and swat the Libyan revolution.

Within a week of his January 27, 1981 unanimous Senate confirmation as the new head of the CIA, William Casey inherited a lengthy study—described in CIA lexicon as a *Secret SNIE* (Special National Intelligence Estimate)—from the previous regime entitled *Libya: Aims and Vulnerabilities*.

Essentially, the document focused on the strengths and weaknesses of the Libyan state and leadership, and on the most effective ways by which they could be destroyed. It made several significant observations and recommendations, two of which were:

(1) Since Libya had become militarily involved in proping up the government of Goukouni Ouedei in neighboring Chad increased U.S. covert military assistance to the opposition forces of Hissène Habré’s Northern Armed Forces (FAN) could pin down Libyan forces in Chad and “slowly bleed” the Qaddafi regime to death. Chad could become the Libyan regime’s “Achilles’ heel.”

(2) Given the “fact” that Qaddafi was a “principal architect” of international terrorism and involved in

diplomatic blackmail and assassinations, he should be “ultimately removed from power.”

In July of that same year, Michael Getler revealed in a *Washington Post* article that, for the first time in the four year history of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, several members put their objections to a U.S. covert operation in writing, and directed them to the President. According to Getler, while committee members opposed the regime and policies of Muammar Qaddafi, they could not support the CIA’s call for Qaddafi’s “ultimate removal,” which they interpreted to mean assassination.

The objections did not stop Bill Casey and the CIA.

Casey’s First Stand

In response to a request from Goukouni Ouedei, the head of the governing Provisional Government of National Union (GUNT), Libya began providing limited military support to the beleaguered Chadian forces in December, 1980. The Libyans were convinced that the rebel forces of Habré’s FAN were already receiving U.S. and French support.

Although the decision to support the rebels had already been made, Secretary of State Alexander Haig and CIA director Bill Casey told Congress in January 1981 that the U.S. should support the rebels in order to “counter Soviet-backed Libyan adventurism throughout Africa.” Over-

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alert and had been clearing bars of customers that evening. Weinberger went so far as to say that the MPs were just fifteen minutes late to save the people at the LaBelle discotheque. In fact, this was a complete fabrication. As the Deputy Chief of West Berlin's military police told Bower, there was no alert, no one was going around clearing bars, and it would not have made any sense in the first place, since the intercepts made no mention of specific targets.¹⁶

In any event, this fabricated and totally misleading evidence was the "justification" for the vicious attack launched by the United States against Libya ten days later. And even then, the Reagan administration was more than usually hypocritical, for it denied that a major goal of the air assault was the death of Colonel Qaddafi.

An Obvious Assassination Attempt

One thing—the only thing—which the administration's regulation governing U.S. intelligence activities purports to

16. Bower, *op.cit.* n. 14, p. 6. A few days after the Bower show aired, West Berlin police again confirmed that no evidence linking Libya to the bombing had been uncovered in twelve months of investigation. Associated Press, April 5, 1987.

prohibit is assassinations.¹⁷ Yet it is now clear that the principal objective of the Tripoli raids was the murder of Col. Qaddafi. In a lengthy analysis in the *New York Times Magazine*,¹⁸ Seymour Hersh demonstrated convincingly that the repeated bombings of Qaddafi's residence and various offices were not accidental. Indeed, despite the Pentagon's vigorous denials, Hersh discovered that Israeli intelligence had pinpointed Col. Qaddafi's location for the U.S. Air Force, but that the laser-guidance systems on four of nine F-111 fighter-bombers failed and no bombs struck Qaddafi—although his infant daughter was killed.

In fact, only a few days after the bombing raid, anonymous "U.S. officials" were quoted saying: "We hoped we would get him, but nobody was sure where he would be that night."¹⁹ Another official said that the National Security Council had even drafted a statement for the administration to use, if necessary, describing Qaddafi's death as "fortuitous"; it was, of course, withheld when it was learned that the Libyan leader

17. Executive Order 12333, December 4, 1981, §2.11.

18. *Op. cit.*, n. 9.

19. *Washington Post*, April 18, 1986. None of the reports noted that these sentiments seemed to violate E.O. 12333.

night, by dint of Haig's and Casey's determinism, a local African conflict was transformed into a major geo-strategic, East-West power confrontation.

Chad, then, became a sideshow. Casey's real objective was "target Libya." Thus, the Reagan/Casey CIA embarked upon its first low-intensity war. Casey's Libya program called for:

- Aiding anti-Qaddafi Libyan nationals resident in Europe and Africa, in hopes of bringing a pro-U.S. regime to power in Tripoli. One principal figure in this scheme was the multi-millionaire Mustafa ben Halim, who had fled from Libya in 1969 with millions, only days before the Qaddafi takeover.
- Increasing intelligence and other forms of logistical and material support to pro-U.S. regimes surrounding Libya—especially Egypt, Tunisia and Sudan—and bolstering U.S. military support for the Moroccan monarchy.
- Working in conjunction with the French secret service (SDECE) and Israel's Mossad to identify and support anti-Qaddafi forces inside Libya itself. Also, in conjunction with the French, exploring ways by which Qaddafi could be "ultimately removed from power."
- Working with the U.S.'s African allies to "neutralize Libyan influence" within the pan-African Organization of African Unity—including blocking Qaddafi from assuming his turn as (rotating) Chairman of the OAU.
- Supporting militarily and diplomatically the forces of Hissene Habre's FAN inside Chad.

By June, 1982, the Casey plan bore some fruit. On the morning of June 7—with U.S. and French backing—Habre's FAN forces entered Ndjamena, the Chadian capital, and overthrew the National Transition Unity Government

of Goukouni Ouedei.

Immediately following the overthrow of the legally constituted government of Chad, the CIA solicited the aid of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Sudan and other anti-Qaddafi Arab governments in shoring up the Habré regime.

The overthrow was a fairly inexpensive undertaking. Jeff McConnell, in a 1982 article in *CounterSpy* magazine (Vol. 7, No. 1) documented U.S. costs at approximately \$10 million. And in July of the same year, President Reagan authorized an additional \$10 million from a "discretionary fund." Habre continues to receive U.S., French and Saudi Arabian support. Additionally, some African states loyal to France and the U.S., such as Senegal and Zaire, continue to provide military and diplomatic support. Throughout 1986 and 1987, during some of the most intense fighting between Libyan-supported rebels and Habré's forces, it was Senegal from which much of the French support came.

Casey's Last Stand

Having achieved one major goal in its "multi-track" strategy aimed at Libya, the CIA then embarked on the anti-Qaddafi propaganda destabilization program of unprecedented dimensions, described in detail in the accompanying article.

The uncovering of the CIA's so-called Iran/*contra* affair, the recent rapprochement between the United States and Syria, and the nightly images of innocent Palestinian children and unarmed adults being clubbed or shot to death by Israeli soldiers, have all served to soften U.S. verbal attacks on Iran, Syria and the PLO for sponsoring international terrorism. But, where Libya is concerned, nothing has changed—Casey or no Casey. ●

had survived.²⁰

The Poindexter Memorandum

We do not know how *Washington Post* reporter Bob Woodward got a copy of Admiral John Poindexter's three-page memorandum to President Reagan, but it was genuine front-page material. His plan, adopted at a White House meeting on August 14, 1986, noted:

One of the key elements [of the strategy] is that it combines real and illusionary events—through a disinformation program—with the basic goal of making Qaddafi *think* [emphasis in original] that there is a high degree of internal opposition to him within Libya, that his key trusted aides are disloyal, that the U.S. is about to move against him militarily.

And, the story noted, the *Wall Street Journal* at great length, and other major papers to lesser degrees, had dutifully carried what appeared in retrospect to be totally untrue “news” about Libya, as part of this campaign.

Of course, the most interesting thing about the entire memorandum is that it actually used the word *disinformation*, the very thing which the extreme right wing has always insisted the United States does not do. In fact, President Reagan's first comment, when confronted by reporters who were at the White House to discuss the forthcoming Reykjavik summit, was: “I challenge the veracity of that entire story that I read this morning with great shock.... We are not telling lies or doing any of these disinformation things.” This is how we might expect Reed Irvine to react; for the President to say this, columnist James Reston noted, only “added to his crisis of credibility.”²¹

The *New York Times* editorial²² was eloquent, if hypocritical:

However desirable it may be to get rid of this unstable, dangerous dictator, the chosen technique was worthy of the KGB. To the Reagan administration's shame, the “disinformation” worked all too well, but only here in the land of the free.... No end can justify these means, not even overthrowing a sponsor of terror.... There is no place in America for disinformation.

State Department spokesman and long-time journalist

20. *Ibid.* In fact, USIA head Charles Z. Wick admitted that the Voice of America was informed of the bombing raid three hours before it began, when he and three high VOA officials were given an editorial to broadcast internationally immediately after the raid. According to the AP, Wick asserted “there was nothing unusual about the operation.” The group, Wick said, was “terribly careful about ensuring that there could be no leaks because lives of our military people could be at stake as well as the general success of the mission.” Associated Press, April 18, 1986. Some NBC television personnel have admitted that they knew about the raid a few hours in advance, because the bombers were spotted leaving the U.S. Air Force base at Lakenheath, England. They also did not report this development out of concern for the lives of the pilots. There seems to have been little concern for the lives of the Libyans.

21. *New York Times*, October 5, 1986, p. 21.

22. *Ibid.*, October 3, 1986.

Bernard Kalb resigned. The nation's press lauded him for what everyone called his “principled resignation.” Indeed, a *New York Times*/CBS News poll discovered that only 18 percent of those polled believed it was all right for the government to lie, even to achieve foreign policy goals. Indeed, only 35 percent of the people thought the government told the truth “most of the time.”²³

But Europeans, who are far more sophisticated in these matters, and who *expect* their governments to lie a great deal of the time, were unmoved. Reports of the disinformation campaign “aroused little hostile press commentary and no perceptible protest among West European allies of the United States.”²⁴

The Judith Miller Episode

The Poindexter disinformation campaign was not limited to establishment media like the *Wall Street Journal* and the *New York Times*. Judith Miller, a *Times* correspondent based in Paris, co-authored a piece in the August 14, 1986 *Rolling Stone* with Marie Colvin, UPI's Paris bureau chief, which undoubtedly pleased Admiral Poindexter.

Both writers had interviewed Colonel Qaddafi several times from January through April. Then, Ms. Colvin had interviewed the Libyan leader on June 18, in what was described, undoubtedly for the benefit of the *Rolling Stone* editors, as “the only interview he has granted a western reporter since the American bombing of Libya on April 15th.” Halfway into the first page of the article, the Poindexter line is dutifully set forth, fully if a bit floridly:

Three and a half months after the American bombing of Libya, Muammar Qaddafi appears to be losing control of his country and himself. Based on our [sic] interview, several recent television appearances, in which he seemed fatigued and incoherent, and the reports of diplomats in Libya and western intelligence analysts, we think Qaddafi is in the paralyzing grip of a profound depression. Demoralized by the loss of face and traumatized by the severity of the raid..., Qaddafi has virtually dropped out of sight. Insiders say he is in hiding.... On his occasional visits to the Libyan capital, Qaddafi, now more than ever fearful of assassination, is said to travel with an armored caravan.

The article is filled with unattributed quotes, all justified by the speakers' fears for their lives. “One Arab diplomat” is quoted, then “another diplomat, a westerner,” and then “a third envoy.” Qaddafi, the authors say, is receiving massive amounts of drugs, “according to our informants.” A certain, unnamed doctor “is said” to be “orchestrating” the giving of medication.

The only apparently straightforward admission in the article is the authors' acknowledgement that they conferred with “western intelligence analysts.” They quote from “a top-secret CIA analysis written in 1982,” describing a raft of alleged per-

23. *Ibid.*, October 31, 1986.

24. *Ibid.*, October 7, 1986.

sonality disorders. And then they note that "diplomats say" Qaddafi is no longer in charge of Libya.

In this, the article follows the party line. It says that "power is now what appears to be slipping from Qaddafi's grasp. In scores of private interviews with Libyans since the American air attack, we found a dramatic shift in public opinion against Qaddafi."

In all but one respect, the article could have been manufactured by the same people who drafted Admiral Poindexter's memorandum. But it had an even more bizarre note. The authors claim that Col. Qaddafi has tried to seduce nearly every women reporter to whom he has granted an interview. Ms. Miller refers to an alleged incident in January of 1986 when she was one of five "young female correspondents representing major western television and press organizations" summoned for an interview. Late in the afternoon, she says, Qaddafi invited three of them, one after another, into a room for "private interviews," where he "made a crude pass at each of the three—without success." Miller was not one of the three; she says this was because she had told Qaddafi that "her father was not only Jewish but also an ardent Zionist." And although Ms. Colvin was not at this interview, she says that she, too, was propositioned by the Libyan leader at a late night interview in early April.

Judith Miller was undeterred by the exposure of the Poindexter memorandum. On January 4, 1987, the *New York Times Magazine* published her article on "The Istanbul Synagogue Massacre," which exhibited similarly shoddy journalistic standards. Once again she quotes "American intelligence analysts," "an Israeli terrorism expert," and numerous other unnamed "sources."²⁵ This article posits the novel theory that the ghastly attack on the Istanbul synagogue was not the act of a handful of fanatics, but "the perfection of a new brand of cooperative international terrorism.... The evidence...while circumstantial...plus information from a terrorist under arrest in Pakistan...all point to three states as possible sponsors of the Istanbul carnage: Syria, Libya and Iran."

Circumstantial evidence, suspicions, and possibilities are raised to the level of certainty. Photographs of President Assad of Syria, Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran, and Qaddafi illustrate the article, along with photos of weapons found at the synagogue, described as "the same type as some of those supplied by Libya to terrorists for an attack on an American officers' club in Ankara last April." Of course, the only evidence that *that* attack was sponsored by Libya was a secret presentation of "irrefutable proof" by the U.S. to the Turkish authorities. "Attack," in fact, is not quite the right word. The incident in question involved the arrest at the officers' club three days after the bombing of Tripoli of two Libyans found to be carrying grenades which, "like those in the synagogue, were Soviet-made." And the irrefutable proof that Libyan diplomats had been storing and distributing such grenades was never made public.

Judith Miller's reward for reaching such dazzling heights of speculation was the post of deputy Washington editor of

25. Miller's sourcing reminds one of Claire Sterling. See Edward S. Herman, *The Real Terror Network* (Boston: South End Press, 1982), pp. 53-59.



Credit: Dick Bancroft

Qaddafi's residence after the U.S. bombing raid.

the *Times*.

South Pacific Waves of Disinformation

In the summer of 1987 there appeared a number of press reports referring to Libyan influence in the Pacific. In the most celebrated instance, the establishment of diplomatic relations between Vanuatu and Libya was transformed into a virtual invasion and takeover. When the government of Prime Minister Walter Lini announced that, in keeping with Vanuatu's policy of maintaining diplomatic relations with all countries, Libya was free to establish a "People's Bureau," Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke viciously attacked. He said that "the nations of the South Pacific should not get entangled with the Libyans." Libya, he said, "has got no concrete, legitimate, peaceful reason for coming into this region."²⁶ This is an unusual way to refer to the establishment of diplomatic relations, to say the least, and was doubly bizarre since Australia maintained diplomatic relations with Libya at the time, though they have broken these ties since.

Vanuatu was subjected to considerable pressure, at one point asking two Libyans who had arrived without following proper protocol to leave and return correctly;²⁷ ultimately the People's Bureau was opened, but Vanuatu's relations with Australia have remained tense.

Other strange stories appeared, including the allegation that Libya had offered to build an airport for Tonga if Tonga would break relations with Israel, and an "unconfirmed report" that Libya was channeling funds to the Kanak separatists in New Caledonia.²⁸

Other rumors at the same time suggested that Libya was "undermining U.S. interests in the Caribbean." According to the Associated Press, Jamaica, Guadeloupe, French Guiana, and Dominica were all "inviting targets for Libya in its cam-

26. United Press International, April 7, 1987.

27. *New York Times*, May 6, 1987, p. A13.

28. United Press International, April 7, 1987. This same report, replete with rumors, confided, however, that "no one is certain that Libya, a Soviet client, is following any grand scheme for subversion."

paign to undermine U.S. and French interests."²⁹ As recently as April 15, 1988, Vice President George Bush asserted that it was only because of Libyan support that Panamanian leader Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega remained in power. The vice President would not elaborate and a White House spokesman, Marlin Fitzwater, said that, "We can't discuss our intelligence sources, but that is our belief."³⁰

Recent Developments

One of the most recent opportunities for knee-jerk anti-Libya propaganda was the April 14, 1988 bombing of a servicemen's club in Naples, Italy. That night, on the CBS Evening News, reporter Doug Tunnell said:

Investigators are still trying to establish who could be responsible and why. But there is an especially ominous timing about the bombing. The last time an American serviceman died in a terrorist attack like this was in Berlin, a bomb said to have been planted by Libyan agents. The Reagan administration held Muammar Qaddafi personally responsible; and, in reprisal, American jets bombed Qaddafi's capital city, Tripoli, exactly two years ago today.³¹

In a similar oblique suggestion of Libyan involvement, the *New York Times* reported that a "senior officer at the Naples police headquarters" noted that "today was the second anniversary of the United States bombing raids on the Libyan cities of Tripoli and Benghazi..."³²

The next day, the prime suspect—the renter of the car in which the bomb was placed—was identified: Junzo Okudaira, described as a member of the Japanese Red Army. According to an unnamed "senior anti-terrorism investigator here" quoted by the *New York Times*, Okudaira was connected to "hard-line Shiite Moslems in Lebanon." "Responsibility for the attack," the *Times* said, "was claimed by the Brigades of the Holy War in a telephone call to a Rome news agency today." An unnamed "anti-terrorism specialist" told the *Times* the group named was "unknown previously and probably did not refer to a specific organization."³³

A few days before the Naples bombing, another Japanese man, Yu Kikumura, was arrested in New Jersey with what was alleged to be material for making bombs. After the Naples incident, news reports linked the two items, and Libya was implicated by innuendo. This is from the CBS Evening News:

RITA BRAVER: U.S. officials feared that the Naples bomb may be part of a new terrorist campaign against the U.S. on the two-year anniversary of the American bombing of Libya. Another bomb exploded today at a U.S. military communications facility outside Madrid...and New Jersey police, earlier this week, ar-

rested a Japanese man carrying...the makings of several bombs.... So far, Yu Kikumura has refused to answer any questions, but Japanese police have told the U.S. government that they believe he is linked to the Red Army, the same group now believed responsible for the Naples attack, and terrorism experts say the Red Army may now be working for Libya.³⁴

That is the typical strength of the accusations against Libya: The terrorists in question *may* be working for Libya. CBS had a "terrorism expert" saying, "It is a demonstrable fact that many of these organizations do have close ties with one another and occasionally do cooperate with one another in operations."³⁵

Conclusion

As *CAIB* was being typeset there were more reports of allegations of an upsurge in Libyan terrorism, but once again with no details and no specifics. It seems likely that there will be no letup in this disinformation campaign, despite the periodic revelations of the existence of such plans. Once again, the microscopically short political memories of the American people allow their government to tell the same lies over and over again. ●

34. *CBS Evening News*, April 15, 1988, Transcript, p. 2.

35. *Ibid.*

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29. Associated Press, April 6, 1987.

30. *New York Times*, April 16, 1988, p. 10.

31. *CBS Evening News*, April 14, 1988, Transcript, p. 4.

32. *New York Times*, April 15, 1988, p. A3.

33. *Ibid.*, April 16, 1988, p. 4.

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The Endless Campaign:

Disinforming the World on Libya

By Bill Schaap

It is like a grade B horror movie. A dozen times it rises from the dead and lurches towards the audience; a dozen times it is cut to ribbons, staggering back, collapsing in a heap; and a dozen times it rises again and clomps slowly forward. But it is not the mummy's ghost, and it is not haunting the Upper Nile. It is the notion that the Libyan leader, Col. Muammar Qaddafi, is responsible for every act of terrorism in the entire world, and it haunts the pages of the western press and the screens of western television sets.

On October 2, 1986 the *Washington Post* published Bob Woodward's now famous article about the August 14, 1986 memorandum from National Security Adviser Adm. John Poindexter, calling for a major disinformation campaign against Libya. The pious shock expressed by the mainstream media was deafening; State Department spokesman Bernard Kalb, no mean disinformationist himself,¹ resigned in a huff of moral outrage. But the most ironic aspect of the whole fuss was the notion that this was something new.

From the day of his inauguration, President Reagan launched a campaign against "terrorism" in general, and against Libya in particular, and disinformation was *always* a part of that campaign. When the Reagan administration took office in January, 1981, the President announced the appointment of a special group to study "the Libyan problem." As early as March 1981, Secretary of State Alexander Haig was testifying before Congress about Libyan responsibility for

world-wide terrorism.² And it was about this time that CIA Director William Casey approved a plan presented by Deputy Director for Operations Max Hugel to neutralize and overthrow Qaddafi. The operation was actually exposed in the August 3, 1981 issue of *Newsweek*, something the handwringing pundits appeared to have forgotten five years later. The plan was "a large scale, multiphase and costly scheme to overthrow Qaddafi and his government" by means including a 'disinformation program designed to embarrass Qaddafi and his government.'³ The plan was approved by the White House and the intelligence oversight committees in Congress.

Thus, despite the surprise shown later by some, disinformation against Libya has always been a mainstay of the Reagan administration's agenda.

The Gulf of Sidra and the "Hit Squad"

In the spring of 1981 the administration broke diplomatic relations with Libya and began AWACS surveillance flights near Libya's borders; the first major provocation was on August 19, when the U.S. sent ships into the Gulf of Sidra (the *Khalij Surt*), territory claimed by Libya—a deliberate provocation which led to an air battle and the loss of two Libyan planes.

The battle clearly deflected attention from the revelations

(continued on page 69)

1. As is his brother Marvin. See *CAIB*, Number 19 (Spring-Summer 1983), pp. 20-23, and Number 23 (Spring 1985), pp. 6-7.

2. *Facts on File*, March 18, 1981.

3. Quoted in Alexander Cockburn, "Is the Press Awakening to Reagan's Deceptions?" *Wall Street Journal*, November 13, 1986, p. 29.

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