When Imperial China Had a Vietnamese Prime Minister: The Surprising Origins of Meritocracy—And Why It Outperforms the West More Than Ever

Political legitimacy thrives on competence and executing the people’s will—not on money and endless election campaigns

Long before the West ever seriously discussed equal opportunities, sophisticated concepts of meritocratic selection already existed in China. The Tang Dynasty state, in particular, is considered an early example of a system based on merit and competence. This offers interesting insights for today’s world, which is torn between Chinese meritocracy and Western plutocracy, as well as between a lived democracy of the Chinese type and a formal Western democracy that is limited to periodic elections and routinely fails to represent the interests of the population.

Harmony over Conquest: The Chinese Governance Ethos Explained

More than 2,000 years ago, Sun Tzu (孫子) wrote in The Art of War that the highest form of strategy was to “subdue the enemy without fighting.”

This principle, foreign to the West and seeking to renounce violence, reflects a fundamental truth: The Chinese political tradition values harmony and competence over domination and dogma. Unlike the missionary zeal that traditionally characterizes Western foreign policy, which China perceives as aggressive, China’s concept of Tianxia—“All under Heaven”—envisions a world governed by moral example, not by coercion or conquest.

Professor Daniel A. Bell emphasizes that this principle of harmony (hé, 和) extends beyond philosophy into practical governance. It is not about uniformity, but about reconciling diverse interests peacefully, both domestically and internationally.

The Secret to China’s Longevity: A System Built on Merit

If China has endured and thrived for millennia, it is not by accident. Its survival owes much to a unique political architecture rooted in meritocracy—a concept formalized during the Tang Dynasty (618–907 CE) but inspired by Confucius centuries earlier.

While aristocratic Europe still clung to bloodlines, China developed a bureaucracy that judged candidates by knowledge, ethics and performance.

The Tang’s imperial examination system, or Keju, allowed anyone—including peasants, foreigners and even women in rare cases—to rise based on merit. This was not an abstract ideal. A peer-reviewed study of epitaphs from Tang elites found that elite lineage had virtually no effect on success in the exam. In terms of social mobility, Tang China resembled 1960s America—a time when the American Dream was still somewhat real.

As we will see later, democracy with Chinese characteristics functions in a way that is often misunderstood and misrepresented. I will examine this in more detail below.

Critics often cite China’s internet censorship as definitive proof of an authoritarian state. This narrow view, however, misinterprets how the system actually operates: It pairs targeted information management with systematic public feedback and highly responsive political action. By embedding citizen input directly into policy decisions, these mechanisms achieve a level of state accountability that Western systems must emulate to become truly democratic themselves. Read the full analysis in my article here. In a separate piece, I have also debunked the propaganda myth of a “social credit system.”

The Three Tiers of Chinese Meritocracy

Political theorists like Professor Bell describe China’s system of political meritocracy through a distinct formula: “Democracy at the bottom, experimentation in the middle, and meritocracy at the top.”

1. Democracy at the Bottom (Grassroots Level)

Direct elections occur at the village and neighborhood levels. Citizens vote directly for local representatives who manage immediate community affairs, public services, neighborhood infrastructure, and day-to-day governance.

2. Experimentation in the Middle (Provincial Level)

Provincial and regional governments serve as vital testing grounds for new policies before nationwide rollouts. Higher-ups evaluate intermediate officials on their ability to pilot innovative solutions for complex socioeconomic challenges—such as poverty reduction, urbanization and industrial transformation.

3. Meritocracy

Senior national leaders, including members of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Politburo, ascend through rigorous institutional evaluation rather than popular electoral campaigns. Reaching the highest levels of state governance typically requires decades of administrative experience and a proven track record of maintaining economic growth, effective management, and social stability across multiple regions.

Foreign Prime Ministers, Female Innovators, and the Dawn of Confucian Feminism

Among the system’s remarkable outcomes: Khương Công Phụ, a Vietnamese scholar, rose to become Prime Minister of China. Japanese Prince Abe no Nakamaro and Korean philosopher Choe Chiwon also passed the imperial exams and held high office.

The system itself was formalized under Wu Zetian, China’s only female emperor—a powerful testament to women’s intellectual potential, even in an era when the bureaucracy remained entirely male-dominated. This legacy continues to have an impact today, as women increasingly assume leadership positions within Chinese institutions.

Confucius and Plato: A Tale of Two Meritocracies

Confucius envisioned a society where ability and virtue—not birth—determined leadership. Plato, who lived 150 years later, also promoted a meritocratic ideal, but retained hereditary privilege in his political vision. Confucius rejected hereditary rule, recognizing its tendency to breed corruption, decadence, and dynastic collapse—a cycle he sought to break through education and moral leadership.

He called for rulers to be practical, generous, and just—people-centered in the truest sense. He famously declared: “In education, there should be no class distinctions” (Analects, 15.39). And he insisted that trust—not force—is the foundation of any legitimate government. If something must be sacrificed, he said: Abandon the army before the grain, and the grain before trust.

Bell highlights that Confucian emphasis on moral leadership and long-term planning still informs contemporary Chinese governance. Decisions are made with the future in mind, not merely for electoral cycles or short-term gain.

A Model That Inspired the Enlightenment—and Alarmed the British Aristocracy

China’s imperial examination system left a deep mark on European modernity. The British adopted this meritocratic model for their colonial administration in India in 1832, and finally for their own civil service in 1846—much to the horror of the nobility, who saw their traditional privileges and exclusive grip on government power slip away.

Thinkers like Voltaire were openly inspired by China’s governance. He translated Chinese plays and lauded Confucian values for their rationality and moral clarity. A statue of Confucius even graces the U.S. Supreme Court building, alongside Moses and Solon—representing the foundational thinkers of the world’s great legal traditions.

Meritocracy vs. Plutocracy: A Tale of Two Systems

China’s modern examination system, the Gaokao, continues the legacy of the historic Keju, ensuring that entry into elite institutions like Tsinghua University—which trains many of the country’s top leaders—is fiercely competitive. Out of 10 million high school graduates each year, only 3,000 secure admission.

Professor John L. Thornton, former Chairman of Goldman Sachs Asia, who over the course of his career also met numerous leading Chinese politicians, explains it as follows:

“The CCP functions more like a meritocratic elite than a traditional party—akin to the historical mandarin class. It’s performance-based, much like the U.S. military.”

Thornton emphasizes that only the most capable individuals ascend within the party and government. In contrast, Western political systems increasingly rely on billionaire-funded campaigns, media narratives shaped by elite interests, and a declining trust in democratic institutions. As the voices of the dwindling middle class grow quieter, governance in the West is drifting toward oligarchy and away from democracy.

While most political leaders in the West come from backgrounds in law and finance, China’s leadership is largely composed of capable engineers and scientists, builders of things rather than administrators of things.

David Bell underscores that China’s system blends meritocracy with limited local democratic mechanisms. Mid-level governance experiments allow officials to be tested on multiple criteria, such as economic performance, poverty reduction, and environmental sustainability. This ensures that leaders are genuinely competent and adaptable.

The Role of the Communist Party Explained

In the West, political legitimacy comes from noisy elections, charisma and fundraising; anyone can rise quickly with the right media moment.

In China, however, village committees (村委会) and, in some cases, town councils are elected. Residents can vote directly for their representatives in the village or neighborhood, thus choosing candidates they know and can therefore evaluate.

These low-level representatives can then advance through a quiet, corporate-like system run by the Communist Party’s Organization Department—an enormous HR apparatus that manages millions of officials through data-driven performance reviews rather than public elections. Over decades, leaders climb a strict 30-year ladder from village posts to provincial leadership, overseeing populations the size of entire countries, and are evaluated on hard metrics such as GDP growth, poverty reduction and social stability, and environmental targets.

This system cultivates highly experienced technocrats and shields governance from populism.

However, it also fosters conformity, risk aversion and historical abuses tied to narrowly focused Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). While highly efficient at solving known problems, this structure has neither prevented nor actively fostered creativity and disruptive innovation—which seem to occur regardless of the state apparatus. Consequently, China’s governance is not a personal dictatorship—as Western narratives often claim—but an institutional, meritocratic system grounded in “performance legitimacy.”

Western observers often misinterpret China as fragile or primitive. In reality, it operates less like a traditional state and more like a powerful, meritocratic corporation playing a long-term strategic game.

In this context, it is important to emphasize that criticism is permitted, while defamation is prohibited and punishable under Chinese law. This applies to everyone—from ordinary citizens insulting one another to individuals making false accusations against Chinese leaders. Yet Western narratives often distort this fact and portray it as particularly “dangerous” to criticize Chinese leaders, while overlooking the broader legal framework.

Democracy with Chinese Characteristics: Two Illustrations from Contemporary China

China’s political system is often reduced by outsiders to simplistic narratives that fail to capture how it actually functions. A closer examination reveals a far more nuanced reality—one featuring institutions and practices that do not fit neatly into conventional Western categories.

Two examples—the exercise of oversight powers by a local People’s Congress in Zhejiang Province and the rise of a migrant worker to the National People’s Congress—illustrating China’s “whole-process people’s democracy” or democracy with Chinese characteristics.

The People’s Congress System in China

Every administrative level in China has a People’s Congress (人民代表大会, rénmín dàibiǎo dàhuì), which serves as a representative body within the country’s political structure.

Representatives are selected through a multi-tiered system:

• At the township, district and county levels, representatives are directly elected by voters in local constituencies.
• At higher levels—including prefectural cities, provinces, and the National People’s Congress—representatives are elected by the People’s Congress at the level immediately below them.

The powers exercised by local People’s Congresses are not uniform across the country. Their authority over government spending, appointments and policymaking varies from region to region.

Zhejiang’s Stronger Oversight Powers

Zhejiang Province is widely regarded as one of the regions where People’s Congresses possess comparatively strong oversight authority.

This situation is often linked to reforms introduced by Xi Jinping during his tenure as Zhejiang’s provincial Communist Party secretary in the early 2000s. During that period, Xi promoted a framework known as “Do Practical Things for the People” (为民办实事, wèi mín bàn shí shì).

The central principle behind this framework was that elected representatives in local People’s Congresses should play a meaningful role in determining how public funds are allocated. Over time, this evolved into a more formalized system in which representatives vote on major government investment projects.

The Huangyan District Vote

A recent case in Huangyan District, part of Taizhou in Zhejiang Province, demonstrates how this system operates in practice.

The Huangyan District People’s Congress reviewed 16 major government investment projects proposed for 2026. While most were approved, representatives rejected two significant proposals:

• A sports center project.
• A large-scale irrigation project.

Together, these projects were valued at more than one billion yuan, and approximately 80% of representatives voted against them.

Importantly, rejection does not mean permanent cancellation. Instead, the proposals are returned to the relevant government departments for revision. Before resubmission, those departments must:

1. Address the concerns raised by representatives.
2. Conduct additional reviews and consultations with experts.
3. Revise the projects where necessary.
4. Present the revised proposals for future consideration.

This demonstrates how local democratic accountability functions within the country’s institutional framework.

An Example of Democratic Oversight

This episode highlights a form of democratic practice that many outside China may not realize exists.

In this case:

• Representatives exercised genuine oversight authority.
• They were able to block major government spending proposals.
• The executive branch could not simply proceed despite their objections.
• Government agencies were required to respond to criticism and seek approval again.

National Attention and Debate

What made the Huangyan vote particularly noteworthy was that it attracted significant attention within China itself.

Not all People’s Congresses across the country exercise comparable authority, and the incident sparked nationwide discussion. Major Chinese media outlets reported on the vote, transforming what began as a local political event into a broader national conversation.

Many observers questioned why similar oversight powers were not being exercised as visibly or as effectively elsewhere. At the same time, China’s history of local experimentation suggests that innovations pioneered in one region can attract national attention and, in some cases, eventually be adopted more widely.

The Deleted Zhejiang People’s Congress Post

An unusual aspect of the story was that the Zhejiang People’s Congress reportedly deleted its original WeChat post discussing the vote.

However, there is little evidence that this constituted an attempt to suppress the story. Numerous state-affiliated media organizations continued reporting on the event, and it remained widely discussed in the public sphere.

No official explanation was provided for the deletion. One plausible—though entirely speculative—interpretation is that Zhejiang officials became uncomfortable with being placed at the center of a national debate about why congresses in their province appeared more willing or able to exercise oversight than those in other regions.

Publicizing Zhejiang’s example may have been interpreted as implicitly criticizing provinces whose People’s Congresses were less assertive in exercising similar powers.

From Factory Gate to National Legislature

Another example of democracy with Chinese characteristics was described by commentator Jerry Grey, a long-time resident of China, on my YouTube channel. His statement is corroborated on Chinese social media. He told the story of a woman whose life took her from a poor province to a factory gate in Guangdong Province and later to the National People’s Congress in Beijing.

A Migrant Worker Arrives in Guangdong

The story begins in rural Gansu Province, nestled in northwestern China. At just 17 years old, a young woman left her hometown behind, traveling thousands of kilometers to the booming manufacturing hub of Dongguan.

She had no university education and few formal qualifications. Like millions of migrant workers who contributed to China’s economic development, she arrived seeking opportunity.

Her first job was as a security guard at the entrance to a clothing factory. While her responsibilities involved monitoring goods and personnel entering and leaving the facility, she spent her limited free time learning how the factory operated.

She taught herself sewing, machine operation and production processes. Her initiative was rewarded with successive promotions—from machine operator to senior operator, then into quality control after proposing improvements to factory procedures.

Eventually, she became the factory’s operations manager.

Her rise reflected a principle often emphasized in China: that practical experience, initiative and demonstrated competence can create opportunities for advancement regardless of educational background.

A Problem Facing Millions of Families

Despite her professional success, she encountered a challenge familiar to many migrant workers.

Under the Chinese household registration system (Hukou), migrant workers often had difficulties registering their children at public schools outside their place of residence. As a result, many families were separated, with children returning to their hometowns to live with grandparents while parents remained in distant cities for work.

When her son reached school age, she was confronted with this reality.

Rather than accepting it, she began searching for solutions.

She contacted schools, sought information about enrollment requirements, and explored ways of satisfying local regulations. Unable to afford certain fees and facing numerous administrative hurdles, she volunteered at local schools. She helped manage traffic during student arrival and dismissal times, worked in school cafeterias, and assisted with other activities.

Through persistence and community involvement, she eventually succeeded in enrolling her son in a local school.

Turning Personal Experience into Public Service

What followed transformed a personal challenge into a public contribution. Drawing on habits she had developed during her years as a security guard, she carefully documented every step of the process. She recorded requirements, obstacles, paperwork and practical solutions.

Other migrant-worker families soon began asking how she had managed to keep her child with her rather than sending him back to Gansu. She shared her notes.

The information spread among friends and coworkers. Factories began distributing copies to workers. What began as a personal guide evolved into a practical handbook that helped many migrant families navigate school enrollment procedures.

By solving a real-world problem and sharing the solution, she improved the lives of people far beyond her own family.

From Community Advocate to People’s Congress Representative

Critics of China claim that those who question the system are punished. But her efforts caught the attention of members of the Guangdong Provincial People’s Congress, who recognized that her experiences mirrored the challenges faced by millions of migrant workers.

She was invited to participate in the provincial parliament, where she was able to help represent the concerns of migrant worker families. Her influence continued to grow.

Eventually, national-level representatives recognized the value of her experience and invited her to become a delegate to the National People’s Congress, China’s highest legislative body.

Each year she traveled to Beijing to participate in national meetings, bringing with her the perspective of someone who had personally experienced the challenges facing migrant workers.

The journey was remarkable. A teenager from a rural village in Gansu who began her working life guarding the gate of a factory eventually became a representative in China’s national legislature.

In May 2026, the State Council issued guidelines calling for basic public services to be provided according to a person’s place of residence rather than their household registration, a reform widely regarded as one of the most significant changes to the hukou system in decades.

While it would be impossible to attribute such reforms to any single individual, her story illustrates how concerns experienced by ordinary citizens can be elevated through representative institutions and ultimately contribute to broader policy discussions. The challenges she faced were shared by millions of migrant workers across China, and the subsequent reforms reflected a growing effort to address those concerns at the national level.

It demonstrates how democracy with Chinese characteristics works.

Rather than emphasizing competition between political parties, the system focuses on identifying capable individuals who emerge from communities, workplaces and social organizations. These individuals gain recognition by solving practical problems, serving the public, and demonstrating competence.

In this conception of democracy, representation is measured not only by how representatives are selected but also by whether they maintain close connections with ordinary citizens and effectively channel public concerns into policy-making.

The examples of the Huangyan District vote and the migrant worker who became a National People’s Congress delegate are illustrations of how participation, oversight, community engagement and problem-solving influence governance within China’s political framework.

These two cases illustrate the complexity of the Chinese political system and the impossibility of reducing it to simple narratives.

China can simultaneously exhibit several characteristics that may appear contradictory to outside observers:

• Local representatives can be elected and exercise meaningful oversight over government spending.
• Such powers may stem from reforms initiated by Xi Jinping himself.
• The media can openly praise examples of challenging oversight of authorities by elected representatives.
• At the same time, some government bodies may be reluctant to draw excessive attention to differences in how such powers are exercised across regions.

Continuous Citizen Engagement vs. Periodic Voting

Whether one accepts the concept of “democracy with Chinese characteristics” or not, these examples demonstrate how democratic participation is conceptualized in China. Rather than a system of periodic voting followed by long intervals where elected officials ignore voter concerns to prioritize personal or donor interests, this model operates as a continuous process. It actively connects citizens, representative institutions, public oversight, community engagement, and government decision-making on an ongoing basis. Some call it genuine rather than formal democracy.

The broader lesson is that China’s political reality contains significant regional variation, institutional complexity, and evolving practices that do not always fit neatly into conventional political categories.

Resilience Through Reinvention

China’s system has also demonstrated an ability to respond to broader economic challenges, particularly in the housing sector. In recent years, the country has sought to reduce its reliance on an overheated real estate market and redirect investment toward high-value manufacturing, artificial intelligence, advanced technologies, and green energy industries.

While some Western analysts have characterized this transition as risky, more neutral observers view it as evidence of a long-term strategy aimed at building a more sustainable and innovation-driven economy. It also reflects the party’s political principle that apartments are for living in and not for speculation.

Within China’s meritocratic model of governance, leaders are expected to look beyond short-term political pressures and focus on long-term national development. This enables policy makers to pursue structural economic transformations whose benefits may take years—or even decades—to fully materialize. In contrast, Western politicians, even those genuinely concerned with the common good, often remain stuck in short-term thinking and action due to relatively short election cycles.

The results of this system are often surprising. Even Elon Musk, who questioned the competitiveness of Chinese automakers in a 2011 Bloomberg interview, recently acknowledged their remarkable progress:

“Chinese car companies are the most competitive in the world…If no trade barriers are put in place, they’ll demolish most competitors.”

His remarks reflect the extent to which Chinese firms have evolved from followers to global leaders in several advanced industries, particularly electric vehicles and clean-energy technologies. Without China’s system of government, this might never have happened.

Western Mockery, Eastern Ingenuity

When China cracked down on its bloated private tutoring industry, Western media accused it of stifling opportunity. But David P. Goldman, a U.S. expert on China, praised its rigorous public education and digital regulations aimed at curbing youth addiction and inequality. Children in China under eight years old are limited to 40 minutes a day of supervised screen time—a far cry from laissez-faire digital chaos in the West.

As China improves education for all, wealthy elites who move their children abroad are making space for motivated students from modest backgrounds. Confucius would approve.

Professor Bell further notes that China’s rise is driven by both historical-cultural values—such as long-term planning and state responsibility for poverty alleviation—and modern policy frameworks that incentivize officials while promoting economic liberalization. This combination has produced sustained, inclusive growth without resorting to coercion abroad.

Why Meritocracy Is a Global Imperative

While China anchors its social contract in education and competence, the West confronts profound institutional decay. Western leaders are routinely hoisted into office by wealth, charisma and populist appeal rather than genuine merit, locking in their loyalty to elite donors. Amid evaporating public trust and soaring inequality, the ancient warning from Confucius himself rings true: “A government without trust cannot stand.”

The modern lesson from China’s Confucian model is that meritocracy is an absolute necessity. Professor Bell highlights that Chinese governance is context-dependent, historically rooted, and focused on long-term, peaceful outcomes. Western skepticism typically reflects a misunderstanding of this philosophy, driven by the flawed projection of Western values onto Chinese culture.

This misunderstanding drives the Financial Times’s ironic claim that the West is falling behind because China lacks democratic accountability.

The reality is the reverse: China succeeds because it focuses on material public outcomes like infrastructure, poverty reduction, and higher living standards. Western democracies are losing ground because they forgot whom they answer to. If the West hopes to reverse its decline, it must restore its commitment to competence, character and equity in public life—though whether its ruling oligarchs will permit such a shift remains a separate matter entirely.

This institutional focus on material outcomes is made possible by a highly structured governance framework. Rather than relying on Western-style electoral cycles, China utilizes a distinct multi-tiered model that balances local feedback with rigorous national standards.

Meritocracy, Plutocracy, and the Battle for Global Legitimacy

The rivalry between the United States and China has evolved beyond economics and geopolitics. It is increasingly a contest of competing visions of political order—between Chinese meritocracy and Western oligarchy or plutocracy. Unlike the United States, whose foreign policy has been characterized by the drive to impose its political and economic model internationally, China presents itself as an advocate of national sovereignty, civilizational diversity, and the right of every nation to choose its own path of development without external interference.

The outcome of this contest will not only determine which model enjoys greater international legitimacy but will also shape the character of the emerging world order. Given the economic growth of the global majority and the waning political influence of the West, this order is likely to shift away from the dominance of a single hegemonic power toward a multipolar system in which influence is more evenly distributed and no nation can unilaterally dictate the rules to others.

At the same time, increasing tensions, profound political instability, and widespread, violent unrest in the West, triggered by millions of disaffected citizens, are to be expected.

The era of unchallenged Western dominance is nearing its end. The future favorsnations that earn legitimacy through competence and shared prosperity, maintain stability via sovereignty, and expand influence through cooperation — rather than ideology, extreme wealth concentration, coercion, or hegemonic pretensions

Watch my global travel videos on my YouTube channel, Lixplore. For regular updates and insights, join my community (free of charge) on Substack: https://felixabt.substack.com.

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